Propositions and Principles of Divinity Disputed, Section 14
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MAN. XII.
1 SEing that man is the moſt excellent of all the viſible workes of God: for whoſe cauſe next vntounto Gods, all other things were created: we holde it a matter belonging vntounto a Diuine, to entreat of the nature of Man.
2 Man is neither the bodie, nor the ſoule, ſeuerallie conſidered, but compoſed of both, that is, of ſoule and bodie joined together by a moſt ſtraight, and moſt louing band.
3 The truth of Gods worde doeth witnes, that there was but one man created at the firſt, who was to bee the originall of all other men. And ſo, all thoſe that proceded from him, ſhould be tyed together by a common bond of blood. Wee doe then reject the opinion of ſuch Philoſophers, as hauehave denied, one certaine man to hauehave had his beginning firſt of all other.
4 The bodie of that firſt man, was formed by God of the duſt of the earth: that is, as wee interprete it, of the foure elements: that it ſhould not be a graue of the ſoule, as PLATO thought, but a moſt excellent and a moſt meete inſtrument to performe the faculties of the minde.
5 Now in reſpect that this bodie was made of qualities repugnant one to the other, it was mortall in the firſt creation of it, (for repugnancie or diſcord, is the authour of diſſolution:) yet by the appointment of God, it was made immortall, that it ſhould be the habitation of the immortall ſoule: but after the entrance of ſinne into the worlde, it returned vntounto the former neceſsitie of mortality.
The PELAGIANS therefore do erre, in holding that the bodies of men, were naturallie ſubject vntounto death: and in attributing the cauſe of death, to be onelyonly the diſcord of the contrary qualities.
Other points that belong vntounto the frame and beautie of mans body, we leaue to be diſcuſſed by naturall Philoſophers and phiſitians. As alſo manie things that they teach concerning the powers of the ſoule: becaus we think it meet that we containe our ſelues within the bonds of diuinitie. And now we will ſpeak of the eſſence of the ſoule.
6 The eſſence of the ſoule can ſcarce be knowne: for it is not to bee perceaued by the inſtrument of any the ſenſes of our bodies: yet by the faculties and operations of it, it doth in a ſort open it ſelfe vntounto vsus. And therefore it is vſuallie deſcribed and pointed out, after this plaine maner.
7 The ſoule of man is an eſſence, created according vntounto the image of God, infuſed into the bodie: that man cō ſiſting both of bodie and ſoule, ſhould be capable to know and glorifie God.
8 The ſoule of man is properlie & trulie called a ſoule, for that facultie which is in beaſts and plants, is by reaſon of the ſcarcity of words ſo called of the Latines. For ſeeing the ſame doth not ſubſiſt of it ſelf, & that it is nothing els, but a power aryſing out of the properties of the matter & forme; it ſcant retaineth the name of a being, much leſſe deſerueth to be called a ſoule.
9 The ſoule of man is of a ſpirituall and not of a bodily nature, ſubſiſting by it ſelfe: not vnaduiſedlie made of moates, not a fire, or anie other of the foure elementes, or yet anie thing compact of the elementes, not any number, not an harmony, not any facultie brought forth out of the matter: brieflie, not anie part, cut as it were, out of the Deitie: but wiſelie created of nothing after a manner vnknowne vntounto vsus, by God who woorketh moſt freely.
10 Now although it hath a beginning, yet doeth it remain immortal, not onlie becauſe of it owne ſubſtance, it is vncompounded, and voide of al contrarieties and bodilie accidents: but eſpeciallie in aſmuch as it is ſo created of God, that of it ſelfe, it can liue, exiſt, and continue for euer. And it doth rather afforde life vntounto the bodie, than deriue it from the ſame. The which wee doe beleeue, in aſmuch as it is proued vntounto vsus by the moſt ſure teſtimonies of the holy ſcriptures, rather then becauſe it is demonſtrated by philoſophicall reaſons.
Wee condemne therefore, the MANICHAEES, GNOSTICKES, and PRISCILLIANISTS, who hauehave ſaid that the ſoule was of a double nature, whereof the one was from a good beginning, vz. a good God. The other from an euill. The SELEVCIANES, HERMINIANES, PROCLIANES, who held that the ſoule was not made by God, but by Angels. The LVCIFERIANES and TERTVLLIANISTS, who were of opinion, that it was a bodilie ſubſtance, and ſuch as could fall off, or be ſhelled from the bodie, and remooue from one bodie to an other. The ARABIANES, and the NAZARITES who thought it mortall: the ORIGENISTS, who judged that all ſoules ſhoulde aeternallye liue in heauen, and the APOLLINARISTS, whoſe opinion was, that one ſoule was begotten of another.
11 Neither is the ſoule of the ſame nature and ſort, that the Angels are, as ORIGEN thought: who made onlie an accidentall and not a ſubſtantiall difference between Angels, and the ſoules of men. Now, that eſſentiall difference although it cannot be eaſilie knowne, is yet in ſome ſort perceaued by this adjunct, vz. that Angels can not be ordinarilie joined vntounto bodies, wheras the ſoules may. Now the ſoule is alſo not onelie the firſt mouer of the bodie, but euen the verie cheef and eſpeciall forme of a man, whereby firſt of all and of it ſelfe, A man is that which hee is, and for whoſe cauſe, the bodie is ſo framed as it is: to the ende, that a moſt honorable lodging ſhould be prepared for a moſt honorable ghueſt.
12 The ſoules of all men are not one as THEMISTIVS and the followers of AVERROIS thought, but of euerie particuler man, there is a perticular ſoule, which can (as naked and bare formes) conſiſt and remaine, when they are ſeuered from the bodie, as in deed they do for a time, when as they being out of the bodie, do expect the aeternall and indiſſoluble conjunction, that they are to hauehave with the ſame.
13 And ſeing that the form of euerie thing, doth not onlie make vp the whole, but alſo eueryevery part thereof, and no part can effect the office thereof, except the forme bee preſent, and ſeeing when the ſame departeth, it ceaſeth from doing: wee do defend that common opinion out of AVGVSTINE, vz. that the ſoule is whollie in the whole, and whollie in eueryevery part. Although there be this diuerſitie of the being of it in the whole and in the partes, as that it is firſt and of it ſelfe in the whole, whereas it is in the parts, but after a ſecondarie manner.
Defended by IOHN CASTOLL of Geneua.