Propositions and Principles of Divinity Disputed, Section 12
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CREATION OF ALL THINGS, AND THEIR DIVISION. XII.
WE HAVE DONE WITH GODS PROVIdence and Praedeſtination: nowe wee are to entreat of the works of God, (wherby he doth as it were make him ſelfe viſible vntounto vsus,) that is, concerning the creation of all things, and their diſtinction.
1 CReatiō is the external work of God, fore-known and decreed by him of his vnſpeakeable goodnes from aeternitie: whereby, vntounto the glorie of his Name, he did create of nothing, all things that are without him: that is; all things that hauehave a ſubſtance different from his eſſence.
2 The alone ſoueraigne cauſe therefore of the world, and all things that hauehave being therein, is God: who made all things, not after the manner of men, but without all labour: and alſo without the worke, help, and ſeruice of anie other, but by his word alone; that is, by his Sonne, through the power of the holie Ghoſt. For the workes of the Trinitie, are vnſeparable.
3 Neither did he frame all thoſe things of anie fore-being ſtuffe or matter, but euen of nothing; that is, from that which was not, by his word alone he gaue being, vntounto all things that are.
Thoſe Philoſophers therefore doe erre, who held, that the world was aeternall; and thoſe alſo who deemed it, to hauehave bene made and formed of moates by chance, together with theſe who taught, this viſible worlde to hauehave bene framed by ſome other then by God. In which error was CERINTHVS, CARPOCRATES, the ARCHONTIANES, and others, who attributed the work of the creation, only vntounto certain vertues and powers.
4 The chiefe end of the creation is, that there ſhould be ſome, who ſhould enjoy the louing kindnes of God, in the true taſt thereof, and glorifie his Majeſtie for euer.
To this end were Angels and men created. A ſecundary end of the creation is, that all other creatures ſhoulde together ſet foorth the glorie of God, and ſerue to the vſe of man.
5 Now, although by the order of nature, from one, as far as it is one, there can proceed but one: and that God of all other things, is moſt ſingle and but one: yet the infinite varietie of things, proceedeth from the ſame wiſedome of God, from whence their creation and gouernement doth depend. For he worketh not according to the courſe of nature, but doth whatſoeuer he will, aboue all nature, moſt freelie and voluntarilie. Yet, in that inaequalitie of things, there appeareth greateſt aequalitie: yea, & the diuerſitie of things, appeere to be but one, in reſpect that whatſoeuer hee hath created, are referred vntounto that generall kind of the beeing of things, which is but one.
6 The eſſentiall diuiſion of things, is from their matter and their forme: in which reſpect, ſome things are viſible, as all ſimple & mixt bodies, either without life and breath, or enjoying both: Some alſo are inuiſible; as Angels, & the ſoules of men, whoſe effectes are manifeſt; though both their Materiall and Formall cauſes, as alſo other circumſtances of the time and place, wherein they were created, be obſcure, and in ſome ſort vnknowen vntounto vsus.
7 Now all theſe things, which God created, could not but be good, ſeing he himſelfe is moſt good; for they were created of him exceedinglie good, and moſt pure without all corruption; hauing nothing in them, which did not declare the omnipotencie, and the exceeding goodnes of the Creator. In this originall integritie, men and euill Angels, might hauehave ſtill continued, if they had woulde; and men might hauehave conuayed the ſame vntounto their poſteritie: In ſtead whereof; God, for the ſinne of man, did curſe the inferiour Creatures, which he had created for mans ſake.
8 As concerning Euill: it is not anie thing created or hauing beeing, but onelie ſignifieth the meere abſence of the good, that ought to be preſent; neither is it in the ſubjects as an accident, but as Priuation oppoſite vntounto good; rather expelling the ſame, then hauing beeing in it ſelfe.
9 And although it doth marre that, which otherwiſe is good in it ſelfe; yet is it by accident, the cauſe of good: That the degrees of thinges created may appeare, which hauehave their ſtate, according as they hauehave the greater, or leſſe good in them. So vntounto the good of all things in generall, Euill ſeemed to bee in ſome ſort neceſſary. And ſo AVGVSTINE ſaith; that God was the Author of good, and the ordainer of euill.
10 Nowe, ſeeing that Euill is not any thing, that hath being in nature: it followeth, that there can be no extream ſoueraigne Euill, ſaue onelyonly as far as euill is altogether departed from that, which is the chiefe, and the ſoueraigne good, which onelie is God alone, bleſſed and mightie aboue all.
Wee doe therefore condemne, the MARCIONITES, the MANICHAEES and others; who hauehave taught, that there was two beginnings, the one contrary vntounto the other; that is, two Gods, the one good, of whome the inuiſible, ſpiritual, and good Creatures hauehave had their beginning. The other euill; from whence all viſible, corporall, and corrupt things hauehave iſſued: whereas indeed all things are good, in regard of their beeing, and the euill that is in them, hath proceeded from the corruption and defect of their being.
Defended by IOHN HENRIE SVVYTZER, of Tygurine.