Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 13
The xiij. Chapter.
That mans wisedome hath acknowledged Gods Prouidence, and how the same wadeth betwene Destinie and Fortune.
NOW, like as men of olde tymeThe Men of old tyme. hauehave acknowledged ye maker of the world, some in expresse termes, and othersome by cō sequence: so hauehave they also easely perceiued the Prouidence, which thei hauehave déemed to depend vponupon the same as an appurtenance thereunto. Insomuch that euen they which hauehave flatly denyed the Creation, hauehave neuerthelater graunted the Prouidence, by reason that they found it so cleere and manifest a matter; howbeit that to denye the Prouidence and to denye the Creation is all one. Hermes espyes it out euerywhere, as well in the Creation of the whole and of the parts thereof, as in the order and maintenance of al things. And if it be demaunded of him, what prouidēce it is, to hauehave brought foorth so many things which seeme néedlesse and vnprofitable; his answer is readie shapen, That God created all things to his owne glorie: and that it is a glorie, both to him to hauehave created all things, and vntounto all things to hauehave bin created by his hand.Hermes in his Asclepius, and Cyrillus in his second booke. And if it bee asked againe, whence the euill commeth that is in things: He answereth, That GOD created them good, howbeit that (to speake properly) there is nothing purely good but only God. As for the euill, it is come in vponupon the good, like as all generation is accompanyed with corruption. The yron rusteth; thou wilt not wyte it vponupon the Smith. The Wine sowreth; thou wilt not wyte it vponupon the Uintener. The things that are created doe corrupt; as little also oughtest thou to wyte it vponupon the Creator. Why? Because that only he is vnchaungeable, and it is méete that there should alway bée some difference betwéene the Creator, and the things created; betwéene all, and nothing. Plato in that he teacheth the Creation, doth also sufficiently teach the Prouidence. For if Gods power, wisedome, and goodnesse bee equall, or rather all one thing; looke where his power is, there is his wisedome, and thither also extendeth his goodnesse. But his power extendeth euen to the least things, for els they could hauehave no being at all: therefore his wisedome also extendeth vntounto them to guyde and gouerne thē, and likewise his goodnesse without the which nothing could be preserued. And so, Gods prouident goodnesse and gracious wisedome doe watch ouer all things. Againe, when as Plato setteth downe God to bee the end of man, and man to bee the end of all things in the world and of the world it selfe: hee sheweth sufficiently that as man tendeth to God, so doth the world also; but vntounto that ende it should not tend, vnlesse it were directed thether, and who directeth it thether, but he that first made it? To bee short, the perticular formes of all things present and to come in respect of vsus, but eternally present with GOD, can hauehave no abyding without a perfect knowledge and a steadie direction of all things.
But if any dowt hereof remaine yet still; let vsus heare what the Platonistes say to that matter. Surely Plotin hath made two or thrée bookes thereof, wherein he teacheth prouidence by all things from the greatest to the smallest, comming downe euen to the little flowers which wee see vnblowen in the morning and withered at night, as though he had ment to say the same thing that wee reade in the Gospell: namely, Consider me the Lillies of the field; and so foorth. Unto the ordinarie complaynt concerning the prosperitie of the wicked, and the aduersitie of the vertuous; he answereth that the prosperitie of the wicked is but as a Stageplay, and the aduersitie of the godly is as a gaming of exercise, wherein they bee tyed to a streight dyet, that they may win the prize for which they contend. Unto the Question concerning euill, he answereth; that it is nothing els but a fayling of goodnesse,If the man that suffereth be good; also. Plotin lib. 3. Ennead. 4. which goeth on still diminishing it from degrée to degrée euē to the vttermost; and that it procéedeth not from GOD, but from the imperfection of the matter, which he termeth nothing: and that the euill, (which consisteth altogether in degrées and in fayling of good,) is so farre of from diminishing Gods Prouidence, that it is rather the thing wherein Gods Prouidence sheweth it selfe the more, as without the which there were no Prouidence at all to be séene: and yet that therewithall, God is the author of all abilities, and the disposer or ouerruler of all willes. Which things (to auoyde long discourse) are more conueniently to be seene in his owne workes.
His Disciple Porphyrius departed not from the same opinion, howbeit that he was combered with the like perplexities, that they be which dispute ageinst it. Seeing that God (sayth he) doth by his skill ouerrule all things, and order them by incomparable proprietie of vertue; and that on the contrary part, mannes Reason being very small, is ignorant of most things how skilful and curiouse so euer it seeme to be of the trueth: Surely we may then call it wyse, when it is not curiouse in serching such doutfull and hard matters, as are matched with daunger of blaspheming; but rather graunteth that the things which are done, are very well as they bee. For what can our small Reason finde fault with or reprooue in the doings of that greate Reason, to esteeme them eyther lawfull or vnlawfull, seeing wee vnderstande them not?Porphyrius to Nemertius. And in another place, If wee suffer a King (saieth he) to dispose of his owne affayres as he listeth; shall wee deny vntounto GOD the ordering and disposing of the things heere beneath,Cyrillus in his second and Fifth bookes ageinst Iulian. which hee himselfe created? And against such as founde fault with the gouerment of the world which they vnderstand not, these are his very words. Soothly (sayth he) there is not a more vniust speech, than that which presumeth to teache God Iustice, nor a more holy speech than that which yeeldeth to the trueth; and to think otherwise is a disease of mynd & a great cryme. For God not only directeth all things at all tymes, too the behoofe and full harmony of the whole vniuersally; but also is the cherisher preseruer and repayrer of eueryevery seuerall thing in particular. I pray you hathe hee not shewed too Phisicians, (who hauehave so much prouidence as hee hathe giuen them skil,) the things that are too befall too the whole body of man, how that some members are to be cut of, some to be seared, and othersome to be eaten away with Corrasiues, for the health of the whole body? And yet when the Nurces or Mothers see the Surgiō about to do it, do they not weepe and cry out ryght strangely, notwithstanding that they knowe it to be for the welfare of the childes body? But what doth the Father then who is wiser than they, but comfort the patient, and hold the playster ready to lay to the wound? God lykewyse for the curing of the whole, hath ordeyned that men should dye, (That is the thing that Epicurus findeth fault with) & that they should be separated asunder, as a Toe is sumtime cut of for the sauing of the whole body. And could we enter into the mynd of God, we should vndoutedly knowe why and to what good end hee hath from the beginning barred some things from being because he foresaw they should be to hurtfull, and vntounto other some hath giuen death in recompence of their godlynes. The summe of all is, that nothing is done but by the prouidence of God, howbeit that many things seeme repugnāt to his wisdome and goodnes, as the cutting off of a Leg, or the searing of a member séeme repugnant both to the healing of the whole body, and to the purpose of the Surgion.
Also as touching the aduersities of good men, Syn…sius the Platonist.Sée héere what Synesius ye Platonist answereth. The aduersities (sayth he) which wee thinke wee indure without our deserts, doe helpe vsus too weede out our affections out of our ground; which is to much inclyned too them; and by that meanes the inconueniences which make fooles to doubt of Gods Prouidence, doe confirme wise folke the more therein. For what man would bee contented to part hence, if he found no aduersitie here? And therefore it is to be thought, that the Rulers of the lower Regions (he meaneth the Féends) were the first founders of these prosperities which the comon sort maketh so great account of, of purpose to bewitch men with them, and to lull them a sleepe here. Hierocles also hauing made a long discourse, Hierocles.concludeth that if we fall into any aduersitie whereof wee cannot coniecture the cause, it behoueth to consider that wee bee ignorant in all things, and yet we must not procéede, so farre, as to say that God is the author of euill, or that he hath not a care of vsus; for those (sayth he) were ouergreate blasphemies.
Aristotle Aristotle in his Moralles to Nicomachus and Eudemus.speaketh not any otherwyse eyther in his greate Moralls or in his little Moralls, howbeit that hee be more graueled in his Metaphysiks. Howsoeuer the case stand, in his booke concerning the world he graunteth vntounto God the care of al greate things. And thinke you it beséemeth man too set bounds too the wisdome of God who hath limited the natures of all things; and to appoynt what God shall estéeme greate or small, before whom nothing can be greate or small? Neuerthelesse whereas he sayth that the world dependeth vponupon God as the end thereof; the best of his Desciples do by infallible consequence gather thereof the prouidence of God. For seeing that the World dependeth vponupon hym and tendeth vntounto him; the beginning of that direction cannot procéede of any other, than of him to whom it tendeth. Agein, seeing that (as he sayth in other places) all kynd of things tend too some one perticular ende eueryevery one peculiar to it selfe, and all méete togither in one vniuersall end, and yet all of them hauehave not reason or vnderstanding to appoynt that ende too themselues, or to hold themselues within that bound. It followeth then that there is a certeine prouidence which hath that reason for all and eueryevery of them, and that the same reason resteth in God vponupon whō al of them depend, as Aristotles best lerned interpreters are constrained to confesse. To be short, the quick sentence which is attributed vntounto him, which is, That such as require a proofe of Gods prouidence are to be answered with the lasshes of a Whippe: doth giuegive vsus sufficient credit of his opinion.
Of the opinion of Theophrastus we cannot doubt. For he that graunteth the creation of a thing, cannot doubt of prouidence, considering that power and goodnes are alike equall in both of them. But behold héere ye expresse words of Alexander of Aphrodise in his booke of Prouidence.Alexander of Aphrodise in his booke of Prouidence. That God should hauehave no wil (sayth he) to care for the things heere beneath, is too farre disagreeing with his nature; for it is the propertie of an enuious person. And that he should be vnable, were to vnseemely for him, for he is able to doe more than he hath yet done. Therefore let vsus not dout of him, either the one or the other, but let vsus rather conclude, that hee both can and will hauehave care of all things that are done heere belowe. And in another place hée gathereth this very conclusion, That all our welfare lyeth in the seruing of God, and that the feare of him is a gift of his, in that he voutsafeth to extend his prouidence vntounto vsus.
Of the opinions of Plutarke and Seneca, their owne bookes doo expresly testifie: namely Plutarks treatise concerning the slowe punishment of euill doers, for him; and Senecaes bookes concerning benefites,Seneca concerning Benefits, lib. 2. Cap. 4. 5. 6. 21. 31. and a treatise of his concerning Prouidence; for him. So lykewise doth the wise Philosopher Epictetus vponupon whome Simplicius hath written. For after many forespéeches concerning the greatnes and maiestie of God, and the weakenes of man, they assayed to yéelde a reason of all things that offended the weaker sort in this case, yea euen to the very accidents and to the thunderclaps. And I desire my readers to take the peynes to reade them whole, that they may sée how conformable the things whiche Christians teache, are to the wisedome of the best sort among the Heathen. Wherevnto they may for an income, adde this Oracle of Apollo himselfe reported by Porphyrius.
No man too hyde himself from God by cunning can deuize;
No man by slyghts or suttle shifts can blind or dim his eyes.
All places he fulfilleth,Porphyrius in his Collectiōs of Philosophy. Oppianus foreign He is present euerywhere,
And giueth lyfe to eueryevery thing that mooues and lyfe doth beare.
And as concerning all other people of the Earth, in whose behalfe the Poets (which are full of such sayings eueryevery where) may answere, as Orpheus, Homere, Hesiodus, Aratus, Sophocles, Phocylides and such others: surely in as much as wée sée that all Nations hauehave some Religion, it is a visible president, that Gods prouidence is beléeued and receiued of all with one accord. For in vayne doe meu serue God, if he sée it not; in vayne doo men pray to him if he regard them not, in vayne complaine they to him, if hee iudge them not; and to be short, in vayne doe wee call vppon him both on Sea and Land, (where counsell and casualtie seeme most to take place) for the mainteyning of our welfare, and the preseruing of vsus from harme; vnlesse wée bée throughly perswaded that he heareth vsus, and that he ruleth Heauen and Earth and all things in them from aboue, yea and euen the verye hazard of warre as Caesar termeth it, wherein fortune séemeth to beare greatest sway. But afore wee giuegive our determinate Iudgment, wee hauehave yet two Aduocates to heare, namely the Aduocate of Fortune, and the Aduocate of Destinie. For (sayth the one) if all things passe vnderunder the guyding of prouidence, what becommeth of Fortune which we sée in so manye things? And (sayeth the other) what fréedome then hath man? must it not néedes be confessed, that a certeine destinie compelleth eueryevery man to doe whatsoeuer he doth?
If ye meane fortune as she is peynted by the Poets,Ageinst Fortune. blynd, standing on a bowle, and turning with eueryevery wynd: it is as easie to wype her away as to paynt her. For who seeth not that there is an vniforme order, both in the whole world, and in all the parts therof, and how then can one that is blynd be the guyder therof? Also who vnderstandeth not, that to moue things belongeth to stedfastnesse and not vntounto vnstedfastnesse? for how can that thing rule and wéeld others, which is caryed away it self? Or how can he hold the sterne who floteth himself vponupon the water? Séeing then that there is so certein order in all things: it followeth that fortune beareth no sway in any thing, and therefore that there is no fortune at all. But if by the word fortune they meane as Proclus doth,Proclus vppon Timeus. a certein diuine power that gathereth causes farre distant one from another, all to one end: surely in that case we be more fréends to fortune than they be. For we admit it, not only in things vncerteine wandering and wauering, but also euen in the things that are moste certein, yea and in all things whatsoeuer; as the which is but God himself disguysed vnderunder another name.
Nowthen to speake properly, what is Fortune? Is it a Substance? Euen by their owne confession, it hath no being but in the disorder of other things. Shall wee terme it an Accident? How should an accident worke so diuers accidents?Iunenall. I here wants no God at all, where wisdum doth aduyse: we …ooles hauehave fortune deifide and plaste aboue the Skyes, Cicero. What is it then, if it be any thing at all? Surely it is a word that signifieth nothing but respectiuely, that is to say, as hauing respect of some things or persons that are spoken of, and it hath no ground or being but of and in our owne ignorance. That which is fortune to the Childe, is no fortune to the father: that which is fortune to the Seruant, is none to the Maister: that which is fortune to the foole, is none to the wise man: that which is fortune to the wise man, is none vntounto God. According to the measure of our knowledge or ignorance, so doth fortune increase or abate.Error, & Blindnes and the not knowing of things and causes, hauehave brought vp the names of Nature and Fortune. Take away ignorance frō men, and fortune is banished from all their dealings. The father letteth a thing fall in his Garden, to see whether his child wil bring it to him or steale it away. The childe thinkes it to be falne by chaunce; and his father who knowes to what ende he did let it fall, smyles at him. And so the thing that was chaunce or fortune to the childe, was of set purpose in the father. A Mayster sendeth foorth diuers Seruants diuers waies, all to one place, to the intent that of many, some one at the least may escape and come home againe. They méete there all together. At the first sight the thing which was forecast by good order, seemeth to them to happen by aduenture. A Captayne hauing deuised to take the Gate of some Citie, causeth a Cart or a Charyot to bee broken vponupon the Drawbridge as it were by some mischaunce, that his ambush may in the meane while breake foorth and enter the Towne. The Warders fall to beating of the Wagoner for it, and othersome excuse him as ouertaken by misfortune. And so the thing which was a pollicie of Warre in the Captayne that deuised it, is a chaunce or fortune to the Towne that wist not the ground of it. A wise man to giuegive a glyke to another wise man, or a Captayne to beguyle a Captayne, or an enemie to delude his enemie, cyphereth a letter grossely for the nonce, and sendeth it such a way as he imagineth that it shalbe surprized. He that lighteth vpō it is glad of so good aduenture, and thinking that he readeth the secretes of his aduersaries hart, buildeth all his affayres in good earnest vponupon things contriued to deceyue him. And so the thing which was a rare deuise in the one, is a rare aduenture to the other. Now if among men, which are all of one kynde, and hauehave welneere like portion of reason, there bee such oddes betwéene age and age, betwéene qualitie and qualitie, and betwéene wit and wit; that the same which in one is prouidence, is fortune in another: shall wee thinke it straunge, that the thing which seemeth fortune to vsus that are but blindnesse and ignorance, should be singular prouidence as in respect of God? Or that he which is the only cause of all causes, should hauehave the skill to assemble them together to some one certeyne effect, how farre distant soeuer they be? As for example, if he make thee to finde a Treasor in digging of a pit, or to scape a fall from a plancher in going to walke vppon it; wouldest thou steale that benefite from the goodnesse of GOD, who brought thée to the one place, or saued thée from the other? I say from God who is thy maker, to father it vponupon blynd Fortune which knoweth thée not? And why should it be harder for him to match two causes together that are farre asunder, than to hauehave made them so farre at oddes one from another? Or than it is for thy selfe to put wood to fire, and fire to water, & thy meate into the water, which are causes so farre distant, and yetnotwithstanding thou ioynest them together to one certeyne ende, which is the nourishment of thy bodie? And what things are further distant in thy mynd, than a Charyot, a Drawbridge, and an Hoste of men; which things notwithstanding thou couldest skill to bring fitly together for ye taking of a Citie? Thus looke wherein thou doest chiefly place fortune, there doth the rarest and most wonderfull poynt of Prouidence most euidently shewe it selfe.
But now comes me the other Aduocate;Ageinst Destinie. who to bring vsus vntounto Destinie, and to a certeyne necessitie of all things and of al doings, maketh his hand of all the things which we hauehave alledged against Fortune. Therefore let vsus see how we may walke betwéene Fortune and Destinie, so as wee may shunne chaunce without failing into necessitie, and perceiue whether the same be Prouidence or no. If all things (say they) be guyded by GOD to some one certeyne end, yea euen those also which seeme casuall; then can they not bee turned any other way. I willingly graunt them that. And if they cannot bee turned; then are not mens doings free, but of necessitie. Nay, this cōsequent is vtterly false; because the things which hauehave free will to endeuer themselues contrary to Gods will, hauehave not free power to restreyne his will from ouerruling them. But let vsus lay foorth this matter more at large, that it may bee the better vnderstood. We see in the Skye a great number of Starres that are fixed, and many also (as the Planets) which hauehave eueryevery of them their peculiar mouings turnes & courses seuerally to themselues. Now, the highest Heauen, by his vniuersall mouing carieth all the Starres about, as well the mouable as the vnmouable, without any stopping or interrupting of their perticular mouings, whereby bee made innumerable figures aspects and respects, which I leaue to the Astrologers to declare. The Sunne maketh the day and the yéere; the Moone maketh the moneths & the quarters; the Pleyads and Hyads make the Seasons; the D…gstarre maketh the heate of the Sommer, and so foorth. Let vsus put the case that the highest Heauen stood still, and that the lower Heauens kept on their peculiar mouings: or let vsus put the case that he went on, and that all the rest stood still; and then should there bee none of the sayd figurings and aspects to bee seene. But let them all alone as they bee: let the highest Heauen by his mouing carie all the Starres about, and let eueryevery of them continue the hauing and executing of his owne peculiar nature, the mouable as mouable, and the vnmouable as vnmouable, and eueryevery of them indeuer accordingly against the Uniuersall; and then shall wee see the woonderfulnesse of the Heauen, which by an vniforme kynd of mouing yt leaueth to eueryevery Starre his proper and peculiar mouing, yéeldeth eueryevery day diuers formes in the Skye, which cause alterations in the ayre; which thing neyther his owne sole mouing could doe if the residue of the Starres stoode still, neyther could the courses and mouings of the Starres bring it to passe, if they were not carried about by the mouing of him. Now let vsus see how this example agréeth with our matter. God by his will and power hath created all powers, and disposed all willes. That his power ouerruleth all powers, al men confesse. For who is he that maketh a Clocke and cannot rule it? But that his will should direct all willes to such ende as he listeth, without forcing them frō their nature which is to be free; there is the dow…. God forbid that he which created nature to doe him seruice, should be vnable to vse the seruice thereof without marring it. God then (say I) guydeth all things to the performance of his will, the mouable by their mouings, and the vnmouable by their stedfastnesse; the things indewed with sence, by their appetites, and the reasonable things, by their willes; the naturall things, by their thraldome, and the things that hauehave will, by their freedome: And the freer that they be, the greater is his glorie, as in déede it is a more commendable thing to cause libertie to yéeld freely to obedience by gentle handling, than to hale it by for…e and compultion as it were tyed in a chayne. If the willes of all men were caried by Gods will without hauing their awne peculiar mouings: the power of God could not shine foorth in them so much as it doth now, when all willes inforce themselues seuerally against his will, and yet neuerthelesse euen in following their owne sway, doe finde themselues led (they wote not how) whether soeuer it pleaseth him. Neither should wée see the said diuersities of figures in the Heauen, which bréede so diuers effects, of Warres, of Peace, of decayes, of prosperitie, of aduersitie, and such other; which serue all to the Prouidence of the euer…asting God; but wee should see euerywhere one vniforme will holding all other willes fast fettered, and carrying them whether soeuer it listed; and the more streightly that they were tyed vp, the lesse should we estéeme of his power, as who would say he stoode in feare to let them loose. Agayne, if wee imagine all those willes to hauehave free scope, to followe their own lykings without any gouernment of higher power to ouerrule them, and restreyne their wh…n they intend to breake out: wee should undoubtedly see diuers ends in things, where as now they tend all to one: And libertie would turne into loosenesse, loosenesse into disorder, and disorder into destruction; whereas the world doth necessarily require ord…r, and order requireth all things to bee referred to some one certeyne ende. God therefore to shew his power in our fréedome and libertie; hath left our willes to vsus; and to restreyne them from …senesse, he hath so ordered them by his wisedome, that he wor…th his owne will no lesse by them, than if wee had no will at all. Let vsus enforce ourselues as much as wee list against his will, and yet euen our disobedience shall turne to the fulfilling of his will. Let vsus goe Eastward when his will goes Westward, and yet doth his mouing cō duct vsus still. But alveit that God do leade foorth and guyde the one will as well as the other; yet notwithstanding right happie as that will which indeuereth to followe, and vnhappie is that which must bee haled and dragged. Likewise in a keness of Hounds, eueryevery of them runneth according to his naturall inclination, and yet all of them serue the purpose of the Hunter. Also in an Hoste of men, one fighteth for honour, another for spight, a third for gayne, and al for victorie to the Prince that sent them into the field. Take from the Hounds their naturall inclinations, and from the Souldierr… the… perticular willes and dispositions; and ye doe away Hunting, and the Armie must néedes disperse.
Yea (say they)Godes foresight or Forknowledge. but God sawe al things and all the courses of the world from euerlasting al at one instant, and things cannot fal out otherwise than he hath forséene them. It séemeth therfore that nothing is casual nothing at the choyce of our wil, nor any thing that is not of necessitie. Yes: for as God beholdeth all things with one view,If it be predestined (saieth one) that thou shalt recouer thy sicknes, it is in vayn for thee to send for the Phisision. If it be thy destiny (answereth another) to hauehave Childrē; it is in vayn for thee to cōpany with thy wyfe. so doth he also behold eueryevery of them woorking according too their seuerall properties. He séeth the motting of the Heauen, and the particular mouings of the Sunne and the Moone to bring forth the Eclipses of necessitie: he seeth men cōsulting of warre, of peace, of alyance and other things, willingly; and hee séeth the Plants sp…ing vp and growe naturally. He himself hath set downe the second, third, yea, and fourth causes, and hath linked them one to an other, to do what he will hauehave done: but the thing that deceiueth vsus in this case, is that we consider not that our wills are among these causes and that according to their fréenesse such as it is, they work fréely in the doings of this world, lyke as all other causes woork eueryevery of them according to their peculiar moouings, inclinations, abilities, natures or kynds. After the same maner the man that is acquaynted with… his howseholdmatters, will deeme aforehand which of three parts his eldest sonne will choose, and which his second will choose, though he be farre of frō them, bicause he knoweth their natures and inclinations; and yet for all that, hee inclyneth them not to the dooing of the one or of the other. Ageine, another foreséeth that a Prince will kéepe peace or make warre, bycause he knoweth him two be eyther of a quiet or of an vnquiet disposition. Euen so is it with God: sauing that he being néere and innermore to al things than the things themselues are, doth knowe them most perfectly, wheras we hauehave nothing but by coniectures, and those verye weake. To be short, as in respect of God the things are of necessitie, which as in respect of themselues are things of casualtie; the cause wherof is, that the matter which in the things themselues is to come, is present to his sight euerlastingly; and his foreséeing of things to come, is not in the causes of them as it is vntounto wyse men, but in himself who is the cause of all causes; and therfore he séeeth not that thou shalt do this or shalt not do that [as of a thing to come] but whatsoeuer thou art to doo, he séeth thée doing it from euerlasting; naturally if it be to be done naturally, and willingly if it be to be … willingly: and yet thy will is no lesse subiect to his will, than thy nature is subiect to the power that created it: neither is the fréedom of thy will (such as it is now after thy fall) any more compelled in taking deliberation, than thy nature is compelled in growing or shuming. When I speake heere of fréewill, I meane not to deale with this Question whether it lye in vsus to choose the way of Sa…ation or no. For as it is a thing that surmounteth the whole nature of mankind, and excéedeth ye proportion of our … vnderstandings: so must it necessitie ensue that wee must bee drawen by some hygher cause from aboue, as in a case that concerneth the forsaking of our selues and of our owne desires, and not the following of them. Ageine, I intend not to take away the extraordinarie motions which God worketh in vsus, when he vseth vsus sometymes beyond the inclination of our nature; …y bréeding that in vsus by a secret operation, which was not in vsus of our selues, But I speake peculiarly of these inferiour doings, which are proportionable to our wit and to the capacitie of our reason; in which things our Fréewill (as may…od as it is) hath abilitie to exercyse itself, notwithstanding that is be vtterly lam…aud vnable to mount vp any higher. After that maner therefore may we … betwéene the Fortune of Epicurus and the de…mie of Chrysippus, by Prouidence; and betwéene casualtie and necessitie by the will of Got; and betwéene Loocenesse and Bondage by leauing their mouings frée which yet neuerthelesse shall come to the end which God hath listed to appoint vntounto them, whatsoeuer windings and wreathings they séeme to themselues to make in the meane tyme. And as touching the destinie of the Astrologers, who make all things subiect to the whéelings about of the Skye, and make all things to be as much of necessitie as the mouings thereof: we will leaue them to pleade their case ageinst that greate Learned man the Countie of Mirandula, praying them to consider at least wyse, whether the greate studye and peynes which those greate Clerks hauehave tak…n to disprooue this destinie, can by any meanes bee fathered vppon destinie.
Now then, for a small conclusion of this whole discourse, let vsus say that God is a souereine Beeing, and a souerein mynd, and that Beeing and Mynding are all one in him; and therefore that as in creating things the might and power of his Beeing extended euen to the least things or els they had not bin at all: so the Prouidence, forecast and direction of his mynd extend to all things, or else they could not continue. Let not the confusion of things which we see …eere belowe trubble vsus; for the greater the same is, the great… doth Gods prouidence shewe it self therein, as the skill of a Phisition doth in the intricatenesse of a disease. But who is he that can limit the sight of the Euerlasting God? Surely not the prosperities of the wicked; for they be but visors: nor the aduersities of the godly, for they be but exercises; nor the Deathes of the giltlesse, for it is but a poudering of their vertewes to preserue them to the vse of posteritie. Nay, let not euen sinne it selfe, which is the very euill in deede, cause any grudge of mynd in vsus; for God Created Nature good, but euill is sproong thereof. He Created freedome, and it is degenerated into Loocenesse. But let vsus prayse God for giuing vsus powers, and let vsus condemne our selues for abusing them. Let vsus glorifie him for chastising vsus by our owne Loocenesse, for executing his Iustice by our vniust Dealings, and for performing the ordinaunce of his rightfull will by our inordinate passions. It we see a thing whereof we knowe not the cause; let vsus acknowledge our ignorance, and not name it fortune. The causes that are furthest a sunder, are neere at hand vntounto him, to performe whatsoeuer he listeth. If we do any vnreasonable thing; let vsus not alledge necessitie. He can skill to vse all things without marring them; the moouable, according to their moouings; the things indewed with will, according to their passions; and the things indewed with reason, according to their reasonings. In thinking to do our owne will, we bring his to passe. We be free to followe out owne Nature; and our Nature is becomme euill through sinne. O wretched fréedome, which bringeth vsus vnderunder such bondage! And a…fore this nature of ours, we can neither shun it nor driue it from vsus: for we be bon…laues to it, and it to sinne, and there behoueth a stronger than our selues to rid vsus thereof. Therefore let vsus pray God to bring the fréedome of our wills in bondage to his will, and to frée our soules from this hard and damnable kind of fréedome, and to graunt vsus by his grace, not as to the wicked, to doe his will in béeing vnwilling to do it; but as to his Children, at least wise to be willing to doe it euen in not doing it.