Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 15
The xv. Chapter.
That the immortalitie of the Soule hath bene taught by the Philosophers of old tyme, and beleeued by all people and Nations.
SOothly it had bene a very harde case, if this mynd of ours which searcheth so many things in nature, had not taken some leysure to search it selfe and the nature therof, and by searching atteyned to some poynt in that behalfe. And therefore as there hauehave at al tymes bene men, so shall we see also that men hauehave at all tymes beléeued & admitted the immortalitie of the Soule; I say not some one man or some one Nation, but the whole world with generall consent, because all men vniuersally and perticularly hauehave learned it in one Schoole, and at the mouth of one Teacher, namely euen their owne knowledge in themselues. The holy Scripture which teacheth vsus our saluation, vseth no schoole arguments to make vsus beléeue that there is a God: and that is because we cannot step out of our selues neuer so little, but wee must néedes finde him present to all our Sences. And it seemeth to speake vntounto vsus the lesse expresly of the immortalitie of our soules, specially in the first bookes therof, because we cannot enter into our selues be it neuer so little, but we must néedes perceiue it. But inasmuch as from the one end thereof to the other, it declareth vntounto vsus the will of God: in so doing it doth vsus to vnderstand, that it is a thing wherof it is not lawfull for vsus to doubt.The opinion of the Men of old tyme. And whereas it setteth foorth so precisely from age to age, the great and manifold troubles and paines which good and godly men hauehave susteyned in indeuering to followe that will; it sheweth infallibly that their so doing was in another respect than for this present wretched life. For who is he that would depart with any péece of his owne lyking in this life, but in hope of better things? and what were it for him to lose his life, if there were not another life after this? This serueth to answer in one word to such as demaund expresse texts of Scripture, and are loth to finde that thing in the Byble, which is cōteyned there, not only in eueryevery leafe but almost in eueryevery sine. For whereas God created man after the world was fully finished and perfected: it was as much as if he had brought him into a Theatre prepared for him, howbeit after another sort than all the other liuing things which were to do him seruice. As for Beastes, Birds, Plants, and such other things, the Elements brought them foorth: but Man receyued his Soule by inspiration from God. Also the brute Beasts are put in subiection to man, but man is in subiection onelyonly vntounto God. And the conueying of that good man Henocke out of this life for his godlinesse, was to none other end, but to set him in another life voyd of all euill and full of all good.The beleefe of the Patriarkes. &c. But when we reade the persecutions of Noe, the ouerthwartings of Abraham, the banishment and wayfarings of Iacob, and the distresses of Ioseph, Moyses, and all the residewe of the Fathers; they be all of them demonstrations that they did certeynly trust and beléeue that the Soule is immortall, that there is another life after this, and that there is a iudgement to come. For had they bene of opinion that there is none other life after this; the flesh would hauehave perswaded them to hauehave hild themselues in quiet here, and they would hauehave liked nothing better than to hauehave followed swéetly the cōmon trade of the world, Noe among his frends, Abraham among the Chaldees, Moyses in Pharaos Court, and so foorth. So then, although the Scripture seeme to conceale it; yet doth it speake very loude thereof in déede, considering that all the cryes of the good and godly, and all the despayres of the wicked which it describeth vntounto vsus, doe sound none other thing vntounto vsus, if we hauehave eares to heare it. And it may bee, that in the same respect, this article of the Immortalitie of the Soule was not put into the auncient Créede of the Iewes, nor also peculiarly into the Créede of vsus Christians, because wee beléeue beyond reason, and this is within the bounds of reason; and whosoeuer treateth of Religion must néedes presuppose God eternall and man immortall, without the which two, all Religion were in vayne. Also, when we see that Godlinesse, Iustice, and vertue were commended among the Heathen of all ages: it is all one as if wee should heare them preach in expresse words the Immortalitie of the Soule. For their so doing is buylded eueryevery whit vppon that, as vppon a foundation without the which those things could not stand. I will spend my goodes or my life for the maintenance of Iustice. What is this Iustice but a vayne name, or to what end hauehave I so many respects, if I looke for nothing out of this present world here? I will (sayd a man of olde tyme) rather lose euen the reputation of an honest man, thā behaue my selfe otherwise than honestly. But why should I doe so, if I looke for no good in another world, seeing I hauehave nothing but euill here?The wise Men of Egipt. Surely if there be none other thing than this life, then is vertue to be vsed no further, than profite and commoditie may growe vponupon it; and so should it become a Chaffer and Merchandise, & not vertue in déede. Yet notwithstanding, those are the ordinary spéeches, euen of such as speake doubtfully of the Immortalitie of the Soule. Therefore they doe but denye the ground and yet graune the cōsequence; which is all one as if a man bauing first bin burned, should fall to disputing whether fire be hot or no. But now (which is better for vsus) I will here gather together their owne spéeches one after another.
Hermes declareth in his Poemander, Hermes in his Poemander.how at the voyce of the euerlasting, the Elements yéelded forth al reasonlesse liuing wights as it had bin out of their bosomes.foreign But when he commeth to man, he sayth, He made him like vntounto himselfe, he linked himself to him as to his Sonne, (for he was beautiful and made after his owne Image) and gaue him al his works to vse at his pleasure. Againe, he exhorteth him to forsake his bodie, (notwithstanding that he woonder greatly at the cunning workmanship thereof) as the very cause of his death, and to manure his Soule which is capable of immortalitie, & to consider the originall roote from whence it sprang, which is not earthly but heauenly, and to withdraw himself euen from his Sences and from their traiterous allurements, to gather himself wholly into that mynd of his which he hath from God, and by the which he following Gods word, may become as GOD. Discharge thy selfe (sayth he) of this body which thou bearest about thee, for it is but a cloke of ignorance, a foundation of infection, a place of corruptiō, a liuing death, a sensible carryon, a portable graue, and a household theefe. It flattereth thee because it hareth thee, and it hateth thee because it enuieth thee. As long as that liueth, it bereueth thee of life, and thou hast not a greater enemie than that. Now, to what purpose were it for him to forsake this light, this dwellingplace and this life, if he were not sure of a better in another world (as he himselfe sayth more largely afterward?) On the other side, what is the Soule?Hermes in his Poemander. cap. 10. The Soule (sayth he) is the garment of the mynd, and the garment of the Soule is a certeyne Spirit whereby it is vnited to the bodie. And this Mynd is the thing which wee call properly the Man, that is to say a heauenly wight which is not to bee compared with Beastes, but rather with the Gods of Heauen, if he be not yet more than they. The Heauenly can not come downe to the earth without leauing the Heauen, but Man measureth the Heauen without remouing from the earth. foreign.The earthly man then is as a mortall God, and the heauenly God is as an immortall man. To bee short, his conlusion is, That man is dubble, mortall as touching his body, and immortall as touching his Soule, which Soule is the substantiall man and the very man created immediatly of God (fayth he) as ye light is bred immediatly of the Sunne.Hermes in his Esculapius. AEnaeas Gaz. concerning the immortalitie of the Soule. And Chalcidius sayth that at his death he spake these wordes. I goe home againe into myne owne Countrie, where my better forefathers and kinsfolk be.
Of Zoroastres who is yet of more antiquitie than Hermes, we hauehave nothing but fragments. Neuerthelesse, many report this article to be one of his,Gha…deans. That mens Soules are immortall, and that one day there shall be a generall rysing againe of their bodies; and the answers of the Wise men of Chaldye (who are the heires of his Doctrine) doe answer sufficiently for him. There is one that exhorteth men to returne with spéede to their heauenly father, who hath sent them from aboue a Soule indewed with much vnderstanding; and another that exhorteth them to seeke Paradise as the peculiar dwelling place of the Soule. A third sayth that the Soule of man hath God as it were shut vp in it, and that it hath not any mortalitie therein. For (sayth he) the Soule is as it were dronken with God, and sheweth foorth his …uders in the harmonie of this mortall body. And agayne another sayth, It is a cléere fire procéeding from the power of the heauenly father, an vncorruptible substance, and the mainteyner of life, conteyning almost all the whole world with the full plentie thereof in his bosome. But one of them procéedeth yet further, affirming that he which setteth his mynde vppon Godlinesse, shall saue his body, frayle though it bee. And by those words he acknowledgeth the very glorifying of the bodie.
Now,The Greekes. all these sayings are reported by the Platonists, & namely by Psellus; and they refuse not to be acknowne that Pythagoras and Plato learned thē of the Chaldees; insomuch that some think, that the foresayd Hermes and Zoroastres and the residewe aforementioned, are the same of whom Plato speaketh in his second Epistle, and in his eleuenth booke of Lawes, when he sayth that the auncient and holy Oracles are to be beléeued, which affirme mens Soules to bee immortall, and that in another life they must come before a Iudge that will require an account of al their doings. The effect whereof commeth to this, That the Soule of man procéedeth immediatly from God, that is to say, that the father of the bodie is one, and the father of the Soule is another: That the Soule is not a bodily substance, but a Spirit and a light: That at the departure thereof from hence, it is to goe into a Paradise, and therfore ought to make haste vntounto death: And that it is so farre from mortalitie, that it maketh euen the body immortall. What can wee say more at this day, euen in the tyme of light wherein we be? Pherecydes Pherecydes.the Syrian, the first that was knowne among the Greekes to hauehave written in prose, taught the same. And that which Virgill sayth in his second Eglog concerning the Drug or Spice of Assyria, Assyrium vulgo nascetur Amonium.and the growing thereof euerywhere, is interpreted of some men to bée ment of the Immortalitie of the Soule, the doctrine whereof Pherecydes brought from thence into Greece; namely, that it should be vnderstood euerywhere throughout the whole world. Also Phocylides who was at the same time, speaketh therof in these words.
foreign.
That is to say:Phocylides.
The Soule of man immortall is, and neuer weares away
With any age or length of tyme, but liueth fresh for ay.
And againe,
foreign.
The Remnants which remaine of men vnburied in the graue,
Become as Gods, and in the Heauens a life most blessed hauehave.
For though their bodies turne to dust, as dayly we doe see,
Their Soules liue still for euermore from all corruption free.
And in another place he sayes agayne:
foreign.
We hope that we shall come agayne
Out of the earth to light more playne.
And if ye aske him the cause of all this: he will answer you in another verse thus.
foreign.
Because the Soule, Gods instrument and Image also is.
Which saying he seemeth to hauehave taken out of this verse of Sibils.Sybill.
foreign.
In very reason Man should bee
The Image and the shape of mee.
Of the same opinion also are Orpheus, Theognis, Homer, Hesiodus, Pindar, Pindar in the second song of his Olympiads Homer in the Funeralles of his Iliads.and all the Poets of old tyme; which may answer both for themselues and their owne Countries, and for the residue of their ages. Likewise Pythagoras a disciple of Pherecides, held opinion that the Soule is a bodylesse and immortall substance, put into this body as into a Prison for sinning. And whereas the fléeting of soules out of one body into another, is fathered vponupon him; although the opinion be not directly against the immortalitie of the Soule, yet doe many men thinke that hee hath wrong doone vntounto him. And his Disciple Timoeus of Locres reporteth otherwyse of him. For what punishment were it to a voluptuous man, to hauehave his Soule put into a beast, that he might become the more voluptuous without remorse of sinne? Soothly it is all one as if in punishment of Murder or theft, yée would make the Murderer to cut the throtes of his owne Father and Mother, or the Théef to commit trecherie ageinst God. Howsoeuer the case stand, he teacheth in his verses, that man is of heauenly race, and that (as Iamblichus reporteth) he is set in this world to behold God. And his Disciple Architas sayth,Pythagoras. Hera…litus as he is reported by Philo. Epicharmus as he is reported by Clement of Ale…andria. that God breathed reason and vnderstanding into him. Likewise Philolaus affirmeth that the Diuines and Prophets of old time bare record, that the Soule was cuppled with the body for hir sinnes, and buryed in the same as in a Graue. Of Epicharmus we hauehave this saying. If thou beest a good man in thy heart, Death can doe thee no harme, for thy Soule shall liue happyly in heauen, &c. Also of Heraclides we hauehave this saying, We liue the Death of them (that is to say of the blessed) his meaning is,Thales, Anaxagoras, Diogenes and Ze…o. that we be not buried with our bodyes; and we dye their Lyfe, that is to say, wee bee still after this body of ours is dead. Of the like opinion are Thales, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes concerning this poynt; yea and so is Zeno too, howbeit that he thought the Soule to bee begotten of Man, wherein hee was contrarie too himselfe. To bée short, scarsly were there any to be found among the men of old time, saue onelyonly Democritus and Epicurus, Epicurus.that held the contrary way; whome the Poete Lucre immitated afterward in his verses. Yet notwithstanding when Epicurus should dye, hée commaunded an Anniuersarie or Yéermynd to bee kept in remembrance of hym by his Disciples: so greatly delighted hée in a vayne shadowe of Immortalite, hauing shaken off the very thing it self. And Lucrece Lucretius.(as it is written of him) made his booke béeing mad, at such times as the fittes of his madnesse were off him, surely more mad when he thought himselfe wysest, than when the fits of his phrensie were strongest vppon him. Whosoeuer readeth the goodly discourses of Socrates vponupon his drinking of poyson, as they bee reported by Plato and Xenophon Socrates, Plato and Xenophō.hymselfe; can not doubt of his opiniō in this case. For he not only beléeued it himself, but also perswaded many men to it with liuely reasons, yea and by his own death much more then by all his lyfe. And so ye see we be come vntounto Plato and Aristotle, with consent of all the wyse men of olde tyme, vngeinsayd of any, sauing of a two or thrée malapert wretches, whom the vngraciousest of our dayes would esteeme but as dronken sottes and dizards. Certesse Plato Plato in his Timaeus.(who might paraduenture hauehave heard speake of the bookes of Moyses) doeth in his Timaeus bring in God giuing commaundement to the vndergoddes whom he created, that they should make man both of mortall and of immortall substances. Wherein it may be that he alluded to this saying in Genesis, Let vsus make man after our owne Image and lykenesse. In which case the Iewes say that GOD directed his spéeche to his Angels; but our Diuines say hee spake to himselfe. But anon after, both in the same booke and in many other places, Plato Plato in his Timaeus, and in his third booke of a Comonweale.(as it were comming to him himselfe ageine,) teacheth that GOD created Man by himselfe, yea and euen his Lyuer and his Brayne and all his Sences; that is to say, the Soule of him, not onelyonly indewed with reason and vnderstanding, but also with sence and abilitie of growing and increasing; and also the instruments whereby the same doe woorke. Moreouer hee maketh such a manifest difference betwéene the Soule and the body; as that hee matcheth them not toogither as matter and forme, as Aristottle doth: but as a Pilot and a Ship, a Commonweale and a Magistrate, an Image and him that beareth it vponupon him. What greater thing can there be than to be like God? Now (sayth Plato in his Phoedon)Plato in his Phoedon, in his matter of state, in his Al…ibiades, and in the tenth booke of his Comonweale. The Soule of Man is very like the Godhead; Immortall, Reasonable, Vniforme, Vndissoluble, and euermore of one sorte, which are conditions (saith he) in his matters of State) that can not agree but to things most diuine. And therefore at his departing out of the world, he willed his Soule to returne home too her kinred and to her first originall, that is to wit, (as hée himselfe sayth there) to the wyse and immortall Godhead the Fountaine of all goodnes, as called home from banishment into her owne natiue countrie.Plato in his fifth booke of Lawes. He termeth it ordinarily foreign, that is to say, of kin vntounto God, and consequently foreign, that is to say, Euerlasting, and of one selfesame name with the immortall ones, a Heauenly Plant and not a Earthly, rooted in Heauen and not in Earth, begotten from aboue and not héere beneath, and finally such as cannot dye heere, forasmuch as it liueth still in another place. To be short, séeing (sayeth he) that it comprehendeth the things that are Diuine and immortall, that is to wit, the Godhead, and the things that are vnchaungeable and vncorruptible, as trueth is: it cannot be accounted to be of any other nature than they. The same opinion doth Plutarche also attribute vntounto him, which appeareth almost in eueryevery leafe of his writings. As touching the auncienter sort of Platonists, they agree all with one accord in the immortalitie of ye soule, sauing that some of them deriue it from God, and some from the Soule of the World, some make but the Reason or mynd onelyonly to be immortall, and some the whole Soule: which disagreement may well be salued, if we say that the Soule all whole together is immortall in power or abilitie, though the execution and performance of the actions which are to be doone by the body, be forgone with the instruments or members of the body.
The disagréement concerning this poynt among such as a man may voutsafe to call by the name of Philosophers, séemeth to hauehave begonne at Aristotle, howbeit that his Disciples count it a commendation to him, that he hath giuen occasion to doubt of his opinion in that behalfe. For it is certeine that his newfound doctrine of the Eternitie or euerlastingnesse of the World, hath distroubled his brayne in many other things, as commonly it falleth out, that one error bréedeth many other.Aristotle in his second booke of liuīg things. Because nature (sayth he) could not make eueryevery man particularly to continue for euer by himself, therefore she continueth him in the kind by matching Male and Female together. This is spoken either grossely or doubtfully. But whereas he sayth that if the Mynd hauehave any inworking of it owne without any helpe of the Sences or of the body, it may also continue of it selfe, concluding thereuppon that then it may also be separated from the body, as an immortal thing from a thing that is transitorie and mortall: It followeth consequently also, that the Soule may hauehave continuance of it selfe,Aristotle in the third book of the Soule. as whereof he vttereth these words, namely, That the Soule commeth from without, and not of the seede of Man as the body doth, and that the Soule is the onelyonly part in vsus that is Diuine. Now, to be Diuine and to be Humane, to be of séede and to be from without, that is to say, from GOD; are things flat contratrie, whereof the one sort is subiect to corruption, and the other not.Aristotle in his tenth booke of moralles. In the tenth booke of his Moralls he acknowledgeth two sorts of lyfe in man; the one as in respect that he is composed of Body and Soule, the other as in respect of Mynd onelyonly; the one occupied in the powres which are called humane and bodily, which is also accompanyed with a felicitie in this lyfe; and the other occupied iu the vertues of the mynd, which is accompanied also with a felictie in another lyfe. This which consisteth in contemplation, is better than the other; and the felicitie thereto belonging, is peculiarly described by him in his bookes of Heauen aboue Tyme, as which consisteth in the franke and frée working of the Mynd, & in beholding the souereine God. And in good sooth,Michael of Ephesus vponupon Aristotles Moralles. full well doeth Michael of Ephesus vppon this saying of his conclude, that the Soule is immortall; and so must al his morals also néedes do, considering that too liue wel, whether it be to a mans selfe or towards other men, were els a vaine thing and to no purpose but to vexe our minds in this lyfe.foreign. In his bookes of the Soule, hee not onelyonly separateth the Body from the Soule, but also putteth a difference betwixt the Soule it selfe & the Mind, terming the Soule the inworking of the body and of the bodily instruments; and the mynd that reasonable substance which is in vsus, whereof the doings hauehave no fellowship with the doings of the body, and whereof the Soule is (as Plato saieth) but the Garment. This Mynd (sayth he) may be seuered from the body, it is not in any wyse mingled with it, it is of such substaunce as cannot be hurt or wrought vponupon, it hath being and continuance actually and of it selfe; In his second booke of the Soule.and euen when it is separated from the body, then is it immortall and euerlasting. To be short, it hath not any thing like vntounto the body. For it is not any of al those things which hauehave being afore it vnderstād them. And therefore which of all bodily things can it be? And in another place he sayeth thus: As concerning the Mynd, and the contemplatiue powre, it is not yet sufficiently apparant what it is. Neuerthelesse it seemeth to bee another kind of Soule, and it is that onelyonly which can bee separated from the corruptible, as the which is Ayeuerlasting. To be short, when as he putteth this question, whether a Naturall Philosopher is to dispute of all maner of Soules, or but onelyonly of that Soule which is immateriall: it followeth that he graunteth that there is such a one. And againe, when as he maketh this Argument; Looke what God is euerlastingly, that are wee in possibilitie according to our measure: but hee is euerlastingly separated from bodily things, therefore the time will come that wee shall bee so too. He taketh it that there is an Image of God in vsus, yea euen of the Diuine nature which hath continuance of itselfe. Uery well and rightly therfore doth Simplicius gather therof, the immortalitie of the Soule. For it dependeth vponupon this separation,In the last booke of the parts of beasts. In the tenth of his Supernaturalles. & vpō continuance of being of it self. Besides this he sayth also, that hunting of beasts is graū ted to man by the lawe of Nature, because that thereby man chalengeth nothing but that which naturally is his owne. By what right I pray you, if there be no more in himself than in them? And what is there more in him than in them, if they hauehave a soule equall vntounto his?In his first booke of matters of state. Herevnto make all his commendations of Godlines, of Religion, of blessednes, and of contemplation. For too what ende serue all these, which doe but cumber vsus here belowe? Therefore surely it is to be cōcluded, that as he spake doubtfully in some one place, so he both termed and also taught to speake better in many other places, as appeareth by his Disciple Theophrastus, who speaketh yet more euidently thereof than he.
The LatinsThe opinion of the Latin writers. (as I hauehave sayd before) fell to Philosophie somewhat later then the Gréekes. And as touching their common opinion, the exercises of superstition that were among them, the maner of speeches which we marke in their Histories, their contempt of death, and their hope of another life; can giuegive vsus sufficient warrant thereof. Cicero Cicero in his first booke of his Tusculane Questions, & in his booke of Comfort.speaketh vntounto vsus in these words. The originall of our Soules and Myndes cannot bee found in this lowe earth: for there is not any mixture in them, or any compounding that may seeme to bee bred or made of the earth. Neither is there any moysture, any wyndinesse, or any firy matter in them. For no such thing could hauehave in it the powre of memorie, Vnderstanding, and conceit, to beate in mynd things past, to foresee things to come, and to consider things present, which are matters altogither Diuine. And his conclusion is, that therefore they bee deriued from the Mynd of GOD, that is to say, not bred or begotten of Man, but created of God: not bodily, but vnbodily; wherevpon it followeth that the Soule cannot be corrupted by these transitorie things. The same Cicero Cicero in his second booke of the Nature of the Gods: and in his fust booke of Lawes.in another place sayeth that betwéene God and Man there is a kinred of reason, as there is betwéene man & man a kinred of blud. That the fellowship betwéene man and man commeth of the mortall body, but the fellowship betwéene God and man commeth of God himselfe who created the Soule in vsus. By reason whereof (sayth hée) we may say we hauehave Alyance with the heauenly sort, as folke that are descended of the same race and roote; whereof that we may euermore be myndfull, we must looke vp to heauen as to the place of our birth, whether we must one day returne. And therfore yet once againe he concludeth thus of himself. Think not (sayth he) that thou thy selfe art mortall, In Scipioes dreame.it is but thy body that is so. For thou art not that which this outward shape pretendeth to be, the Mynd of Man is the man in deede, and not this lumpe which may bee poynted at with ones Fingar. Assure thy selfe therefore that thou art a GOD; For needes must that be a God, which liueth, perceyueth, remembereth, foreseeth, and finally reigneth in thy body as the Great God the maker of all things doth in the vniuersall world. For as the eternall God ruleth and moueth this transitory world, so doth the immortall Spirit of our soule moue & rule our fraile body. Hereuntoo consent all the writers of his tyme, as Ouid, Virgill and others, whose verses are in eueryevery mans remembrance.
There wanted yet the wight that should all other wights exceedeOuid in his first booke of Metamorphosis.
In loftie reach of stately Mynd, who like a Lord in deede
Should ouer all the resdewe reigne; Then shortly came forth Man,
Whom eyther he that made the world and all things els began,
Created out of seede diuine, or els the earth yet yoong
And lately parted from the Skie, the seede thereof vncloong
Reteyned still in frutefull wombe: which Iapets sonne did take,
And tempering it with water pure, a wight thereof did make,
Which should resemble euen the Gods which souereine state doe hold.
And where all other things the ground with groueling eye behold;
He gaue to man a stately looke and full of Maiestie
Commaunding him with stedfast looke to face the starry Skie.
Here a man might bring in almost all Senecaes wrytings; Seneca writing to Gallio and to Lucillus.but I will content my selfe with a fewe sayings of his. Our Soules (sayth he) are a part of Gods Spirit, and sparkes of holy things shining vponupon the earth. They come from another place than this lowe one. Whereas they seeme to bee conuersant in the bodie, yet is the better part of them in Heauen, alway neere vntounto him which sent them hither. And how is it possible that they should be from beneath, or from anywhere els thā from aboue, seeing thei ouerpasse al these lower things as nothing, and hold skorne of all that euer we can hope or feare? Thus ye sée how he teacheth that our Soules come into our bodies from aboue. But whether go they agayne, when they depart hence? Let vsus here him what he sayes of the Lady Martiaes Sonne that was dead. He is now euerlasting (sayth he) and in the best state,Seneca concerning the Lady Martiaze Sōne and the shortnesse of this life In his Questions, and in his hooke of Comfort. berest of this earthly baggage which was none of his, & set free to himselfe. For these bones, these sinewes, this coate of skin, this face, and these seruiceable hands, are but fetters and prisons of the Soule. By them the Soule is ouerwhelmed, beaten downe, and chased away. It hath not a greater batterll, than with that masse of flesh. For feare of being torne in peeces, it laboureth to returne from whence it came, where it hath readie for it an happie and euerlasting rest. And agayn: This Soule cannot be made an Outlaw: for it is a kin to the Gods, equall to the whole world, and to all tyme; and the thought or conceyt thereof goeth about the whole Heauen, extending it self from the beginning of al tyme to the vttermost poynt of that which is to come. The wretched coarse being the Iayle & setters of the Soule, is tossed to and fro. VponUpon that are tormēts, murthers, and diseases executed. As for the Soule, it is holy and euerlasting, and cannot bee layd hand on. When it is out of this body, it is at libertie and set free from all bondage, and is cōuersant in that beautifull place (wheresoeuer it be) which receyueth mens Soules into the blessed rest thereof as soone as they bee deliuered from hence. To bee short, he seemeth to pricke very nere to the rysing againe of the dead. For in a certeyne Epistle to Lucilius, his words are these. Death, wherof we be so much afrayd, doth not bereue vsus of life, but only discontinew it for a tyme; and a day will come that shall bring vsus to light agayne. This may suffise to giuegive vsus knowledge of the opinion of that great personage, in whom wee see that the more he grewe in age, the nerer he came still to the true birth. For in his latest bookes he treateth alwaies both more assuredly and more euidētly therof.
Also the saying of Phauorinus is notable. Fauorinus.There is nothing great on earth, (sayth he) but Man; and nothing great in Man, but his Soule. If thou mount vp thether, thou moūtest aboue Heauen. And if thou stoope downe agayne to the bodie, and compare it with the Heauen; it is lesse than a Flye, or rather a thing of nothing. At one word, this is as much to say, as that in this clod of clay, there dwelleth a diuine and vncoruptible nature: for how could it els be greater than the whole world?
As touching the Nations of old tyme,The common opinion of all nations. we reade of them all, that they had certeyne Religions and diuine Seruices, so as they beléeued that there is a Hell, and certeyne fieldes which they call the Elysian fields, as we see in the Poets Pindarus, Diphilus, Sophocles, Euripides & others.Porphyrius in his 4. booke of Abstinence. The more supersticious that they were, the more sufficiently doe they witnesse vntounto vsus what was in their Conscience. For true Religion and Superstition hauehave both one ground, namely the Soule of man; and there could be no Religion at all,Which with their owne hands made the fire to burne their bodies in: and sawe aliue the kindled flame that should consume their Skinne. if the Soule liued not when it is gone hence. Wee reade of the Indians, that they burned themselues afore they came to extreme oldage, terming it the letting of men loose, and the fréeing of the Soule from the bodie: and the sooner that a man did it, the wiser was he estéemed. Which custome is obserued still at this day among the people that dwell by the Riuer Niger otherwise called the people of Senega in Affricke, who offer themselues willingly to be buryed quicke with their Maisters. All the demonstrations of Logicke and Mathematicke (sayth Zeno) hauehave not so much force to proue the immortalitie of the soule, as this only doing of theirs hath. Also great Alexander hauing taken prisoners ten of their Philosophers, (whom they call Gimnosophists) asked of one of them to trye their wisedome, whether there were mo…men aliue or dead. The Philosopher answered, that there were moe aliue: Because (sayd he) there are none dead. Ye may wel think they gaue a drye mocke to all the arguments of Aristotle and Callisthenes, which with all their Philosophie had taught their scholer Alexander so euill. Of the Thracians, we reade that they sorrowed at the birth of men and reioyced at the death of them, yea euen of their owne chidren. And that was because they thought that which wee call death, not to be a death in déede, but rather a very happie birth. And these be the people whom Herodotus reporteth to hauehave bene called the Neuerdying Getes, and whom the Greekes called the Neuerdying Getes or Thracians. Who were of opinion that at their departing out of this world, they went to Zamolxis or Gebeleizie, Gebeleizie, that is to say, Register or Giuer of caze & rest.that is to say (after ye interpretation of the Getish or Gotish tongue) to him that gaue them health, saluation or welfare, and gathered them together. The like is sayd of the Galles, chiefly of the inhabiters about Marsilles and of their Druydes; of the Hetruscians and their Bishops; and of the Scythians and their Sages; of whom all the learning and wisedome was grounded vponupon this poynt. For looke how men did spread abroad, so also did this doctrine, which is so déeply printed in man, that he cannot but carie it continually with him. Which thing is to bee seene yet more in that which wee reade concerning the hearers of Hegesias the Cyrenian, who dyed willingly after they had heard him discourse of the state of mens Soules after this life; and likewise concerning Cleombrotus the Ambraciote, who slewe himselfe when he had read a certeyne treatise of the immortalitie of the Soule. For had it not bene a doctrine most euident to mans wit, they would neuer hauehave bin caried so farre by it, as to the hurting of their bodies. And if among so many people, there be perchaunce some fewe wretched caytifes, that hauehave borne themselues on hand the contrarie; which thing neuerthelesse they could neuer yet fully perswade themselues to be out of all doubt or question: surely wee may beléeue that they had very much adoe and were vtterly besotted like Drunkards, afore they could come to that poynt: so as wee may well say of them as Hierocle Gebeleizie, that is to say, Register or Giuer of caze & rest.the Pythagorist sayde: namely, That the wicked would not hauehave their Soules to bee immortall, to the intent they might not be punished for their faults: But yet that they preuent the sentence of their Iudge, by condemning themselues vntounto death afore hand. But if they wil neither heare God, nor the whole world, nor themselues: let them at leastwise hearken to the Deuill as well as they doe in other things; who (as sayth Plutark Plutarke in his treatise of the flow punishing of the wicked.) made this answer to Corax of Naxus and others in these verses.
It were a great wickednesse for thee to say
The Soule to be mortall or for to decay.
And vntounto Polytes he answered thus.
As long as the Soule to the body is tyde,
Though loth, yet all sorowes it needes must abyde.
But when fro the body Death doth it remoue,
To heauen by and by then it styes vp aboue.
And there euer youthfull in blisse it doth rest,
As God by his wisedome hath set for the best.
Not that any saying of the Deuilles owne is to bee alledged in witnesse of the trueth; furtherfoorth than to shewe that he speakes it by compulsion of Gods mightie power, as wicked men diuers tymes doe when they be vponupon the Racke. Now we bée come to the time or nere to the time that the heauenly doctrine of Iesus Christ was spred ouer ye whole world, vntounto which tyme I hauehave proued ye continuall succession of that doctrine, which could not but bee vnseparably ioyned with the succession of men.The opinion of the later Philosophers. But frō this tyme foorth it came so to light among all Nations and all persons; that Sainct Austin after a sort tryumphing ouer vngodlinesse, cryeth out in diuers places, saying: Who is now so very a foole or so wicked, as to doubt still of the immortalitie of the Soule? Epictetus a Stoikphilosopher, who was had in very great reputation among all the men of his tyme, is full of goodly sayings to the same purpose. May wee not bee ashamed (sayth he) to leade an vnhonest life, Epictetus. foreign. and to suffer our selues to be vanquished by aduersitie? we be alyed vntounto God, we came from thence, and wee hauehave leaue to returne thether from whence we came. One while, as in respect of the Soule, he termeth man the ofspring of GOD, or as it were a braunch of the Godhead; and another while he calleth him adiuine ympe or a spark of God: by all which words (howbeit that they be somewhat vnproper) (for what wordes can a man finde to fit that matter?) he sheweth the vncorruptiblenesse of the substance of mans Soule. And whereas the Philosopher Simplicius Simplicius.hath so diligently commented vppon his bookes, it doth sufficiently answer for his opiniō in that case, without expressing his words here. Plotinus Plotinus. Plotin. lib. 1. Ennead. 4. cō cerning the Beeing of the Soule, & lib. 2. cap. 1. & lib. 3. cap. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. lib. 4 cap. 11. & the seauenth book throughout.the excellentest of al the Platonists, hath made nine treatises expressely concerning the nature of the Soule, besides the things which he hath written dispersedly heere and there in other places. His chiefe conlusions are these. That mens Soules procéede not of their bodies, nor of the seede of the Parents, but come from aboue, and are as ye would say graffed into our bodies by the hand of God: That the Soule is partly tyed to the body and to the instruments thereof; and partly franke, frée, workfull, & continuing of it selfe; and yet notwithstanding that it is neither a body nor the harmonie of the body, but (if wee consider the life and operation which it giueth to the body) it is after a sort the perfection [or rather the perfector] of the body; and if wee hauehave an eye to the vnderstanding whereby it guydeth the mouings and doings of the body; it is as a Gouernour of the body: That the further it is withdrawne from the Sences, the better it discourseth of things; insomuch that when it is vtterly separated from them, it vnderstandeth things without discoursing, reasoning or debating, yea euen in a moment; because this debating is but a certeyne lightening or brightnesse of the mynde, which now taketh aduisement in matters whereof it doubteth, and it doubteth wheresoeuer the body yéeldeth any impediments vntounto it; but it shall neither doubt nor séeke aduisement any more when it is once out of the body, but shall conceyue the trueth without wauering: That the Soule in the body is not properly there as in a place, or as in a ground, because it is not conteyned or comprehended therein, and may also bee separated from it; but rather if a man had eyes to see it withall, he should see that the bodie is in the Soule, as an accessary is in a principall, or as a thing conteyned in a conteyner, or a sheading or liquid thing in a thing that is not liquid, because the Soule imbraceth the body, and quickneth it, and moueth it equally and alike in all parts. That eueryevery abilitie thereof is in eueryevery part of the bodie, as much in one part as in another, as a whole Soule in eueryevery parte; notwithstanding that eueryevery seuerall abilitie thereof seeme to bee seuerally in some particuler member or part, because the instruments thereof are there; as the sensitiue abilitie seemeth to rest in the head, the yrefull in the heart, and the quickning in the Liuer, because the Sinewes, Hartstrings and Uaynes come from those parts: Whereas the reasonable power is not in any part, sauing so farre foorth as it worketh and hath his operation there, neither hath it any néede of place or instrument for the executing of it selfe. And to be short, that the Soule is a life by it selfe, a life all in one, vnpartable; which causeth to growe, and groweth not it selfe; which goeth throughout the bodie, and yet is not conteyned of the bodie; which vniteth the Sences, and is not deuided by the Sences; and therfore that it is a bodilesse substance, which cannot bee touched neither from within nor from without, hauing no néede of the bodie eyther outwardly or inwardly, & consequently is immortall, diuine, yea and almost a very God: Which things he proueth by many reasons, which were too long to bee rehearsed here.Plotinus in his booke of the Sences, & of Memorie. En. 4. lib. 3. and in his booke of doubts concerning the Soule chap. 26. 27. Yea he procéedeth so farre as to say, yt they which are passed into another world, hauehave their memorie still, notwithstanding that to some mens seeming it goe away with the Sences as the treasury of the Sences. Howbeit he affirmeth it to be the more excellent kynd of memorie; not that which calleth things agayne to mynd as alreadie past, but that which holdeth and beholdeth them still as alwaies present. Of which two sorts, this latter he calleth Myndfulnes, and the other he calleth Rememberance. I will add but onelyonly one sentence more of his for a full president of his Doctrine. The Soule (sayth he) hath had companie with the Gods, and is immortal; and so would we say of it (as Plato affirmeth) if we sawe it fayre and cleere. But forasmuch as we see it commonly troubled, we thinke it not to bee eyther diuine or immortall, howbeit that he which will discerne the nature of a thing perfectly, must consider it in the very owne substance or being, vtterly vnmingled with any other thing. For whatsoeuer els is added vntounto it, doth hinder the perfect discerning of the same. Therfore let eueryevery man behold himself naked without any thing saue himselfe, so as he looke vppon nothing els than his bare Soule: and surely when he hath vewed himselfe in his owne nature merely as in respect of his Mynd, he shall beleeue himselfe to bee immortall. For he shall see that his Mynd, ameth not properly at the sensible and mortall things, but that by a certeine euerlasting power, it taketh hold of the things that are euerlasting, and of whatsoeuer is possible to be conceiued in vnderstanding: insomuch that euen it self becommeth after a sort a very World of vnderstanding & light. This is against those which pretend a weakenesse of the Soule, by reason of the inconueniences which it indureth very often in the bodie.
Of the same opinion are Numenius, Iamblichus, Porphirius, and Proclus, notwithstanding that now and then they passe their bounds, suffering their wits to runne royet. For in their Philosophie they had none other rule, than only the drift of their owne reason. It was commonly thought that Alexander of Aphrodise beléeued not the immortalitie of the Soule,Alexander of Aphrodise in his bookes of the Soule. because he defined it to be the forme of the body proceeding of the mixture & temperature of the Elements. Surely these words of his doe vsus to vnderstand, either that he ment to define but the sensitiue lyfe onelyonly (as many others doe) and not the reasonable soule; or els that he varieth from himselfe in other places. And in very déede hee sayeth immediatly afterward, that he speaketh of the things which are subiect to generation and corruption. But speaking of the Soule he sayeth it is separable, vnmateriall, vnmixed, and voyd of passions, vnlesse perchaunce we may thinke as some doe, that by this Soule he meane but onelyonly God, and not also the Soule that is in vsus; for the which thing he is sharply rebuked by Themistius, who notwithstanding speaketh neuer a whit better thereof himselfe. Howsoeuer he deale elsewhere, these words of his following are without any doubtfulnes at all. The Soule (sayth he) which is in vsus, commeth from without and is vncorruptible. In his second booke of Problemes.I say vncorruptible because the nature thereof is such, and it is the very same that Aristotle affirmeth to come from without. And in his second booke of Problemes, searching the cause why the abilities of the Soule are oftentimes impeached: If a mans brayne be hurt (sayth he) the reasonable soule dooth not well execute the actions that depend thereon. But yet for all that, it abydeth still in itselfe, vnchaungeable of nature, abilitie and power, through the immortalitie thereof. And if it recouer a sound instrument, it putteth her abilities in execution as well as it did afore. But I wil reason more at large hereafter against the opinion that is fathered vponupon him.
What shall we say of Galene, (who fathereth the causes of all things as much as he can, vponupon the Elements and the mixture and agréeble concord of them) if after his disputing against his owne Soule,Galen in his booke of the Manners of the Soule. he be constreyned to yéeld that it is immortall? Surely in his booke concerning the manners of the Soule he doeth the worst that he can against Plato: and in another place hee doubteth whether it be immortall, and whether it hauehave continuance of it selfe or no. Yet notwithstanding, in his booke of the doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato, In his booke of the doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato.It must needes be graunted (sayeth hee) that the Soule is either a sheere body and of the nature of the Skye, (as the Stoiks & Aristotle himself are inforced to confesse) or els a bodilesse substance, whereof the body is as it were the Chariot, and whereby it hath fellowship with other bodyes. And it appeareth that hee inclyneth to this latter part: For hee maketh the vitall spirit to be the excellentest of all bodily things,In his booke of Conception. and yet he graūteth the Soule to bee a farre more excellent thing than that. What shall we then doe? Let vsus wey his words set downe in his booke of the conception of a Child in the Moothers Wombe. The Soule of Man (sayeth he) is an influence of the vniuersall Soule that descendeth from the heauenly Region, a substance that is capable of knowledge, which aspyreth alwayes to one substance lyke vntounto it selfe, which leaueth all these lower things to seeke the things that are aboue, which is partaker of the heauenly Godhead, and which by mounting vp to the beholding of things that are aboue the heauens, putteth it selfe into the presence of him that ruleth all things. Were it reason then that such a substance comming from elsewhere than of the body, and mounting so farre aboue the body, should in the ende dye with the body, because it vseth the seruice of the body?
Now hereuntoo I could adde infinite other sayings of the auncientThe vniuersall consent. authors both Greeke and Latin Philosophers, Poets, and Orators from age to age, wherein they treate of the iudgement to come, of the reward of good men, of the punishment of euill men, of Paradise and of Hell, which are appendants to the immortalitie of the Soule: but as now I will but put the reader in mynd of them by the way, reseruing them to their peculiar places. To bée short, let vsus runne at this day from East to West, and from North to South, I say not among the Turkes, Arabians, or Persians, (for their Alcoran teacheth them that mans Soule was breathed into him of God,In the Alcorā, Azo: 25. and 42. and consequently that it is vncorruptible) but euen among the most barbarous, ignorant & beastly people of the Wold, I meane the very Caribies and Cannibals; It appeareth by the storyes or the East and West Indyes.and we shall find this beléefe receiued and imbraced of them all. Which giueth vsus to vnderstand, that it is not a doctrine inuented by speculations of some Philosophers, conueyed from Countrie to Countrie by their disciples, perswaded by likelyhods of reasons, or (too be short) entered into mans wit by his eares: but a natiue knowledge, which eueryevery man findeth and readeth in himself, which he carieth euerywhere about with himselfe, and which is as easie to bée perswaded vntounto all such as viewe themselues in themselues, as it is easie to perswade a man that neuer sawe his owne face, to beléeue that he hath a face, by causing him to behold himselfe in a glasse.
There remayne yet two opinions, to be confuted. The one is the opinion of Auerrhoes, Ageinst Auerrhoes.and the other is the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodise, who affirme themselues to hold both of Aristotle; namely in that they vpholde that there is but one vniuersall reasonable Soule or mynd, which worketh al our discourses in vsus, howbeit diuersly in eueryevery seuerall person. And this thing (if wee beléeue Auerrhoes) is done according to the diuersitie of ye Phantasies or Imaginations wherewith the mynd is serued as with instruments. But if we beléeue Alexander, Let the Reader beare these termes & their significations in Mynd, for al the discourse here ensewing.it is done according too the diuersities of the capable mind as they terme it, that is to say, of the abilitie or capabilitie that is in men to vnderstand things, by receyuing the impression of the vniuersall mynd that worketh into eueryevery of them which in respect thereof is called of them the woorker. Soothly these opinions are such as may bee disprooued in one worde. For this onelyonly one Mynd, whether in possibilitie or in action, could not hauehave receiued or imprimted in eueryevery man one selfesame common beléef and conceit of the immortalitie of the Soule, in so great diuersitie of imaginations, and in so many Nations, as we sée doe beléeue it, considering that the very same conceit is directly repugnant against it. Nay, it may well bée sayde that Auerrhoes and Alexander had very diuers conceits and imaginations one from another, and very contrary to all other mens, seeing they had so diuers and cōtrarie opinions imprinted either in their mind or in their imagination. Howbeit forasmuch as there may be some, ye will make a doubt of it; Let vsus examine them seuerally yet more aduisedly.Auerhoes, vppon Aristotles third booke of the Soule. First Auerrhoes will néedes beare Aristotle on hand, that Aristotle is of that opinion. Let vsus see how this surmize of his can agrée with the propositions which Aristotle hath left vsus. Aristotle telleth vsus that the Soule is knit to the body as ye forme or shape too the matter; that the Soule hath thrée chiefe powers, namely of lyfe, of sence, and of vnderstanding; and that the vnderstanding part conteineth in his power both the other two powers, as a Fiuesquare conteineth both a Fowersquare and a Triangle.Aristotle in his second booke of the Soule. Whereupon it followeth that if any one of the three powers of the Soule be ioyned to the body as a forme to the matter; all the thrée be ioyned so to, as which are all in one soule as in their roote. Now Auerrhoes neither can nor will deny that the powers of growing and of perceiuing by the sences are ioyned after that maner too the body; and therfore it followeth that the vnderstanding power is to ioyned also, and consequently that according to Aristotle, as eueryevery body hath his forme, so eueryevery body hath his Soule.Aristotle in his first booke of the Soule. The same Aristotle findeth fault with the former Philosophers for holding opinion that a Soule might passe out of one man into another: because (sayeth he) that eueryevery certeyne Soule must needes be apportioned and appoynted to some one certeine body. Now looke by what Soule a man liueth, by the same Soule doth he vnderstand: for it is but one Soule indued with three diuers abilities, as hee himselfe teacheth opently. One vnderstauding or Mynd therefore, must (according to Aristotle) worke but in one seuerall body, and not in many bodyes. Also according to Aristotle, a Man & a Beast agree in this, that both of them hauehave one sensitiue power and one selfsame imagination of things perceiued by the Seuces, & that they differ in this, that man hath yet further a mynd and reason aboue the beast, which thing the beast hath not. Now if this Understanding or Mynd be without the man, as the Sonne is without the Chamber that it shineth into and inlighteneth; then cannot he be called reasonable or indewed with vnderstanding, neither doth he consequently differ from a beast. For the difference must bee in nature, and not in accident. And so should it insue that Aristotles foresaid definition of a man is false, as if he should define a Chāber by the shyning of the Sunne into it: Or say that a Dog differeth not from a man in kind; yea and that Beasts are eapable of vnderstanding, forasmuch as they hauehave Imagination ready aforehand to receiue the influence thereof as well as wee. But Aristotle is alwaies one in his defining both of beast & of man; and Auerrhoes also holdeth himself to it, without doubting thereof at all. This conclusion therfore cannot in anywise be vpheld by such grounds.
Againe, if there bee not in eueryevery seuerall man a seuerall mynd, but onelyonly one vniuersall mynd common to all men, which becommeth diuers by the onelyonly diuersitie of our imaginations: Then in respect that we hauehave sundrie imaginations, wee shall bee sundrie liuing wights; and in respect that we hauehave al but one mynd, we shall bee all but one man. For man is not man in respect of the sensitiue power, but in respect of the reasonable part which is the mind. But Aristotle graunteth that we be not only diuers liuing wights, but also diuers men. And therefore he must néedes meane also, that we hauehave not only diuers imaginations, but also diuers mynds. Now besides many other Reasons that might be alledged, ye might add this also, That otherwise Aristotles Moralles and his discourses concerning Iustice, Fréewill, the Immortalitie of the Soule, the happie blisse, the reward of the good, and the paynes of the wicked, were vtterly frutelesse and to no purpose: For as our fancies or ymaginations did come and goe, so would al those things come and go likewise; and so should they hauehave no continuance of themselues, but only be as a shadowe and vayne fantasie. But let Aristotle alone, (for he hath wrong) and let vsus come to the matter it self. The Philosophers doe ordinarily make a dubble mynd; the one which they call possible or in possibilitie, which is capable and of abilitie to vnderstand things; and this they liken to a smooth table; the other they call working or workfull, which bringeth the abilitie into act, whereas notwithstanding they be not two mynds, but two seuerall abilities of only one mynd. Now, as for this abilitie or possibilitie of vnderstanding, we affirme it to be in the Soule of eueryevery man. Contrarywise, Auerrhoes affirmed onelyonly one vniuersall capable mynd to be shed abroad eueryevery where throughout all men; and that the same is diuersly perfected and brought into act in eueryevery seuerall man, according to the diuersitie of the imaginations which the man tonceyueth, euen by the helpe or influence of the sayd vniuerall workfull mynd, which he sayth is also a substaunce seuered from man, and (in respect of the vnderstanding in possibilitie) is as the Sunne is to the sight of our eyes; and the vnderstāding in possibilitie is to the imaginations, as the sight is vntounto colours. Now, I demaund first of all, whether these vniuersall Mynds of his, bee substances created or vncreated. If they bee created, where becommeth then his conclusion, That the world is without beginning, and without ending, seeing that he will hauehave them to be continued euerlastingly in all men that hauehave bene, are, or shall be? If they bee vncreated, how can so excellent substances bee made subiect to our fond imaginations, to yéeld influence into them at their pleasures? Or rather how happeneth it that they correct them not? How happeneth it that thei leaue them in such errors, yea euen in the knowledge of themselues, seeing that by the erring of the imaginations, the very vnderstanding and reason themselues must also néedes be so often beguyled? Againe, as concerning these substances, which extend into so many places; are they Bodies or Spirits? How can they be Bodies, seeing they be in infinite places at one instant, and do infinite things, yea and flat contraries? And if they be Spirits, doth it notfollow thervpō, that they be wholly in al men, & wholly in eueryevery man; that is to say, that eueryevery man hath them whole to himselfe? And therefore that if they bee deceyued by the fantasie of any one man, they be consequently deceyued in all men? And wherof comes it then, that one man ouercommeth his imaginations, and another man not? Or that one man resisteth them, and another suffereth himselfe to be caryed away by them? Moreouer, who can denye that a man willeth things, whereof he hath vnderstanding; and likewise that he willeth some things which he vnderstandeth not; and that he vnderstandeth some things which he willeth not? And also that he willeth things euen contrary to his appetites, and concludeth oftentymes contrary to his imaginations, as commeth to passe in Dreames and in Lookingglasses; which thing the brute Beastes doe not? When a man willeth contrary to his appetites, willeth he not contrary to his sences, yea and contrary to his imagination too? for what els is fantasie or imagination, than the rebounding backe of the sences? And if this workfull vnderstanding be the only worker in his possible vnderstanding by meane of imagination; how commeth it to passe that a man willeth contrary to his imagination? Againe, when either in dreaming or in debating, reason concludeth cleane contrary to that which fancie or imagination offereth; wherof commeth it that a man is contrary to himself, or that the déede is contrary both to that which imprinted it, and to that wherein it is imprinted? Also what els is imagination (according to the opinion of Auerrhoes,) than a certeyne operation annexed to the bodie, steaming vp from the Hart to the Brayne? And on the contrary part who can say nay, but that the Will and Understanding are able to performe their operations without the instruments of the body, seeing that a man doth both will and debate things that are most repugnant to the body?Aristotle in his …. booke of Supernaturalls. Yea and that (as Aristotle sayth) those bee not actions which passe into the outward man, but those which abyde within and make perfect the inner mā? And who can make Will and Understanding to be things depending vponupon imagination, seeing that both waking and sléeping and all maner of waies els, they dayly vtter infinite iudgements and determinations against it? Now, if we hauehave nothing in vsus aboue Imagination: then considering that wee doe both will and vnderstand, it must needes bee that this power or abilitie to will and vnderstand is shed into vsus from without. And if it be but only one vniuersally in all men; then seeing that the actions thereof are executed without the imagination, without the sences, and without the instruments of the bodie, yea and against them: it followeth that it willeth and vnderstandeth in vsus whatsoeuer it liketh and listeth, euen in despite of all impediments and lets of the bodie; and that as it is but one, so it shall will but one selfsame thing, and likewise also vnderstand but one selfesame thing in all men. For if (as Aristotle confesseth) our imaginations make not our will and reason subiect vntounto them; much lesse doe they make the foresayd vniuersall mynd subiect to them as Auerrhoes pretendeth. But now contrariwise wee see there bee as many Willes as men, yea euen in one matter; and that the vnderstandings of men are not onelyonly diuers, but also contrarie. It followeth then that eueryevery particular person hath in that behalfe a particular substaunce, which willeth and vnderstandeth, franke and free from all imaginations whensoeuer it listeth to retyre into it selfe; and not that there is but one vniuersall mynd which willeth and vnderstandeth all things in all men. Besides this, by the iudgement of Aristotle as I sayd afore, this vniuersall mynd could not worke will and vnderstanding in vsus: for to will and vnderstand (sayth he) are operations that passe not into the matter nor into the outward thing, but abide stil in the worker, that is to say in the mynd, as actions and perfections thereof.
Let vsus yet agayne take of that which hath bin sayd afore. If the sayd vniuersall only one working mynd, hauehave wrought from euerlasting in the sayd vniuersall only one capable mynd, by the Imaginations of men: then hath the knowledge of all things bin euermore imprinted in the sayd capable mynd; for it shal euermore hauehave brought the abilitie into act: And therwithal, the working and perfection of the thing that is euerlasting, shall hauehave depended vponupon a thing that is temporall; which is vnpossible. And although Auerrhoes supposed not the World to be euerlasting: yet notwithstanding, the sayd capable mynd which hath bene set a worke so many hundred yéeres, by so many imaginations of men, and in so many sundry Nations, could not now méete with any newe thing wherof it had not the knowledge afore. For this capable mynd (saith Auerrhoes) is a certeine spirituall substance, which spreadeth it self foorth into all men and into all ages, and the nature of such sort of substaunces is to be all in the whole, and all in eueryevery part thereof. For they bee not tyed to any one place, but are wheresoeuer they worke, and their working is in respect of the whole and not in respect of any one part, forasmuch as they be vndiuidable. Therefore it should followe by his opinion (as I hauehave sayd afore) that the one vniuersall capable mind is & worketh whole and vnparted in eueryevery man. And if it be so; then is ye being of it there, not in way of méere abilitie or possibilitie onelyonly, but in way of operation and perfect inworking, as a wicked spirit is in a Witch, in a Pythonesse or in a possessed person: which spirit, (were he possessed of the man as he himselfe posseseth the man, (after which maner Auerrhoes affirmeth vsus to possesse the vnderstanding in possibilitie, by our imaginatious;) would make the man capable of all that euer the Spirit himselfe knoweth or is. Whereupon it will followe, that this vnderstanding in possibilitie shall euerlastingly in all men from their very birth, actually vnderstand and knowe all things that all men vnderstand, as well in the old as the yoong, and in the ignorant as the skilfull; so as wee shall hauehave no more neede of sences, nor of imagination to vnderstand withall. Too be short, although Auerrhoes admitteth not the World to bee without beginning: yet at leastwise he will not deny, but that [by his reckening] they which come into the world at this day, should come farre more skilfull than all their predecessors, and the children of them more skilfull than their fathers, and the ofspring of those children more skilfull than those children themselues, and so forthon, because they should succeede in the knowledge continued throughout all ages. Whervpon it will also insue, that all Sciences shalbe equally in all men that make profession of them. As for example, we will speake heere but of some one speciall Science, as Grammer and Arithmetike. Now if there bee any diuersitie in the skill thereof, that diuersitie cannot come but of the diuersitie of the subiect or ground wherein the skill is. Now the ground of the skill is the capacitie of the mynd or vnderstanding, (which Auerrhoes supposeth to be but only one, common to all men) and not the Imagination, which is but a reflexion or rebounding backe of the Sence. And so forasmuch as there is (by his saying) but one ground in al men; it followeth that the knowledge or skill of this or that Science must needes bee equall & alike in all men: or els that if it be not equall, but doe vary, as wee see it dooth in diuers degrees; then the same varying or diuersitie happeneth through the diuersitie of the ground wherein the skill is, and consequently that there is one particular vnderstanding or one peculiar mynd in eueryevery man, and not one vniuersal mynd comon to all men. Also it is a generall rule, that the receiuer of a thing hath not the thing afore he receiue it. For (as Aristotle Aristotle in his third booke of of the Soule.saith (that which is to receiue a thing, must needes be first vtterly voyde of the thing which it receiueth. Now afore that our Sence and Imagination had any beeing at all, this vniuersall comon mynd had receiued & possessed all things aforehand; and not only receiued them, but also kept them together. For as Aristotle himself saith, that maner of mynd is the place of all vnderkinds & sortes of things, and thereto hath no lesse power than the Imagination, to reteine whatsoeuer the Sences receiue. In vaine therefore should that vniuersall mynd vnderstand by our Imaginations, considering that it vnderstandeth by it selfe: in vaine likewise should the Imaginations imprint those things in it, which were imprinted in it so long afore: and in vaine is Aristotles settingdowne of a workfull vnderstanding, which should bring our vnderstanding in abilitie, from possibilitie into action; if the sayd onelyonly one vniuersall mynd or vnderstanding be perfect of it selfe from euerlasting, as it followeth to be vppon the opinion of Auerrhoes. Neither is it to be sayd, that although the conceyuable vnderkinds of things hauehave bene imprinted euerlastingly in the sayd vniuersall mynd; yet notwithstanding there needed an Imagination for the vnderstanding of them, as there needeth now whensoeuer we will vse the things that we hauehave seene or learned afore. For by that reckening, to learne all maner of Sciences, wee needed no more but to bethinke vsus by imagination, of the things that were already aforehand in the said only vniuersal one mynd, as we doe the things that hauehave bene printed sometime in our memories, and are somewhat slipped out of our remembrance; and so might we our selues learne all sciences without a teacher, because that in the sayd vniuersall mynde of ours, wee should hauehave all the skill that euer any man had atteyned to, in like maner as the persone that hath once had the skill of Arithmetik or Cosmographie throughly settled in his mynd, needeth no teacher to teache it him ageine, but onelyonly to ouerturne his owne imagination, and to search his memorie for the finding againe of that which he had layd vp there. Now we knowe that whosoeuer learneth nothing▪ knoweth nothing, and that ordinarily he which most studyeth, most learneth: and that all the tossing and turmoyling of a mans owne imagination that can bee all his life long, will neuer make him to attaine of himself to so much as the very principles of the least science that is. By reason wherof it followeth, That we hauehave not the skill of any science in vsus, vntill wee either be taught it or find it out by beating our wits about it: and that our imagination serueth not to reuiue the Sciences in vsus, but to bring them into vsus, and to plant them in vsus. And forasmuch as all the Sciences should bee in all men from the beginning, if there were but one vniuersall mynd in all men, [which is not so] it followeth that there is in eueryevery particular persone a particular and peculiar mynd, and not any one vniuersall mynd common to all men. Moreouer, our mynd atteyneth after a sort to the vnderstanding of itself: which thing it could not doe in very deede, if there were but one vniuersall mynd common to all men. For too vnderstand it selfe, it must needes worke vponupon it selfe. But if wee beleeue Auerrhoes, our mynd shall but onelyonly be wrought vppon and receiue into it from the Imagination, as a Windowe receyueth light from the Sunne. Ageine, the capacitie of the vniuersall vnderstanding in possibilitie, could not doe that. For it behoued it to hauehave some other thing besides itself, to bring it selfe into action. And surely Imagination could not helpe it, for it doth but offer vp the sensible things vntounto it, & atteineth not so farre as to the things that are to be discerned by drift of reason. Yet notwithstanding we vnderstand that wee vnderstand, and we reason and iudge both of our Imagination, and also of our reasoning and vnderstanding itselfe. The thing then which doth so enter and pearce into itselfe, is another maner of power than an Imagination, or than an vniuersall vnderstanding in possibilitie. What is to be said to this, that of one selfesame Imagination, one selfsame persone concludeth now after one sort, and byandby after in another sort; and thereoutof draweth both contrarie argumēts and contrarie determinations: or that diuers persons by diuers imaginations doe close togither in one will and one mynd? Is it possible that this should proceed of an euerlasting substance in one selfesame persone, seeing that enerlastingnesse is not subiect to any change of tyme or place? Or that it should proceede of any one selfesame substance in many men, seeing that the imaginations of them be so diuers one from another? at leastwise if the said substance worke not but by such instrumēts?
As touching the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodise, Against Alexander of Aphrodise.who vpholdeth a certeine vniuer sal working mind that imprinteth things in the vnderstanding in possibilitie, that is to say in eueryevery mans seuerall capacitie, and bringeth it foorth into action: the most part of the Reasons alledged afore against Auerrhoes, will also serue against him. Howbeit forasmuch as by this workfull mynd, hee seemeth to meane God himself, there is thus much more to be added vntounto it; That God who is altogither good and altogither wise would not imprint in our mynde the fond and wicked conceites, which we find there, nor leaue so great ignoraunce and darkenesse as wee feele there, but would in all men ouercomme the infection which the body bringeth: and although hee inspired not all men alike with his gracious giftes, according to the diuersitie of their capacities after the mauer of a planed Table; yet would he not at leastwise peint the Worlde with so many false Portraytures and Traynes, as eueryevery one of vsus may perceiue to bee in our selues. Agayne, were there any such inspiration or influence, it should bee eyther continuall or but by tymes. If continuall or euerlasting, we should without labour and without cunning vnderstand all that euer our imagination offereth vntounto vsus. And if it bee but at tymes, then should it not lye in vsus to list or to vnderstand any thing at all, though we would neuer so fayne. For contrarywise, we hauehave much a doe to vnderstand some things, so as we must bee fayne to winne them from our ignorance by péecemeale: and there bee some other things, which we vnderstand by and by as soone as they be put vntounto vsus, and when we list our selues. There is then in vsus a power of Understanding, though very feeble; but yet neuerthelater obedient to our will: which thing cannot be fathered vponupon God. Also if there be but onelyonly one Mynd working in all men, there shall bee but one selfesame vnderstanding in all men, I meane naturally, notwithstanding that it differ in degrees. For into what place soeuer the Sunne doe shed his beames, he doth both inlighten it and heate it, howbeit diuersly according to the nature and condition of the places and things that receyue him, some more and some lesse, some brightlyer and some dimlyer. But howsoeuer the case stande, his light yéeldeth no darknesse, nor his heate any cold. So then, if the diuersities of mens imaginations doe cause diuersities of effects in the inspiration or influence that floweth into the capacitie of our vnderstanding; surely it must néedes bee after this maner, namely that one man shall vnderstand one selfesame thing more, and another man lesse; but not in that any man shall take vntruth for truth, vnright for right, or one thing for another. Now, we see vntounto how many errors wee bee subiect, I meane not in such things as this, namely, that one man seeth better a farre of, and another better at hand; but that one man seeth white and another seeth blacke (which are things contrary) in one selfesame ground and at one selfesame tyme. It followeth therefore that diuers and sundries mynds doe worke in diuers persons, and not one selfsame mynd in al persons. By force of which reasons and of such others, I say that eueryevery mā shall finde in himselfe and of himselfe, That eueryevery man hath a particular Soule by himself, that is to say a spirituall substance vnited to his body, which in respect of giuing life to the body is as the forme therof, and in respect of giuing reason, is as the guyde of our actions: That in eueryevery man there is a certeyne Sunbeame of Reason, whereby they conceyue things and debate vponupon them; wherethrough it commeth to passe, that oftentymes they agrée both in the Reason it selfe which is one, and in the manifest grounds therof, and in whatsoeuer dependeth euidently vponupon the same: That eueryevery man hath also a peculiar body by himselfe, and likewise peculiar complexion, humours, imaginations, education, custome and trade of life: whereof it commeth that eueryevery man takes a diuers way, yea and that one selfsame person swarueth diuersly from the vnitie of Reason wherof the path is but one, and the waies to stray from it are infinite: That this Sunbeame of reason which shineth and sheadeth it self from our mynd, is properly that vnderstanding which is termed The vnderstanding in abilitie or possibilitie, which is increased and augmented by all the things which it seeth, heareth, or lighteth vppon, like fire, which gathereth increase of strength by the abundance of the fewell that is put vntounto it, and becommeth after a sort infinite by spreading it selfe abroad: Also it is the same which otherwise we call the Memorie of vnderstāding, or myndfull Memorie: and it is nothing els but an abundance of Reason, and as it were a hoorder vp of the continuall influences of the Mynd: That the Mynd from whence this floweth as from his spring, is properly that which they the sayd Auerrhoes and Alexander doe terme the working or workfull Mynd, which is a certeyne power or force that can skill to extend reason from one thing to another, and to procéede from things sensible to things vnsensible, from things mouable to things vnmouable, from bodily to spirituall, from effects to causes, and from beginnings to ends by the meane causes. This Mynd is in respect of Reason, as cunning is in respect of an Instrument or toole; and Reason, as in respect of imagination and of the things that are sensible, is as an Instrument or toole in respect of the matter or stuffe that it workes vponupon: Or to speake more fitly, this Mynd is vntounto Reason, as the mouer of a thing is to the thing that is mouable, and Reason is to her obiects, as the mouable thing is to the thing whereunto it is moued. For to reason or debate, is nothing els but to procéed from a thing that is vnderstoode, to a thing that is not vnderstoode, of purpose to vnderstand it: and the vnderstanding thereof is a resting that inseweth vppon it, as a staying or resting after mouing: That both of them as well the one as the other, are but onelyonly one selfesame substance; and like as a man both when he moueth and whē he resteth, is all one and the same man, or as the power that moueth the Sinewes is one selfesame still, both when it stirreth them, and when it holdeth them still; so the reasonable or vnderstanding Soule that is in eueryevery man, is but onelyonly one selfesame substance bodylesse and immateriall, executing his powers partly of it selfe and partly by our bodies. And seeing that Auerrhoes and Alexander make so great estimation and account of the effects which are wrought in vsus, that they bée inforced to attribute them to some vncorruptible and euerlasting Mynd; let vsus take of them, that in very trueth the thing which worketh so great woonders in the body, can be neither sence, nor body, nor imagination; but a diuine, vncorruptible and immortall mynd, as they themselues say.
But let vsus learne the thing of mo than them, which al wise men teach vsus, and which eueryevery of vsus can learne of himself; namely, that this Understanding or Mynde is not one vniuersall thing as the Sunne is that shineth into all the windowes of a Citie, but rather a particular substance in eueryevery seuerall man, as a light to leade him in the darknesse of this life; for surely it was no more difficultie to the euerlasting GOD, to create many sundrie Soules, that eueryevery man might hauehave one seuerally alone by himselfe, than to hauehave created but onelyonly one Soule for all men together. But it was farre more for his glorie, to bee knowne, praysed, and exalted of many Soules, yea and more for our welfare to prayse, exalt and knowe him, yea and to liue of our selues both in this life and in the life to come: than if any other vniuersall Spirit, Soule or Mynd whatsoeuer, should hauehave liued and vnderstoode eyther in vsus or after vsus. Now then, for this matter let vsus conclude, both by reason, and by antiquitie, and by the knowledge that eueryevery of vsus hath of himselfe; That the Soule and the Body be things diuers: That the Soule is a Spirit and not a Body: That this Spirit hath in man three abilities or powers, whereof two bee exercised by the body, and the third worketh of it selfe without the body: That these three abilities are in the one onelyonly Soule as in their roote: whereof two doe ceasse whensoeuer the body fayleth them, and yet notwithstanding the Soule abideth whole without abatemēt of any of her powers, as a Craftsman continueth a Craftsman though he want tooles to worke withal: And finally, that this Soule is a substance that continueth of it selfe, and is vnmateriall and spirituall, ouer the which neither death nor corruption can naturally hauehave any power.
And for a conclusion of all that euer I hauehave treated of hetherto in this booke, let vsus mainteyne, That there is but only one God, who by his owne goodnesse and wisedome is the Creator and gouerner of the world and of all that is therein: That in the world he created Man, after his owne Image as in respect of mynd, and after the Image of his other creatures as in respect of life, sence, and mouing; mortall so farre foorth as he holdeth the likenesse of a creature; and immortall so farre foorth as he beareth the Image of the Creator: that is to wit, in his Soule: That he which goeth out of himself to see the world, doth forthwith see that there is a God, for his workes declare him euerywhere: That he which will yet still doubt thereof, néedeth but to enter into himselfe, and he shall meete him there; for he shall finde there a power which he seeth not: That he which beléeueth there is one God, beléeueth himselfe to bee immortall; for such consideration could not light into a mortal nature: and that he which beléeueth himselfe to be immortal, beléeueth that there is a God: for without the vnutterable power of the one God, the mortall and immortall could neuer ioyne together: That he which seeth the order of the world, the proportion of man, and the harmonie that is in eyther of them compounded of so many contraries, cannot doubt yt there is a Prouidence; for the nature which hath furnished them therewith, cannot bee vnfurnished thereof it selfe; but as it once had a care of them, so can it not shake of the same care from them. Thus hauehave we thrée Articles which followe interchaungeably one another. Insomuch that he which proueth any one of them, doth proue them all thrée, notwithstāding that I hauehave treated of eueryevery of them seuerally by it selfe. Now, let vsus pray the euerlasting God, that wee may glorifie him in his workes in this world, and he voutsafe of his merciemercy to glorifie vsus one day in the world to come.
Amen.