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Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul · Edward Reynolds

Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, Chapter 42

CHAP. XLII. Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Perswasive. Of Fate, Astrology. Satanicall Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wils Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.

I Proceed to the last Faculty of mens Soul, his Will. Which doth alone governe, moderate, and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; Appetite, Liberty, Domination. The former respecteth an End; the two Latter, the Means thereunto conducing.Arist. …. l. 1. c. 1. Lib. 8. cap. 5. The Desires are fixed on some Good throughly proportion to the widenesse of the Heart: then the Liberty of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Iudgement, makes choise of such Means, as are most proper for attaining of that Good: and lastly, the Dominion imployes all inferiour Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.

Sundry Ends there are, which may bee desired upon particular and conditionall occasions: but the true Vltimate, utmost and Absolute Good is God. All other Ends are Ministring and Subordinate; Ethic. l. 1. c. 2.he only is foreign & foreign. as Aristotle cals his Felicity, the Supreame & overruling End; the Fountaine of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that soantling of satisfaction & proportion, which they beare unto mans Will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him Bonum & Bonum Superessentiale the only Self. Sustaining, and Selfe. Depending Good, that is onelyonly able throughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.

The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two Extremes of Excesse and Defect. The Extremes of Excesse are Supers…itlon and Idolatry; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of Originall Blindnesse, with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the Circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of of Darknesse and unavoydable Doubting and Vncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the Necessity of a Duty; but not to cleere the Means of Execution. Light enough to enjoyne a walking; but the way being a narrow way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Desect, is either Atheisme, in not acknowledging, or Ignorance in not seeing, that God whom wee ought to serve and desire. Both which (if Affected and Voluntary, as usually they are) proceed either from Guilt; or a Consciousnesse of fearefull Crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted Spirits in the perswasion that no Iudge sees them; or else from a Sensuality and a Desire and purpose to give Indulgence to themselves in their evill courses; thinking like that foolish Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no snare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but seiled up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their owne darknesse: Though herein both the Atheists discovers Divinity, and the Ignorant person Knowledge enough to convince their owne Consciences, and condemne themselves.

The Dignity of mans Will in regard of Liberty, foreign. Zeno▪ apud …. l. 6. Vnde Stolel Sapientes; Reges appellahant.consisteth in the Freedome, which it hath to chuse or reject Means ordained for the Compassing some proposed End, according as the Vnderstanding shall finde them more or lesse ConducibleIbid. for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a chusingEthic. l. 3. c. 1. of the Means: For Election (as Aristotle determines) is never of the End. Wee doe not Chuse, but necessarily Desire to be Happy. The matter of our Happinesse being proposed without appearance of present inconvenience: because every thing is naturally prone to its owne Perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as wee say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sinne: So wee may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty▪ Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and V…naturalnesse. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite Depraved, being now in Corruption, without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, throughly disinabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly cap…ivated and inthr…lled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, onelyonly in Naturall, Morall and in Civill Actions▪ Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeleble Foot prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its owne and others Temporall Good.

The Dominion and Supreme Command of the Will is onelyonly over those Powers to the Production of whose Operations, it doth by its … ▪ Authority concurre as an Absolut… Efficient, or a least, as a Moving Agent. It reacheth not therefore so farre as to the Command of the Vegetative Power: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an Vniversall Command of the Senses; but onelyonly by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Soveraigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing, not immediately, but by the Locomotive Power, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the Sensitive Appetite, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy▪ Irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will and the Law of the Members, carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Soveraigne over those Apprehensions of the Vnderstanding, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it not to discourse about such Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the Evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perswasive. The one is Absolute, working on meere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditionall, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an Oeconomicall Government in respect of the Body,…. …. l. …. c. …. and the Moving Organs thereof, as over Servants: and it hath a Politique or Civill Government towards the Vnderstanding, Affections, and Sensitive Appetite, as Subjects, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditiou… and rebellious Subjects. So that the Corruption of this Power in the Will, is either Tyranny in it selfe, or Vsurpation in another; an Abuse of it, and a Restraint of it. The Abuse, when the Will absolutely gainsayes the Counsels, Lawes, and Directions of the Vnderstanding, which is wrought by the Allection, Inticing & Insinuation of the Sensitive Appetite, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of those courses, which are most delightfull to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken; and the highest Faculties of the Soule become themselves Sensuall and Carnall. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny overbeares the Soule, and leads it captive to the Law of Sinne, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and intangled with some viscous slime, though hee offer to flye, yet falleth downe againe.

Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion▪ there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Naturall and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only, ab Extrinseco, and that Necessarily. The Stoicks, they framed a supreme swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion & flux of causes, which they call Fate. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothingL…ert. i… Zen. Pi…t. de placit. …. l. …. c. 27, 28. Sen. Ep. 96. A. G…ll. l. 6. c. 2. but the Vniforme and Vncha…gable working of those beautifull Bodies, the Heavenly Orbes, and their Influencies upon Inferiours, annexed unto them a Binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practises of men. Inquire the reason, why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breakes out into Exorbitant courses?

Anne aliud, quàm——…, & occulti miranda potentia Fati?

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,

And wondrous power of secret Destiny.

It is not to be denyed, but that the HeavensVid. …useb. C… sariens. de pr… parat …. lib. 6. & Max. Tyrium dis…. 3. Plut. advers. …. Tertul. Apol. …. 1. & …bi no… Herald. Aug. de …iv. …. l. 5. c. 1, 7, 8. having strong and powerfull Operations on all Sublunary Corporall Substances may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kind of Influence (if it may bee so called, upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding, the Actions of mans Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, &c. Wee doe not onelyonly impiously take away the Guilt of Sinne, in that we make all mens Lapses to be wrought without free Principle in himselfe (and so d…rogate from the Iustice of God, in punishing that, whereunto wee were by other of his Creatures unavoydably determined) nor onelyonly rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those vertuous dispositions of the Mind (which are his immediate Breathings into man) unto the Happy Aspect of the Heavens) but withall wee deny to the Soule both Naturall Motion and Spirituality. Naturall Motion first; since that alwaies flowes from an Inward Principle, that is Essentiall to the Mover (which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impression made by some Extrinsicall Worker. And then Spirituality likewise; since the Heavens, being Corporall Agents, can therefore extend the Dominion of their Influence no farther than over Bodily Substances.foreign. Hom…r. Odyss. ….

Others there have been yet more Impious, which seeke to fasten all the Corruptions of their Wils on somthing above the Heavens, even the Eternall Foreknowledge and the Providence of God: As if my Foreknowledge, that on the morrow the Sunne will rise; or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the Cause working Necessity of the next Day, or the last Iudgement. It is true indeed, Gods Prescience imployes a Necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknowes: but this is Necessitas onelyonly Infallibilitatis, in regard of his Vndeceivable Knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to passe by the free or naturall workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not Necessitas Coactionis, or Determinationis, whereby the Will of man is without any other disposition or propension in it selfe, inforced or unspontaneously determined to the producing of such Effects. The Actions of our Will are not therefore necessarily executed, because they were foreknowne, but therefore they were foreknowne, because our Will would certainly execute them, though not without Freedome and Election. And for Providence notwithstanding there be Providentia Permissiva, wherebyAug. de …iv. …. l. 11. c. 17, 18 l. 14. c. …6▪ God hath determined to suffer and permit men to sinne; and moreover a Disposing Providence in Ordering…ab. de …. c. 6. de Co…rept. & G…at. c. 10. Epist. 120. all things in the World unto his owne Glorious Ends, yet we may not presume to think that God doth determine, or actuate, impell, andCap. 2. de Gen. Co…tr. Mani…l▪ l. 2. c 28. overrule the wils of men to Evill. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all respectsDe …. ad …. l. 11. c. 4. dothwill, shall not be done with the secret WillDe Trin. l. 3. c. 4 Octoginta criumque. q. 2…. of his good pleasure (for who can withstand his Will) and that his purposes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature: but yet hee doth not so worke his Will out of mens, as thereby to constraine and take away theirs (for indeed the constraint of a liberall and free Faculty, is (as it were) the extinction thereof) This were an Argument of Weaknesse, as if hee were not able to bring his owne Ends about, but by chaining and … his Oppugners from exercising the Freedome which he first gave them; nor doe his owneUid. E…seb. de praepara…. Will, but by taking away his owne Gifts. ButEvang. l. 6. c. …. herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence,…. Alex. contra Iul. l. …. and the great Wisedome of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh accordingHin… et…am quod saci…nt contra voluntat…m D…i, non …, visi voluntas De…. Aug. de Prad. Sanct. l. …. c 16. to the inclination of his owne heart, and that even Rebelliously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, hee is able to raise his owne Glory (the▪ End whether we will or no, of all our Actions) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerfull to fulfill it. For as sundry times Gods Revealed Will is broken, even by those, whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it: so alwaies his Secret Will is performed. Eve… by the free and Selfe-moving Operations of those who set themselves stubbo…nly to oppose it. There is not▪ then any Supreame Destiny, Extri…sically moving, or Necessarily binding any Inferiours to particular Actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casuall Causes (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the Intrinsicall Operation of all Inferiour Agents (which we call Nature) produce one maine and Supreame End, without strayning or violating the proper Motions of any.

Lastly, many men are apt in this case to father their sinnes upon the motions of Satan, as if hee brought the necessity of sinning upon them; andRom. 7. 17. as Saint Paul said in Faith, Not I, but Sinne in me: So they in Hipocresie, Not I▪ but evill motions cast into Math 4. 3.me; and because the Devill is in a speciall manner called the Tempter, such men therefore▪ thinke to perswade themselves, that their Evill commeth not from any Willingnesse in themselves, but from the violence of the Enemies Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the Devill hath a strong Operation on the Wils of Corrupt men

1 First, because of the Subtilty of his Substance whereby he can winde himselfe and his suggestions most Inwardly on the Affections and Vnderstanding.

2 Secondly, because of the Height of his Naturall Vnderstanding and Policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himselfe into an Angel of Light, and so to method and contrive his devices, that they shall not misse of the best advantage to make them speed.

3 Thirdly, because of the vastnesse of his Experience, whereby he is the better inabled to use such plots as have formerly had the best successe.

4 Fourthly, because of his manner of Working,Luke 11. 21. 1. Peter 5. 8. Rev. 12. 3. … …. 27. Heb. 3. 13. Rom. 7. 11. grounded on all these, which is Violent and Furious for the Strength; and therefore he is called a Strong Man, a Roaring Lyon, a Red Dragon. And Deep for the subtilty of it; and therefore his working is called a Mystery of Iniquity, and Deceivablenesse of Iniquity. Which is seene: First in his Accommodating himselfe to our particular Humours and Natures, and so following the tyde of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Temptations according to our Vocations and Personall Imploiments, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing, or any other the like qualifying of his Suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other Circumstances. But yet wee doe not find in any of these any violation of mans Will, nor restraint of his Obedience; but rather the Arts that are used to the inveagling of it. TheEp…. …. 11. Eph…s. 7. 2. 2. …. 2. 26. Ep… ▪ 6. 11. 2. Co…. 2. 11. 2. Tim. 2▪ 26. working then of Evill Angels, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men; and in respect of Evill men, they are but as those of a Prince over his Subjects; or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives; which may w…ll stand with the Freedome of mans Will, And therefore his temptations are in some place called the Methods, in others, the Devices; in others, the S…ares of S… tan:… … …. All words of Circum…ention, and presu… pose the working of our own▪ Wi…s: Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Tempt…r▪ belonging to him; yet wee are told in another place, that ▪ Every man is tempted when hee Vi…ij A…thor … decipientis Callidita… & Homini… Consentient is …. Au…. de p…ccat. Orig. l. 2. …. ….is drawne away of his owne Conc…piscence, a…d intic…d▪ So that the Devill hath never an … Temptation (such an one as carryes and overcomes the Will) but it is alwaies ioyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne, proceeding from the decei…fulnesse of our owne lusts. So that in thisLi…. de …. … vin. …. case every man may say to himselfe as Apollodoru… in Plutarch dreamed of himselfe, when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe.

Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty, which I wil but name. As first for the manner of its Operations. In some cases it worketh Naturally and Necessarily, as in its Inclination unto Good in the whole latitude, and generall apprehension thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the gener…ll and formall notion of Evill In others Voluntarily, from it selfe, and with… ▪ l. 3. c. 1. a distinct view and knowledge of an End whe…unto it work…th. In others freely, with a Liberty to one thing or another, with a power to elicite, or to suspend and suppresse its owne Operation. In all Spontaneously, without violence or compulsion. For though in some respects the Will be not free from Necessity, yet it is in all free from Coacl…on. And therfore though Ignorance & Eeare may take away the complete … of an Action proceeding from the Will (because without such Feate or Ignorance it would not have been done. A… when a man casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a sh…pwracke. And when Oedipus slew Laius his Father, nor knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the Will to doe that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of Good thereunto.

Secondly for the Motives of the Will. They are first Naturall and Internall. Amongst which, the Vnderstanding is the principall, which doth passe Iudgement upon the Goodnesse and Convenience of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater or lesser excellency ther…of, represent it to the Will, with either a Mandatory, or a Monitory, or a permissive Sentence. The Will likewise doth move it selfe. For by an Antecedent willing of the E…d, she setteth her selfe on work to will the Means requisite unto the obtaining of that End.

And the Sensitive … doth Indirectly move it too. By suppressing or bewitching and inticing the Iudgment to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensuall things. And then, as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glasse: so such a… a mans owne Affection is, such will the End seeme unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.

Next Supernaturally God moveth the Wil… of men. Not only in regard of the Matter of the Motion▪ For in him we live, and move, and have our being; but in regard of the Rectitude and Goodnesse of it in Actions Supernaturall, both by the Manifestation of Heavenly Light. They shall be …ll taught of God; and by the Infusion and Impression of Spirituall Grace, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to Will and to Doe of his owne good pleasure.

Lastly, for the Acts of the Will, They are such as respect either the End, or the Means for att…ining of it. The Acts respecting the End are these three. 1. A Loving and Desiring of it in regard of its Beauty and Goodnesse. 2. A serious Intention and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its distance from us. 3. A Fr…ition or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two thing…. In Assec…tion or possession, whereby we are Actually joyned unto it: and in Delectation or Rest, whereby we take speciall pleasure in it.

The Acts of the Will respecting the Means, are these: 1. An Act of Vsing or Imploying the Practicall Iudgement. An Application and Exercising of it to consult & debate the proper means conducible unto that End. Which Consultation having passed, and by the practicall Iudgem…nt, a Representation being made of the Means discovered, there next followeth an …mbracing of those means, and inclining towards them with a double Act. The one an Act of Consent, whereby wee approve the means dictated, as proper and possible: the other, an Act of Election, whereby, according to the different weight of Reasons, we adhere unto one Medium more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more seasible. Thirdly, because the Means do not bring us unto the End by being Chosen, but by being Executed. Hereupon followeth another Act of Mandate to all the Faculties interested in the Execution of those Means, to apply and put forth their forces with vigor and constancy, till the End be at the last by the due Execution of those Means attained and enjoyed.

Now whereas the Philosopher doth often distribute…. l. 2 c. 6. … l. 2. c. 2. the things belonging unto the Soule, into Affections, Faculties and Habits. For the Faculties are moved by the Passions, and the Passions are regulated and managed by the Habits. The Habits procured for Facility and Constancy of Action, and the Actions directed to the obtaining of an End. This Method of the Philosopher would now lead us to speake further.

First of the Habits of the Reasonable Soule, and they are either Rationall only, and in the Minde, as the Habits of Wisedome, of Principles, of Conclusions, of Art and Prudence; or besides that Vertuous and Vitious, conversant about Good or Evill Morall. Which are first the Habits of Practicall Principles, called Synteresis; and next the Habits of particular Vertues, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. VntoUnto the felicity of all which are required these foure conditions.

1 Iustice and Rectitude disposing the Will to render unto God, unto our selves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right wee owe unto them.

2 Prudence, discovering that which is in this manner Right, Iudging of it, and directing unto it.

3 Fortitude, enabling the Will firmely to persist in her vertuous purposes, according to the Instructions of Practicall Prudence, notwithstanding the labour it must undergoe, the delaies it must sustaine before it can obtaine the End, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withall.

4 Temperance, suppressing and subduing those Sensuall Appetites, which would stagger, inter rupt, divert us from these constant Resolutions.

Next, because all Habits, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of Actions, wee should thereby be led on to the consideration of Humane Actions, Fortuitous, Violent, Naturall, Voluntary, Involuntary, Mixed. As also, to the grounds of the Goodnesse or Illnesse of Actions, taken first from the Rule of them unto which they are to conforme. Secondly, from the Principles of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, Knowledge and Faith to see, Will to purpose, Love to doe, subjection, to obey strength, to finish and fulfill what vertue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed.

By which consideration, we should be led to take a view of the right end, and ultimate felicity, unto which all these actions should leade and carry us; not as the causes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.

But these pertaining to a nobler science, and being without the limits of the subject which I proposed to speake of, I shall follow Plinies counsell, and looke backe to the title of my Booke: Which having (as well as my weaknesse was able) endeavoured to goe through, It now cals upon me to goe no further.

FINIS.