Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 10
The x. Chapter.
That GOD created the World of nothing; that is to say, without any matter or stuffe whereof to make it.
I Cannot tell whether I may woonder more at the good insight of the auncient Philosophers in the knowledge of many naturall things, or at their blindnesse in the knowledge of the author of them, in that they set it downe for a definitiue sentence, That nothing in al the world is made of nought, and therfore that the great workmayster himself could not make any thing without matter or stuffe whereof. For in effect it is a measuring of the builder and his building both by one rule or skantling, and an aba…ing of the power which they themselues confesse to be infinite, vntounto the state of our infirmitie. God (say they) cannot make any thing without matter whereof. And why? Because a Mason cannot make any buylding without stuffe whereof. As who would say there were a more absurd kynd of reasoning in Logicke, than to conclude from the finite to the infinite, from the mightlesse to the almightie, from the transitorie to the euerlasting. Nay rather thou shouldest reason thus. Man, who is lesse than a Worme in comparison of ye highest, draweth gold out of the Rocke, or out of the dust of the earth: Of the same earth or stone he maketh such cloath, wyre, and leaues of gold foyle, as no mā would déeme to hauehave come of so grosse a matter. Of the gréene Hearbe he draweth out white flower for his sustenance: of the stalkes of Flaxe and Hempe, he draweth out thréed to make cloath of: of ragges he maketh Paper to write on: and of the excrements of the little Silkworme he draweth out a great …eale of Silkcloath. Agayne, he turkyneth some one rude & rough kynd of stuffe into a hundred thousand fashions: of the least things he maketh very great things, and by the excellencie of his wit draweth most excellent things out of that where the most part of men (notwithstanding that they be men as wel as he) found not ne perceyued not any thing at all: as for example, out of the F…t, fire to warme him: out of the barreyne Ferne and vyle Seawéede, glistering Glasse: out of a Shelfish that the Sea casteth vp, Purple to make Ornaments of. To bee short, after a certeyne maner, he maketh somewhat of nothing. Now, seeing that the weakenesse of mortall men can doe so much, shall not the mightie power of the euerlasting, bee able to doe much more? And seeing that a thing of nought is able to doe so much, shall any thing be vnpossible to the maker of all things? But although this which I hauehave sayd might suffize the discréete, yet notwithstanding let vsus discusse more largely this matter concerning matter or stuffe.
Soothly if God néeded matter or stuffe to worke vponupon; either he himselfe made it, or els it was eternally of it selfe as well as he. If he made it, he made it of nothing: for in seeking the matter of matter, ye shall procéede to infinite; and so hauehave I the thing I would hauehave. If it were from euerlasting, then were there two eternalles together; which is a thing repugnant to all reason and contrary to it selfe. For nothing can bee more contrary to eternitie, than to say that there is a matter or stuffe which attendeth or wayteth to hauehave his shape forme or fashion at some workmaster hand; or that there is an eternal thing which hath not any other life or being, than such as another eternall thing hath voutsafed to giuegive vntounto it. For let vsus see I pray you what maner of thing they imagine this matter to bée?He that graū teth God to be former, fashioner, or giuer of shape; doth therewith confesse him to be the Creator. They will hauehave it ot be a thing without shape, but yet a receiuer of all shapes: and they will hauehave shape to be without matter wherein to bee, but yet as a mould wherein to fashion all matters; so as the matter should hauehave no beeing at all, but by reason of the shape or forme, as of the giuer of being thereto. But how can matter be without forme, seeing that euen deformitie it selfe is a kynd of forme? Or how can matter be alone by it selfe, seeing that forme is the thing that giueth being vntounto it? Now then, to say that matter is without forme, is all one as to say that it is and is not; which were the saying of a madman.
Yea (say they); but how is it possible for somewhat to be made of nothing, sith there is an infinite distance betwixt somewhat and nothing? Nay, I say rather, what is it which is not finite, in respect of him that is infinite? I meane in respect of him whom thou thy self aff…rmest to hauehave bounded the selfesame matter which thou doest take and teach to be infinite? But if thou listest to consider it, thou shalt perceyue that thou confessest a thing no lesse vncredible to thyne owne sence, than is the same which thou reiectest by thy sence. For when thou imaginest a matter without forme, and a forme without matter, thou speakest things that destroy one another. But whereas I say that God created the World of nothing, that is to say without hauing any thing wherof to make it: in déede I say a thing that is wonderfull, howbeit which hath not any rep…gnancie in it selfe. Now, there is great difference betwéene speaking aboue reason, and against reason. For trueth and mans reason are not inclosed within the like and selfesame bounds. But forasmuch as thou hast graunted that God is the author and worker of Nature, I would fayne knowe how thou canst be so bold to denye, that he hath put life and mouing where none were afore, and that he hath made both sight and light, hearing and sounds, spéech and vnderstanding, where erst was more than death, more than blindnesse, more than dumbnesse, and more than dulnesse; that is to say, more than the bare priuation or bereuing of those things …onsidering that neither to bee nor euer to hauehave bene, are much more wāts than simply not to be. Now, betwéene liuing and not liuing, seeing and not seeing, and so foorth, there is an infinite distance as well as there is betwéene being and not being, which distance can not be filled vp but by an infinite power: and looke where an infinite power is, it is alike mightie towards all things. Therefore it followeth that sith thou attributest vntounto him the making of thy sight, of thy life, and of thyne vnderstanding; thou canst not deny him the creation of the things that hauehave light, life, and vnderstanding in them. Which if thou graunt in one thing, néedes must thou graunt it alike in all. For to giuegive life, and to giuegive béeing; to giuegive forme or shape, and to giuegive matter; and to giuegive them to one thing, and to giuegive them to all things; are all workes of one selfsame power, how diuers soeuer of degrées of them seeme vntounto thée at the first sight. He therfore that confesseth God to be the former or giuer of shape, doth also confesse him to bee the creator of all things. Nay, I say more, that when thou termest God the souereine or highest being, (as Aristotle Aristotle in his second booke of things … bo…e na…re.doth) or him that essentially and in very déede is, (as Plato doth): thou sayst (though vnwittingly) that he is the Creator, that is to say, the author of the being of all things.
If we looke into nature, the thing that holdeth the first place in things of order, is commonly the cause of al the things that fall vnderunder it. Among hot things, some bee hotter than some; but yet fire, which holdeth the highest degrée in heate, is the cause of heate in all things, and sheadeth it selfe into all without diminishing of it selfe, and by imparting it selfe to them is still increased: insomuch that the striking of a Flint inforceth the castingforth of a thousand sparkes, whereof eueryevery one were enough to set the whole World on fire. In light some things, one light lighteth another, and by imparting maketh it selfe after a sort infinite: and the Sunne which is as the fountayne of light, extendeth and spreadeth it selfe out infinitely without disseuering, & after a maner createth light where was nothing but darknesse. Also in humaine affayres, Kings impart their dignities to Princes, Princes to their Uassalles, & Uassalles to their Subiects: and when they giuegive any man a qualitie which he had not afore, they terme him their Creature, as hauing made him somewhat of nothing, in respect of the qualitie wherewith he was indewed afore. To bee short, sents or sauors are shed foorth, and Sciences are taught from one to another, and from one to infinite: yea and euen diseases, which are nothing els but corruptions, ingēder one of another without diminishing themselues. Now, as for Heate, Light, Sauour, Science, and Dignitie; they be but qualities, termed by the degrées of first, second, and third qualities; yea and moreouer dead, senslesse, and liuelesse: and yet notwithstāding, looke which of these qualities holdeth ye first place, the same doth naturally bring forth al the rest, without diminishing it selfe. And shall we then thinke it straunge that God, (who is the Béeing, which euen by their owne confession holdeth the chiefe and first place of all Béeings, or rather alonly can in very déede be sayd to be) should by his being bring fooith all other beings?
Yea say they; for wee see not any thing brought againe to nothing, and therefore néedes must they hauehave bene created of something. Nay, if worldly things should returne to nothing, considering how transitorie and fléeting they be alreadie, how short a time could the world indure; or rather how long agoe had it come to an end? But it was Gods will that it should continue. And therefore thou shouldest rather say thus: I see that the Trées, and the greatest Beastes, yea and men themselues doe spring as it were of nothing, and are resolued agayne into as good as nothing. I see them multiplye, liue, and do wonders. Of one selfsame seede I sée spring both flowers, leaues, and fruite, and of another, the wonderfulnesse of eyes, the substantialnesse of bones, and the finesse of vitall spirites. Agayne, I see all these things vanish away I wote not how, so as there remayneth nothing of them but a handfull of dust. And shall I now be so blockish as to say, that he which of so little and in so little hath made so many wondrous things that were not afore, could not make the little it selfe? Or that he which created the life the sence and the mouing, could not create a drop of water, a blast of ayre, and a handfull of earth? Nay, I will reason thus rather: That if God were not able to create the very matter of matter it selfe, surely he could neither giuegive forme or shape to the matter, nor create such things of the matter. Yes will they say: for it appeareth that all things returne as it were into one commō matter, whether wee followe the auncient Philosophers which reduce them to the Elements, or that wee followe the late writers which reduce them into Oyle, Salt, Water, &c. Bee it so: and then oughtest thou to conclude therevpon, that seeing there is but one matter, there is also but one God; vntounto whose power thou oughtest not to déeme any thing vnpossible, seeing that of that one thing he maketh so many things, not only diuers, but also contrary. For he that of one selfesame thing maketh both fire and water, doth he lesse than he which maketh that one thing it selfe?
What wilt thou say then if I make thée to see that there is not that thing which hath not in it self a peculiar creation, or a propertie created,The particular Creation of all things. which cannot be attributed to the matter wherof it consisteth, but is a greater thing than the matter it selfe, without the which, neither the matter, nor the elements, nor all the things that thou drawest out of them were any thing at all? And sith thou wilt néedes play the Philosopher afore thou doest beléeue; I demaund of thée whether things in their nature hauehave their béeing from matter or from forme? If from matter: why is a Plant rather a Plant than a mettall, seeing that (by thyne own saying) matter being but one, is no more one thing than another, ne inclyned to one thing more than to another, nor bounded within any one particular substance otherwise than by forme or fashion? And forasmuch as thou hast taken so great paynes in resoluing or bringing things backe agayne into their first matter; whence commeth it that thy extractions or the things which thou drawest out of it, hauehave so diuers or contrary operations, if besides the matter it selfe there be not another substance which giueth them theirs?
If things hauehave their being from forme; I demaund againe whether forme bee a substance or no. If it bee not a substance, how can that which is not a substaunce make a substaunce, and how may an accident or income make an essentiall difference, & cause life, sence, and mouing to be where they were not afore? And if it bee a substance (as most Philosophers teach in expresse wordes) yea and a very perfect substance, as which perfecteth the matter and maketh it to be that which it is named to be: must it not néedes follow, that he which gaue this forme shape or fashion to the matter, created a substance which was not afore, yea aud a much more excellent substance than the matter which thou surmisest to hauehave bene afore it? Now, why should not he that was able to create the better, be also able to create the lesser good? Rightly therefore doth Aphrodiseus Aphrodisaeus in his first booke of the Soule.in his booke of the Soule say, that the forme shape or fashiō which the Craftsman giueth to his work, is no more a substance than the arte, craft, or cunning whereby he giueth it: but that ye forme which Nature giueth, is no lesse a substance than Nature it selfe is. Let vsus procéede further. Of the Mettalles, thou estéemest Gold & Siluer: of the Hearbs, thou estéemest some for foode, and some for Phisicke: of the Beastes, thou estéemest some to eate, and some to serue thée: of men, (which yet notwithstanding make all but one kynde) thou admittest and acceptest some for one purpose and some for an other. Now, if thy estéeming of them bee for the matter whereof they consist; how is that matter but one? Or if it bee for the forme, as in respect wherof Gold is not the same that Leade is; is not that forme a substance? And if it be a substance; shall it not followe that he which gaue that shape forme or fashion to the matter, is also the Creator of the matter it selfe? And seeing there is such difference of Mettalles, Hearbes, Beastes, and Men; doth it not followe that there are as many diuersities of Creation? And whereas he hath created all these diuersities of substances, wouldest thou make him to fayle in that one the bacest of all? What shall I say to it, that some one thing shall hauehave diuers powers, vertues and operations in diuers parts thereof; so as it shalbe cold without and hot within, white in the outside and red in the substance, colde in the leafe and hot in the roote, laxatiue in the pith and costiffe in the barke? As for example, the rynde of the Orrendge is hot, and the meate within it is cold; the leaues of flowers of the wyld Vine doe coole, and the inner part of them doth burne. Phisitions report that the Lungs of a Hare healeth folke that are shortwinded; that the bloud of him breaketh the Stone, and that the heare of him stauncheth bloud. HaueHave not these diuers parts diuers formes, besides the vniuersall forme of the thing whereof they bee the parts? And are not these diuers formes as many diuers substaunces, and consequently as many Creations? The Adamant or Lodestone draweth yron to him, and sheweth cōtinually the Northpole, and yet is disappoynted of his force by Garlicke. The Amber also draweth all light things vntounto it; Hors…yes layed to a mans héele make blisters in his bladder; Agaricke purgeth Fleagme, Rhubarb Choler, and Elleborus Melancholie. If these operations come of the matter alone, tell me how that may bee. And why bee not the same operations common to all things? Or if (as thou sayst) they come of a secrete propertie; doth it not then come of the substantial forme, séeing that nothing can bée sayd to bee that which it is, or to hauehave any peculiar propertie, but by reason of the substantiall forme? Thou wilt perchaunce say, that it is the mingling of the Elements together that giueth forme or shape. Nay: for if it bee that mingling, where is then the foresayd common matter become? and what mingling together or what m…dley or mixture can bee made of one selfesame thing? And if thy meaning bee that the foresayd matter is a diuers composiding of the Elements together; then is thy matter a▪ forme compounded of diuers formes. For wherein do the Elements (being so contrary) differ one from another, but in their essentiall formes? And if it bee a mixture or Composition, where is then the eternitie thereof? Moreouer, wee see that in Plants, Beastes, and Men, the Compositiō that is made of the mixture of the elements, abydeth euen when they be cut downe or killed. For put a blocke into the fire, and the moysture that was in it when it grewe a Trée boyleth out with the heate, the aire therof steameth vp into smoke, the firie matter thereof burneth out in an oylie substaunce, and the earthly parts thereof falleth downe into as…hes. And in all liuing wights aswell as in man, the outward lump (which thou wilt hauehave to be composed of the mixture of the Elements,) remayneth whole after they be dead. But as for the Soule whereby the things hauehave their life, sence, and reason; which Soule is the peculiar forme both of Trées, Beastes and Men each after their kynd: that appeares no more when the thing is once dead. And therefore it followeth, that besides the matter (which is liuelesse) and the mixture of the Elements, there is also a substantial forme, which maketh ye thing to be a Trée, a Beast, or a Man; and without the which it is not a Trée but a blocke, nor a Beast or a Man, but a dead Carkesse or Carrion. Furthermore, when a Trée is dead, there remayne still certeine vertues both in the bark, and in the wood, and in the leaues thereof; which vertues are not only diuers, but also sometyme contraries, and those vertues procéed not of the matter, but of the substantiall forme. Whereof it followeth, that besides the forme of the Plant which fadeth by the death of the Plant it selfe, there are also other formes peculiar to eueryevery part thereof, which abyde after that the forme of the whole Plant is perished. Now, if the mixture of the Elements cannot make the forme whereby the vpperkyndes differ one from another, as the sencelesse things from the things that hauehave sence; and the things that hauehave but only sence, from the things that hauehave reason too; can it make the difference that is betwéene the vnderkynds that are comprehended vnderunder eueryevery of the vpperkynds; or betwéene the particulars that belong to eueryevery vnderking; or betwéene the seueral parts that are in eueryevery particular? If the mixture of the Elements (say I) make not a Trée to liue, that is to say to bee a Trée; shall it make it to heale, both some certeyne diseases, and also some certeyne parts of it, some certeyne parts of man? And if it make not a Beast to hauehave sence, that is to say to bee a Beast: can it make it to bee a Lyon, an Elephant, or a Stagge? And if it make not a man to hauehave life, sence, and mouing; can it make him to speake, and to reason, one of one thing and another of another, each man according to his seuerall inclynation? But how should the Elements giuegive life, which they themselues hauehave not? or free mouing, they themselues being caried vp & doune whether they will or no? or also sence, being themselues but the obiects of our sences? Then must wee conclude that the difference of the vpperkynds from the vnderkynds, of the vnderkynds from the Particulars, and of their parts one from another, consisteth not in the matter whereof they bee made, but in their forme; and that the same forme is the peculiar substance of eueryevery thing; and that looke how many sundrie sorts of formes there are, so many sundrie sorts of creations there hauehave bene, all procéeding from the power of the Former or giuer of them. And so, he that attributeth vntounto God the forming or fashioning of the World, must whether hee will or no attribute vntounto him the power of creating it also. For without creating of a new substance (what matter soeuer ye presuppose to hauehave bene afore) he had not created the World in such sort as it is. And he that was able to create any one of thē, was able to create them all. For like might and power is requisite to the creating of an Emet as of an Elephant, of a Ponde as of the Sea, of a péece of the world as of the whole world.
They procéede on still with their Chimere.The Peripatetiks. God (say they) draweth the forme out of the Abilitie of the matter. Let vsus examine this doterie yet further. Abilitie (sayth Aristotle) is the beginning of mouing and of chaunge. Also there are (say his Disciples) two sorts of Abilitie: the one which worketh the sayd beginning in the other, and that is God; and the other which suffereth the mouing and chaunge at the others hand, and that is matter or stuffe, which by the mouing wrought into it by the other, receyueth his perfection which is termed Forme. Now, I demaund whether this passiue Abilitie of the matter, bee a qualitie or a substance. They dare not say it is a substance; for were it a substance, then euen by their owne doctrine it were a forme also: and wheresoeuer is a forme, there is also an act, and that is more than an abilitie: but matter (as they say) is a mere abilitie. And if they say it is a Qualitie, (as Aristotle himselfe affirmeth): then followeth it that God draweth a substance out of the qualitie of an accident. Now, he that draweth the very Essence or béeing of things out of the passiue abilitie of an other, can much more drawe it out of his owne actiue abilitie or workfull power. For shal he be barraine of himselfe, which maketh a qualitie (yea and lesse than a simple qualitie) fruitfull in bringing foorth so many things? And seeing that Qualitie and Substaunce and all the highest kynds of Contraries bee (as they teach) further differing one from another than fire from water; and also that qualitie and accident are nothing of themselues: shall it not follow that God is able to create substances of nothing? Surely it is the saying of Trismegistus in many places, that God created the World and all that is therein; and man with al his parts by his most fruitfull word: and also that the will of God was the bréeder of the Elements. Pythagoras and all the old Diuines affirme, that God or the only One is the beginner of al things, yea euen of the first matter, as Simplicius Simplicius vppon the naturals.reporteth in alledging the record of Eudorus. And Syrian the Maister of Simplicius sayth, that in that behalfe Plato followed Archenetus and Brotinus, Syrian vppon the Supernaturals.which agréeed with Pythagoras. And in very déede he telleth vsus, that to speake properly, Matter is no Essence at al, nor can be conceiued otherwise than by a bastard reason, that is to wit by imagining it voyd of al shape, and consequently also voyd of all being.
As touching Aristotle, he maketh matter to be the first beginning of all things. But if he beléeued the world to hauehave bin beginninglesse according to his owne teaching; where is this beginning become? Also he disprooueth the Chaos with very lyuely reasons; and to scape that, he holdeth himself to the eternitie, which is quite and cleane ageinst him. But howsoeuer the case stand, it is fully agréed vponupon among his most approued interpreters, yt these names of Matter, Forme, and Priuation, serue not too bet…ken things truely béeing the same whereof they pretend the names; but onelyonly are inuented to teache their scho…lers, after what maner things are bred & corrupted, by putting of one shape and putting on another? And wheras he saith that the power of all life séemeth to be partaker of some diuine thing, & better than the Elements; and that the Soule of man hath his beeing from without,Aristotle in his second booke of the breede of liuing things. chap. 3. and not from the elements or from matter as the bodye hath: And that all Soules are formes, and all formes are substances: Dooth hee not make God to bee the creater of substances, yea and of better substances than the elements? Ageine, when he sayth that the knitting parts that is to wit the bones, the skin, the Sinewes and such lyke may be made of the mixing togither of the elements, and that the vnknitting parts as the Head,Aristotle in his 4… booke of Meteores, Chap. 10. the Leg, the Arme, and so foorth cannot be so made, but are made by nature and heauenly skil; insomuch that the proper essence and forme of the knitters, procéedeth neither of heate nor of cold, of moysture nor of drythe: Dooth hee not acknowledge in eueryevery seuerall part a seuerall forme and substaunce which commeth from some other where, than of the matter or of the mixture of the elements?Aristotle in his second booke of the breede of liuing wights, towards the end. And sith hee sayth in another place, that it were possible to hauehave such a coniunction of the heauenly bodyes, as myght produce not only an efficient cause, but also euen matter it self for the creating and bringing foorth of liuing things, yea and of mankind also: why should he hauehave thought it vncredible, that GOD who dwelleth verye farre aboue such Coniunctions, should be able to doo ye like?Arist. in his probl. sect. 10. probl. 64. Also we see that Theophrast the greatest Clark of all his Disciples, findeth himself so graueled in his booke of Sauors or Sents, by reason of the particular natures of things, that hee bursteth out into expresse woords, and sayeth that God created all things of nothing.Aphr. probl. 1. And Algazel the Arabian disputing ageinst Auerrhoes, sayeth that the cause of all things, did also make matter it selfe. Also Aphrodiseus declareth in his problemes, that the philosophers were fayne to referre the effects and vertues of many things, to some other thing than to ye Elements. And if they coulde not father them vppon the Elementes, howe could they father them vppon matter or stuffe, séeing that the Elements hauehave power and force to do, wheras matter hath abilitie but only to suffer or to be wrought vppon. And if they could not father them vppon matter; vppon what else should they father them than vppon God, who hath created both the propertie and the substance of them togither?
The Platonists The Platoniststhat wrate since the comming of Christ, hauehave giuen libertie too their owne braynes, to gad out into a thousand imaginations. But whereas Plotin Plotin in his book of Contemplation & of the One.telleth vsus that Gods actions and effects, are contemplations which imprint in nature the séedes of all things: hee teacheth vsus too thrust farre from vsus such brutish questions as these; namely, Of what kind of stuffe did God frame the world? And with what tooles did hee it? which are further of from the nature of the Godhead, than our dooings are from mere contemplations. For what else is contemplation (according to their owne docttine) than to be wholy seuered from matter? He speaketh often of the first matter, but how doth he descrybe it? He sayeth that the very matter it selfe which is ioyned too the forme hath not any true béeing, and he termeth it The beeing of a Notbeeing, that is to say, a thing, that in deede is not; and that dooth hee too distinguish theis transitorie natures from the verye Beeing of God, which he termeth The Supersubstantiall Beeing. But as for the first matter, he calleth it The very Notbeeing that is too say an imaginatiue thing which hath not any béeing at all in déede; as if yée would say (as hée himself addeth) a certeine vnshapednesse, which is the cause of all mishapennesse, the chéef default or want; which is the cause of all the defaults or wants that are in partic…lar things; the very euill, which is the originall of all euils; and to be short, a thing that can neither bée knowen nor imagined, otherwise than we imagine what Darknesse is by the knowledge of light; namely an vtter absence of all light.
Yea, but (will some man say) Although it be not an Essence, yet ought it at the least to bee a Qualitie; and by his terming of it an Euill he séemeth after a sort to make it a qualitie.Plotin in his 1. book Enne. 2. Whence euill commeth. Nay; like as (saith he) when we call the first of all Beeings by the name of Goodnesse, we meane not that that Goodnesse is in him a Qualitie, but a very substance, yea and more than a substance: So when wee call Matter by the name of Euill, our meaning is not that it is a Qualitie or hath any Qualitie in it; But that it is no Qualitie ne hath Qualitie in it: For had it any Qualitie in it, then should it bee a Substance, and consequently a shape or forme too; but it is not any forme at all. Ennea. 2. lib. 4.That in effect is the summe of his booke concerning euill and the originall thereof. In his booke of Matter, he declareth that there was a matter, (for he would not els hauehave made bookes thereof in vayne;) but yet he sayth that the same was neither essence, qualitie, nor quantitie, nor had any essence, qualitie or quantitie in it; ne differed any whit from priuation, sauing in this respect, that priuation is verifyed as in respect of some subiect or substaunce that is bereft of some thing that is peculiar or incident vntounto it, wheras Matter is an vniuersall and vtter want of all things, that is to say a thing farre worse than priuation. And yet for all this, he will not hauehave it to be vtterly nothing at all, but as a wast or emptie space, a thing without bounds, a being without being. And what or where thē shall that be? At length he findeth it in the world that is to be conceyued but only in vnderstanding, that is to say in God, in whom he will hauehave it to abide as a forme or patterne of the vniuersall masse of all things. What a raunging is here abroade to fall alwaies into one selfesame path againe? Might he not with more ease hauehave confessed plainly, that God is both the formall and the materiall cause of all things, that is to say, the Creator former and shaper of all things by his wisedome and power?Plo…n in his booke of Prouidence, & Enn…d. 6. lib. 1. Chapt. 17. Agayne, whereas in other places he telleth vsus, that Matter being it self no essence at all, cannot be the cause of the particular beings of so many sundrie things; nor hauing no life, bée the cause of life, but that both life and béeing are breathed into all things from without, euen from the souereyne mynd: doth he not iumpe with vsus, which say that GOD created all substances of nothing? And if he could create that which was, and giuegive vntounto it both being and life: could he not also forbeare the thing that was not, that is to say matter? Atticus and his adherents would néedes beare Plato downe by reason of certeyne sentences of his Timeus and of his Commonwealematters misunderstood, that matter was eternall as well as God, howbeit that the same being voyd of reason, was brought vntounto reason by him that is the very reason it self. With these fellowes wee our selues shall not néede to deale, but only heare Porphyrius Porphyrie vppon Timaeus.disprouing them after this maner. If neither God (sayth he) be of Matter, nor Matter of God, but both of them be Beginnings alike; whereof then commeth it that there is so great ods betwixt them, sith we hold opinion that God is Good and the very worker or Doer, and contrarywise that Matter is Euill, and but only a Sufferer? The cause of this difference cannot proceed from the one to the other, at leastwise if our saying be true: namely, that the one of them is not of the other. And much lesse proceedeth it of any third, considering that wee acknowledge not any higher cause: which beeing admitted, it followeth that these two so disagreeable Beginnings met and matched together by chaunce, and consequently that all things are tossed and tumbled together by Fortune. Agayne, If God (sayth he) bee apt to the beautifying and orderly disposing of Matter; and Matter be apt to receiue beautie and orderlines at Gods hand; I demaund frō whence this mutuall aptnesse and disposition commeth? For considering that they bee so disagreeing and so full contrary one to another; surely they could neuer hauehave agreed of themselues, but must of necessitie hauehave had a Third to make the attonemēt betwixt them. Now I am sure you will not say that there was any third to commaund them: Neither wil I beleeue, that they fell to greement by aduenture. To bee short, seeing that Matter is not sufficient of it self to be in happie state, but needeth Gods helpe thereunto; but God is of himself abundantly sufficient, both to be, and to be happie: who seeth not that GOD is of more excellencie than Matter, and that Matter is not of it selfe so much as able to be? For were it able to bee, it were also able to be happie. And therefore it is not to be denyed, but that he whom wee confesse to hauehave perfected Matter, was also the very first maker and Creator of Matter. But how could he make it of nothing? Let vsus heare once agayne what the sayd Porphyrie sayth vntounto this poynt. Handycrafts (saith he) hauehave need of instruments or tooles. For their working is outwa…, and they hauehave not their matter or stuffe at commaundment. But the naturall Powers as more perfect, & being within things, doo performe all their doings by their only being. After that sorte the Soule by his essentiall life, doth nourish, growe, ingender, breathe, feele, and so foorth. So likewise the Imagination, by the only one Inworking of it selfe, giueth diuers qualities and mouings to the bodie, all at one instant. So also the bodilesse Spirites themselues, (as the Diuines report) doe worke wonderous things by their imaginations, without instrument or action. Much rather therefore shall the workemayster of the whole world who is a Mynd, giuegive substance to the whole by his owne only being, that is to wit, to this diuidable world, himselfe being vndiuidable. For why should it be thought straūge, that a thing which is without a bodie, should produce things that hauehave bodies, considering that of a very smal seede there groweth so great a Beast, composed of so many, so great, and so differing parts? For though the seede bee little, the reason of the seede cannot bee small, seeing it worketh so great things: neither on the other side can it be great, forasmuch as it vttereth and sheweth it selfe euen in the smallest percelles. Now, this reason of the seede needeth matter to worke vppon, but so doth not the Reason of God; for he needeth not any thing, but maketh and frameth all things; and notwithstanding that he bring foorth and moueth all things, yet abydeth he still in his owne proper nature. Now, when as the sorest and learneddest enemie that euer Christiās had, acknowledgeth this doctrine in good faith and in so expresse wordes who dareth open his lippes any more against it? Dare the Epicures with their motes doo it? How can they alledge any reason for them selues, being by their owne opinion made by haphazard at aduenture without reason? Or shal the naturall Philosophers do it, with their temperings and mixtures? First let them examine their Maister Galene, concerning the things which I hauehave alledged out of him in the former Chapter: and if that will not suffize them, they shall heare him yet agayne in this Chapter. Certesse as it cannot bee denyed, but that as he laboureth by all meanes possible, to father the causes of all things vppon the Elements, and vppon the mixture of them together: so is he driuen at eueryevery turne, to acknowledge somewhat in them which he is ashamed to father vpō them. In discoursing how the babe is formed in the moothers wombe, he findeth himselfe turmoyled with many opinions.Galen in his booke of the fashioning of infants in their moothers wombe. But yet in the end, Soothly (concludeth he) I see so great a wisedome, and so mightie a Power, that I cannot thinke that the Soule which is in the child that is begotten, maketh the shape thereof, considering that it is altogether voyde of reason; but rather that it is formed by that which we call Nature. In his booke of the tempering of things, a place that serued best for the exalting of the powers of the Elements to the vttermost;In his second book of Temperings. he very sharply reproueth those which father the cause of the forming of the parts of the bodies of liuing things, vponupon the qualities of the Elements. Notwithstanding (saith he) that these Qualities be but instrumēts, and that there bee another that is the framer or fashioner of things. In his booke of the opinions of Plato and Hippocrates, he maketh the vitall spirite to bee the excellentest of all things that hauehave a bodie: and yet for all that, he will not hauehave it to be eyther the substance or the dwelling place, but only the instrument of the Soule. And in his booke of Flesshes he procéedeth further, & sayth that in treating of Leachcraft he spake often according to the common opinion: but that if it came to the poynt of vttering the opiniō that he himslfe hild, he declared that both man and Beast hauehave their beginning from aboue, and that their Soules are from Heauen, and finally that the Soule procéedeth neither from the qualities of the Elements, nor from any of all the things that wee see here beneath. Now, if the Soule of man, or of the very Beastes, procéede not of the Elements: how should it possibly procéede of the Matter? And if it procéede not of the Matter, must it not néedes procéed of the forme, or rather must it not néedes be the very forme it selfe? And what els is so excellent a forme, than an excellent substance? And from whence is that (by his owne saying) but from a former fashioner or shaper? And what els shal that former be, than a Creator, seeing that euen shaping, is a creating of a substance?
Now therefore, let vsus conclude for this Chapter, both by vnsoluble reasons, and by the testimonies aswell of our enemies as of our friends; that God both was able to create and also did in déede create the World of nothing, that is to say, by his owne onelyonly power, without the helpe of any thing whereof to make it. And (to comprehend in fewe wordes whatsoeuer I hauehave treated of heretofore) that GOD of his owne goodnesse wisedome and power, did make, shape, and create the World: that is to say, That (if a man may so say) he is the efficient formall and materiall cause thereof, without that he néeded eyther helpe, patterne, or stuffe to make it withall. And now let vsus consequently see the finall cause: that is to wit, how and to what ende he guydeth it: which shall serue for the next Chapter following.