Exposition of Romans 8-11, Chapter 9 · Verses 19-23
VERSE 19. Thou ſhalt ſay vntounto me, Why doth he yet finde fault? for who hath reſiſted his will? and ſo to the end of the 23. verſe.
THe Apoſtle in the 18. verſe ſaid, that GOD hardeneth whom he will: againſt this, wicked men cauill, and Paul anſweres, verſe 19.20,21,22,23.
There are two parts. 1. The Cauillers obiection, verſe 19. 2. The Apoſtles anſwere, verſe 20, 21, 22, 23.
Why doth he yet finde fault? That is, ſo as he puniſheth.
Who hath reſiſted his will? The will of God is diſtinguiſhed to be his ſecret or reuealed will.
His ſecret will, is the will of his good pleaſure, whereby he determineth of things which himſelfe will doe. His reuealed, is that which is manifeſted in his Word, commanding things to be done by vsus. His reuealed will is refuſed of the wicked; his ſecret cannot be reſiſted of any.
The Interrogations imply Negatiues: as thus: If his Will be the Cauſe of Reprobation, then he hath no reaſon to complaine, Becauſe his Will cannot be reſiſted.
Here are two parts. Firſt, the obiection. Secondly, the proofe.
The obiection in theſe words: Why doth hee yet finde fault? It is formed thus;
If Gods will be the cauſe of our Hardning: hee hath no cauſe to finde fault.
But the laſt is denyed. Therefore the firſt.
The Propoſition is proued, thus.
Whoſe will bringeth a neceſſitie of ſinning, hee hath no cauſe to finde fault with thoſe ſinners.
But Gods will brings a neceſſitie, and cannot bee reſiſted.
Therefore.
Concerning this Obiection, before we come to Pauls anſwere, wee will propound two Queſtions: in the anſwering of which, the force and infirmitie of this cauill will appeare.
Quest. 1. Whether a Reprobate be in ſuch an eſtate, that he cannot but ſinne?
Queſt. 2. If hee be in ſuch an eſtate. Whether it doth excuſe him?
Anſw. 1. To the firſt, I anſwere affirmatiuely, proued, Gen. 6.5. Ier. 12.23. Iam. 2.12. Mat. 18. So that a Neceſſitie of ſinning lyes vponupon Reprobates: which is double. 1. Of Nature. 2. Of the Decree.
The firſt is Inward, comming from an inward beginning, which being corrupt, of neceſsity that which proceedes from it, muſt be corrupt alſo. As fire, heat, the ſunne, light: ſo corruption bringeth forth euill neceſſarily. Ioh. 3.6.That which is borne of the fleſh, is fleſh. So that, though the act it ſelfe of volition be alwaies moſt free, yet now, through corruption of nature, all mens wills are neceſſarily, both weake to attaine the good, and peruerſly inclined to that which is euill.
The other neceſſity is that which followeth the decree. For things are neceſſarily vponupon ſuppoſition that God had decreed them. Principiatū ſequitur natura principij.Yet the decree is not the cauſe of ſinne, nor compelleth thereunto: but God finding the nature corrupt, decrees of it as he findes it.
Ʋſe. 1.The Philoſophers erred, who thought none were euill by nature, but by imitation; and that vice is not borne with vsus, but comes afterward.Erras, ſi exiſtimes nobiſcū naſci vitia, ſuperuenerunt, ingeſta ſunt. Sene. ep. 9.6.
Vſe 2.Alſo the opinion of the Papiſts, and Arminius, is hereby confuted; vvho hold a power in the vvil, of it ſelfe not to ſin. For the vnderſtanding of the trueth herein, we will firſt note what Free-will is. Secondly, what neceſſity is to be meant in this queſtion. Thirdly, the difference of actions. Free-will is a facultie in an intelligent nature, freely chuſing or refuſing the obiect, as it appeareth vnderunder the ſhew of good or euil. The forme of this freedome is, that by an inward beginning, it freely, without any violence, affects or reiects the obiect.
This freedome is diſtinguiſhed, to be a liberty of cōtrariety or contradiction. The firſt is, when we chuſe one of two oppoſites, as good or euill. The latter is, when one thing beeing propounded, we freely chuſe it, or refuſe it. The firſt vvas in Adam, and (being of moralls) is not in vsus. In the ſecond, the obiect is to be diſtinguiſhed: for it may either generally be conſidered, or particularly. If generally as euill, then we hauehave not this liberty: If particularly as this euill, then we may hauehave ſuch liberty.
Neceſſitie is two-fold; of coaction, of immutabilitie. The firſt is contrary to the nature of the will; the ſecond is not.
Actions are either naturall, as to eate, drinke, ſpeake, &c. or ciuill, as to buy and ſell, &c. or morall, as with or againſt the Law: or ſupernaturall, as to belieue and repent.
In ſome naturall actions there is a liberty of contrariety & contradiction. So alſo in ciuill. In morall, there is no liberty of contradiction in the generall, but in particular.
In good actions, as they are rightly performed, there is no libertie at all in a reprobate, or vnregenerate man, qua talis.
The Queſtion between the Aduerſaries and vsus, is about the libertie of Contrariety in good and euill in the generall. The libertie of the will is not taken away: the liberty of the perſon is. For Adams liberty is taken away, but the liberty of the will is not, neither can be, but that whatſoeuer it chuſeth, or refuſeth, it chuſeth or refuſeth freely.
The liberty of contrarietie, is rather a liberty of the ſtate of a perſon, then of the will: and ſo a neceſſity of ſinning & free-will may ſtand together. A neceſſity, I ſay, not of coaction, but of immutabilitie, both by an inward beginning, and alſo by the decree, and a freedome I ſay of contradiction, but not of contrarietie.
Arminius thinketh, that if the will bee determined to one part, it loſeth the freedome, which is manifeſtly falſe. For God is the moſt free Agent, yet is his wil, by a moſt abſolute neceſſity, tied vntounto that which is good: he being both moſt freely and moſt neceſſarily good.
The Diuell is now by a double neceſſitie euill, and yet freely euill: ſo our wills are free, though determined, becauſe they are not compelled. And whereas the Arminius auouch, Vide Aug. tractat. 26. in Ioh.that God cannot determine the will to one part, without deſtroying it, it is neere vntounto blaſphemy. If Orators can perſwade by their eloquence, cannot God, by the ſweet power of his Spirit ſo perſwade the heart, and determine it that it cannot actually reſiſt, whatſoeuer the poſſibility be in regard of nature vncorrected? If they ſay that ſuch poſsibilitie ſtill remaines in the wil to come into act; I would faine know what good they wil ſay the Spirit hath done in vsus, whē the nature of our wills is as euill diſpoſed as before grace receiued? If God cannot determine our wills infallibly to one part, then it ſhall be poſsible for the holy Angels and glorified Saints to fall from their happineſſe, which is horrible to affirme. For they hold that the will of man loſt nothing of its inward vertue by Adams ſinne: not receiues any vertue or ſtrength from grace in the way to conuerſion.
But to returne, wee thus conclude; that the vnregenerate ſinne freely, and yet neceſſarily: yea, by how much the more neceſſarily, by ſo much the more freely, becauſe their wil hath brought vponupon them this neceſsitie. Our will is alwaies free, though it be not alwaies good.
Ob. If there be no other freedome, vvhy are wee exhorted to chuſe the good, and to refuſe the euill?
An. The reaſon is ſet downe by Leo; Ideo datur praeceptū, & praecipientis quaeratur auxiliū. Leo ſer. 11. de Quadra.Therefore (ſaith hee) is the precept giuen, that perceiuing our weaknes, wee might ſeek for helpe from him that gaue it. And indeed hence wee ſhould be admoniſhed, to ſeek the ſetting free of our wills frō euill vntounto good; which is onelyonly by the power of God: that as in the ſtate of corruption wee hauehave a free neceſsity vntounto euill; ſo in the ſtate of regeneration (perfect) wee may hauehave a free neceſsity vntounto that which is good.Voluntas quae libera eſt in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo non eſt libera in bonis quia non eſt liberata. Aug. contra 2. Epiſt. Pelag. l. 1. c. 2.
To the ſecond Queſtion, the anſwere is negatiue: though a man that is borne lame, is to be excuſed before men for his halting, becauſe he was ſo borne: yet wicked men and reprobates are not excuſable before God for their ſinning, either by the neceſsitie of nature or of the Decree.
Not by neceſsity of nature. For its the nature of the diuell to doe euill, yet none excuſe him: Its the nature of an Adder to ſting deadly, yet we ſpare them not: ſo we are born in ſin, yet the Saints excuſe not thēſelues by it, but rather condemne themſelues for it, as Dauid and Paul. Pſalm. 51. Rom. 7.Beſides, not God but our ſelues hath layd this neceſsity vponupon vsus. Adam willinglie obeyed the voice of his wife, and brought vponupon vsus this condition which I call neceſsity. Indeed, if God had created vsus vnderunder ſuch a neceſsity, or now did compell vsus, we deſiring to doe good, there might be ſome excuſe: but it is not ſo; nor ſo.
Neither doth the neceſsitie of the Decree excuſe. For God doth not by his decree force vsus to euill, but finding vsus euill, & prone onelyonly vntounto it of our ſelues, hee decrees wee ſhall be ſo: and knowes that ſo we would be, though hee ſhould neuer decree. And thus he leaues vsus to our ſelues, who hauehave no more power to leaue ſinning, then a ſtone hath, not to goe downeward if it hauehave no impediment.
God forceth not the drunkard, or ſwearer, but they voluntarily, and with deſire commit theſe ſinnes, as their owne conſciences teſtifie. Iudas did nothing but by the Decree of God, yet he was not forced, but did that which he did, of his own accord moſt freely, his heart being ſet vponupon couetouſneſſe.
God gouernes the wils of the wicked, but hee takes not away either the will from man, or freedome from the will, but he moues their wils according to their owne Natures, as hee moues the heauens with a circular motion, fit for the nature of it. And when God moues, then the will freely deliberates, and willingly of it ſelfe conſents. So that wee may conclude this, with that of Bernard: Bernard ſer. 8. ſuper cant.The will bringeth a Neceſſitie vponupon it ſelfe, ſo that neither the Neceſſitie can excuſe the Will, nor the Will exclude the Neceſſitie.
When Adam finned, he blamed his Wife: and ſhe blamed God himſelfe, and we hauehave ſuckt the ſame milke. But remember thou, that God is not the cauſe of thy ſinne, but thy ſelfe. If thou ſmarteſt for thy faults, thanke thy abominable and wicked life, of which thou art the Cauſe: GOD the Auenger.