Predestination, Treatise · Objection and answer 3
The third Crimination is,
That the Stoicall predestination and fate is brought in by vsus, because (as they say) wee teach that all things come to passe by the necessarie and foreign, Powerfull in working.energetical decree of God, yea euen the fall of Adam, the which (say they) God according to our opiniō did decree and will.
Answere.
We say that Adams fall came to passe God not only foreknowing but also willing and decreeing it: and that without blasphemie, if thou wilt friendly and curteouslie giuegive leaue to shew how far forth and in what manner. The will of God is twofold, generall and speciall. The special wil (which the scripture calleth, Cephets) is that by which God doth both approue and effect a thing: or else it is Gods good pleasure, whereby taking delight in some thing he doth will it simply, both as touching the doing of it, as also in respect of approbation. The obiect of this will dependeth on the will, and followeth it as the effect followeth the cause. And by this will our iudgement is, according to the word of God, that God willeth that which is good, and …illeth that which is euill as it is euill. Psal. 5. 4. Thou art a God which willest not iniquitie. And of this kind or rather maner of will are these sentences of Austi… to be vnderstood. God hath foreknowne, but he did not f…reappoint the workes Hyp…gnost. lib. 6. lib. 80. q. 9. 2.of vngodlinesse. And, Hee doth onelyonly foreknow, and not preordaine euils. And, It is all one to say God is the author and God willeth. The generall will is that whereby God willeth a thing not to bee, (for that, which is not, therefore is not, because hee willeth it shall not bee) and for certaine causes also hee willeth not to hinder some things, and consequently willeth that they shal come to passe; which things notwithstanding hee doth not simplie approue. Or, it is the decree of God, whereby hee willeth some thing, not in respect of approbation and effecting of it by himself, but only in respect of suffering it to be done by others. And here the thing which is to be done doth not depend vpō Gods will, but onelyonly vponupon the will of the creature which falleth away: and with this will we say that God willed the fall of Adam, yet not simplie but onelyonly that it should come to passe. Now it is one thing to will a thing by it selfe, and another thing to wil it as touching the euent. Moreouer hee willeth the euent of sinne, not by effecting it himselfe: but by forsaking or not hindring when he might if he would. And if we enquire of the order of willing, it is this, first and properly God doth will not to inhibit, and not to hinder sinne: and by consequent onelyonly hee willeth the euent of sinne. For that which God doth nor hinder, doth therfore come to passe, because hee doth nor hinder it: and as no good thing can either bee or come to passe, vnlesse God make it: so no euill thing can be auoyded, except God doe hinder. And there is not the least thing which may bee done without this will; vnlesse we will say that Gods prouidence is idle; which to say were wicked. The reasons of this our iudgement are many. The first reason I will draw out of most euident testimonies of Scripture. Act. 2. 23. Him I say being deliuered by the determinate counsell and foreknowledge of God, after you had taken, with wicked hands you hauehave crucified and slain. Act. 4. 27. 28. They gathered themselues together, to doe whatsoeuer thine hand and thy counsell had determined before to be done. Here it is to be obserued, that not only Christs passion but also the works which in respect of the Iewes were wicked, doe come vnderunder the decree and will of God: to wit, so far forth as God willed that they should come to passe for iust endes. This very thing Augustine signifieth when he saith, When the father deliuered the son, and Christ Epist. ad Vnio. 38.his bodie, and Iudas his master: In this deliuering wherefore is God iust and man guilty, but because in one thing which they did, there is not one cause for which they did it? And there is no reason yr it should seeme harsh vntounto any, if speaking of Adās fall we follow the holy scripture on this manner. When Adam did eate of the forbidden fruite, he did eate that, which the hand and counsell of God had determined before to bee done. This is that very thing which we say: This is the language of the Apostles and of the Church, which therefore we may vse without the least suspition of blasphemie. But to the former testimonies I will adde one place out of Peter, 1. Epist. 3. 17. It is better (if the will of God be so) that yee suffer for well doing, than for euill doing. But to punish men so… well doing, in respect of men, it is f…a…ly to transgresse the law of God. Furthermore God is said to bid Shimet 2. Sam. 16. 10.to curse Dauid, that is, to hauehave ordained and decreed, for God biddeth and commandeth a thing two waies, first by his reuealed will; and this he doth by his word de…iuered vntounto men. Secondly, by his secret will, which is his prouidence or hidden decree, by which hee doth so gouerne all things, that nothing can be done without it or against it: as in these places. ser. 34. 22. I will commaund and call backe the Assyrians against this citie. Lam. 3. 37. Who is he then that saith, and it commeth to passe, and the Lord commandeth it not? Iob. 37. 6. He saith to the snow, be thou vponupon the earth: likewise to the small raine, and to the great raine of his power. By which it appeareth that it may well be said, that God decreed that Shimei should curse Dauid: and it is the like kind of speech to say, that God did not decree Adams fall simply, but in foreign.some respect. The second reason followeth: it is the common opinion of all men that God doth will to suffer sinne, but to will to suffer it, is to will not to hinder it, and to will not to conferre grace. Now he which foreknoweth some future euill, and willeth not to hinder it when hee might, and not to conferre confirming grace, he doth indeed will that the same should come to passe. Therefore we doe not place that will, whereby wee say that God doth will that sinne should come to passe and bee in nature, either without or beyond the diuine permission, but we doe enwrap and enfold it in it. And this is that which Caluin saith and no other: It In Genes. cap. 3. ver. 1.often offendeth some …ēs eares to heare that God willed the fall of man. But I pray you what other thing is his permission besides wil, who hath authoritie to hinder, and in whose power the matter standeth? The same affirmeth Beza: If any man heare that some Ad acta. colloq. Mampelg. pag. 152things come to passe, which indeed are done against his will, that is, against his liking, not because he cannot, but because he will not hinder thē: I answer, that it is all one as if a mā should say that they come to passe hee being willing they should. For those things, which he could surely hinder if he would, must needs come to passe, because by not hindring of them he willeth that they should come to passe. And whatsoeuer God doth not hinder, he doth therefore not hinder it, either because he willeth that it should be done, or because he doth vtterly nill that it shuld be done, or because he doth not will it should bee done, or else because hee cares not: that is, hee neither willeth nor nilleth that it should come to passe. If you graunt the first, I hauehave my desire. The second is absurd; namely that God doth not hinder euill, because hee doth vtterlie nill that it should bee done. For this is to make God incōstant. The third, Lumbard and the schoolemen affi…me. For they say that God in respect of sinne hath no positiue act, neither of willing nor of nilling, but onelyonly a negatiue act of not willing to hinder it. But by this meanes a great part of those things, which are done in the world should come to passe God being either ignorant or negligent. The very permission also is a certaine will and not a pure negation: for no…to will to hinder, that is, to suffer, is indeed to will not to hinder. If thou wilt say the fourth, thou doest wickedly make an idle and Epicurish god, therefore wee must needs retire vntounto the first, viz. that God' doth decree that euill should come to passe in such sort as I hauehave declared. Yet the fault must not bee for all that translated vntounto him, because he doth iustly and holily decree that which men doe wickedly.
Thirdlie, we know that Adams reuolting is now past and done; therefore wee must say that God did will that it should be done; vnlesse we shall say that his prouidence is not in all, and euerie thing. Thou wilt say that an euill worke is ordeined of God, that is, disposed to Gods glorie, the saluation of the godly, and the destruction of the wicked. I grant it, but not this onelyonly. For the prouidence of God is ouer the world and eueryevery thing therein: both in respect of the ende, as also of the beginning of euerie action: Sathan and the wicked doe not onelyonly not finish, that which they would, but they doe not so much as begin it, vnlesse God willeth and giueth leaue. It seemeth impious to thinke that any thing, though as little as may be, doth either exist or come to passe besides that, which God being alwaies holy and inst hath willingly from all eternitie decreed.
Fourthly, let vsus heare the iudgement of the ancient Church. Augustine, We must De praed. & grat. c. 15.know that all things are either perfi…d the Lord helping, or permitted the Lord forsaking, that thou maist know that nothing is at all admitted the Lord being vnwilling. Againe: There is nothing done but that Enchir. c. 95 101.which the Almightie willeth to bee done, either by suffering it to bee done, or by doing it himselfe. Againe: Sometimes a man willeth a thing with a holy will, which God willeth not. Againe: It is possible that a man should will this with an euill will, which God willeth with a good will. So much difference is there twixt what is fitting for man to will, and what is fitting for God to will, and to what end eueryevery one referreth his will, so as that it may bee allowed or disapprooued. And againe: Know that whatsoeuer falleth out here contrarie to our will, happeneth not but by the In Psal. 148.will of God, his prouidence, ordinance, appointment and decrees. Tertullian: God hath foreknowne all things by disposing them, and Cont. Marcel. lib.disposed them by foreknowing them. Ierome: Shall I say that any thing is done In Abacuc. cap. 1.without thee, and that the wicked can doe so much against thy will? Surely it were blasphemie so to imagine. And againe: What good or euill things soeuer are in the world, In Ierem. 12. cap.they happen not by casuall chance, and without the prouidence of God, but by his pleasure. Hugo saith: Men may well endure Lib. de sacra. 1. c. 1…. par. 14.the hearing of this, and it may be said without any scruple or trouble of conscience, God willeth that which is good. But if it bee said, God willeth that which is euill, it is a thing very grieuous to bee heard, and a religious minde doth not easily conceits of that which is goodnesse it selfe, that it willeth euil: for then it seemeth to be said that the good loueth that which is euill, and approueth that which is bad, and therefore a godly minde reiecteth this, not because that which is said is not well said, but because that which is well said is not well vnderstood. But after what sort it ought to bee vnderstood, hee himselfe in the selfe same place explaneth. This (saith he) is onelyonly said, and yet another thing is meant and vnderstood, because God willeth that euill be, and yet willeth not the euill, And againe: He will that euill be, and yet Lib. 1 c. 7. part. c. de sa….he wil that therein be nothing but that which is good. And againe: When hee doth good and suffereth euill, his will appeareth in this, because he wils that to be which he doth or permitteth. And againe: The will of God is his good pleasure, and his will is his working, and his Will is his Permission. Catharinus In ep. … ad Rom.saith: We need not be afraid to confesse that God willeth sinne, as blessed Augustine saith also, not because he willeth sinne as it is sinne and euill, but as it is good, to wit, as it is is the punishment of sinne and vengeance in the reprobate (for that is Gods purpose, and it is good and not euill) or as sinne it selfe is an occasion vntounto good in his beloued and elect.
But they vse to obiect thus: To will that euill be done is proper and belonging to an euill will which is delighted with euils, or would vse them to good, contrary to the rule: That no euill should be done that good might come thereof. To this I answere: That heere are two grounds to bee laid. The first is, that the obiect euen of mans will is good, and therefore much more of Gods will, and the obiect of the will cannot be euill by it selfe but by accident: for if the will willeth euill, it willeth it not as it is euill, but as it is good. The second ground is, that there is a certaine summum bonum or soueraigne good with which there is no euill conioynd; because there is a certaine thing infinitely good, namely God: but there is not any absolute euill, because there is nothing so euill, but it hath some good ioyned therewith, and therefore it is good that sinne should be and come to passe. So saith S. Augustine: Although Enchirid. …. 98.therfore those things which are euill, so farre forth as they are euill are not good, neuerthelesse it is good that there should bee not onelyonly good things, but also euill. For vnlesse this were good, that there should be also euils, they should … …o meanes bee suffered by the Almigh… …o is goodnesse it selfe. Thus therefore I answere: That sinne in the causes and circumstances thereof fully and exactly weighed, is two waies to be considered. First we consider sinne not as it is sinne, but so farre foorth as it hath some respect vntounto good with God which decreeth it. And this way taking sinne, although God willeth it not simply and by it selfe, yet he decreeth it and willeth it as touching the euent. Moreouer sinne hath respect vntounto God two manner of waies, first, because it is in that which is good: secondly, because it tendeth to that which is good. I say it is in that which is good; because eueryevery euill is in that which is good as in the subiect. Now in respect of the subiect, that is, as sinne is a motion, an inclination, or an action, God both willeth and effecteth the same. Moreouer sin tendeth to that which is good, because God ordaineth it to good, and from thence draweth the good either of triall, chastisement, or punishment. And we say that God is so farre foorth willing that sinne should come to passe, as hee is able and will by his wonderfull wisedome from thence to draw foorth that which is good.
Secondly, we consider sinne according God did n…t decree the fall of Adam, nor any sin as it is … vntounto God.to the propertie and naturall being thereof, that is, sinne as it is sinne; And this way also we weigh sinne either so far forth as it is sinne in it selfe in regard of men, or as it is sinne to God. But God himselfe neither willeth, nor approueth, nor effecteth sinne, as it is sinne in it selfe in regard of the creatures that offend; and yet hee willeth as touching the euent, not simplie, as those things that are good in themselues, but only by willing to permit that it may be. For there is a threefold action of Gods wil, the first is that whereby God willeth any thing by willing it, that is, when he willeth it with his whole and absolute will, as Tertullian saith, and this way he willeth that which is good in it selfe. The second action is that, whereby he nilleth any thing by nilling it, as that which shall neuer come to passe, because God doth vtterly nill the being thereof. The third and last action is remisse and in the middest betweene both, whereby hee willeth some thing by nilling it slackely or remissely, that is, when hee partly willeth it and partly nilleth it, or else so far forth wills it, as that for iust causes he nills it. And after this sorte wee say, that God willeth the euent of euill, as it is euill in it selfe in respect of men; because euill as it is euill after this sorte, is not absolutely euill: and God draweth good out of euill as it is euill in the nature thereof or in it selfe: as hee brought forth light out of darkenesse, euen as it was darkenesse in it selfe. And if so be that euill were absolurely euill, as God is absolutely good, he would in no wise will the euent of euill, neither should there be any euill existent at all. For that which God vtterly nilleth, hath not any being or existence. But sin as it is sin to God, (now that is a sinne to God which is in it selfe sinne, in his decree whereby all things are ordained as it considereth sinne) hee neither willeth it, nor approueth it, nor worketh it, no in this respect he doth not so much as permit it. I doe not denie but that God permitteth and suffreth euill, as it is euill in it selfe, (otherwise there were not euill properly and naturally) but I denie that he permitteth it, because it is euill. For God neuer suffreth euill for it selfe, but for the good that is therewith conioyned. And this is the meaning of that saying of Beza: The Lord neuer permitteth sins, as they are sins, …ib. cont. Castel. de pr… dest.yea rather be euermore forbiddeth and hindreth them. And againe: Sinnes so farre forth as they are permitted by God being thereto willing, are not sinnes but the punishments of sinne. And thus vsing this exposition is the mind and iudgement of Master Caluin of blessed memorie to bee vnderstood, where as he saith that all the sons of Adam did fall away by Gods will: And againe, that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his owne falling away. Instit. lib. 3. cap. 23. 5. 4. & 5. 7.And againe, it was the secret counsell of God, in which the fall of man was ordained. And againe: Adam did not fall away but according to Gods knowledge and ordinance. Opu…. …05. 8. 616.In these and such like maner of speeches his purpose was, to ouerthrow the opinion of the Schoolemen, who would hauehave his permission seuered from his will: It were good therefore for them better to consider of the matter, who without either chatitie or humanitie doe with the blasphemies of the Manichees slaunder and bely this holy man.
Secondly they vse to obiect, that God willeth things contrarie, if hee will that that should come to passe which hee forbiddeth in his law. Answer. It is true indeed, if he should will one and the same thing to come to passe and not to come to passe in one and the same respect and manner: but God forbiddeth euill as it is euill, and willeth it to come to passe as it hath respect vntounto good. Heereupon Aquinas saith, That euill be and that euill bee not, are contradictorilie opposed; but that Summ. q. 9. art. 9.God willeth euill to be, and that God willeth euill not to be, are not contradictorily opposed, seeing both are affirmatiue.
Thirdly, they obiect thus: That thing which being graunted, another thing necessarilie followeth, is the cause of that selfe same thing that doth follow; but this being granted that God willed the fall of Adam to come to passe, the same came to passe necessarily and infallibly. Therfore the will of God was in this respect the cause of sinne. Whereto I answere, that the first proposition of this argument is not generall, for in admitting the creation of the world, both the place and the time or continuance thereof are infallibly and without doubt also to bee admitted, and yet the creation of the world is not the cause of the continuance thereof, and of the place, where it now consisteth. And that this proposition may be true, it is thus to be framed: That thing which being granted, another thing infallibly followeth (no other cause comming betweene) is the cause of the very same thing that followeth. And the second proposition also sitted to this former is vntrue. For this being granted that God willeth sin to happen, sin shall not come to passe immediatly, but by the meanes of mans free wil; & although it come to passe infallibly on Gods part which decreeth it, yet it comes to passe freely on mans part, for it had been possible for man not to hauehave sinned when hee did sinne if hee had would. As may appeare by this Similitude. God forsaketh man by not conserring and bestowing on him necessarie and sufficient helpe for the auoyding of sinnes; now man being forsaken by him, sinneth necessarily; And yet the fault is not to be laid on God, because that in this his forsaking him the will of man commeth betweene. For God forsaketh man being willing to bee forsaken, and not against his will and mind.
Secondly, I answere to the aforesaid reproch of our doctrine, that wee say not, that sinne is from the decree, or of the decree of God, as from the efficient, materiall, formall, or finall cause. But wee doe teach and au…rre that sinne commeth to passe according to the prouidence, or decree of God, as the sole consequent thereof. For wee assuredly thinke and iudge that the decree of God doth so go before the sinne of man, as that it hath no respect vntounto any cause, vnlesse it be of such a one, as is a failing and deficient cause. So saith Augustin: Therefore truely the great works Enchir. cap. 101.of the Lord are exquisite in all his wills, so that after a wonderfull and vnspeakable manner, that is not done beside his will, which notwithstanding is done contrary to his will.
Againe it is obiected. He that saith that the decree of God is the energeticall operatiue beginning of all things, necessarilie maketh the decree of God, the beginning also of sinne. Whereunto I answer, That the holy Ghost himselfe saith that the decree of God is the beginning of all things being and existent; Eph. I. cap. II. verse: God worketh all things after the counsell of his owne will. And againe in the 17. of the Acts, In him we liue, we moue, and hauehave our being. Augustine saith: The will of God is the very cause of all things which are. Hugo De gene, cont. Manic. lib. …. c. 2de S. Vict. saith: There is no cause of the will of God, which is the cause of all things. And this very thing common reason will teach vsus, because there must first some certaine ground be laid, from whence eueryevery thing should hauehave or take the being and existence thereof; and this ground is euen the very will of God. For a thing is not first, and then afterward God willeth it to come to passe; but, because God hath decreed that a thing should come to passe, or be done, therefore it is; And yet shall not God therefore bee the cause of sinne: because sinne is not properly a thing, action, or being, but a defect only: and yet neuerthelesse it is not therefore nothing. For whatsoeuer hath a being, is either E…s Real… & Rationale.Really and positiuely, or else in Reason onelyonly. And vnderunder those things which are in Reason, are contained not only notions and relations, but also priuations: because they hauehave not a reall matter and forme out of the vnderstanding. But sinne hath not a positiue and reall being, & yet it hath a being in Reason (as they terre it.) For so farre forth it is in the nature of things being, as it may cause a true composition in the mind: and although it doe not exist positiuely, that is, by matter, or forme created; yet it is priuatiuely: because foreign.that by the remoue or taking away of originall righteousnesse, that doth immediatly and truly follow and exist. Neither doth it follow, as some other naturall habit, or as a pure negation, but as a certaine thing betweene both, that is, a want and absence of the contrarie good.
Some vse to obiect that wee doe teach, that God doth incline vntounto sinne and that hee doth positiuely harden the heart. Whereto I answere, that wee allow not a bare permission seuered vtterly from his will, neither doe we atribute a positiue or naturall action vntounto God, as though hee did infuse corruption and sinne: and yet we say that hee doth actiuely harden the heart. The action of Gods Prouidence (as saith Suidas) in the works of men is threefold. The first is according to his good pleasure, whereby God willeth any work, foreign.alloweth it, effecteth it, and is therewith delighted: this action is onelyonly in good workes, which hauehave their beginning in vsus from the holy Ghost. The second action of Gods prouidēce is of sustaining, wherby foreign.God vpholdeth and maintaineth, the being, and all the faculties, motions, actions and passions of nature which offendeth. Act. 17. 28. In him we liue, and moue, and hauehave our being. And although God do sustaine nature offending, and the action of nature, yet is hee free from fault; because he vpholdeth the creature, onelyonly as it is a creature, not as it is euill. For the second cause, as the will of man, can by it selfe doe euilly and corruptly: yet it can doe nothing by it selfe, vnlesse the effect thereof bee reduced to the first cause. As may appeare more plainly by this similitude: A man doth hault by reason that his legge is out of ioynt: now heere are two things to be considered, the very walking or motion it selfe, and his haulting: the haulting proceedes onelyonly from his legge out of ioynt, the walking both from his legge and also from the facultie of mouing. In like manner a man sinning, in that he doth it is of God, but in that he doth euilly, it is of himself. We must therfore heere know that God doth vphold order as it is of nature, but furthereth not the will violently breaking out against the order of the morall law. The third foreign.action of Gods prouidence is according vntounto concession, whereby God in the euil worke of man worketh some things holily; and this last action is threefold. The first is permission: whereby God forsaketh especially the wicked by withdrawing from them his grace, and by leauing them according to their deserts vntounto their owne wickednesse, which hee had before restrained, that it might not breake forth to so immoderate libertie. And wee vse commonly to say, that he which permitteth, doth and effecteth some thing: as when the rider giueth the reines vntounto his wanton and sporting horse, wee say that hee doth moue and encourage him; and wee say that the hunter doth put his dog on the game, when as hee letteth him slip. The second action (as I may so terme it) is occasionall, whereby God by proffered occasions, in themselues good or indifferent, outwardly draweth foorth, stirreth vp, and bringeth out sinne in those who of themselues openly runne into wickednesse; to the intent that hee may either iustly punish their knowne impietie, or else discouer it being closely shrouded. The like hauehave wee ordinarily euen among our selues: for the Physitian by his preseruatiue medicine, stirreth vp, inflameth, and draweth foorth the humours out of the corruption of the bodie. Admit a house be weakely timbred, which being almost now already falne wilere lōg fall; and that I doe not with any engines or instruments throw or beate down the same, but onelyonly take away the outward hindrances, and on eueryevery side as it were open a way for the downfall, to the intent, that when it falleth, it may by the greater fall be broken in peeces. After this sort dealeth God with the wicked: and hereupon is it that the law is said to stirre vp and increase sinne in Paul, Rom. 7. 8. This action is done many manner of waies, as when the hindrances of sinne are taken away: when as the way is opened to the committing of one especiall sinne, and not of another: when as obiects are offered, which the vngodly vse as instigations vntounto sinne. These obiects, are commandements, threatnings, exhortations, and cogitations either good or indifferent put by God in the mindes of vngodly men, from the which the wicked by reason of his wickednesse doth greedily take an occasion to doe ill. And this is the manner and way truly, whereby wee say that God stirreth man vntounto euill, without infusing the least drop or iot of euill. For as in the middle region of the aire the heate groweth stronger by the antiperistasis or repulsion on eueryevery part, from whence proceeds the thunder and lightning: and by the heate round incompassed, the clowdes are condensated and made thicke: euen so the wicked and vngodly when they are stirred vp by wholsome precepts, doe grow more vngodly: and euill doth so much the more begin to delight them, by how much the more they know that it is lesse lawfull for them: according to the saying of the Poet: Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimus que negara: We still endeuour things forbid, and couet thats denide. The third action is a disposing, whereby God through the euill worke of an euill instrument, finisheth his owne worke iustly and holily. As for example: The sale of Ioseph in his brethren was sin: the iust action of God in this euill worke was the foresending of Ioseph into Aegypt for the common good and benefit of Iacobs familie. And from this disposing proceedes it, that God vseth the sins of men …olily, that hee prouoketh them holily, and ordreth them as the Physition for a medicine ordreth poyson, contrary to the nature thereof: that he ordreth them holily both according to the causes, and beginnings, and also according to the ends and issue: as when he disposeth the work of the diuell infusing corruption, either to the punishment of correction, vengeance, or triall. But concerning these let vsus rather giuegive care to ancient writers. Clemens Strom. lib. 1Alexandrinus saith: It belongeth to Gods wisedome, vertue, and power, not onelyonly to doe good, which is the nature of God, but also especially to bring vntounto some good and profitable end, that which hath been inuented by those which are euill, and vse profitably those things which doe seeme euill. Augustine saith: God maketh and ordaineth iust men: De gen. ad. lit. imperf. cap. 5.but hee maketh not sinners as they are sinners, but ordreth them onelyonly. And againe; As God is the most excellent creator of good De ciuit. Dei lib. 11. cap. 17. Enchir. ad Laur. c. 101. De cor. & grat. c. 14.natures: so is he the most iust disposer of euill wils. Againe: God verily fulfilleth certaine of his good wils, by the euill wils of euill men. Againe: God by those men which doe those things which hee will not, doth himselfe those things which he will. And againe: God vsing well euen those that are euill as being himselfe absolutely good: so farre foorth as in them lay they did that which God would not; In this very thing that they did that which was contrarie to Gods will, euen by them his will is done. and againe: Who would not tremble at these iudgements of God, whereby De grat. & lib. arb. c. 21God doth in the hearts of euill men what soeuer hee will, giuing vntounto them according to their deserts▪ And againe: It is plaine that God worketh in the hearts of men to encline their wils whither soeuer he will, either vntounto those things that are good for merciemercy, or else vntounto those things that are euill for their deserts, somtimes verily in his open iudgement, sometimes in his secret iudgement, but euermore in his iust iudgement. And againe: God maketh not euill wils, but vseth them as Cont. Iul. lib. 5. cap. 3.he list, because hee cannot will any thing that is vniust. Fulgentius saith: Although God be not the author of euill thoughts; yet he is the disposer of euill wils; and out of the euill worke of eueryevery one, he doth not cease to worke that which is good.
In respect of these diuers actions concerning sinne, it commeth to passe that we finde it said in the Scripture, That God doth harden, doth make blinde, doth deceiue, 2. Sam. 12. 12. & 16. 10. & 24. 1doth command a worke that is euill, yea and doth the same, and that hee deliuereth ouer to beastly affections, &c.
Thirdly I answere to the aforesaid reproch of this our doctrine, that wee doe vtterly abhorre and detest the Stoicall Fate, because it appointeth an inherent necessitie in things themselues, which should bind euen God himselfe, and all other things, and make them subiect thervnto. For howsoeuer wee doe beleeue that the very decree of God is immutable and therefore necessarie, yet in God himselfe it was most free (for hee could either not hauehave decreed that which hee did decree, or else otherwise hauehave decreed it: I and he addeth to the second causes placed out of God a certaine necessitie, but yet so free a one, as that it is rather to be termed a libertie, then a necessitie. And this shall easily appeare to be as I say, if I shall first shew, what sortes of necessitie there bee, and how farre forth it is agreeable vntounto thinges. First therefore, a thing is necessary two waies, absolutely & conditionally. That is obsolutely necessarie which cannot be otherwise, or else whose contrarie is impossible, as that God is omnipotent and iust. And that is conditionally necessarie, which cannot be otherwise, but yet not simply, but by the granting of one or many things: and this kind of necessitie is either by nature, or the commaundement, or decree of God. That is necessarie by nature, which commeth to passe constantly and immutably by reason of that order which God hath set in the nature of things: after this sort is it of necessitie, that fire doe burne, that the earth is carried downeward, and the heauen moued. That is necessarie by commaundement, which is necessarily to be done because God hath commanded it. After this fort it is of necessitie that one vndergoe the office of a magistrate. Rom. 13. 5. That is necessarie by the decree of God, which is so, because God hath foreknowne it, and willed either to effect it, or at the least to permit it. After this sort eueryevery thing in respect of God is necessarie, and the will De ciuit. Dei lib. 5. …. 8. q. 10. & de genesi ad lit. l. 5. c. 15.of God (as Augustine saith) is the necessitie of things. Secondly, necessitie is either of compulsion or infallibility. Necessitie of compulsion, is that which inferreth violence to things by some cause working without, and forciblie constraineth that they doe either this or that. And this indeed is the Stoicall necessitie, that a man Tull. de Finibus.should doe any thing against his will being compelled by force and necessitie. There is also such a like kind of necessitie of the Manichees, condemned by the fathers, who taught that there was no violence or necessitie offred vntounto the will by God, nor that it was forced by necessitie to sinne. The necessitie of infallibilitie is that whereby a thing according to the euent shall certainly and immutably come to passe: yet so, as if we consider the cause of a thing by it selfe, it may either not come to passe, or else come otherwise to passe. Of this manner of necessitie wee must vnderstand that principle: Euerie thing that is, when it is, is of necessity. And thus is necessitie distinguished: now will I shew how farre forth it is agreeable to seuerall things. The euents of all things hauehave reference either to the second causes, or to God, who is the first cause. Now some things in respect of the second causes are necessary, othersome contingent. From causes which are necessarie, must needs proceede that which is necessarie, from those that are free, that which is free, from those that are naturall that which is naturall; and to bee briefe, such as are the next causes aforegoing, such also is the euent of things. But in respect of God, all things whatsoeuer, are partly changeable, and partly necessarie. In respect of Gods libertie, which doth that which it doth freely, all things are contingent and mutable: howsoeuer according to nature and the order of the next causes, they be necessarie and immutable. In respect of Gods decree, the second causes and the effects of them are all necessarie, howsoeuer in themselues they bee vncertaine and conti…nt. And yet they are not absolutelie necessarie, but by the supposition of Gods decree, neither are they necessarie by the necessitie of compulsion, but of infallibilitie only, because God ordained before that those things which should come to passe should be. And this kind of necessitie taketh not away the contingencie and libertie of second causes, but rather establisheth and confirmeth it. For that which is free worketh freely, and that which is contingent, worketh contingently, by the necessarie decree of God. Neither doth libertie and necessitie mutually ouerthrow each other, but libertie and compulsion. It is manifest therefore that Gods decree causeth an immutabilitie to all things, of which notwithstanding some, in respect of the next causes, are necessarie, and othersome contingent; but all of them in respect of Gods liberty mutable. And as the mutabilitie which thinges hauehave from Gods power, taketh not away the necessitie which they hauehave from the second causes: so the necessitie of immutabilitie by Gods decree consequently comming to passe, taketh not away the contingencie which they hauehave from the next causes and Gods libertie. Moreouer wee say, that Gods decree ordaineth the second causes, and the verie libertie it selfe also of mans will, not by compulsion, as if a man should violently throw a stone, but by inclining and gentlie bending them, by obiects outwardlie offred to the vnderstanding (euen as a sheepe is said to be drawne, when grasse is shewed her being an hungry) that a man August. de verb. Apost. ser. 2.may choose by his owne free motion, or refuse that which God hath iustly decreed from all eternitie.
These things being granted, it is manifest also what we ought to thinke concerning the fall of Adam. Which truely according to the euent is necessarie by the necessitie of infallibilitie by reason of the forcknowledge and decree of God: yet so as that God is not guiltie of any fault; because the decree of God howsoeuer it was necessarie in it selfe, yet it planted nothing in Adam, whereby he should fall into sinne, but left him to his owne libertie, not hindring his fall when it might; and the same fall in respect of mans wil (which doth that freely that it doth) came to passe contingently and most freely. But, you will say, that Adam could not withstand Gods will, that is, his decree; whereto I answere, that euen as he could not, so also hee would not. But, you will say againe he could not will otherwise. Which I confesse to bee true, as touching the act and euent, but not as touching the very power of his will, which was not compelled but of the owne free motion consented vntounto the suggestiō of the diuell. But to the intent that these things may more plainely bee vnderstood, wee must make distinction betweene three times, the time going before his fall, the present time of his fall, and the time after his fall. In the first moment of time the fal of Adam was necessarie in a double respect: First, by reason of the foreknowledge of God: for that which he foreknew would come to passe, must needes of necessitie come to passe. Secondly, by reason of the permissiue decree of God, that fal was according to the euent necessarie immutably. Honorius Augustodunensis saith, It cannot otherwise Dial. de praed. citat. in Catalogo Illyrici.…e but that al things must come to passe, which God hath predestinated & foreknowne, seeing that hee onelyonly either doth all things or permitteth them to be done. Hugo de S. victore saith: Sinne followeth of necessitie by Quaest. in Rom. 44.the withdrawing of grace. And the reason hereof is very easie, because euill permitted must come to passe, and cannot otherwise come to passe than God permitteth. For to permit euill, is not to stirre vp the will, and not to bestow on him that is tempted the act of resisting, but to leaue him as it were to himselfe: and he whose will is not stirred vp by God, and to whō the act of resisting is not conferred, howsoeuer he may hauehave power to withstand: yet can he not actually will to withstand, nor persist for euer in that vprightnesse wherein hee was created, God denying him strength. I confesse truly that this kinde of necessitie as touching the liberty of mans will, was altogether euitable and to be auoided: and yet according to the euent of the action it was ineuitable. Yet I would not that any man should thinke that this necessitie did any way proceede from the decree of God, which did onelyonly follow the decree being granted and admitted; and Adam in his temptation being destitute of the helpe of God, cast himselfe of his own accord into this same ensuing necessitie of sinning. In the second time, his fall being present, there was another necessitie thereof: because when it was it was of necessitie. In the third time, man drew vntounto himselfe by his fault, his nature being now corrupted, another necessitie of sinning, insomuch that he made himselfe the seruant of sin. Bernard saith: I know not after what euill and strange manner, the will it selfe corrupted or changed to worse maketh a necessitie to sinne: and yet the necessitie although it be voluntarie is not able to excuse the will: nor the will, although it bee enticed, to exclude necessitie.
If any man shall say, that by this our platforme many are tied by an ineuitable necessitie to bee damned; I would hauehave him giuegive care to Augustine, who saith: Hold this most stedfastly, and doubt not in De fide ad Pet. cap. 35.any wise that any can perish whom God before the creation of the world, hath of his free goodnesse made vessels of merciemercy,—or that any of them whom he hath not predestinated to eternall life, can by any meanes be saued. And yet I say that the decree of reprobation doth not cause a necessitie of damnation in any man. For the first act thereof, which is a purpose not to shew merciemercy, causeth not this necessitie in men, but goeth before it as an antecedent: and man himselfe verily hath brought vponupon himselfe this necessitie with his owne most free, yet rebelling will. Now the second act of Reprobation, which is a purpose of condemning, causeth not any necessitie of damnation, but by the sinne of man comming betweene. Moreouer, the necessitie of damnation followeth after the same manner by the foreknowledge of God: and yet this neuer seemed a thing strange vntounto any one. But some will say, that the foreknowledge of God doth neuer cause in men any necessitie of damnation, although it doe assuredly foresee the same. And I say also, that Reprobation doth either not at all cause damnation in man, or that it doth not cause it, but for sinne. But it may be obiected: They that are predestinated vntounto damnation, cannot be freed by repentance, although they would. Whereto I answere with Augustine: As they did fall by their will, so by their will they are content to lie: and he that turneth himselfe Ar…. 15.away from God, hath both depriued himselfe of will to doe that which is good, and also of power. It doth not therefore follow (as they imagine which obiect such things) that God hath taken repentance from those to whom he gaue it not, and hath throwne downe those, whom he hath not taken vp.
Moreouer, the selfe same necessitie followeth of their hypothesis, who affirme a bare permission. For that which God permitteth, the selfe same thing will hee not hinder▪ and euill, if God hinder not, cannot bee auoyded: and that which cannot be auoyded, shall come to passe infallibly. And therfore euill, permission being once graunted, of necessitie cōmeth to passe, although most freely on mans part. Whereupon it is plaine, that the decree of God is not more ineuitable, than is the very permission separated from the decree. I doe wish that they would well weigh and cō sider this, who obiect vntounto vsus either the Stoicall fate, or the do…ages of the Manichees. For we differ from them as much in certaine iudgement & opinion, as whosoeuer doe differ most. For first, the Stoickes doe tie God vntounto the second causes, so that he cannot doe otherwise, then the nature of them will suffer: wee on the other side, doe hold that all second causes do depend vponupon and are ordered by God. Secondly, the Stoickes say, that neither God nor second causes can doe otherwise by their nature than they doe: wee say that some second causes, are by Gods ordinance mutable, othersome immutable; and that God himselfe, can either not doe, that which hee doth, or else doe it otherwise. But now to come to the Manichees, who make two coeternall gods; we but one. They of their two Gods, make one good, and another euill: we say, that there is one absolutely good & iust God. Thirdly, they wil hauehave one of their Gods to bee the cause and worker of good things, and the other of euil: we make one true God the creatour and ruler of all things, and working nothing but that which is most good and most iust. Fourthly, they say that they which are created by their good God cannot sinne: we say, that God doth most freely conuert whom hee will, and when they are conuerted, they can neuer in this life perfectly be free frō sinnes, but doe sometimes run into such sinnes, as doe grieuously wound the conscience. Fiftly, they say, that they that are created by the euil God simply cannot be conuerted: wee say, that vncleane spirites and men were created both good and holy, but yet they fell by their owne will and fault, and not by any fault but the iust permission of the Creatour, and brought vponupon themselues a necessitie of sinning. And although it be true, that man cannot withhold himselfe from sinning, vnlesse God giuegive him that grace, yet doth he not sin of necessitie, that is, of compulsiō, but willingly. And the will hath sufficient libertie if by it selfe or the nature therof it be inclinable to the cōtrary of that which it chooseth, and doth of the owne accord choose that which it chooseth; although the same liberty bee gouerned and one way limited by God. Wherefore I am flat of Anselmus opinion, who saith: Although Lib. de concor. grat. & lib. arbitr.it bee of necessity that those things do come to passe which are foreknowne and predestinated; yet some things foreknowne and predestinated doe not come to passe by that necessitie which goeth before a thing, and causeth is, but by the same necessitie which followeth a thing. For God doth not cause, although he doth praedestinate them, by forcing the will, as by resisting it, but by leauing them in the power thereof. And I am also of Gaudentius his opinion; who saith: The Iewes Ser. 3. ad Neophy.were willing to doe that euill which they did. And verily, if they had bin vnwilling to doe it they had not done it. And it is a grosse sinne, but to thinke that God, who is not onelyonly good and righteous, but also goodnesse and righteousnesse it selfe, doth either command, or compel any thing to be done, which he condemneth when it is done. But that I may in a word fully deliuer my opinion, if it bee demanded, how the will of God carrieth it selfe to good or euill, I answere: that in a good act God carrieth himselfe positiuely. For first he determineth the euent of good, by willing effectually to worke it; and secondly, hee inwardly inclineth the will of the creature, to doe that good which it doth. Thirdly, he sometimes laieth a necessitie of immutabilitie on him that doth well, but yet it is ioyned with an exceeding freedome. After this sort the elect Angels doe necessarily obey God, yet not by constraint, but greatly coueting, and with all the strength of their will desiring it, not being thereunto compelled. In an euill act, I say that God carrieth himselfe priuatiuely; not by a logical, but a natural priuation foregoing the habit. For first he willeth that euill come to passe, not by doing it himselfe, but by willing not to hinder it to be done by others. Secondly, he doth not inwardly incline the will to doe euill, but he forsaketh, and outwardly offereth obiects which are good in themselues. Thirdly, God laieth not on vsus any necessitie, but a desertiō, or want of grace, to which being imposed, followeth the necessitie of sinning, not as the effect doth his cause, but as the defect doth him that forsaketh. And this I am resolued on, that Gods decree doth altogether order eueryevery euent, partly by inclining and gently bending the will in all things yt are good; and partly by forsaking it in things that are euill: and yet the will of the creature left vntounto it selfe, is carried headlong of the owne accord, not of necessitie in it selfe, but contingently that way which the decree of God determined from eternitie. We therefore (thankes be giuen vntounto God) doe with all our hearts renounce the doting follies of the Stoickes and the Manichees.