Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 18
The xviij. Chapter.
That God is mans souerein welfare, and therefore that the cheef marke which man should ame at, is to returne againe vntounto God.
WE say that the chéefe poynt wherein fooles differ from wisemen, is that fooles shoote out their dooings at allauenture into the aire, and that wise men direct all their dooings to some certeine end. And againe, that the poynt wherein good men differ from euill men, is that good men determine with themselnes vponupon the good things, and euill men vponupon the euill things, the good vppon that which is good in deede, and the euill vppon that which is good in showe. Therfore it standeth vsus greatly on hand, both to hauehave some one certeine marke, and the same to be good: & to hauehave but one, because God hath giuen vsus but one wit, and the perfection of wit is wizdome: and to hauehave the same good, because he hath giuen vsus but one will, and the perfection of the will is goodnes. Surely God being the very goodnes and wizdome it selfe, was not without this one marke and the same very good, when he first created al things. For Nature (say the Philosophers) doth nothing otherwise than well and to a good ende. If they spake so of the Handmayd, what shall we say of the Mayster of the house? But forasmuch as he him self is the beginner, the holder on, and the ender of all things: he in all his doings did not set downe any other end than himselfe.Things are said to be good, either by cause they come to good end, or were purposed to a good end. We his creatures, who take our beginning and continuance from him, can hauehave none other end than him. Yet notwithstanding, the reaso… creature wisheth well to it selfe, and doth alwaies purpose a certeyne end with it selfe, which it thinketh to be behooffull. For the end of eueryevery thing, is the peculiar good, benefite, or welfare therof: and this desire being in vsus by kynd, cannot be in vayne. Therefore it must néedes be that the true welfare of man consisteth in his true ende or in his true amingpoynt: and that the true amingpoynt of man, and the ende which the Creator intended, must méete iumpe together:Mannes end or amingpoynt and his welfare consist or rest both in one thing. That is to wit, he must imploye himselfe to the glorie of God, whose creating of all things was for his owne glorie, and by tending thitherward atteyne to his owne welfare, which is ye thing that all things doe naturally seeke. And therefore if we finde either mans chiefe amingpoynt, or his souereyne welfare; we finde them both: for they be both but one selfesame thing; which in respect that his witte looketh thereat, is called his amingpoynt, and in respect that his will resteth thereon, is called his welfare, both of them together being the restingpoint of the whole man. And vntounto this end is he to applye himselfe and all his motions, all his indeuers and all his desires, as to his highest felicitie benefite and welfare.
Now,The Mark… whereby to knowe the amingpoynt and welfare of Man. had we continued in our originall nature, we should hauehave had no payne at all to séeke them: for our wit was inlightened with the sight of our marke, and our will was drawen by our welfare, that is to say, by GOD by whom and for whom we were created; whereas now through our pride our eyes are gazing at all things, sauing our right way and our chief welfare. Yet notwithstanding, wee may trace it out by certeyne markes, specially if wee beare in mynd that we be falne: for then wee will not stand groping for it in the filth of the things that are here beneath, as folke amazed at our fall; but wee will seeke for it in the grace and in the face of our maker from whence we be falne. For like as when we seeke to knowe the vse and goodnesse of a toole (as for example, of a Sawe,) wee consider it not by the rustinesse thereof that hath eaten away the téeth, or by the breakes that it hath taken by some falles; but by the téeth thereof which are sound, sharpe, and smooth, such as they were when they came newe out of the Sythemakers shop: euen so must we doe with man; we must not iudge of his end by the blyndnesse, ignorance, naughtinesse, and corruptnesse that is come vponupon him, but by the excellencie, goodnesse, and light that was in him at the first when GOD created him. Also wee iudge not of the vse of the Sawe by the mettall thereof in that it is Stéele, or in that it hath a handle, or in that it hath an edge to cut withall: for a knife hath all things, which yet notwithstanding is neuer the more a Sawe for all that: but we déeme thereof by some peculiar shape, and by some propertie of the téeth therof, which make it to differ, not only from a Knife, the which hath no téeth, but also from a Fyle which hath téeth, howbeit of another sort. Then let vsus doe the like still in man. If wee déeme of the vse whereto God hath appoynted him, by that he liueth, or by that he hath sences; what néedeth man to be made, seeing that the Plants are indewed with life, and the brute Beasts both with life and sence? But now hath he made Man, and he hath not made him in vayne. The vse of him therefore is to be taken, of that part which GOD hath giuen him specially and peculiarly to make him a man; of that (I say) which maketh him to differ from the things which hauehave but onelyonly being, life, and sence: I meane the very highest part of his Soule. Againe, the fayd perticular shape which giueth a perticular vse to the Sawe, is common to all tooles which beare the name of a Sawe: and therefore the special propertie of Man which giueth him a peculiar vse which no other Creature hath, must néedes bee after such a sort peculiar vntounto him, as it may neuerthelesse bee common to all of the same kynd: that is to say, as al men are created with that propertie, so all men must tend to that end. And forasmuch as that end is the souereyne welfare of Man; it hath consequently certeyne markes or tokens whereby it is to bee knowne. Man feareth nothing more than his end, neither desireth he any thing so much as to continue for euer: and yet notwithstanding the souereine welfare is the end of Man: and therefore it must néedes bee an end without end; and end which doth not consume or waste, so as the thing which tendeth to it should therby be fordone: but which perfecteth & fulfilleth it, so as beyond it there is not aught that can bee desired or be. If there were any other beyond it, it were neither an end, nor souereine or chief. But for such a one doe we seeke. And if it could eyther waste or perish, we might be afrayd to lose it: and the greater that the pleasure were, the greater also should the greefe thereof bee. But the propertie of felicitie or happinesse is, to content the desire & to exclude feare. Now then, as touching the thing which we seeke; in respect that we seeke it as our end, it behoueth it to bee agreeable to the very nature of Man, peculiar to the whole kynd, and common to all that be of the kynd: and in respect that it is our souereine welfare, it behoueth it to bee vniuersall, perfect, and continuall. And now let vsus see what that may be.
Surely if we consider man and the world;The world is not the end to which man was made. in man the Sences, and in the World the sensible things: man as the beholder, and the world as a Theatre: man as the guest, in the world the Feast prepared of all things conuenient for him: we will say by and by, not only that they be made the one for the other, but also that in very deede the World was made for man, and not man for the World or for any thing therein. And ageine, if we consider how that in the World there is wherewith to content the eye the eare and all the sences; but nothing that can sufficiently content the mynd, the which (as earthly as it is) passeth from the things visible to the inuisible, from the bodily to the gostly, and from the creatures to the maker: shall we not easily conclude (which thing I will treate of more at large hereafter) that as the worlde cannot be mans ende, so can it not also be his contentation? And yet notwithstanding man is not created for nought; neither is the desire of his owne welfare planted in him to no purpose. For as say the Philosophers, nature hath made nothing in vayn, neither is she maymed in things needfull. Therefore it must needs be, and otherwyse it cannot be, but that the creator is the end and contentment of man, whose mynd cannot be satisfyed nor his will contented to the full, if any part of him do rest vppon these vyle and transitorie things. By the way whereas we comonly affirme that God is both the end and the welfare of all things for that then he guyded and led whither soeuer be listeth by his prouidence, and also be made partakers of his goodnes: we must vnderstand that this is verified of man after a …ore high and excellent maner. Of the Creatures here beneathe, some hauehave but sence and appetite, and other some but only a bare inclination of nature: only man hath witte aud will, which make him a man. Now all these are vnfall…y directed whether soeuer it pleaseth God, as the arrowe is leueled at some marke by the Archer, who shooteth the Arrow streyght though it hauehave no eye to see with. But man by a peculiar pruiledge hath an vnderstanding wit which was giuen vntounto him cleere sighted and cleane, that he might see the marke whereat he is leueled, and will, which he receyued frank and free, that he myght repose all his delyght therein: the one to knowe and discerne it, the other to louelove aud imbrace it; the one to see, and behold it, the other to obteyne and enioy it. Nowthen, as the hither end of all Creatures here beneathe is man, and the furthest end of them is God: so the neerest and immediate end of man is to knowe God, and his only welfare is to sticke wholy vntounto him.
Let vsus imagin man as much as we list,God is the end or Marke that Man ameth a…. to be stil as sound as euer he was: yet what end, or what contentment could he hauehave but only God? We make greate account of riches; what could he be the better which had gotten all, or which had all riches gotten for him all ready to his hand? For what els is the getting of this world, but a proofe of want and pouertie? we esteeme hyghly of honor, of vaine tytles, and of dignities: And what els are all these but a bayne gasing and wonderment of people, which can be none at all where no people are? Surely then was not man set in the world, to the intent that that should be his mark to ame at; and much lesse could he seeke his contentment there. Yet notwithstanding he had receyued more wit than we hauehave, and not to no end. And therefore we must needes say it was to direct him to some further thing than vanitie, which at that tyme could hauehave no place at all. Some will say, his fouereine welfare consisted in his health. What was his health; but his very being, and what maketh he…th to be esteemed, but siknesse… and who longeth for it, but he that is diseased? But whereto serueth so excellent a wit, if it be to hauehave nothing more than ye brute beast? Another … it cōsisted in vertue. How in vertue, seeing yt vertue is nothing els but the subduing and conquering as affection by reason; whereof he was in possession already by nature, and had … it still without cōtradiction she had not of his owne … himself … who sees not that many brute beastes doe passe man in lyuely force both of life and sence? But in this alone he (as Plutark saith) doth passe them all. Secondly, it must neuerthelesse bee comon to all men. Now (as vtterly blinded and corrupted as we be) what is more common among vsus all, than the knowledge of God? If Riches and Honor bee the marke we shoote at; how feawe of so many men which leuell at it with Heart, Eye, Hand, and Sinewes, doe hit it? If our welfare consist in hauing our health, in béeing vertuous, in dealing vprightly, or in calmenesse of mynd; how feawe doo inioy it? On the contrarie part, who is so blynd, that he feeth not God, as soone as hee doth but looke out with his Eyes? or which findeth him not within him selfe? or which atteyneth not to him, if he looke aboue himselfe? And who seeth not this marke, so cleere that the world is but a shadowe to it? so great that the whole world is nothing to it; and so néere, as that we be not néerer to our selues? Or who can be afrayd to bee shut out from it, whose greatnes hath roome inough for all, and whose sufficiencie is such, as the former shotte can be no impediment to the latter to hauehave a lighting place? Surely therefore we may wel say, that if we had continued sound, we could hauehave had none other marke or end but him; for all things els had bin nothing. And now also for all that we be corrupted; we ought not to tend or intend to any other than him; for he alone can be all to all, and this poynt can be nowhere but in him. To be short, like as the Soule is the shape of man, so is the knowledge of God the true shape of al vnderstanding of man. Neuerthelesse, although the shape of man was disfigured in the first man, yet there remayneth a certeine comon conceiuing of God, howbeit so defaced and beslubbered, that either wee discerne him no more to bee our ende, though hee put vsus in mynd thereof on all sides; or els imagining our selues to leuell at that marke, we swarue aside one while to vngodlynes, and another whyle to superstition; or at leastwise we had leuer for the most part, to roue at eueryevery thing that our sences méete withall, and too wallowe in these bace things like Beastes which hauehave no more but their sences.
Thirdly in our souereine welfare, I required that it should bee vniuersall. Now where shall it be found to be so but in God, who is in deede the very good of all goodnes, and the very welfare of all welfare that is in the world? Also that it should be perfect and full. And what desire wee but the things that are? And what can hee want, which possesseth him in whome all things are? Againe, I added that the same must be euerlasting and vnchaungeable. Now who can bee so, but the maker of order and chaunge it selfe? and what thing see we heer… in this word, yea euen in our selues, which a …deth in one state by the space of two moments? To be short, if wee desire to content our sences, hee hath made sensible things for the …once; and if we desire to content our mynd, he himselfe is the things that are to be mynded. Where then is the thing to be recouered which we couet, but onelyonly in him? Now as touching this vniuersall souereine good, true it is that all of vsus are able too desire it, but for the most part of vsus, vnable to discerne it, and none of vsus able to atteine vntounto it. There remaineth nothing to vsus at all, I meane euen to the best of vsus since our fall, but a gréef that we hauehave it not any more, and that we be not able of ourselues to recouer it ageine héere belowe. Then let vsus say, that as it had bin a happy case for vsus, to hauehave continued still in our first state: so is it now for vsus to returne thither againe; that is to say, to be set againe in Gods fauour, that we may oneday see his face yet againe. And because this blessednes cānot be brought to perfection in this life so full of wretchednes: we must dispose our lyfe in this world, not to liue still in the world, but to dye in respect of these dead things, and to liue vntounto God; at leastwise if wee intend to liue the true lyfe, and to liue euerlastingly in him.
Now then wee see that wee hauehave found our true restingpoynt and our true welfare,The false ends and the false Welfares. that is to wit the turning ageine vntounto God, from whose fauour and fellowship we be departed. For proof therof, we neede but to examine from point to point the other ends and welfares which worldly men doe set downe to themselues, by the tokens & proofes which I hauehave made of the other already. Wherby as we shall find a common desirousenes in all men to seeke the welfare; so will we doubtlesse wonder at such diuersitie of tastes, which like to the lustings of them that hauehave the gréene Sicknesse, (who be greedy of Dust, Coales, Ashes and such other baggage) cannot but bewray vntounto vsus a straunge distemperature and corruption of our whole nature. Most men hauehave in all ages spent their whole life, either in raking togither of riches, or in Ambition, or in purchasing of Lands, or in puffing vp themselues with the wind of Pryde. And what can bee more contrarie to the lyking of our vnderstanding, than those things? The end whereto things tend, is better than the things themselues. What is it then for a man too …end himselfe to these outward things; but too shewe that wee be worse then Earth and Doong? And who would not beléeue that the Soule of man were infinitely lesse made for such things, than cloth of Gold to wrap vp myre and dirt in?
Also wee seeke the vttermost end of man.Riches. Now who is he that desireth not Riches for some other end, than for the Riches themselues? namely that hée might spend them either wantonly or honorably, or necessarily? Nay who would passe for them at all, if he might hauehave the other things without them? Were it not so; what were more wretched than man in whose end consisteth his welfare; seeing that either the Wind, or Fyre, or robbing may bereue vsus of that felicitie; that is to wit, ouerwhelme vsus with miseries in one moment? Againe, how can Riches be the common marke for all men to shoote at, seeing that the inriching of one man is the impouerishing of another? Yea and that the very béeing of them consisteth but in the opinion of men, some counting Gold, some stones, some Shelles, and some Nuttes to be Riches; and all resembling yoong children, which set al their felicite in Checkstones & pinnes? And what is it for men to set their felicitie in things which are neither Man nor of Man, as if they should set the goodnes of a Knyfe in the Sheath, or of a Horse in his Footecloth or Saddle? To bée short, how can that bee the souerein Good, which is no good at all? which is common as wel to the bad as to the good, and doth rather impaire men than amend them? Or howe can that bee our chéefe marke to shoote at, which of all things turneth vsus most frō the true marke, that is to wit, from God; as in trueth there is not a readier way to driue vsus quite and cleane from God, than to drawe vsus néerer and néerer to worldly riches?
And what is Ambition?Honor. We might discourse of that tyme without end: for in very déede it hath no end. Some atteyne to some certeyne poynt: othersome be quite excluded. Which of them in our opinion are the happiest? Soothly they that are excluded are disappoynted of their pretensed felicitie. That is al the harme they hauehave by it. They that atteyne to honor, are in continual torment, spightfull or spighted, doing mischiefe or receyuing mischiefe, ouermated or ouermating. What is this but many euilles for one, and a multiplying of miseries without number, for the obteynement of one sillie shadowe of felicitie? We will leaue the residue to declamers: what are the fruites of these hellish torments, what are they? Forsooth Honour, Reputation, and Power or Authoritie. What is all this but wynd, which cannot fill vsus, nor scarsly puffe vsus vp? I shall be saluted as I goe abroade, I shall sit highest at méetings. In hauing these things, what hauehave I, which a wicked man may not rather hauehave than I: And if it be a good thing, how is it giuen to euill men? I shall hauehave reputation. If it bee among euill men, O how shal I be blamed among good men! Perhaps I shal hauehave it among good men. If for vertue: who seeth not that reputation is but a shadowe, made to followe vertue? And who will runne after the shadowe, to forgoe the body? If freely for nothing, (as men say) vponupon Credite: who knoweth not that thing to be nothing worth, which is giuen for nought, and by such as are noughtworth? And who will beléeue that we be borne to such an end as that? Nay rather, how many be the slaunders wherewith good men be charged: insomuch that diuers tymes they bee fayne to forgoe their reputation, for the preseruation of their Conscience?
Finally,Powre Authoritie and Soucreintie. I shall hauehave obteyned power and authoritie. If that be the end of Man; how happeneth it that for one mans hauing of it, so many millions are fayne to goe without it? And if it be his souereine good; whereof commeth it, that not only it is turned to euil, but also commonly turneth the possessors thereof to euill? But let vsus put the case that all this is good. To whom? For eueryevery one that is honored as a Prince, ten thousand are fayne to knéele: For one that tryumpheth, a hundred thousand are led in captiuitie: For one that reigneth, ten hundred thousand serue as Slaues. By this reckoning, some only one man should be the end of many men: and the felicitie of thrée or fower should bee the infelicitie of a whole world. Now our séeking is for the end and felicitie, not of some one or two men, but of all the whole kynd. What willye say then if euen those fewe hauehave it not? I take to witnesse the happiest Courtiers that are, whether one wrye looke of their Prince do not sting them more at the heart, than a thousand flatterers and as many crouchers and cappers can delight their eares and eyes? Nay, I report me euen to the greatest Princes themselues, whether one Rebellion of their Subiects against them, doe not vex them more than all their honorable tryumphs doe reioyce them? And were it not a shame to say, that mans souereine good should stand in awe or depend vppon a grim looke? What els then are all these things, but resemblances of the Apples that grow about Sodome, which being pleasant to the eye, and prouoking to the appetite, doe vanish into smoake or into soote as soone as a man puts his téeth to them?
Besides this, the felicitie of man ought to abyde in the thing it selfe. But the contentment of the ambicious person, dependeth vppon another. Also it ought to be euerlasting: But ambition endeth with the body, and is buryed with it in the same graue. Againe, the things that ambition craueth, are fought sometymes for some other things sake: but wee demaund an end wherevpon to rest, and not a meane to an ende. To bee short, so farre of is ambition from being a way to bring vsus to souereine good or felicitie; that in very trueth (as I hauehave sayd afore) it casseth vsus miserably downe, and maketh vsus to fall quite and cleane from it.
Now,The vtmost end & …uerein good of Man are not in himself. seeing we cannot finde the thing we seeke for, neyther among men, nor in these worldly things; doth it not follow that we must seeke it in our selues? Surely the world is not of it selfe, nor for it selfe, but was made by another, and for another; neyther hath man his owne beginning of himself: and therefore he cannot be the end of himselfe. The maker of a thing maketh it not for the things sake, but for his owne sake: and therefore he himselfe is the ende of his worke. Againe, the thing that is made is not good in respect of it self, but for the …fe or end whereto the maker maketh it: and therfore the maker himself is the souereine good thereof. But let vsus discouer the matter …et more largely. Man is composed of Bodie and Soule; the Bodie mortall, the Soule immortall. Now, if wee set mans felicitie in his bodie only; we doe too great wrong, both to the Soule, and to the whole man. For if it consist in the bodie, it perisheth and …adeth away with the bodie. And then what remayneth to the Soule which ouer liueth, but wretchednesse? But wee looke for … which belongeth to the whole Man, and to his whole life both together.Beautie. Againe, what should be this felicitie of the body, vnlesse perhaps it bee Beautie; which gladdeth more the beholder than the hauer thereof, and yet within a while after, is lost by some wound, soone sore, some pimples, or some Sunburning? In the Soule ioyned with the bodie wee hauehave thrée abilities, namely of life, of … and of vnderstanding. Let vsus sée in which of these three mans souer…ine welfare and end may be harbered. The Soule giueth life to mans bodie,Helth and the perfection of life is health. If our life serue to none other end than that; what had the first man to doe with it, who was created healthfull? If it must bee the end of vsus now after our corruption; what is more vnhappie than man? Nay, what is more vncapable of happinesse than man? A bodie subiect to a thousand diseases, a thousand harmes, a thousand daungers; weake, frayle, fraught with miseries within, wrapped in them without; alwaies vncerteyne of life, alwaies sure of death; whom a Worme, an Hearb, a grayne of dust may kill: who if he looked for none other happinesse than that, were much better to bee a Plant than a Man. Againe, who is so sound and healthie of bodie, or so diseased in mynd, which (if he were put to the choyce) had not leuer to hauehave a sound mynd in a sicke bodie, than to bee out of his wittes hauing perfect health of bodie? Soothly then it is a very cléere argument, that our chiefe happinesse resteth in our mynd, seeing wee can finde in our harts to redéeme it with the miseries of our bodie.
Let vsus come too the sensitiue parte.Bodily Pleasure, Voluptuousenes, or Sensualitie. The happines thereof seemeth to consist in Uoluptuousenes or Sensualitie. If that make vsus happy; then happy be brute beastes, as who doe vse it both more freely and with more delyght than wee: and vnhappy is man, who cannot wholy becone a beast, do what he can. The beast taketh his pleasure, without regard who sees him, without remorse of conscience, and without any argewing ageinst himselfe. Contrarywise, what man is hee which féeleth not a Lawe in himselfe that goes about to brydle him; which feeleth not a hartbyting in the m…ds of his pleasure; or whose greatest delyghts leaue him not a sting of repentance behind them? And what happynes can that be whereof we be ashamed, and which compelleth vsus to seeke couert for the dooing thereof? Also what a fond woorkman was he, that framed vsus so farre vnfit for such a purpose… insomuch that wheras al our body is lyable too aches & stiches both within & without and on all sides; we scarsly hauehave aboue two or three parts vpō vsus capable of pleasure, and euen those also subiect to greef and peyue. Let there be a man (sayeth Plutarke) that hath led his whole lyfe in pleasure and sensualitie; and about a two or three howers afore he drawe towards death, let him be put to his choyce whether he had leuer too delight his sences by lying with his Lais, or delyght his mind with deliuering his Country from some greate peril. wil be (think you) be so very a beast, as to dout which of them he shal choose? who séeth not then that the pleasure of the mind, is both greater than the pleasure of the body, and more peculiar to man, and more agreeable too his end? We seeke a souereine good; if it be good, it will amend vsus. But what doth marre vsus and impayre vsus more both in bodie and soule, than fleshly pleasure? Also we meane it should be perfect. If it be so, it will make vsus perfect too. But what consumeth vsus, what decayeth vsus more than sensualitie? Agein, we seeke an end; but yet an endlesse end, not which maketh an end of our pleasures, but which doth still feede our desires. Contrarywise, what is there which is sooner at an end in it selfe, which sooner maketh an end of vsus, or which sooner wearieth vsus and lesse contenteth vsus, than the bodily pleasures; considering that (as the Poet sayth) the pleasure and payne goe both together? Moreouer, how may that be the souereine good, which is not so much as a meane good? For who can denye, but that abstinence is taken for a vertue, euen among the vicious sort? And what maner of good is that, which may become euill by increasing, if it were not euill of it selfe afore? Finally, al bodily pleasures consist in the Sences, and are executed by the sensitiue parts. Now, the Sences are oftentymes forstalled in vsus, eyther by diseases or by old age: and the sensitiue parts are dispatched at the least by death.
Now albeit that a man hauehave a dubble life, the one in this world, the other in another, the one dying, the other immortall; the first which is here tending to the second as the woorse to ye better; yet is not our seeking for such an end or such a felicitie as dyeth with vsus, but for such a one as maketh vsus happye, quickeneth vsus, … sheth vsus euerlastingly; the which surely is not to be found in mortall things. Now followeth therefore the Understanding part, which is occupied one whyle in itself, another while in the gouernment of the world, and another while in contemplation of heauenly things: and of theis three operations spring three perfections; namely Uertue, Policie, and Wisedome. Let vsus see yet in which of these … consisteth our souereine felicitie and contentation. Soothly it is not to bee doubted, but that our end will bee found to consist in that part: for whether can the mynd of man reach, beyond the world and man and him that made them both? But let vsus see if we come néere it in this world.Vertue. I pray you what is Uertue? The cal…edesse of our affections. What are these affections of ours? The waues and stormes of our Soules, raysed with eueryevery little …last of winde, which doe so …osse and turmoyle it vpside downe, that euen the best Pylots are fayne to strike Sayle, and reason it selfe is driuen welnere to forsake the Helue. If M…n were created to this end, why was he created with calmenesse of mynd? Or if his souereine good consist now in ouermaystering his affections; what more contrarietie can there bée, than to bée …oyd of affections and to be a man? Let vsus put the case that some man atteyne therevnto: shall he also stay there? No: for valiantnesse hath an eye to warre, warre to peace, peace to the prosperitie of the Commonweale, weale, and so soorth of others. Now, that which tendeth vntounto another, cannot be the vtmost end. But wil man at leastwi…e be contented therewith? Nay, let vsus commend Uertue as much as wee list, and let vsus busie our selues in making bookes of it; yet if it extend no further than to the things on earth, I dare well say there is not any thing, I say not so happie, but so wretched & miserable as man. Folke will say he is an honest man; but yet as honest as he is, they will let him starue for hunger. The Prince will say he is a faithfull, a sound, and an vpright dealer, neyther led by couetousnesse nor caryed away with ambition: but yet he will not put him in trust with the managing of his affayres in this world. The foulest vyce in the world shall finde a mate: but if Uertue runne through the whole world, she shal scarce find a husband. Now then, if we séeke our felicitie in this life; what is Uertue but very miserie? And if we séeke it in the other lyfe; what shal become of this vertue where we shall hauehave no affections to encounter with? Surely then is not Uertue our end: for the end that we seeke, hath not an eye to a further thing; neither dooth the souereine good thereof which goes ioyntly with it come to any end.
What then?Polici…. Is Policie that end? We call Pollicie the right vse of reason in the gouerning of worldly affaires. Besides that, it may also properly be defined, to be an art or skill of guyding mens doings to a certeine end. Now the skill and the end that it ameth at, cannot be both one thing. But (to be short) what is this world? Strife, Warre, Discord, Enuy, Rancor, Burning, Sacking, wasting, Spoyling, and destroying; a miserable ground for man too buid his felicitie vponupon. What is the gouerning and disposing of al these things, but a dealing with By…es, Botches, and Cankers, whereof if we hauehave no feeling, they can (to go the best way) doe vsus no good; and if wee hauehave feeling, they woorke vsus nothing but sorrowe, grife, stinch, and lothsomnesse … Yea, but the happines or felicitie is in healing them. Happy then is that comonweale which receiueth good by thy peyne; but not thy peyne happy which thou hast taken to heale it. For when a Phisicion healeth a man, who receiues the benefite, the Phisicion, or the Patient? And if the Phicion did his Cure for gaine, and the Magistrate his duety… for honour; who sees not that the skill of curing was not the end of the one, nor the skill of gouerning the end of the other; séeing that they tended either of them to a further end, and that so …lie aone? Notwithstanding all this, in the end Man dyeth and the World perisheth; but the Soule liueth still, and yet giueth ouer the dealings of the world. Therefore néedes must some other thing then Policy be our souerein good, seeing that this Policy is limited within the bounds of this world.
Now then,Wisdome or Religiousnes. let vsus examine Wisdome. It is the beholding of God and of things belonging to GOD. This requireth a man to lift vp himselfe aboue the world, and aboue himselfe; I meane that a man should retyre from all outward things into his owne soule, the Soule vntounto her Mynd, and the Mynd vntounto God. Surely there is great lykelyhod that our dooings ought to bee referred to this wisdome, and that our end and welfare should consist therein. For the perfecting of such a contemplation, wee say there are required Wealth, Health, Uertue, and Policie. For want and pouertie, bée as Fetters of Yron to a weldisposed mynd: a sickely and diseased body, is as a torture to it; vnruly affections dazle it and make it sée one thing for another; Policie is the stablisher of Comonweales, & whosoeuer giueth himself to contemplation, it behoueth him to be settled in a quiet place, that he may hold the Plommet of his mind steddy without shaking or stirring. Thus doe all things séeme to serue to that vse. But when they come all to the forenamed poynt, to helpe vsus; yet I pray you how farre doe they further vsus? It is naturally bred in man to beléeue that there is a GOD: and his woorkes doe put vsus in mynd of it eueryevery howre. But shall we enter into our woorkemayster, séeing that the very outside of the least of all his workes doth stoppe vsus? Again, who knoweth not, that if there be not a God, there can bee no happines atall? And sith wee knowe it, euen (as ye would say) from our birth; why take we so much peine in seeking that which wee hauehave alreadie? Reason telleth vsus further, that God is good and iust; that is to say, that he loueth that which is good, & hateth that which is euill. And our owne conscience telleth vsus, that we doe little good or none, but much euil. And if the little good which we doo be doone amisse, what happines is there, or rather what vnhappines is there not in that knowledge which maketh vsus to feele a continuall torment in our selues? But the partie that is giuen too contemplation, mounteth vp yet higher, and considereth that God is immortall, vnchangeable, and not to be wrought into; which is as much to say, as that he is not as we men are, who doe dye, moue, and chaunge: and when hee comes to that poynt, he is at the highest that his wit can reach vntounto. And what is all this stying vp, but a creeping still vppon the earth? For, to say that of a thing which it is not, or to say it is not this or it is not that; what els is it but a protesting that we knowe not what it is? as if a man should boast that hee knowes an Elephant, vndr pretence that hee knowes it is not a Snayle? What then is our highest contemplation but déepe ignorance? And who would make ignorance his highest felicitie & furthest end or shooteanker? Yet notwithstanding how feawe be there which atteine so farre? And if any through rashnes aduenture any further: … what error and blyndnesse doe they fall, no lesse than they which forgo their fight by looking against the Sunne?
It remaineth then in the end,Faith or Beleef. that wee must atteine to that by Fayth, which wee cannot atteyne vntounto by Reason; that wée must mount vp by liuely beléef aboue our vnderstāding, vntounto the things whereunto the eye of our mynd is not able to reach.Agazel in the beginning of his Supernaturalles. And Algazell the Arabian procéeded so farre, as to say that the roote▪ wherby the felicitie to come is atteind vntounto, is faith. And what is this fayth in God, but a beléeuing that our welfare lyeth in him? What is the beléeuing, but the hoping for it? What is hope, but the desiring of it? What is the desire of it, but the not hauing of it? And to bee short, what is the continuall beléef of it héere, but a bewraying that héere we can neither hauehave it nor see it? If we hauehave not faith; what hauehave we but ignorance? And if we hauehave faith; what hauehave wee but onelyonly a desire and longing; considering that the greater our fayth is, the more wee despise these bace things; and the greater our desire is, the more we hate our selues, and the more earnestly doe we louelove God. To be short, What is fayth? Welfare behighted. But we would sée it. Again, what is faith? The way vntounto felicitie. But we would possesse and inioy it. Looke then what proportion is betwéene that which is present, and that which is to come; such proportion is there betwixt the hope which we hauehave heere (yea euen aboue the world and aboue our selues,) and the perfect and full fruition of the good which we seeke to atteine vntounto. But let vsus in feaw words gather togither what wee hauehave said heretofore. Whereas wee seeke for an ende or restingpoint, the world is made for man, man for the Soule, the Soule for the mynd, the mynd for a much higher thing than it self, and what els can that be but God? As for that which we vnderstand here as concerning▪ God by our naturall wisdome; it is but ignorance; and that which we conceiue by our supernaturall power, … but beléefe; and beleefe maketh not things perfect, but only moueth the vnderstanding. It followeth then that our doings can hauehave no end to rest vponupon here, but only in the life to come, which is the beholding and knowing of God. Againe, if wee seeke the souereine good; our appetites owe obedience to our will, our will to our reason, and the perfection of our reason is the knowing of God. And so the contentment of our will is our possessing of God. Now we possesse not God, but so farre foorth as wee louelove him: we louelove him not, but so farre foorth as we knowe him: and neither can ignorance ingender earnest louelove, nor beleefe ingender full and perfect fruition, but onelyonly a certeyne hope, which hope is matched with impatience euen in the best of vsus. It followeth therefore that we cannot inioye our souereine welfare, vntill we bee come to our vtmost end; nor hauehave our full contentation, vntill wee hauehave full knowledge: that is to wit, wee cannot hauehave it in this world, nor in man, which two cannot content the mynd or satisfie the will of mā, forsomuch as eyther of them both is a world of wretchednesse: but though wee hauehave a dubble life, yet can we hauehave our vtmost restingpoynt and our onelyonly souereine welfare, nowwhere els but onelyonly in God and in the euerlasting life.
Here I should declare what that felicitie of man shalbe, when he is come to his vtmost restingpoynt. But who wilbee so rash as to open his mouth in yt behalf, after him that hath told vsus that neither eye hath seene it nor hart can conceyue it? And how should we knowe it here, being vnable eyther to see it or to hauehave it here? Now therefore at one word, let vsus be contented with this, that all our desires shalbe satisfied at that day, seeing they extend not but too the things that are; and that in God we shall at that day see, hauehave, and knowe all things. But yet for a more larger confirmation of this former poynt, it is now tyme to here what the Philosophers say thereof.