Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, Chapter 5
CHAP. V. Of Passions, their nature, and distribution; of the Motions of Naturall Creatures, guided by a knowledge without them; and of Rationall Croatures, guided by a knowledge within them: of Passions Mentall, Sensitive, and Rationall.
INow proceed unto the Soule of Man: of which, I must speake in a double reference; either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the Body, and receiveth from it; or according to those more immanent perfections which it hath within it selfe: under the former of these, come to be considered the Passions of Mans Minde, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as farre as my weakenesse can discover) which the Soule and Body contracted from them.
Passions are nothing else, but those naturall, perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their owne severall Spheares, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodnesse beareth a naturall conveniencie or vertu… of satisfaction unto them; or by an antipathie and aversation from those, which bearing a contrarietie to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures. This being the prop…rtie of all unconstrained selfe▪ motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Passions, is principally the good; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evill of things: as one beareth with it rationem convenientiae, a quieting and satisfacto rie; the other, rationem disconvenienti…, a disturbing and destroying nature.
This being premised touching the nature and generall essence of Passions, the division of them must be then grounded; because (as Philosophie teacheth us) Faculties and Operations receive their essentiall distinctions from their objects, and those severall respects wherewith they in order to the Facultie are qualified. Now, since all appetite (being a blind Power) is dependant upon the direction of some Knowledge; from the diversitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of Passions.
Knowledge, in respect of created Agents, may be considered, either as dis-joyn'd, and extrinsecall to the things moved, or … intrinsecall and united thereunto; both which serve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disordered and confused, or into idle and vaine motions, …ut might ever worke towards that fixed end, which God hath appointed them to moove …nto.
Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall, are those motions of meerely naturall Agents; which are guided to their generall or particular ends, by the Wisdome and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptorie and uniforme order, observed by these kind of Agents in their naturall course, never either swarving or desisting there-from, so farre as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they worke permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variablenesse nor shadow of changing. And therefore we finde those aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it swerveth from this Law onelyonly, or at least principally in these inferiour things; wherein partly from the deficiencie and languishing of secondarie Agents, and partly from the excesses, defects, mutabilitie, and the like exigences of matter, wee finde sundry times error and enormitie in their severall workes and ends: Which, whether it be to set forth the beautie of regular operations (which by deformitie and confusion will appeare more beautifull; or whether the originall thereof be divine mal…diction, which for the sinne of man hee pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service, (which Saint Paul calleth the vanitie of the Creature) it proceedeth certainely from the Will an… Power of that Law-giver, who is onelyonly able, s… Reasons best knowne to his owne Wisdome, t… dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe: So that all the Miracles which ever God hath beene pleased to worke, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law.
But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations before spoken of, are seene principally in inferiour things. The Earth, being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Man… Fall, which made (if wee will beleeve that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen Philosopher, upon observation o… that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour, to crie out, Aut Deus Natur… patitur, aut Mundi machina dissolvetur; either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universall Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly detaine that vertue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observ'd, to note, that the more raysed and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.
Now, this naturall Passion which I speake of, is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers, the Law, the Equitie, the Weight, the Instinct, the Bond, the Love, the Covenant and League of naturall things in order, to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the Vniverse, service of Man, and glory of the Creator; which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents.
By all which we are given to understand, that when at any time the ordinarie course of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder, there is then admitted a breach of a Law; or, as Aristotle calls it, foreign, an error, (which Saint Iames telleth us, is foreign, an iniquitie of Nature) also a certaine levitie, unusefulnesse, and emptinesse of true worth, which I call in Saint Pauls phrase, the vanitie of the Creature: thirdly, loosenesse, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon, discord and unserviceablenesse towards the other parts, with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.
These are the inconveniences that follow Natures; how much greater are those, which follow Reasons disobedience: for all this, touching the Passions of Nature, I have observed onelyonly to give light unto those of Reason, there being the same proportion of government in them all; saving that, what in things destitute of all knowledge, is guided by the Law-giver himselfe, is in the rest performed by a knowledge conjoyn'd, and intrinsecall to the Worker▪ and this is either Mentall, or Sensitive, or Rationall▪ from all which, arise sundry degrees of Motions, or Passions: Mentall Passions, are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the Vnderstanding, which Aristotle calleth foreign, the Latines, Mens, or Apex animi; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthy saculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an extraordinarie Knowledge, either of Vision and Revelation, or of an exquisite naturall Apprehension▪ both which are beyond the compasse of usuall Industrie, here to attaine unto: The former of these, I call with the Schoole-men, Extasie and Rapture; such as Saint Pauls was (for so himselfe calleth it) Novi hominem 2 Cor. 12. 2.raptum; and such as was the Passions of the Mind, in the Prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that joy unspeakable, and Peace past understanding, which the Apostle makes to be the fruits of the Spirit of God, in those hearts wherein he lodgeth; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soule, the Mind, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in Heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable Light.
And for the later Branch, Aristotle hath placed his greatest felicitie in the contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreme part of the Soule. And it was the speech of the Philosopher Heracl…tus to the same purpose, that Animae sicca est Plutarch, de o…, a…llu, & de Esu ca… nium, Orat. 1. Ar…. Problem. §. 30. qu. 1.sapientissima, (which toucheth something upon that of Aristotle, That Melancholy complexions are usually the wisest, for that Temper is the dryest of all the rest) That a Mind not steeped in the humours of carnall and grosse affections, nor drench'd in the waves of a disquiet Fancie, but more raysed and soaring to its originally, by divine contemplations, is alwayes endued with the greater wisdome.
Another Knowledge from whence the Passions of this Facultie are raysed in Man, is that light of Naturall Principles, which the Schooles callAquin. part. 1. qu. …9. art. 12. Synteresis; unto which, the custodie of all practicall Truths being committed, they there-hence worke in the Conscience motions of Ioy, Love, Peace, Feare, Horror, Despaire, and the like spirituall Passions, according as the Soule, out of those generall Principles, shall gather unto its owne particulars, any either delightfull or disquieting Conclusions.
Sensitive Passions, are those motions of prosecutionArist. de Hist. Animal. lib. 1. ca…. 1. l. 9. p…r …otum Diogen. L…rt. lib. 7. in Zenon. or flight, which are grounded on the Fancie, Mentorie, and Apprehensions of the common Sense: which we see in brute beasts; as, in the feare of Hares or Sheepe, the fiercenesse of Wolves, the anger or slatterie of Dogs, and the like: So Homer describeth the joy of Vlysses his Dog, which after his so long absence, remembred him at his returne.
foreign.
Odyss. s.For wanton joy to see his Master neare,
He wav'd his flattering tayle, and toss'd each eare.
Now these motions in brute creatures, if we will beleeve Seneca, are not affections, but certaine charactersSer. de I…, …ib. 1. c. 3. and impressions ad similitudinem passionum▪ like unto Passions in men▪ which he calleth Impetus, the risings, forces, and impulsions of Nature, upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.
I come therefore to those middle Passions, which I call'd Rationall; not formally, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immateriallVid. Aristot. …ic. l. 2. …. 6. Mag. M…r. l. 1. …. 7. motions of the Soule; but by way of participation and dependance, by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the governmentEadem, l, 2. c. 2. & Ethic. lib. 6. cap. 3. of the Will and Vnderstanding, and not barely of the Fancie, as in other creatures. And for calling Passion thus govern'd, Reasonable, I have the warrant of Aristotle: who, though the sensitive Appetite in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradivided to the Rationall powers of the Soule) yet by…. l. 1. c. 10. reason of that obedience which it oweth to the Dictates of the Vnderstanding, whereunto NatureAquin. part. 1. q. 81. art. 3. hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable (though Corruption have much slackned and unknit that Bond) hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not intrinsecally in it selfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.
Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good; and secondarily, the Evill of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Facultie, in vertue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so doe they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may be considered simply in its owne nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including onelyonly the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie: and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evill, Hatred▪ which are the two radicall, fundamentall, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest; and therefore well called Pondera and Impetus animi, the weight and force, and (as I may so speake) the first springings and out goings of the Soule. Secondly, the object may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of reall union (though never without that which the Schooles call vnio objectiva, union of Apprehension in the Vnderstanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire; if Evill, …light, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Facultie; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Againe, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aides which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as Attainable, and so it worketh Hope; and Evill is presented, either as Avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake through it; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after; of all which, or at least, those which are most naturall, and least coincident with one another, I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature: But first, I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions; and what dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.