Propositions and Principles of Divinity Disputed, Section 38
PRINCIPLES VPPON THE NINTH COMMANDEMENT OF GODS LAVVE. XXXVIII.
1 HAving done with the expoſition of the Eight commandement, order requireth that the ninth be explained, wherein the end and reaſon of the commandement is diligentlie to bee weighed, that it may be made cleare & manifeſt, what is cōmanded & what is forbidden.
2 The reaſon of the commandement is threefolde, diuine, naturall, and polliticke.
3 Diuine, becauſe God who is true, wil hauehave vsus to louelove the truth, and to hate falſhood.
4 Naturall, becauſe there is ſuch a neere conſent and agreement betweene the purpoſe of the mind, & the words of the mouth, that thoſe wiſe men, who firſt gaue names vntounto things, did call them both in Greeke, by the one and the ſelfe ſame name, to wit, foreign thereby ſhewing foreign in the one to be like vntounto the ſpring, and in the other like vntounto the ſtreame: that, like vntounto the ſpring which is conceaued in the minde, and therefore is called foreign inward, or internall: the other like vntounto the ſtreame which floweeth out of the mind through the mouth, be meanes of the tongue, & it is named foreign or vttered & pronounced
5 Nowe then even as it is agreeable vntounto nature, that the ſtreame ſhoulde be like vntounto the fountaine, whence it ſpringeth, & that it is againſt nature that an impure ſtream ſhould iſſue out of a cleane and pure fountaine, ſoe it is agreeable vntounto nature, that the outwarde ſpeach ſhould be anſwerable vntounto the inward mind, and it is contrary therevnto, that the one of them ſhould diſagree from the other.
6 Politicke, becauſe, that ſeeing the ſocietie of men, is verie much annoyed by a lying tongue and ſpeache: this kinde of injurie ought altogeather to be rooted out, from all well ordered Common-wealthes, that men maye liue in peace and quietnes.
7 The end of this cōmandement is, that in all things, at all times & places, we follow after that which is true, plain, and vpright; and that, not onelyonly in the maintenance of the good name, credit, & eſtimation of others, but in the augmenting therof, as far as lieth in vsus, and honeſty wil permit
8 Becauſe furthermore, that this lawe doeth forbidd falſe witnes, vnderunder the which, by ſetting downe a part for the whole is contained all kinde of lying: we think it meet in as much as the whole treatiſe following is concerning lyes, firſt to ſet downe what a lie is.
9 A lie is that, wherby any thing with a purpoſe to deceue is expreſſed, either in word or in deed, or by keeping ſecret the truth, which ought to be ſpoken or otherwiſe. And it is committed two manner of wayes, either in doctrine, or otherwayes in the gouernment of our life.
10 A lie in doctrine is committed, either when in religion men departe from the annalogie of faith: the which ſort of lies, is of all other moſt pernicious; within the compaſſe whereof, all hereſies are contained: Or when as in the deliuerie of arts, ſome thing contrarie vntounto truth, is Sophiſtically intermingled with the true precepts thereof.
11 Now although, of thoſe lies which are committed in the gouernment of our life, we ſee not euerie ſort; yet the great ouglines of them, may bee ſome waies diſtinguiſhed.
1 12 When as a man being caried onlie by the affection of lying, doth vtter an vntruth, hauing neither purpoſe to deceaue, neither hope of gaine, either for him ſelfe, or for others.
2 13 When as a man doth lie, either in word or in deede for his credites ſake; as all proud boaſters, arrogant men, and hypocrites vſe to doe; and all thoſe, who hunting after the common fame, are not aſhamed, with vncleane-mouths to power forth gorgeous and gay lies.
3 14 When as the pleaſure of other men is onelyonly reſpected, and this ſort of lie may bee called foreign, or a ſporting lie.
4 15 An officious lie, whereby, either profit or commoditie is ſought for, without the endamaging of others, or the trueth which ought to bee vttered is kept cloſe, or the falſhood which ought not, is vttered: For it is indeed, contrarie vntounto the dutie of a godlie man, to lie for anie cauſe.
5 16 When ſome deceit is ment towardes him, concerning whome, or to whome a man ſpeaketh.
6 17 Hitherto are to bee referred backbiting, reproach, ſcoffing, and priuie whiſpering: and to bee ſhort; all thoſe thinges, which either priuatlie or publicklie, doe oppugne, the integrity of the good name, or goods of our neighbor, or doe ſow diſſention.
7 18 When as a man lieth, either priuatlie or publickelie in judgement, to gaine either for himſelfe, or for another, by the hinderance of his neighbour, as by falſe accuſation, falſe witnes, the defence of an euill cauſe, or by pronouncing a falſe ſentence.
19 Hitherto concerning a lie, whervnto truth is oppoſed, the excellencie whereof, if it could bee ſeene with the eies, would wonderfullie inflame men with the louelove therof, and drawe them to ſeeke it, and would bring lying into enuie and hatred, and make it loathſome vntounto all men.
20 Nowe Trueth is a conſtant indeuour of the minde, wherby we are drawen to imbrace true ſpeaches, to ſpeake the truth, to auoyd all diſceitfull concealing both in word and deed, and to louelove ſinglenes and vprightnes. Hitherto dooth appertaine the louelove of the trueth, the plainnes and moderation of the tongue; with many other vertues that are oppoſite vntounto lying.
21 But in as much as lying is a thing that cannot bee comprehended: none of theſe things which containe ſome truth either in word or deed, are to bee called lies, but are to be tearmed formes of ſpeach, vnderunder the which, the truth is contained: Of this kind are many Propheticall ſpeaches and actions, and all Tropes in like ſort, as Metaphors, Metonimies or chaunges of the name, Ironies, Allegories, Hyperboles or excesſiue ſpeaches. And in like ſort, all Prouerbs, Parables, Fables which carry no vntruth with them; and therefore they are not to bee called Lies, but inſtruments of the truth.
Defended by IOHN HALBERGIVS a Flemming.