Of Justification By Faith, Treatise · Section 3 · Chapter 4
CHAP. IIII.
Three generall exceptions against the truthes deliuered in this third Section▪
THus we hauehave stood long in the confirmation of our second Argument, touching the impossibility of Mans fulfilling of the Law in this Life, and so consequently of iustification by the Law.
Against all that hauehave bin sayed for the profit of this point; our Aduersaries hauehave three Common and generall Exceptions. Which are these.
1 That Concupiscence or Naturall Corruption in the first and second act of it,Bell. lib. 4. cap. 1…. & passim aubi. is no sinne.
2 That imperfection in our Charity and Obedience is no sinne.
3 That smaller faults, or (as they tell them) Venia… sinnes, doe not hinder the Iustice and goodnesse of any good worke.
To these three Positions they hauehave continually recourse.… Exceptio…. For whereas they cannot deny; but that their is in the Regenerate; both a pronesse of Nature vntounto Euill, and also many inordinate Sinnefu…l motions arising thence: they first deny, that, either these Naturall Corruptions, or disordered Motions of the Heart be any sinnes.
Againe, they confesse that no man hath such perfect louelove of God and Man; but that he may increase in charity: nor be his good workes so perfectly good; but that they ought still to striue to doe them better: but then here also they deny, that this imperfection of our charity and good works, is any sinne.
Lastly, they grant that no man can auoide veniall sinnes, scarse in the best workes he doth: but then they deny that veniall sinnes be contrary to the Law, so that albeit a man commit them, yet he may perfectly fulfill the Law of God. I cannot stand largely in the refutation of these foule errors. The confutation whereof belongs properly to the Article of remission of sinnes; where the nature and kindes of sinnes are to be handled. For this present I shall but touch on them briefly, and proceed to the matter.
1 For the first; we defend this conclusion.
The vitious inclination and pronnesse of Nature vntounto euill,Conclusion. as also the inordinate moti…ns of concupiscence, which goe before consent, they are sinnes euen in a man regenerate.
That the inclination and pronnesse of Nature to sinne is a sinne, we proue thus.
It is expresly so called by the Apostle, Rom. 7. not once nor twice: but almost in eueryevery verse of the Chapter. I am carnall sold vnderunder sinne. The sinne that dwelleth in me. ver. 17. 20. The Law of sinne. verse 23. 25. In it selfe it is sinne, and deserues the wages of sinne, eternall death. For which cause the Apostle there cals it. The body of this death. verse 24. Because this inward Corruption (which is like a Body that hath many members consisting of diuerse euill affections spreading themselues throughout his whole Nature) made him lyable to eternall death, from which onelyonly Gods mercy in Christ could deliuer him.
2 To rebell against the Law is Sinne. Ergo, To hauehave a rebellious inclination is sinne likewise.…. 3. 12. 13. For if the act bee euill, the habite must needes be naught: if the Law forbid one; it must needs forbid the other. If it be euill to breake any Commandement in act: is it not euill to hauehave, a pronenesse and readinesse of minde to breake it?…. 4. 8. …ense your …nds: purge …ur hearts. The habit denominated a man sinfull and not the act. Nor doth God lesse abhorre the pronnesse of man to offend him: then wee doe abhorre the rauenous disposition of a Wolfe, though it be a Cubb, not yet vsed to the prey; or one tyed vp in a chaine, and kept from rauening.
That the euill motions of the heart without consent be sins.
1 They are forbidden in the Morrall Law. In the tenth Commandement. Thou shalt not couet. For motions with consent are forbidden in the other Commandments. As appeares manifestly in Christs exposition of the Commandements. Mat. 5. 22. were not only the outward act of Adultery: but the inward desire is also forbidden; if wee beleeue Christ the best interpreter of the Law: When Ergo the tenth Commandement forbids coueting [of our Neighbours Wife, it either meanes the same kind of lusting, with a needelesse Tautology: or a different. viz. that which is not consented vntounto. Nor can our Aduersaries shift this off: though Becanus most impudently denies it,Tom. 2. pag. 885. with out any reason of his so doing.
2 We proue it thus. Whatsoeuer is inordinate and repugnant to right Reason: that is Sinne.
But these Motions without confent be inordinate.— Ergo They be Sinne, The Minor is confessed. That these Motions be inordinati & recta Rationi repugnantes.
The Maior is apparant. For what is Ordo & recta Ratio in Moralibus: but that course of doing any thing, which is conformable to Gods Law and his will. God is the God of order. Marke them that walke disorderly, foreign, i e. sinfull, otherwise according to the Law.His Law is the rule of order in all humane actions. Recta Ratio what is it; but the conformity of mans vnderstanding and will vntounto Gods will, which only is the rule of righteousnesse; We neuer purpose and will matters aright: but when wee will them agreeably to Gods will. Wherefore it is a grosse absurdity to deny the Sinnefulnesse of these disorderly motions: seeing no man can breake those orders which God hath made, and yet be faultlesse. Nor is it possible a Man should doe that which is contrary to Gods will: And yet be without Sinne in doing of it. These motions then without consent be confusions in Nature opposites to the righteousnesse of the will of God; and vntounto that euen and streight order expressed in his Law.
We conclude then that Concupiscence and inordinate motions of the Soule not consented vntounto, are Sinnes contrary to our Aduersaries assertion.
They bring some Reasons to proue they are not.
1 Originall sinne is taken away in Baptisme.1 Arg. Adu. But concupiscence is not taken away in Baptisme; as appeares by experience in the regenerate in whom it remaines.—Ergo, concupiscence and pronnesse to Sinne, is no sinne.
This Argument is friuolous. In Originall sinne, there are two things, First, the guilt. Secondly, the inherent corruptions. We say in Baptisme the guilt is altogether washed away from the Baptized Elect, by the blood of Christ. And for the corruption thereof, it is part done away by the sanctifying Spirit of Christ, powred out vponupon the Regenerate, which by degrees purgeth out the inherent sinfulnesse of Nature, by replanting the graces of Sanctification in all parts. Concupiscence then, notwithstanding Baptisme remaines in the Regenerate, and is a sinne in them, the guiltinesse whereof God mercifully pardons in Christ.
2 What is not in our power to auoide:2 Arg. Adu. that God doth not forbid vsus by his Law.
But tis not in our power to auoide the Motions of the heart that preuent Reason and consent. Ergo, they be no sinnes forbidden vsus.
To this we answere. The Maior is true in things meerely Naturall, that fall out by the Necessity of Nature well disposed. So we say, Gods Law were vncouth, should he command a man neuer to be an hungry or thirst, which things he cannot auoide, but they come vponupon him, will he, nill he; by the meere necessity of Nature. But concerning inordinate motions, there's no such matter. God hath layed no such necessity on Nature in her creation: but we by our sinne hauehave brought it upon our selues.
Now such a necessity excuses vsus not. In this case it helpes a man no more to say. [I cannot auoid euill thoughts and desires:] then it doth a desperate sinner, that by countenance hath hardened himselfe in euill courses; or then it helpes the Diuels and the damned, if they should say; Wee cannot chuse but doe euill.
3 They argue thus. That which would hauehave beene naturall and without fault in man,3 Arg. Adu▪ if he had beene created, in puris Naturalibus; that is, no sinne nor fault in vsus.
But motions preuenting consent, would be naturall, and without fault in men so made.—Ergo, In vsus they be no faults of themselues.
Heere our Aduersaries hauehave made a Man of white Paper, or the like to Materia prima: that hath not any quality in him morally good or bad. That is. A Man that hath neither the Image of God in knowledge, righteousnes, and holines, engrauen on his vnderstanding, will, affections, and whole person; nor yet, though it hauehave it not, hath in him any contrary euill quality, that comes vponupon him by reason of such a defect. Now of such a Wiseaker they dispute. If God had created a Man thus▪ in puris naturalibus, neither good, nor bad, then. What then? As the old word is. If the Heauens fall, we shall hauehave Larkes good cheepe. Suppositions framed by our Imaginations touching what might be done, are vaine and needlesse when we see what is done. This we see that Man was created in God's Image invested with all reall Qualities of Righteousnes and Holinesse. This we see also, that Man being falne is borne in Originall corruption, depriued of God's Image, & thereupon depraued in his whole Nature by sinfull infirmity. Wherefore a man in his pure Naturals, one that hath neither Grace, nor Corruption, was neuer found in this world: yea, 'tis a contradiction to imagine a man thus naked without his Qualities; that he hath Reason, but neither enlightened, nor darkened, a will but meerely indifferent, neither enclined to good, or euill; affections, but neither vertuously, nor vitiously disposed. In a word, that he is a Man capable of Vertue, or Vice; Holinesse, or Sinfulnesse, and yet hath neither. That were to make a Man litle better then an vnreasonable Beast. But to follow them a little. Suppose a Man were made in his pure Naturals, would such disorderly motions be found i… him?… Yea, say they, and that boldly. Si Homo crearetur a Deo in puris naturalibus, proculdubiò constaret duabus partibus repugnantibus, Spiritu & Carne: & haberet duos app…titus contrarios. Rationalem, & Sensitivum: ergo naturaliter haber…t quosdam motus repugnantes Rationi. Without doubt the Iesuite is deceiued in this his Imagination, and his Argument is not worth a Button. A Man in his pure Naturals should hauehave two parts, a Soule and a Body, Spirit and Flesh; he should hauehave two appetites, Reasonable and Sensuall, ergo, these parts in their motions and desires would be contrary one to the other. This consequent is false. They would be diuerse, not opposite and repugnant. The Body and the Sensitiues would lead a Man to those things that are agreeable to the Body. The Soule and reasonable appetite, or will would incline him to those higher and more noble objects agreeable to the Soule. But neither of these inclinations would crosse and trouble one another, the inferiour faculties, like the lower Spheares would moue differently from the superiour: but yet most orderly according to their owne nature, without impeaching the Motions of the other. Each faculty in it's place would worke orderly in sweet harmony and agreement each with other, had not Sinne brought in confusion and discord into the world, as betweene God and Man: so betweene Man and himselfe. This we further make good by this argument. Whatsoeuer is naturall, and so without blame in Man: that Christ took one him—But these inordinate Motions of the sensitiue appetite, repugnant vntounto Will and Reason; Christ tooke not on him—Ergo they are not naturall, and without blame. The Maior we proue by that, Phil. 3. 7. He was made like vntounto Man: and Heb. 2. 17. In all things it behoued him to be made like vntounto his Brethren. And againe, Chap. 4. 15. Wee hauehave not a high Priest which cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities: but was in all things tempted in like sort: yet without Sinne. Whence 'tis manifest that Christ taking on him our Nature, tooke on him all the properties of our Nature, and with all such infirmities of our Nature as not sinfull in themselues, or the effects or punishments of Sinne in vsus. If therefore it be naturall vntounto Man, that the Motions of the sensitiue appetite should preuent and be repugnant vntounto Reason, and that this is no Sinne except consent make it so: then certainly Christ had in him such motions and inordinate desires. But to affirme that, there were in Christ such disorderly Motions of his inferiour Faculties, repugnant vntounto his Reason and Will, is a blasphemie against the immaculate Lambe of God, Christ was indeed tempted (as the text saith) and in like sort as we are: but will any Man heere vnderstand this of inward Temptations arirising from any thing within Christ, as if he were like vntounto vsus drawne aside withbIam. 1. … Concupiscence and inticed, the motions of his sensitiue faculties, inclining him to that which was contrary to his vnderstanding and will? We confesse that he was fiercely tempted by Satan and wicked Men from without: but that he was tempted by any thing in himselfe, by disorderly Motions of his heart tending vntounto euill, and ergo checked by his will and Reason, this we account an abominable Errour touching the spotlesse humanity of our Sauiour. Wherein we deny, that there euer was any the least disorderly desire, thought, word, or worke whatsoeuer. And therefore we conclude, that such motions are not naturall vntounto Men, becomming sinfull only by accident, because they are consented vntounto: but they are accidentall vntounto him, being the fruit of originall Corruption, and are in themselues verily and properly Sinnes.
For Conclusion of this point, let vsus heare that Argument which Bell. makes.4 Arg. Bell.
4. Where there is no Law,cLib. 4. cap. 1…. there is no sinne. Rom. 4. 10.
But there is no Law prescribed vntounto sense and sensuall appetites. Ergo The Motions thereof are not sinfull.
The Maior we grant. The Minor he proues▪ Because the Law praesupposeth Reason in all that whereto it is giuen. But the sensitiue part of Man is without Reason, and ergo not capable of a Law, according as it is in bruite beasts, to whom ergo no Law is giuen. This he further proues by that place, Rom. 7. 20. Now if I doe that I would not, it is no more I that doe it, but Sinne that dwelleth in me. Where 'tis plaine (saith Bell.) that the Apostle did not sinne, because he lusted against his will. 'Twas not he did the worke: but 'twas the Sinne in him. Wherefore he saith afterward. That in his mind, i. e. in his superior faculties he serued the Law of God: and kept it: although in his flesh, i. e. sensitiue appetite and inferiour faculties he serued the Law of sin: yet, for all that he sinned not in so doing, because sinne cannot be but in the minde, and the Law is not giuen to those facul…ies that be vnreasonable.
To this we answere. That God giues no Law to vnreasonable Creatures, but such as hauehave Reason. The sensitiue faculties of bruite-beasts hauehave no other Rule then Natures instinct, which guides and moderates their seuerall motions in due order and measure. But in man those inferiour faculties how euer vnreasonable, are yet capable of Reasons Gouernment, which according to Gods Law prescribes vntounto the motions of the sensitiue appetite their measure and bounds, beyond which they may not passe. If a man were vncorrupt, the appetite would obey this rule of Reason and keepe it selfe within those prescribed Bounds. But being now corrupt by Sinne, it breakes out beyond this compasse and ouerbeares Reason and will, which in their sinfull weaknes are not able to bridle these vnrulie motions. wherefore when Bell. saieth. That the Law is giuen to the reasonable will, not to the sensiue appetite; it is vtterly false: Because in Man it is probable of gouernment, and so subject to the Law. Our Reason hath euen in this our corrupted estate a ciuill command ouer our appetite and affections; so that it can moderate them by faire persuasions now and then. That which it can doe sometimes, it ought to doe alwaies, and if any affections can obey Reason at sometimes, were they not infected with Sinne, they would doe it at all times. And if they doe well when they obey, certainly they doe euill when they disobey. And ergo such motions of them, as are repugnant to right reason, are nothing but rebellion against God's Law. As to the place in the 7. Rom. we answere. That that Interpretation of it which Bell. brings is most peruerse and against all Sense. The Apostle complaines that he did the Euill, which he would not; no doubt in so doeing he did sinne. But what is it now which committed this guilt or sinne? It is not I that doe it saieth the Apostle: but that sinne that dwelleth in me. That is, according to Bell: not I in my mind, or superior faculties of Reason and Will: but my inferior Appetite and affections which doe this euill against my consent. So the meaning shalbe Concupiscence in that duell in the Apostle committed Sinne: but the Apostle himselfe committed it not. Which is very absurd. As if a cholericke-Man hauing done a mischiefe in his anger should sa…e, It were not he did it; but his raging passion: or an adulterer, that 'twas not he committed the Sinne; but his sinfull Affection that carried him further then reason would. So that if God will punish such a sinne; he must not punish him: but onelyonly his sensitiue appetite which was in fault. This is ridiculous, for besides that it crosseth the Romanists Doctrine manifestly; in teaching that such disorderly motions of the sensitiue appetite be no sinnes, which heere the Apostle contradicts, saying plainly (that the Sinne which dwelt in him did doe the euill he would not. (viz, Sinne:) it draweth after it this grosse Error. That some faecultie in man may sin, and yet the man not sinne himselfe. Wherefore the Apostle in that speach, 'Tis not I doe it: but sinne in me. doth not oppose one facultie against the other, the reasonable will, against the sensitiue appetite, seeking for a shift to excuse his sinne, by putting it off from himselfe, to that which was not capable of Sinne: but he opposeth grace in eueryevery facultie to Corruption in the same facultie; as two contrarie Principles and causes of his actions, one mouing to good; the other enclining to bad. Thence the Apostle saieth, that (when he doth euill) 'tis not I that doe it. i. e, I regenerate according to the Grace, that dwelleth in me, for that inclines me to doe good: but 'tis the Sinne dwelling in me which (when I would doe well) inclines me to doe euill. He heere shewes the Roote, whence this Euill comes: but yet he doth not put off the fault from himselfe. As 'tis himselfe doth well: so 'tis himself… doth ill too, according as he concludes. vers 25. Then I my selfe. foreign doe both well and ill; well, according to Grace, in my mind that is regenerate, part both of inferior and superior facultie. I serue the Law of God; but ill according to corruption remaining in me: but in my flesh, vnregenerate part the Law of Sinne. Much more might be added: but 'tis not my purpose, heere to enter vponupon the common place at large,
I proceed to the second quaestion of our Aduersaries, who teach that albeit our LoueLove of God be imperfect: yet this imperfection is not sinne in vsus. They grant. That no man hath any grace of the spirit: but he may encrease in it daily. that the LoueLove of God and our Neighbours may still grow on to farther degrees of affection; That no grace, nor good worke hath that full perfection, which it might hauehave in this Life, or which we shall attaine vntounto in Heauen. But they deny this defect to be any fault or sinne.
2. Defectus Charitatis quod (viz) non faciamus opera nostra tanto feruore dilectionis,Excep…ion. quanto faciemus in patriâ,Be… lib. 4 c. 10. … 17. … cap. …. defectus quidemest: sed culpa & peccatum non est. saieth Bell. and againe Charitas nostra quamuis comparata ad Charitatem beatorum, sit imperfecta: tamen absolute perfecta dici potest.
This is an Error, against which we defend this Conclusion in generall, touching both Charity and all man Righteousnes.
The defects or want of Perfection in Mans Righteousnes is Sinne.Conclusion. contr.
For the proofe of this point we are to obserue, that the Imperfection, or Perfection of any thing is to be considered of two waies.
1 Comparatiuely. When any thing set by another is more or lesse perfect, then that other.
2 Absolutely. When considered in it selfe, it hath or wantes that Perfection which it should hauehave by its proper Nature.
Betweene these there is great difference. For Comparatiue imperfection is not euill: absolute imperfection is Euill. We may see it in an example, The Senses that are in Man being compared with their like in other creatures, 'tis manifest they are much excelled by them, as by an Eagle for sight, a spider for touch. &c. Heere we say that the eie of a man is not perfect as the eie of an Eagle: but yet we doe not account this imperfection any Naturall euill of the eie of a man. God might hauehave giuen a stronger and a clearer sight to men: but we, blame not his workes; nor count our sight imperfect because it hath not that singular Temper which is in other Creatures; but because it wants at any time that temper which is agreeable to our nature. Such a defect only, is properly an Euill in Nature, when something is wanting to the perfection of any part, which by the Course of nature should be there. Thus 'tis also in Grace. Compare we the Righteousnes of man, or Angels, with the Righteousnes of God; we saie that God's is infinitely more perfect then the Creatures. But now is this imperfection in Humane or Angelicall righteousnes any Euill and Sinne in them? We saie No. Neither are the Angels sinfull because lesse righteous then God: nor Adam sinfull because lesse righteous then either. God made them both lesse good then himselfe: yet very good and without all Sinne. There be degrees of Righteousnes, and though the Creature be infinitely below the heighest pitch of goodnes (which is God:) yet he may bee still aboue that lowest descent vntounto Sinne and vnrighteousnes. In Phylosophie we dispute whether the slackening of any degree in one Quality, be the mingling of another that is contrary. As heat in eight degrees if it decrease vntounto seuen, whether there is any degree of cold mingled with it. 'Tis heard to say that there is. But concerning Grace and Righteousnes 'tis certaine, there is that remissio graduum without any admixtion of Sinne and iniquity. As the Holines of Saints is lesse then that of Angels; that of Angels lesse then the Holines of Christs glorified Humanity, this lesse then his Diety. And yet in the least of these Righteousnesses there is no Vnrighteousnes at all to be found, no not in the seuere judgement of God. Except we say there is vnrighteousnes in Heauen where no vncleane thing can enter. Well then. What Imperpection of mans Righteousnes is it, which is Sinne? We say. That Imperfection, when man in any Grace or good Worke wantes that degree of goodnes, which he ought to hauehave. As in nature. If the Eye want that cleernes of sight which should be in it: 'tis a naturall Euill. In Morality if a man want that Temperance or degree of Temperance he ought to hauehave, its a vitious and morall euill: so in Grace the want of that righteousnes or degree of righteonsnes which God requires to be in man, is a Sinne and spirituall Euill. All such priuations of what should be present are Euill in what kind soeuer. If they be in nature they be malamiseranda, deserue pity and cure: if in Vertue and Grace; they be mala culpanda worth of blame and punishment. Such defects as these in Grace, when man fals short, not onelyonly of that which is in others; but that which should be in himselfe, doe alwaies arise from the mixture of Corruption and Sinne. Hee that loues n…t God or his neighbour so much as he ought to doe: 'tis because his heart be wicked, at the least in part; and that he loues others things more then he should doe. These things are certaine and vndeniable according to those words of St. Augustin that are authenticall. a…Profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est. And againe.bLib. de perfect. …. 15 Pec…atum est, vel cum non est charitas, quae esse debet: vel minor est quam debet. 'Tis a Sinne, not to louelove. God at all: or to louelove him lesse then we should. Wherefore heere we aske the Iesuite whether Charity and other Graces in a man regenerate be so perfect in this Life, as they ought to be? If he say, they be not so perfect, as they ought to be. how can he affirme that this defect is no fault nor Sinne: Can a man possibly doe worse, or be worse then he should; and yet be i… no fault therefore? If he say they be as perfect as they should be, his owne Conscience and the Conscience of all the men in the World will gain-say him for a liar. No man can say, that he loues God and his Neighbour asmuch as he ought to doe: and that he is not bound in eueryevery grace and good worke to ariue at greater perfection, then hee hath for the present. He that thinkes himselfe come nearest vntounto the marke, will yet be driuen to confesse, that he fals many bowes short of those patternes which we ought to imitate, Adam in his Innocency; Christs Humanity, and the Saints in Heauen. Wee here bid them (Depinge ubi sistam) make a point where we shall stoppe: that when we are come so farre, we need seeke no further perfection. If they cannot do this, then they must confesse, as the truth is, that eueryevery man is bound by Gods command to be more holy, to be more perfect in all Graeces and good workes; and so farre as he wants any degree or dramme of goodnesse, that should be in him and his works, so farre he is sinfull and guilty of a fault.
3 I goe on to the last Assertion of our Aduersaries, 3 Exception. Bell. lib. 4 c. 17.which is to…ching veniall sinnes, (viz.) That these doe not hinder the righteousnesse of mens good workes. A man may be a perfect iust man, though he commit many veniall sinnes. The reason whereof they make to be [because veniall sinnes are not contrary to charity, the louelove of God and our neighbour, and so may stand well enough with the fulfilling of the Law.
Against this errour, tending to the obduration of mans hart in impenitency & louelove of sin: we maintain this conclusiō.
Those sinnes which the Church of Rome cals veniall,Conclusion contr. doe truly make a man regenerate, and his workes vnrighteousnesse in the sight of God.
This we proue by this one Argument.
Whosoeuer transgresseth the Law, he is vnrighteous in so doing.
But he that commits veniall sinnes, transgresseth the Law. Ergo, He that commits veniall sinnes is an vnrighteous man.
The Maior is vndeniable. For the Minor our Aduersarie is at a stand. They are loath to grant it: yet cannot tell how to deny it with any honesty. Bellarmine after one or two shuffling distinctiōs of simpliciter, …. 4. cap. 14.& secundum quid; perfectè and imperfectè, at last plainly denies that veniall sinnes be contrary to the Law. For answering vntounto those places in Iames. [In many things we offend all,] and that in Iohn. [If we say we hauehave no sinne, we deceiue our selues.] Hee saith they cannot hansomly shift themselues of those places, who hold that veniall sinnes be [propriè contra Legem.] Such as bee of that opinion [Let them looke to it (saith he) what they will answere to that of Saint Iames.] He that keepes the Law in one point, &c.] He therefore will be more wise and wary. [Sol…da igitur respensio est (saith he) Peccata venialia, sine quibus non viuitur, non esse peccata simpliciter, sed imperfectè & secundum quid: neque esse contra Legem, sed praerer Legem.] And thus saith he, Omnia cohaerent (like a Pebble in a Withe) [Nam qui ostendit in vno praeuaricans scilicet vnum praeceptum, reus est omnium & simpliciter iniustus constituitur & tamen in multis offendimus omnes, quia tametsi nihil facimus contra Legem; tamen multa facimus praeter Legem. Et qui …atus est ex Deo, non peccatat transgrediendo Legem, & tamen si dicamus q…ia peccatum non habemus. (viz.) nihil praeter Legem faciendo: no… ipsos seducimus, & veritas non est in Nobis.] This is an vnbound Besome, as will appeare by vndoing that distinction which seemes to hold it together. Veniall sinnes are not against the Law: but besides the Law. Well, we must now know what is against the Law, & what besides.…t…er meaning of these words [against] …nd [Besides] there can be … That is against the Law, when any thing is done which the Law forbids; or left vndone which it commands. That is besides the Law, when the thing done is neither cōmanded, nor forbidden in the Law. He then that commits a veniall sinne, doth some such act as the Law neither forbids nor commands. Here then we aske. Be veniall sinnes, sinnes? Yea, they be. Is God offended with them? Yea, and he may iustly punish them, on vsus with the losse of Heauen. For so Bellarmine himselfe confesseth.Lib. 4. cap. vse. [Peccata venialia nisi misericorditer remittantur impediunt ab ingressu illius Regni in quod nihil coinquinatum intrare potest.] Now sure this is admirable, that such acts as these should defile a man, deserue hell, offend God, in a word be sinnes, and yet for all this neither commanded nor forbidden in any Law of God. Was there euer such a toy heard of as this? as Sinnes beside the Law. Tis a most ridiculous contradiction, Peccatum praeter Legem. He that doth any thing beside the Law, not mentioned, nor include … therein by way of prohibition or command, tis most apparent he sinnes not, nor offends not at all. For whom doth he offend, or who can challenge him of Sinne? Doth God the Law-giuer? No, for twas not his intention to command or forbid such an act, and ergo, be it done or not done, it crosseth not his will: nor hath he any reason to finde fault or be displeased at it. Satan or Man cannot accuse him. For let them then shew the Law that prooues him an offender. If they cannot alleadge a Law against which he hath transgressed: they wrongfully accuse him of a fault. Were it not absurd accusation against a prisoner at the Barre; to say that he hath indeed done nothing against the Lawes of the Land: but many things besides the Law not forbidden nor commanded in the Law, those hee hath done and deserues to be punished for it as an offender?
But now if those veniall sinnes bee mentioned in Gods Law: then are such actions either commanded or forbidden. If commanded, then the not doing of such a thing, is plainely contrary to the Law. As for example.c… To steale a penny, or some other small matter, to please an idle word, to tell an officious lie; these be veniall sinnes say our Aduersaries. But how hnow they, they be sinnes? who told them so? The Scriptures they will say. Where? In the 8 and 9 Commandement. Aske them now. Did God intend in those Commandements to forbid those actions of stealing and lying? Yea, or No? If he intended it not; then tis no sinne at all to doe them, seeing it cro…seth not Gods will, nor offends him. If he did intend to forbid vsus those things: then to doe them is a sinne, manifestly contrary to the holy will of God, the Lawgiuer. Wherfore let vsus here remēber that excellent rule of Bernard. Bernard de Praecept… Dispen.[Non iussa quïdem licitè vtrumlibet, vel admittuntur vel omittuntur: iussa vero sine culpa non negleguntur, sine crimine non …ontemnuntur. For things not commanded: we may either lawfully doe them or leaue them: but for things commanded, to neglect them is a sinne, to contemne them is a haynous crime. Wherefore this distinction of sins against, and sinnes beside the Law falleth to dust: and our Minor Proposition stands firme: That he who committeth veniall Sinne, transgresseth the Law of God, and therefore is vnrighteous for his so doing.
aTom. 2. tract. 2 cap 2 q. 2.Becanus here forsakes the Cardinall in this distinction: and helpes him by an other deuis…. He grants that Veniall Sinnes be against the Law, and proues it, [because eueryevery Veniall Sinne is moraliter malum, and Ergo contra rectam rationemet Legem aeternam.) But heres now the distinction: It is one thing to be contra Legem; another contra finem Legis. All Veniall sinnes be against the Law: but no veniall sinne is properly against the end of the Law. that is, against Charity the LoueLove of God or our Neighbour. Is not this a superfine Inuention?foreign. Man. confess praelud. …. Num. 16. As if a Subiect that hath in many things broken the Law, should say. True my faults be against the Law of the Land: but yet they are not against the end of those Lawes. viz. obedience to my Prince, and LoueLove to the good of him and my Country. Though I break the Lawes: yet I would not hauehave you thinke; but I louelove and honour my Prince and Country well enough. Iust so the Iesuits. A man may commit many sinnes against Gods Law: and yet obserue the end of the Law, in louing God with all his heart; and his Neighbour as himselfe. Then which nothing can be more senselesse, that a man should offend God in breaking of his Law: and yet not withstanding louelove God with his whole heart. That a man should wrong his Neighbour doing that to him which he would not hauehave done to himselfe: and yet, for all that, louelove his Neighbour as himselfe. (If ye louelove mee keepe my Commandem…nts) saith Christ. Iohn. 14. 15. Nay (say the Romanists) we louelove him and yet breake his Commandements. (LoueLove doth none eu…l to his Neighbour) saith the Apostle Romans. 13.. 10 Nay (say the Iesuits) LoueLove may doe euill to his Ne…ghbour: and yet keepe the name of louelove. A man may be angry with another without cause, reuile him, and call him Racha, hee may defraude him in small matters (for these they make veniall sinnes) and yet in the meane time, all this without breath of Charity. Himselfe would not willingly be so vsed: but hee will vse another in this sort; and yet looke to bee thanked for his louelove too. Such grosse absurdities doe our Aduersaries runne in to, by coyning such senselesse distinctions of (Sinnes not against: but besides the Law) of sinnes not against the end of the Law: though against the Law it selfe. Our Consciences cannot be satisfied with such silly shiftes: and therefore we leaue them vntounto those that can content themselues; and choake vp their Consciences with a little sophistry. Men who make a pastime of sinne; and take liberty to qualifie and dispence with Gods Law as they thinke agreeable to their Conscience; hoping by tricks of wit and dodging Distinctions to a void the accusations of Conscience, and to elude the seuerity of Gods Iudgement.