Propositions and Principles of Divinity Disputed, Section 5 – Section 9
THE FIFT SORT OF PRINCIPLES, CONCERNING THE ATTRIBVTES OF GOD IN GENERALL.
HITHERTO WE HAVE SPOKEN OF GOD, both as far as wee are able to attaine vntounto, bee the light of nature, & alſo, as he is laied before vsus in the holy Scripturs, to be three in perſon, and one in ſubſtance: now it followeth, that we intreat of his attributes, wherby in a ſort, we are taught, what maner of God he is.
1 ALthough there be no compoſition in God, nor yet any accidentall qualitie, ſeeing hee is a ſubſtance moſt ſingle and eueryevery way one, yet to the end that according vntounto our capacitie we might vnderſtande what a God hee is, he himſelfe in the ſcriptures is accuſtomed to attribute vntounto himſelfe many things, as qualities.
2 By attributes in this place then, we vnderſtande the eſſentiall proprieties of the Deity, which are attributed vntounto him in the ſcriptures.
3 Theſe things are ſo attributed vntounto him, that notwithſtanding they place nothing in him that is cōpoūd, or diuers from his ſubſtance, but look whatſoeuer they point him out to be, the very ſame he is in his owne moſt ſimple ſubſtance.
4 For, both theſe proprieties, and alſo their actions doe in very deede, differ no whit from the ſubſtance of the Godhead: but onelyonly in ſome conſideration we are to holde them diuers both from the diuine ſubſtance, and alſo the on from the other.
5 Now theſe things are attributed vntounto the Deity, ſometimes ſubſtātiuely, & ſomtims adjectiuely as they ſpeak, that we may thereby knowe him to be a being that ſubſiſteth indeede, and that he is ſuch a one, not by participation and imperfectlie, but of himſelfe, and that moſt perfectlie.
6 Of attributes we make two kinds: the one is, of them which are ſo proper vntounto the Deitie, that they can bee in no ſort communicated vntounto creatures, neither hauehave they anie other reſpect vntounto creatures, ſaue that by them, the Deitie is diſtinguiſhed from creatures; of this kind are, aeternity, ſimplenes, vnmeaſurablenes, omnipotencie.
7 The other kind is of thoſe, who although ſimply, and as far as they are in the Deitie, they cannot be communicated; yet creatures may be partakers of them, not properly, but by analogie, and a kinde of agreement, and that not eſſentially, but in regarde of qualitie, and but in part neither: ſuch ar wiſedome, goodnes, and the reſt of that kind.
Therefore OSIANDER erred groſly, whoe taught that the eſſentiall righteouſnes of God, was communicated vntounto vsus, and at this day their error is intollerable, who recalling back again the blaſphemie of EVTYCHES, holde that al the proprieties of the Deitie, were powred by perſonall vnion, into the fleſh, which the Sonne of God tooke vponupon him.
8 For whatſoeuer is not the diuine eſſence, thervnto the eſſentiall attributes of the Deitie cannot be communicated.
9 The actions furthermore, which we ſaid to be alſo attributes of the Deitie, wee deuide both into thoſe which they call remaining, becauſe they doe ſo continue in the Deitie that worketh, as they bring forth no worke out of the doer, of which ſort are prouidence and predeſtination: and alſo into thoſe which may be tearmed paſsing, that is, thoſe which leaue ſome worke out of the doer, or doe inferre a ſuffering vntounto ſome thing, as are creation and redemption.
10 As for the attributes, which hauehave their names from the effects proceeding from God vponupon the creatures, thogh they ſeeme to hauehave had their beginning in time, as where God is called the Creator, redeemer, &c. yet wee denie, that either they put any change in God, or do agree vntounto him by way of accident.
Defended by IOHN CASTOL of Geneua.
THE SIXT SORT OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE OMNIPOTENCY OF GOD.
THE ATTRIBVTES OF GOD IN GENErall hauehave bene dealt with: now ſome of them in ſpeciall are to be handled.
1 THe omnipotencie of God, is that very immeaſurable and infinite eſſence of God, which is communicable vntounto no creature; alwaies doing, neuer ſuffering; and which cannot deciſt to be that which it is.
2 This being in deed but one, may yet in diuerſe conſiderations, be ſaid to be manifolde.
3 For the omnipotencie is one way conſidered, when we ſpeake of it, as God doth alway worke in him ſelfe, & it is another way regarded, in reſpect that God worketh out of him ſelfe, and can worke innumerable thinges, if it pleaſeth him.
4 For wee hold, that God is omnipotent, in as much as, beſides that, he is able to do whatſoeuer he will; he can both will and do innumerable things, which hee will neuer, either will or doe.
We do therefore condemne them, who ſay, that God is for no other cauſe omnipotent, but in as much, as hee can without exception, worke whatſoeuer can bee, either ſpoken or imagined. And we doe diſlike of them, who thinke, that God is in that reſpect, onelyonly called omnipotent, becauſe he can do onelyonly whatſoeuer he will: For his power is in it ſelfe infinite, whereas his will is as it were, bounded, within the verie act of will.
5 Now we hold, that God cannot do any of theſe things, which either are repugnant vntounto his perſonall proprieties, (as that the Father cannot bee begotten, neither the Sonne begotten) or are contrarie vntounto his eſſence, as to be finite; or which implie a contradiction, of which ſort, it is to make, that a bodie ſhall bee truly naturall, and yet, neither to hauehave quantity, nor to be contained in any place. Brieflie we denie, that God can doe any thing, which if they were done, might ſhew him to hauehave defects and weaknes in him, as to die, to lie, to ſinne, &c.
6 And as by faith, we beleeue according vntounto the Scriptures, and the Creeds appointed in the church, that God only is omnipotent, ſo we do profeſſe and publiſh the ſame with our mouth.
7 For it is no leſſe repugnant vntounto his nature, that there ſhould be many omnipotents, then that there ſhould be many Gods.
Whence it is, that Chriſtian Religion, doeth not acknowledge in God diſtinct into three perſons, three omnipotents, but one omnipotent.
Now concerning the humane nature of Chriſt, although it be vnited vntounto the deuine, in the perſon of the Sonne, who is but one, yet as it is not therefore made God, ſo is it not properlie made omnipotent: but it retained even it own infirmities, before it was glorified, wherein it might ſuffer and dye for vsus, and now being glorified, although it be free from all infirmities and glorious; yet is it not in it ſelfe made omnipotent.
Defended by WILLIAM MO…NES of Niuerſe.
THE SEVENTH SORT OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IS IN GOD.
I VNtoUnto the treatiſe of Gods omnipotencie, is to be joined the declaration of the knowledge that is in him, being a doctrine verie neceſſarie; to the end, that the true God may bee ſeuered from the falſe: and that from it we may take counſell and conſolation.
II Now, this ſcience or knowledge is conſidered, both in it ſelfe ſimplie, when the queſtion is what, and of what ſort it is: and alſo in reſpect of the things that it doth know.
III By this knowledge, we meane an abſolute, and a moſt cleare knowledge in God, both of himſelf, and of all things created: whereby he doth not onlie know, all things to bee: but alſo the reaſon, why they are ſo. And this knowledge is different, from all the ſight that men and Angels hauehave: not by compariſon, that it is greater, and theirs leſſer: but altogether in the whole nature of it. The which difference wee diſcerne by theſe notes.
1 That this knowledge is eſſentiall, and euen the vnderſtanding eſſence of God.
2 That it ariſeth not from the outwarde ſenſes, or from the notions that the vnderſtanding doth apprehend: by reaſoning, by joining things together, and by deuiding, or yet from the report of any other: no, not from the knowledge of principles, and cauſes that are of themſelues formed in the vnderſtanding.
3 That it is neither any habite nor action, nor any thing different from that verie thing that doth vnderſtand: that is, from the eſſence of God, ſeeing it is moſte ſimple.
4 That it vnderſtandeth all things at once.
5 That it is moſt certaine.
6 That it is alwaies the ſame.
IIII Now in reſpect of the things that it doth know; wee affirme, that God doth know al things by himſelf, & of himſelf:
1 Himſelf, properly and moſt fullie.
2 All things paſt, preſent, and to come; euen thoſe things that are caſuall.
3 Yea, and ſuch things as neither are, nor euer ſhalbe.
4 Euen euill things.
5 Yea infinite.
6 And euen all the motions of the will, and their iſſues.
7 And not onelyonly by a generall knowledge of generall things, but euen by a moſt exact and perfect of euerie particular.
V This knowledge, which in reſpect of things to come, is called praeſcience, or fore-knowledge; is not the cauſe of the exiſtence of thinges: although there is nothing to come to paſſe, which God did not fore-know that it ſhould come.
VI This knowledge either in whole, or in part, can no creature be capable off,
Defended by IOHN FLORIDVS of Angieu.
THE EIGHT SORT OF PRINCIPLES, CONCERNING THE VVILL OF GOD.
1 THe diſcourſe concerning Gods will, which is moſt of al to be ſought into for our ſaluation, followeth that which is concerning his knowledge.
2 By the worde WILL, in God, wee vnderſtand, both the diuine eſſence, which doth imbrace and delite in that chiefe and ſoueraigne good which it hath in it ſelfe, and alſo in reſpect of the thinges that God will hauehave done; wee meane the verie action of will.
3 And in this latter regard, it is alſo conſidered two manner of waies: either as it is a decree certaine, and knowen onelyonly vntounto God, which we may call foreign,His vnchangeable purpoſe. or els as farre, as he is made known vntounto men, either by commanding, or forbidding in the deuine ſcriptures, and ſpeciallie in his lawe, or otherwiſe by permitting, and working in the creatures.
4 For although the eſſence of God, and therefore alſo his wil be moſt ſimple; yet we deny not the ſame to be manifold, both in reſpect of the things which, and of the maner howe it willeth thoſe things to be.
5 But looke howe that vnchaungeable decree of his, is ſuch, as it cannot but be done, will we, nill wee; euen ſo, that wil of his, which the Morall law doth lay open, is not alwaies fulfilled: for the reprobate doe purpoſely repugne the ſame, and the elect, by reaſon of the corruption of their nature, (which with griefe they acknowledge) cannot fullie obey it.
6 Further, ſeing there is nothing either greater or higher then God, wee account it vnlawfull, to ſeeke any cauſe of his will, either out of him, or aboue him, and ſo we holde his goodnes to bee the cauſe of all thinges, that hee will hauehave done.
Wherevpon we doe juſtlie condemne the olde PELLAGIANS, and the halfe PELLAGIANS of our age, to wit, the Papiſts; who bable, that God was moued to decree what ſhould be the end of reaſonable creatures, by the foreknowledge he had, either of their faith, or of their workes.
7 Thoſe things which God willeth concerning himſelfe, he cannot but will them: but as for ſuch things as he willeth concerning others; them he willeth freelie: yet ſo, as ſome of them doe neceſſarilie come to paſſe and worke: others, as it falleth out, of their own accord.
And ſeeing it is the cauſe of all thinges, wee beleeue, that both good and euill, doe come to paſſe at the appointment thereof, in ſuch ſort, as whereas God is moſt good; ſo his will is moſt vpright, and the rule of all juſtice, ſo as it can not command any thing that is euill.
Now although in Chriſt God and man, there be a double will; his diuine will is yet ſo immutable, as it cannot will any new thing; but whatſoeuer it willeth, the ſame it willed from aeternitie; neither dooth it repent him of any thing hee hath done, ſeeing he is God indeed, and from all aeternitie.
Defended by FRANCIS BYF…ETIVS of Langres.
THE NINTH SORT OF PRINCIPLES, CONCERNING THE GOODNES, FAVOR, LOVE, AND MERCIEMERCY OF GOD.
THe goodnes of God, we call that eſſentiall proprietie of his, whereby hee is good in himſelfe, and bountifull towards all his creatures.
2 God is ſo exceedinglie good, that from him can proceed nothing but good.
Whence it is, that euill is directlie repugnant vntounto his nature, much leſſe, can he be thought to be the authour of euil.
3 And although a proofe of Gods goodnes, bee powred vponupon eueryevery creature, general and perticular: yet he doth not in the ſame meaſure, communicate the ſame vntounto al of them.
4 Now, whereas this goodnes turneth vntounto the diſtruction of the wicked, the fault is their owne; and that becauſe they do either not imbrace the ſame, with a ſure confidence, or els doe contemptuouſlie refuſe it.
5 The word Grace or Fauor, which is taken in diuerſe ſens, doth in this place ſignify the free fauor of God, which is only peculiar vntounto the elect, which doth not only frame our will, being freed from corruption, to will & to do that which is good, but alſo doth continually vphold the ſame, which otherwiſe would fall to decay of it ſelfe, vnleſſe that ſupplying grace, did make the firſt grace to be of efficacie and force.
6 This grace is neither from nature, as the PELLAGIANES did falſly judge, neither yet is it any habit infuſed in vsus: neither doth it become ours by any other means, then as farre as we apprehend the ſame by true fayth in Chriſt.
This ground being layed, wee affirme, that grace and merits of worke, can in no wiſe ſtand together.
7 The louelove that is in God, is no paſsion ariſing of ſome good that it aprehendeth, but it is the verie ſimple eſſence of God, who is graciouſly affected towardes his creatures, and bleſſeth them as he thinketh good.
8 But the cauſe of that louelove of his, is not in the creatures, as though they were ſuch, as could allure God to louelove them, but it is rather in God, who of himſelf is good, and powreth goodnes vponupon his creatures.
9 In like ſort, God is called mercifull; not becauſe hee is ſubject vntounto any perturbation, but in aſmuch as hee repelleth miſery from thoſe whome he loueth.
And although amongſt men, merciemercy ſeemeth to be oppoſed vntounto judgement, as a thing that can not ſtand with it, yet in God, theſe two doe verie well agree, ſeeing mercy is not contrary vntounto judgement; but juſtice being as it were ſubdued by merciemercy; doeth in reſpect of vsus, ſeeme to giuegive place vntounto merciemercy.
Defended by DOMINICVS BAYDIVS a flemming.