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Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion · Philippe de Mornay

Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 9

The ix. Chapter.

That the wisedome of the World hath acknowledged the Creation of the World.

SIth we hauehave seene with what consent yt whole harmonie of the World chaunteth the Creation therof and the praise of the Creator; now it followeth that we see what the wisedome of the world hath beléeued in that behalf: wherein we hauehave to cōsider the selfsame thing which we considered in the doctrine of the thrée Persons; that is to wit, that the néerer we come to the welhead thereof, the more clerer we finde it: yea and it is also a schoolepoynt of Platoes teaching, That in these high matters of the Godhead, of the Creation of the world, and of such other like, we must giuegive credite (as vntounto a kynd of Demonstration,) to the sayings of men of most antiquitie, as folke that were better and néerer to God than wée. Here I should begin at Moyses, as the auncientest of all writers, and whom all the Heathen Authors doe honor and woonder at in their writings… And the very first worde of his booke simply set downe in these termes, In the beginning God created Heauen and Earth; ought to bee vntounto vsus as a maximée of Euclyde, which in those daies men were ashamed to call in question.The men of most antiquitie beleeued the Creation of the world. But to the intent we confound not the word of God with the word of man, forasmuch as the folke with whom wee hauehave to deale, are such as refuse those whom they cannot accuse: let vsus ouercome them rather by their owne Doctors. Certeynly whosoeuer will take the payne to cōferre Mercurius Mercury in his Poemander.Trismegistus with Moyses, shall reape therby most singular contentation. In Genesis Moyses describeth the Creation of the World; and so doth Mercurie likewise in his Poemander. Moyses espyeth darknesse vponupon the Waters: And Mercurie seeth a dreadfull shadowe houering on the moyst nature, and the same moyst nature as it were brooded by ye word of God, Moyses sayth that GOD spake, and foorthwith things were made: and Mercurie acknowledgeth and bringeth in Gods worde shining, whereby he created the light and made the World and all that is therein. Moyses parteth the nature of moysture into twayne, the one mounting aloft which he calleth Heauen, and the other remayning beneath which he calleth Sea: And Mercurie seeth a light fire which he calleth AEther mounting vp as it were out of the bowelles of the moyst nature, and likewise an ayre casting it selfe betwéene the water and the elementarie fire, which is nothing els but a more cléere and suttle ayre. The Sea and Land (sayth Moyses) were mingled together vntill God had spoken; and then by and by eyther of them tooke his place by himselfe. After the same maner Mercurie sayth that those two Elements lying erst mingled together, seuered themselues asunder at the speaking of the spirituall word which inuyroned them about. What more? God (say both of them) created the Starres and the Planets.Mercury in his Poemander, the. 1. & 3. cap. At the voyce of his word, the Earth, the Ayre, and the Water, brought foorth Beasts, Birdes, and Fishes. Last of all, God created man after his owne Image, and deliuered all his workes into his hand to vse them. Is not this a setting downe nor only of one selfsame sence, but also of the selfesame termes and words? But when as Mercurie addeth afterward, that God cryeth out vntounto his works by his holy word, saying, Bring ye foorth fruite, grow, and increase: may it not séeme vntounto vsus that we heare Moyses himselfe speaking?Mercurie alledged by Cyrillus in his second booke ageinst Iulian the Renegate. Mercurie in his holy Sermon. And as for the small differences which are in him concerning the seuen Circles, the Zones, and such other things; they serue greatly to the manifestation of the trueth; namely, that this maner of Mercuries writing, is not a bare borrowing or translating out of Moyses; but rather a tradition conueyed to the AEgiptians from the Father to the Sonne. In another place he sayth that God by his holy, spirituall and mightie working word, commaunded the day sonne to bee, and it was done: that the Sea and Land should bee seuered asunder; that the Starres should be created; and that Herbes should growe vp eueryevery one with his seede, by force of the same worde. Also that the World is but an alteration, a mouing, a generating and a corrupting of things, and that it cannot be called good. These are conclusions cleane contrary to eternitie or euerlastingnesse. But forasmuch as [if I should set downe all his sayings which he hath to that purpose,] I should be fayne to copie him almost whole out: it is better for me to desire the Readers to go to the very place it self.

Orpheus the auncientest of the Greekes, Orpheus in his Argonawtes.had bin in AEgipt as he himselfe skyth, and there he learned, That there is but one God, and that

The Ayre, the Heauen, the Sea, the Earth, and Hell

With all the t…gs that in them all doe dwell,

were harberd in his …reast from all eternitie. And also that

The running streames, the Ocean, Gods and Men,

Things present, things to come lay all at ease

In that wide lap of his: and that within

His belly large the bond lay lapped vp

Which holdeth all this great huge worke together.

And afterward he addeth further,

These things which yet lay hidden all

Within the treasure of his brest,

He into open light did call,

Creating as he deemed best

This stately stage, whereon to showe

His noble doings on a rowe.

And what els is this; than that God did euerlastingly hold the world hiddeny, (as the Apostle sayth) in the Treasurie of his infinite wisedome: Or (as Dennis sayth) in the Closet of his purpose and will; and afterward brought it foorth in tyme when it pleased him? And in another place, I sing (sayth he) of the darke confusion, foreignI meane the confusion that was in the beginning, how it was disfigured in diuers natures, and how the Heauen, the Sea and the Land were made. And what more? I sing (sayth he) of LoueLove, euen of the LoueLove that is perfect of it selfe, of more antiquitie than all these things; and of all things which the same hath brought foorth, and set in order, yea of tyme it selfe. I hauehave alreadie heretofore declared what he meaneth by this LoueLove: namely, the goodwill of GOD; and that also doe euen some of the Hebrewes meane by the Spirit which Moyses speaketh of.Orpheus in his Argonawtes. To be short, he sayth that he himselfe made a booke of the Creation of the world, which was a common argument among the Poets of that tyme, as Empedocles, Hesiodus, Parmenides, and such others, which were all Philosophers. And in many places he reduceth all things to Water and to a certeyne Mud as to their original, which thing agréeth well enough to the déepe of Moyses. The like is done by Homer and Hesiodus, which came after him. For, Hesiodus Hesiodus in his booke of woorkes and Dayes, and in his Genealogie of the Goddes.maketh description, not only of the Creating of … world and of the parts thereof; but also of the Chaos or confusion and of the Gods themselues. And whē Homer intendeth to curse a man, I would (sayth he) that thou mightest returne to Water and Earth: that is to say, I would thou wert not any more, as the time hath bene that thou wast not. To be short, Sophocles, AEschylus, and the very Comedywriters speake after the same maner: and for proofe of them all, Ewripides shall suffize, who was the least religious of them all. The tyme hath bene (sayth he) that Heauen and Earth were but a lumpe: but after that they were separated, they ingendred all things, & brought to light the Trees, the Birds, the Beastes of the field, the Fishes, and Men them selues. For as for others, they speake more to the purpose, as Aratus, who sayth that God hath set the Starres in the Skye to distinguish the Seasons of the yeare: that he created all things: that men are his ofspring: that by the signes of Heauen he ment to giuegive them warning of the chaunges of the Aire, and of Tempests. And the voyce of these Poets is to bee considered as the opinion of the people to whom they sung their uerses.Plutark in his booke of the opiniōs of the Philosophers.

Now let vsus go on with the auncient Philosophers. Pythagoras (by the report of Plutarke) saith yt the World was begotten of God, of it owne nature corruptible, because it was sensible and bodily; but yet that it is not corrupted, because it is vphild and mainteyned by his prouidence. The same thing doth also Diogenes Laertius witnesse. And whereas Varro Varro in his second booke of Husbandry.sayth that Pythagoras acknowledged not any beginning of liuing Wights: Architas his Disciple shall mainteyne the contrary for his Maister: For his wordes are these:Iamblichus one of the sect of Pythagoras, cyting Architas. Of all liuing Wights man is bred most wise of capacitie to consider things, and to atteyne to knowledge, and to iudge of them all. For GOD hath printed in him the fulnesse of all Reason. And like as God hath made him the instrument of all Voyces, Sounds, Names and vtterances; so also hath he made him the instrument of all vnderstandings and conceyts, which is the workmanship of wisedome: And euen for that cause (saith he) doe I thinke that man is of Gods creating, and hath receyued his instruments and abilities at his hand. Thales Laertius in the lyfe of Thales.one of the seuen Sages hild opinion, that all things had their beginning of Water, and that GOD created all things therof, who is alonly vnbegotten, and hath not any end or any beginning. Plutark in his banket.And againe, The World (sayth he) is most excellently beautiful, for it is the worke of God. Also being asked whether was first of the Day or the Night; he answered that the Night was sooner by one day: as if he had ment to say, that afore God had created the light, it must néedes bee confessed that out of him there was nothing but darknesse. Now this Philosopher also as well as the rest had gone to Schoole in AEgipt.

Timeus of Locres termeth Tyme the Image of eternitie, and sayth that it tooke his beginning from the creating of Heauen and Earth, and that God created the very Soule of the World afore the World it selfe, both in possibilitie and in tyme. To bee short, Plutarke affirmeth that all the naturall Philosophers of old time, hild opinion that the begetting or creating of the World began at the Earth as at the Centre thereof: and that E…pedocles sayth that the finest kynd of AEr which they cal AEther, was the first part thereof that was drawne vp on high. And Anaxagoras is reported by Simplicius, to affirme that God (whom he calleth Mynd or Vnderstanding) created the Heauen, the Earth, the Sunne and the Starres; and scarsly is there any one to bee found, which teacheth that tyme is without beginning.

Some of Platoes latter Disciples, (as namely Proclus writing against the Christians) would néedes beare their Mayster downe, that he beléeued the world to hauehave had no beginning. But if wee may beléeue Aristotle, Aristole in his eightth booke of naturall Philosophie. Epicurus in Cicero.who was a scholler of his a two and twentie yéeres; he taught that the world was created; and it is one of the chief Principles wherein they most disagrée. Philo who was as another Plato, saith that Plato had learned it of Hesiodus. And Plutarch Plutark in the Opinions of the Philosophers, and in the creation of the Soule.who sheweth himselfe to hauehave perused him throughly leafe by leafe, speaketh of him in these words. There are (sayth he) some studyers of Plato, which by racking his wordes, indeuer by all meanes to make him deny the creation of the World and of the Soule, and to confesse the euerlastingnesse of time, notwithstanding that in so doing they bereeue him of that most excellent treatise of his concerning the Goddes, against the despysers and skorners of whom in his tyme he wrate. And what needeth any thing to be alledged for proofe thereof, seeing that his whole booke of Timeus is nothing els but an expresse treatise of the Creation of the World? The same thing also doth Aphrodisius Aphrodisius as he is alledged by Simplicius vponupon the bookes of Heauen.witnesse concerning Plato. In his booke intytled Athlantick, he termeth the world a thing Longago created. In his matters of State he sayth that the world was setled and founded by God, and that it cōteyneth store of good things, and that the trouble somenesse which it hath, is but a Remnant or Remaynder of the former confusion. Also Socrates in his booke of Commonweale, termeth it foreign foreign.A Godhead begotten or created. And which of the auncient writers did euer doubt, that Plato taught not the Creation of the World, considering that he hath made descriptions, both of all the parts thereof, and of the Gods themselues? And also that he sayth that the world was created corruptible of it selfe, but yet abode immortall and vncorruptible through the grace of God which vpholdeth it? But let vsus examin the racking which Proclus offereth vntounto him. Plato (saith he) affirmeth in his Commonweale, that whatsoeuer hath a beginning hath also an ende: Now the World, as he sayth in his Timeus, shall hauehave no end: Therefore it followeth that it had no beginning. If another man should reason after that maner against Proclus, Proclus would laugh him to skorne: for he shifteth the termes: and yet our Soules which he concludeth to be without end, faile not to hauehave had a beginning. But though we were neuer so wel contented to let him passe: yet doth Plato assoyle him in one word. The world (saith he) is corruptible of it selfe, for eueryevery thing that is compounded, may also be dissolued: but it is not Gods will that it should be corrupted. And myne ordinance (sayth the euerlasting) is of more power to make thee to continue, than thine owne Nature is to make thee to perish. Plato in his commonweale.The which thing he speaketh yet more shortly in another place, saying that the world hath receyued an Immortalitie at the hand of the workmayster which made it.foreign. Now then, seeing that by Nature it may perish; surely by Nature it had a beginning: and the power that hath preserued it from perishing, is the very same that made it to bee. Proclus addeth: Plato propoundeth a Question (sayth he) whether the World was created after the patterne of a thing forecreated, or of a thing without beginning. Therefore he dowted whether it were eternall or no. What a conclusion was this for a great Philosopher? I aske whether men bee bred of themselues or created of another; therefore I vphold that they be bred of themselues: as who would lay that in disputing, it were not an ordinary matter to set down both the Contraries, for the affirming of ye one and the denying of the other. Agayne, if it were begotten or created after ye example of a thing aforecreated, could it be beginninglesse, seeing that the patterne thereof had a beginning? And if it were created after the example of a thing vncreated, can it come to passe that it should be euerlasting, séeing that it is not the very patterne it selfe? No: but as I hauehave sayd afore, wee admit horned arguments against the trueth, whereas in defence of the trueth the perfectest demonstrations suffize vsus not. Also in another booke intytled of a String he sayth thus: Plato in his booke of Lawes sayth that Commonweales and Artes hauehave infinite tymes bin vtterly destroyed by Waterfluds and Burnings, and therefore that men cannot certeinly say from what time men hauehave first growne into Commonweales: Ergo, he beleeued that the World had no beginning. Nay, he sayth these things in his Timeus, which is the booke whereof thou canst not dowt, but that he treateth there expressely of the Creation of the World. And he repeateth the same agayne in his booke of Commonwealematters, hauing sayd afore, that God created Heauen & Earth, the Starres and Gods. Now then, seeing it is one selfsame Author that speaketh these things, and in one selfesame place, and one immediatly after another: is it not certeyne that he ment not to match cleane contrary doctrines together? What is to be sayd then, but that he spake there after the maner of the common multitude, who (as Aristotle sayth) doe call the things infinite, which they be not able to number? Or as Moyses himselfe speaketh, who calleth the things eternall, euerlasting or endlesse, which are of very long cōtinuance, notwithstanding that he make a booke expressely of the Creation of all things? But in déede it was a surmize of the auncientnesse of the World, which Plato (as it should seeme) had brought home out of AEgipt, accordingly as the report of Solon sufficiently declareth, who telleth him that the AEgiptians had Registers of nyne thousand yeres, that is to say (as Plutarke interprets it) nine thousand Moones.

But let vsus come to Aristotle, Agenist Aristotles Eterniti.to whom this opinion doth properly belong. For although some of his Schollers being ashamed on his behalfe, would fayne beare him on hand that he was of another opinion, or at leastwise that he hild it as a doubtfull poynt; yet notwithstanding his sentences in that case are too certeine, too clere, and too manifest,Aristotle in his. 1. 3. & 8. bookes of naturall Philosophie; In his first booke of the Heauens. and in his first booke of the breede of liuing things. for them to goe about to cloke his opinion. But seeing he was so bold as to remoue the former bound fettled by the authoritie and beléefe of all that went afore him: néedes must it bée that he had very expresse termes, and very certeyne Demonstratiōs. And I pray you let vsus see what maner a ones they be? From the mouings that are here beneath, he leadeth vsus to the mouings that are aboue, and from them to a first mouer. Hetherto he is wel. But afterward he will hauehave this first mouer to moue euerlastingly, and therefore that tyme should be euerlasting also. Neyther the ground nor ye consequence of this argument are aughtworth. How will ye proue that the first mouer moueth eternally? Nay contrariwise, mouing argeweth a beginning. For in mouing there is a certeyne poynt from whence the mouing is made, vntounto another poynt wherto it tendeth: and euen according to Aristotles owne doctrine, forenesse, afternesse, and continuance of tyme do followe forenesse, afternesse, and continuance of mouing: and that implyeth a manifest contrarietie to the definition of mouing from place to place. And that tyme should be beginninglesse, what els is it to say, than that tyme is not tyme, and (as ye would say) an implying of contradiction in the very word it self? For what els is tyme according to Aristotle himselfe, than the number of mouing by forenesse and afternesse, by past and to come. And if it be a number, where is the infinitenesse thereof become? And if there be afore and after, where is the eternitie thereof? In another place he sayth, that mouing is eternall because tyme is eternall; and that the cause why time is so, is that it is alwaies ioyned to that which is past. I pray you what a childishnesse is this? By the same reason I may say that the mouing of a Mill, or the stirring of any liuing wight is eternall: for in those cases eueryevery instant followeth immediatly in the necke of that which is past, no lesse than in the mouing of tyme; and yet wee bee not ignorant that they hauehave a beginning. But like as there is a certeyne first forthsetting in those, so is there also in the mouing of the Heauen, who is the bréeder of tyme. And Algazel Algazel.answereth Auerrhois very well vponupon this poynt; That looke what a poynt or pricke is in things that hold on whole vnbroken of; the same is an instant or moment in things that immediatly or continually succéede one after another: and that as a poynt or pricke is the beginning of a lyne, so an instant is the beginning of tyme: & Auerrhois could not disproue this reason, otherwise than by flowring him for it. He replyeth yet agayne, and sayth; Yea but if the World had a beginning, how shall the maker thereof be voyd of alteration? To such a question as this is, me thinkes he himselfe should answere thus: That the alledging of an incōuenience assoyleth not the question. But good Sir Philosopher! By your seeking to bring vsus to this inconuenience, you graunt at leastwise that God created Nature. And is it not a straunge ouersight in you, that you will néedes tye him to the lawes of Nature, which is the maker of Nature? and measure the power and libertie of the Clockmaker, by the subiection of the Clocke vntounto him? Art thou not ashamed to yéeld lesse preheminence to GOD, than thy King whom thou exemptest from subiection to his lawes, because he is the maker of the lawes? I pray thée what a thing were it, if thou shouldest vndertake but only to measure Nature by thyne owne wit? What a number of tymes hast thou found thy wit to stumble at the least things? How often hast thou found it against thy selfe? Now, if Nature goe beyond the reach of thy wit, how farre shall the very maker of nature outgoe it? Thou canst not shift thy place without remouing; and therefore thou déemest the like of God. But consider at leastwise that they Soule or Mynd not being limited within any place, is the place of a thousand things, & that a thousand things are the place thereof. Againe, thy Soule cannot conceiue any thing, without passing from contemplation to action: no nor abyde in contemplation, without chaunge. Now thy desire is to hauehave GOD like thy self in this behalf. But if thou wilt not yéeld thy self to other mens reasons; at leastwise yéeld thy selfe to thyne owne reasons. For wheras thou sayst, that beyond the HeauenAristotle in his first booke of Heauen▪ cap. 9. there is neither emptinesse nor tyme; but that whatsoeuer is there, is exempted from all maner of tyme, mouing, chaunge, and passibilitie; and that in that vniuersall eteruitie all things doe leade a most happie and welcontented life: darest thou say lesse of God, whom thou thy selfe doest place farre aboue all those things? The very brute Beastes would bable after that maner of the nature of thy Soule, yea and more to the purpose too. For wheras there is no comparison betwéene God and thée; they yet hauehave a thing that doth somewhat resemble thée▪ For thou chaungest in doing, because thy doing is another thing than thy being; and the thing that thou amost at is out of thy selfe; which thing cannot chaunge for thée, and therefore thou art fayne to chaunge for it. Also thou chaungest in beholding; for the thing which thou beholdest, and thou which beholdest it, are two: and to bee short, in beholding, thou doest after a sort suffer at the thing which thou beholdest, & in doing, thou sufferest at the thing which thou doest: but vntounto him which is the maker of al things, to be and to behold, to behold and to doe, to doe and to will are all one thing. For euen in willing a thing he hath done it, and his willing thereof is after a certeyne & determinate maner, (I vse humane wordes for the vttering of my meaning). To bee short, vntounto him that beholdeth all things in himselfe, nothing can spring vp that shall bée new. Let vsus now put the case, that the forealledged inconuenience be most to purpose; and let vsus see at leastwise if thou canst skill to auoyde it in thyne owne opinion. If God (sayst thou) do make any thing new, he must néedes chaunge his mynd. And yet thou sayest therewithall, that in all things which are done here beneath by naturall causes,Proclus concerning the Influence of the first cause. there is a certeyne influence of God, at leastwise of the vniuersall influence vnderunder the which thou puttest all things. So speakest thou, so speaketh Auerrhois, so speaketh Proclus and the rest of you thereof. Now, seeing that GOD doth eueryevery day a thousand newe things here beneath; I demaund of thée whether he doth them vponupon new deuise, or vppon euerlasting forepurpose? If he doe them vppon newe deuise, thou stumblest at that which thou wouldest eschewe: for (by thy reckoning) God doth that which he did not afore, namely, in sheading foorth his influence anewe, and in producing (by that influence) the thing that was not afore. Or if he do them vponupon euerlasting forepurpose; then confessest thou that which thou meanest to denye; to wit, that God determined euerlastingly to make or doe things by his power, and that according to that determination, he giueth to eueryevery thing in their tymes, whatsoeuer hée had foreallotted them of his goodnesse. For what difference makest thou in the cace betwéene one Plant, and all Plants? betwéene the Plant that is newe sprong vp to day, and the Plant that was withered a thousand yeeres agoe? betwéene the whole World, and the least thing conteyned therein; if thou be fayne too admit a new deuice, as well for the least thing as for the greatest? Nay thou hast deuised thée a God that is turned about vppon his Whéele, a God that hath but a little more wit than thy selfe, and a little more strength than thy selfe: and yet such are thy spéeches of him sometime, that I cannot tell whither thou wouldest be contented to be likened to him or no.

Let vsus sée his other Reasons. All the auncient Philosophers (sayth he) sauing Plato, beleeued that tyme is without beginning. A strange case, that he which taketh so great pleasure in controlling all men that went afore him, will now néedes shéeld himselfe vnderunder them! But I hauehave alreadie prooued that that saying of his is false. And againe what greater contraries can there be, than tyme and eternitie? Also, The Heauen (sayth he) is a diuine body, vncorruptible, the dwelling place of the Goddes, wherein there hath not any corruption bin seene that can be remembred: Ergo it is eternall. But how will he proue this Diuinitie, and this Quintessence of his? Whence will hée prooue this vncorruptible nature? What wil he answere to this saying of his owne, that the Goddes and Godheads dwell aboue Heauen, and vtterly without the compasse or reache of tyme? Is not this a setting downe of that thing for a ground, which is the thing that resteth to be proued, and (to speake after his owne maner) a crauing of the principle? But if we beléeue Plutarke, who affirmeth that Aristotle helde opinion that the Heauen is a mingled nature of heate and moysture together; shall it not bee corruptible of it selfe as well as the grounds are whereof it is composed? hee addeth that the auncient Greekes called it AEther [as ye would say Ayrun] because it ronneth about continually.foreign. Plato in his Cratilus. foreign. And what will hee answere to Plato, who saith that the Heauen or Skye is called AEther, of his brightnesse, in which respect also he calleth the Starre of Mars, Aithon. Also what will he answere to al the former Philosophers, who are of opinion that the Skye is as Cristall composed of Water? And finally what is this Running about: but a departing frō one place to another? Soothly great reasons to maynteine eternitie; for if a man doe but breathe vponupon them they vanish into smoke. And therfore Plotin in his booke of the World,Plotin in his booke of the world. and Damascius in expounding Aristotles booke of the Skye,Damascius vppon the bookes of the Skye and Proclus in his second booke vponupon Platoes Iimeus, hauehave very well noted, that for the prouing of the eternitie, Aristotle hath set downe many things which néede none other disproofe than bare denyall, and which would be as hard for him to proue, as to proue the eternitie it selfe. What is to bée thought then, if euen by the propositions of Aristotle Proclus in his second booke vponupon Timeus. Aristotle ageinst Aristotle.himselfe and of his Schollers, wee proue against him and his Schollers, that the World had a beginning? The World (say they) is eternall, and yet as eternall as it is, it dependeth vponupon God. In that poynt they all agráe. The disagréement among them is in this, that some of them make the depending thereof vponupon God to bee as vponupon an efficient cause, and some as vponupon a finall cause, and eueryevery of them draweth Aristotle to his side as much as he can. Now, if it depend vponupon GOD, as an effect dependeth vponupon his efficient cause; who séeth not that an effect is after his cause, and that there went a working power afore the effect distinguished essentially from the cause therof. And where is thē this goodly ground of theirs become, that the World is eternall because no foreworking power went afore it?As in way of end. Or if it depend vppon God as the finall cause thereof, that is to say, if it were for him and not from him; so as it was not a thing of his making, but a thing that he could not conueniently forbeare: wheresoeuer an ende is intended, is there not also a forecast? And where forecast is, can chaunce and necessitie beare there any sway? And if God had no néede of the World, was it not at his choyce whether it should be or no? And being at his choyce, can it bee beginninglesse, seeing that the being therof dependeth vponupon another than it selfe? Againe, if the World depend vponupon God as vponupon the end thereof; the working power which they themselues require in the creation of all things, shall eyther hauehave gone afore it or not. If it must néedes hauehave gone afore it; then was it not from euerlasting; for this word forego being a betokener of tyme, excludeth ye world from eternitie or euerlastingnesse. Or if there néeded not any foreworking power to hauehave gone afore the world, but that it be simply an issewe procéeding from the force of the cause; why should it not procéede as well in tyme as from euerlasting, seeing that the sayd force or power is directed by Reason and by Will? And why then hold they this principle, That the World cannot be of creation, because that if it were so, some cause must néedes hauehave gone afore it? Again, whence hath the Skye his beginning of mouing, but from an Instant? And whatsoeuer could be neuer so little a while without mouing, why might it not be without mouing a longer while, seeing that the respect is all one, both of eternitie vntounto all tymes, and of infinitenesse vntounto all places? Therefore whereas Aristotle sayth that the World (notwithstanding that it is eternall) dependeth vponupon God; he graunteth consequently that it is not eternall. Secondly, contrary to the teaching of all that went afore him, he deliuereth vsus thrée first grounds; namely, Matter, Substance, or Stuffe, forme, shape, or fashion, and Priuation, Want, or berea…ing; and his Schooles are so greatly delighted therwith, that there is nothing els to bee heard spoken of in them. But if these be the first beginnings or grounds of things; where is then their eternitie? And if they kéepe a circuit in going round about; how can it bee that they had not a beginning? Also how can a substance be imagined to be without forme, shape, or fashion; or forme, shape, or fashiō to be without a substance; seeing that euen mishapennesse it selfe is a kynd of shape, and also that a shape is nothing els than the forme or fashion of a substance? Moreouer, what greater absurditie can there be, than to make that a beginning of being, which hath by it selfe no being at all, nor can hauehave any being but in another thing, as if a man would make blindnesse to bee the beginner of sight, or darknesse the beginner of light? Agayne, seeing that neither substance nor shape hauehave of themselues any being at all: how can they cause other things to bee? Or how comes it to passe yt two things which hauehave had no being at all, doe méete together in one essence or being; but by vertue of the souereine Béeer, who hath willed and determined that it should be so? And if his willing or determining be the cause of the being of them; who is he that did set or appoynt him the terme wherein to doe them? But to excuse one vntrueth, a man telles a thousand; and to shift of one error, he falleth into ten thousand: and yet it cannot bee eschewed, but that the trueth will sparkle out of the Contrarietie of vntrueths, as fire sparkles out of the knocking of one Flints…one against another.Aristotle in his problemes Sect. 10. Probl: 64. In his booke of Problemes (which seeme notwithstanding to bee of many mens gathering,) he sayth concerning the ingendring of liuing things, that the small things, as Woormes, Cutfoules, and such other, are ingendred by the ordinarie alterations of the tyme, the greater by the greater alterations as things that hauehave néede of greate …ginnings or grounds; and that there hath in tyme past bin such an alteration, as of it selfe hath ingendred them, yea euen the notablest liuing things and man himselfe,Sect. 10. Probl. 15. supplying therein both the roome of the efficient cause, and also of the materiall, both at once. And it may bee that that is the cause why Va…ro sayth that Aristotle beléeued that there was no beginning of liuing things, or that liuing things hauehave bene from euer without beginning. Also in another place he sayth, that there was such an alteration at the same tyme that liuing things were first brought foorth; and that if it behoue Nature to bring foorth any mo of them, there must be such another alteration going afore, namely, by a rare Coniunction of some Starres.Aristotle in his third booke of the breeding of liuing wyghts. Lucrece: The Wombes of the Earth grew fit for rootes. And in another place he sayth further, that if Man and other liuing wights had a beginning; it was eyther in egge, in séede, or in woorme, and so foorth. What a number of Monsters are héere for the stablishing of one Monstar, and yet he hath not alledged any thing which is not against himselfe. The lesser Coniunctions (sayth he) doe bréede the smaller liuing things, the meane bréede the meane, and the great ones bréede the great. Well, be it so. Yet these Coniunctions méet not but by the course of the Starres; and that course is a mouing, and eueryevery mouing hath a beginning: and therefore it followeth that wights had a beginning. Againe, if the mouing of the Skye and of the Starres be euerlastingly; the Cō iunctions thereof are euerlastingly also, as Aristotle himselfe concludeth;Aristotle in his xjj. booke of Metaphisiks Chap. 7. and so on the contrary. For if it hauehave turned about from euerlasting, the Coniunctions hauehave likewise incountred from euerlasting. But euerlastingly they could not incounter: for the small ones, the meane ones, and the great ones are not all at once together, but they come seuerally one after another with the space of certeyne hundred yéeres, & with diuers reuolutions betwixt them: whereas if they were eternall, none of them could goe or come afore another. Therefore it followeth that there is a beginner of liuing wights, and a beginner of the goings about of the Skye and of all the whole order which we see: And that is euen God himself.

How much better had Aristotle done,Aristotle in his second booke of Generation and Corruption. Cap. 10. and in his bookes of Comonweale. if he had hild himselfe to that which he sayth well in other places; namely, that forasmuch as most things cannot hauehave a perpetuall continuance in the particular, that is to say in themselues, by reason of being too farre distant from their beginning: therefore God hath continued them by the spreading foorth of their kind; and to that end hath made them male and female and ordeyned copulation betwixt them. For if we make the liuing things without beginning, doe we not make them to be euerlasting? And if we ground their beginnings vponupon some reuolutions of the Skyes; can those Reuolutions be euerlasting? Also, how shall they hauehave bene brought foorth, in full growth, or young, seeing that at the bringing foorth of al things, the things are tender and vnperfect? And if the things be not euerlasting, where then is the euerlasting mouing of the Heauen: that is to say, where is Aristotles eternitie become? The same followeth also of that which he sayth in another place; namely that he which did first gather men together, was ye author of very great good. For in acknowledging that there was a tyme wherein folke liued like the men of Brasilie, or like the wandering Nomades; he acknowledgeth also an infancie of the World. For els what should let that men hauehave not bene either euerlastingly dispersed, or els euerlastingly vnited together? And how comes it to passe O Aristotle, that there hauehave not bene Aristotles from euerlasting? Agayne, who shall choose out the very instant in eternitie for the bréeding and bringing foorth of any thing perticularly, but he that is the Lord of eternitie it selfe?

Aristotle in his Moralles commendeth godlinesse, and be highteth blessednesse to them that followe it; teaching vsus that it consisteth in Contemplation. Now, seeing that this Contemplation or beholding is the meane to make vsus blessed; it must néedes bee the beholding of a thing that is right blesfull: but blesfull it cannot bée, if it consist in these inferiour things which are base and subiect to so many miseries and turmoyles: Therefore he meaneth the Contemplation which is the beholding of the only one God. Also in other places he sayth that our Soules are of a diuine nature, that they be immortal, that they come into vsus from without, & that they be (after a sort) a kin to the Gods: and his Disciples would be offended at him that should say, that their Mayster dowted of the immortalitie of the Soule. And whereto is all this, if the World bée eternall? If it be eternall; eyther our Soules also be eternall, that is to say without beginning, or els they be not eternall. If they be; how happeneth it that they hauehave imprisoned themselues in these our bodies? Or if they bee so imprisoned at the appoyntment of an other: who shall that other be but God? And if God appoynt or allot them to this newe state in tyme certeyne; who hath made one eternitie subiect to another? And what is then become of this Maximée of theirs, that the World is eternall because God maketh not any thing there a newe? Moreouer, if they be euerlasting; who hath made them proportionable to their bodies; that is to wit, infinite Soules to infinite Bodies? And thē what becomes againe of this other Rule of theirs, that Nature cannot abyde any infinitenesse? Or if they bee euerlasting and yet of some certeyne number, going and comming into newe bodies by course: is not that the opinion of Pythagoras, which Aristotle doth so greatly mislike? And if our Soules at their departing out of our bodies, doe goe to the enioying of the blessed immortalitie; doth it not followe, that from after the passingouer of that reuolutiō, men must moue without Soule, dispute without reason, and iudge without mynd; yea and that euen Aristotle himselfe speaketh and reasoneth without wit? To bee short, what hooteth it to bee godly or religious, if our Soules acknowledge no better thing than themselues? What auayleth it to looke for the blessed Contemplation, if they bee perfectly blessed of themselues? But perfectly blessed they be, if they be eternall. And whereto then serueth the rewarding of them with immortall life; if they hauehave the eternitie or immortalitie alreadie? What els then is his vpholding of the world to be eternal, than a turning of ye whole world vpside downe? But there are (sayth Aristotle) Godlinesse, Blessednesse, & Immortalitie: then doth it follow that our Soules are not eternall. And if they be not eternall; then hauehave they a beginning; and that beginning hauehave they, either of God, or of the world. Of the world they hauehave it not: for (as I hauehave sayd) were the world eternall, the Conuersions or turnings about thereof should bee eternal too, and consequently so should our Soules be also, as which should be bred of their power. But now are all things mortall that are ingendred by those Conuersions, as Aristotle himself graunteth. But we put the case that they hauehave an originall notwithstanding that they be immortall. Therfore it remayneth that the same is from God. Now, they could not procéede from God as beames of his substance: for all of ye Philosophers vphold that he is a single and vndiuided substance, vnited in it selfe and most perfectly one: but we be subiect to alteration, to ignorance, to euill affections and such other things. It remayneth therefore (and otherwise it cannot bée) that our Soules are the worke of Gods power. Now, if our Soules (which after a sort doe comprehend the Worlde and all things therein) bee the effects of Gods power, which through his goodnesse vttereth it selfe when he listeth: shall not the world it selfe and the senslesse and transitorie things which serue vsus, yea and our bodies also which are but the Cotes or Instruments of our soules be so in likewise? Now then, let Aristotles Disciples choose whether they will giuegive ouer the eternitie of the world, or the immortalitie of their Soules: the euerlasting turning about of a whéele, or the immortal settlednesse of blessed state: for both of them together cannot stand.

But surely his Disciple Theophrastus Theophrast in his booke of Sents, Sauors, or Smelles.seemeth to hauehave perceiued these inconueniences and contradictions well, when he procéedeth so farre as to say that God created the world, yea euen of nothing. And so doth Algazel the Saracen against Auerrhois, vntounto whom he sayth, that God for the creating of the world néeded neither stuffe nor newe aduisement, but that like a most perfect workman, hauing all things in a readinesse, he tooke his owne leisure for the performance of his worke when it pleased him. And yet it seemeth that Aristotle towards the ende of his life repented him of that doctrine: insomuch that in his booke of the world, he sayth that GOD is the bréeder and preseruer of all things in the world after what maner soeuer it be. And euen in his Metaphisicks, hauing reiected the opinions of many men concerning these things; he sayth thus.foreign. He that sayth that GOD or the souereyne Mynd is the Cause & Author not only of liuing things, but also of Nature it selfe and of the World, and of all the order therein; seemeth to speake discreetly and wel aduisedly; and they that speake otherwise, speake vnaduisedly. And they that are of the former opinion, hauehave very well set downe that Cause for the ground of all things that are, as the which is such a beginning as giueth mouing to all things. And in his booke of Wonders, (if it be his) he speaketh yet more euidently: saying, that naturally the Sea should couer the Earth as higher than it; but that God hath caused the Sea to withdraw it self, that the Earth might be vncouered for the vse of man and of other liuing wights. And this is in effect a commingbacke to the opinion of his predecessors, from the which he would so fayne hauehave departed afore. Howsoeuer the case stand, all the auncient Philosophers doe eyther conclude the Creation of the world with vsus, or els yéeld vsus arguments into our hands wherewith to conclude it against themselues. To bee short, whē Aristotle who was the first that stepped out of the high way, sayth that the world is without beginning, he seemeth to bee Aristotle no more; he doth so often gainsay himself and offend against his owne rules. And where he chaunceth to say that the world was created, he seemeth to be minded to yéeld himself to vsus. And where the case concerneth not (at leastwise expressely) the one nor the other: he leaueth vsus many Conclusions, which doe quite ouerthrow and destroye the sayd opinion of his, and make him whether he wil or no, to conclude on our side.

The Latins The Latins.fel to Philosophie somewhat later than ye Greekes; by reason wherof they had the more cause to ouershoote themselues in the case of Eternitie: but yet wee see that the most part of them followed the opinion of Plato. That man (sayth Cicero Cicero in his first booke of Inuention, & in his first booke of the Orator.) that first gathered together men afore dispersed, was surely a great Personage. And ( as sayth Pythagoras) so was he which did first giuegive names to things, and which first comprised within a certeyne number of letters, the sounds of mans voyce which seemed to bee infinite, and which marked the Courses and proceedings of the wandring Planets, and which first found out Corne, Cloth, building, defences against wilde Beasts, and the rest of the things that make our liues the more ciuill. What els is this than an acknowledging of a beginning? For if mē were from euerlasting, did they not from euerlasting speake? Did they not from euerlasting giuegive names to things? Could they not inuent eueryevery thing from euerlasting. Yes: and therfore he concludeth, We be not created by haphazard; but surely there was a certeyne Might or Power which had a care of Mankynde, and which would not hauehave begotten him to fall into the mischiefe of endlesse death, after hee hath outworne the great and innumerable aduersities and toyles of this world. Now, if we were created, and that there bee a souereyne power which hath had care of Mankynd; surely then hath there bene a beginning, seeing that the sayd power had a care of vsus, eyther when as yet wee were not at al,Cicero in his second booke of the Nature of the Gods. or after the tyme that we were. And in another place he saith, That God created and furnished man, and that it was his wil that he should hauehave the souereyntie of all other things. That the world, the Sea, the Land, and all other things obey Gods tokens. And if a… any tyme he bring in an Epicure alledging such worshipfull reasons as this, With what engines & edgetooles did your God buyld the World, Cicero in his Lawes.and such other; eyther he sendeth him away with such answere as he deserueth; or els by holding his peace, sheweth sufficiently that he deserueth no answere at all.

Varro Varro.the best learned of the Latins, maketh an vniuersall Historie deuided into thrée tymes. The first (as I hauehave …ayd alreadie) is from the Creation of the world, vntounto the first Olimpiade. This man being a man of great reading, found the Creation of ye world to hauehave bene but late afore, yea and so late, that he ioyned it immediatly to the tyme of the first Olimpiade. Likewise Seneca Seneca in his first booke of the happy lyfe. Chap. 31 and 32. and in the first booke of his naturall Questions: and in his Epistles. Macrobius lib. 1. Saturnalium. Virgil. Ouid. Lucretius the Poet.found all things to be new, and acknowledgeth in many places that God created the whole world, and man peculyarly to serue him. And euer since the beginning of the World (sayth he) vntounto this day wee be guyded by the intercourses of daies and nights, and so foorth. Macrobius passeth yet further, and sayth that the world cannot be of any long antiquitie, cōsidering that the furthest knowledge that is to be had thereof, reacheth not beyond two thousand yéeres. As touching the Poets, whose spéeches do for the most part represent vntounto vsus the opinion that was admitted among the common people: Virgill is full of excellent sentences to that purpose; and Ouid hath made a booke expressely of that matter. And euen Lucrece also who professeth vngodlinesse, sayth that beyond the Warres of Troy and Thebes, there was not any iote remayning to rememberance; than by the which, he could not better hauehave declared the World to be but young, howbeit that (after the maner of his own sect,) he fathereth that thing vponupon chaunce, which all the wise men ascribe to the euerlasting prouidence. Plinie Pliny.is the only▪ man whom I wonder at, that being so curious a searcher of Nature, he could not conceyue that which is printed in eueryevery part of it, and which eueryevery man might of himself learne by his owne reading therein. He maketh a long Calendar of the first inuenters of things, as of Letters, of Houses, of Apparell, and of very Bread.Plinie. lib. 7. He reckoneth vp the Companies that hauehave fléeted from place to place for the peopling and replenishing of Countries. And can there bee a greater proofe of newnesse than that?Plin. lib. 2. Sometymes he sayth that the Earth is become weary, and sometymes that it is wexed barreine in yéelding of fruite and Mettalles, because it groweth olde. But in one place he sayth expressely, that mens bodies by little & little become of smaller stature by reason of the witherednesse of ye world which wexeth olde. And is not this a reporting of the Skye to bee like a whéele, which gathereth heate and chafeth with rowling and whirling about? And what improteth this wexing old, but that it had also (as ye would say) a birthtyme? What meaneth the wearing thereof away, but that it had erst bene newe? What is ment by the chafing of it, but that the temperature thereof is altered? For if the World be eternall; why is not the whéele thereof eternally in one heate, and men eternally of small stature? Or if at leastwise it be of very auncient continuance; why were not men become Pygmées long ago? And if the contrary bee to bee seene in Nature; what remayneth but to confesse that the World is but of late beginning? The Stoiks.To bee short, the Stoikes (as Varro witnesseth of Zeno) taught that the world was created of God, and that it should perish. The Platonists The Platonistsaffirme that it is created and mortall, but yet is susteyned from perishing, by God. The Epicures The Epicures.graunt that it had a beginning, howbeit by haphazard and not by prouidence. The Peripateticks The Peripatetiks.say in their conclusions, that it is without beginning; and in their premisses they vtterly deny it. The greatest despisers of God, as Plinie Pliny.and such other like, doe write in their Prefaces, That the world is an euerlasting God; and throughout the whole treatises of their bookes, they vnsay it agayne. Now then, after so many graue witnesses, and after the cōfessions of the parties them selues, is there yet any of these pretensed naturalistes to be found, which dareth thinke the contrarie still?

But now since the comming of our Lord Iesus Christ into the earth,The opinions of the Platonistes. this doctrine hath bene receyued throughout the world, so as the thing which had aforetymes bene disputable among the Heathen, is now admitted as an article of faith, welnere among all nations and sects on the earth. It may bee that the myracles which were seene then in Heauen, in Earth, in the Sea, vppon men, and vponupon the very Féends, made the world to perceyue that there was a Creator of the world. For who could doubt that the creating of a newe Starre, the restoring of a deadman to life, or onelyonly the making of a blindman▪ to see, was not the worke of an infinite power, yea euen as well as the buylding of the world; considering that betwéene béeing and not béeing, betwéene life and death, betwéene the hauing of a thing and the nothauing, the distance is infinite? And it may be that the signes which we hauehave seene from Heauen in our tyme, doe serue to make the blasphemers vponupon earth vnexcusable. But wherof soeuer it came, the very Philosophers themselues began to make a groūded principle therof: insomuch that ye Greekes, Persians and Arabians, and likewise afterward the Turkes and Mahometists, did put it into their beléefe as a thing out of all controuersie. To be short, there is not at this day any ciuill or well ordered▪ people, which hauehave not their Chronicles and Histories of tymes, begun alwaies at the Creation of the world, wherein they doe all hold of Moyses, and agrée all with vsus Christians, sauing in the controuersie of some fewe yéeres.

Of all the Philosophers, only the Platonists continued in estimation: and all men reiected the newfound opinions of Aristotle, and they stood at defiance, rather with the Gnosticks than with the Christians. Sainct Austin sayth concerning the Philosophers of his tyme, that their opinion was, that God was afore the World, howbeit not in time, but in order and by way of vndersetting only: like as if a foote (sayth he) were euer in one place, the print thereof should also be euer there. Unto whom it may be answered in one word, that like as abilitie and intent of going went afore the going it self, both in the man and in the foote; so in God also, the power and intent of creating, went afore the Creation. But it is best to heare their owne words. Plotin in his booke of the World, findeth himself not a little graueled in this case, and he maketh very little account of all Aristotles supposalles.Plotin. Ennead: 2. lib. 1. cap. 1. and. 2. If we say (sayth he) that the Skye is euerlasting as in respect of the whole bodie therof: how can that be, seeing that the liuing Creatures dye, and the Elements passe from one into another, and that (as Plato affirmeth) the Skye it selfe is in continuall wheeling? If we say that the Elements and the liuing wights cōtinue their perpetuities in their kynds: why doth the Heauen continue his perpetuitie rather in number and particularitie? If the cause thereof bee, that nothing can slippe out of it because it cōteyneth all things: how can that reason agree to the Starres and Planets, which doe not conteyne al things as the Heauen or Skye doth, and yet we affirme them to be euerlasting? And if nothing impeach it without; what should let that something may not impeach it within, seeing that all liuing wights doe naturally perish through the distemperāce of their parts, notwithstanding that they liue euen while they bee a dissoluing? And what inseweth hereof, but that both sortes of bodies, as well Coelestiall as terrestriall, doe perish? yea and both Heauen and Earth likewise, sauing that the Coelestiall indure a longer tyme, and perish more slowly than the Earthly? Certeynly (sayth he) if we tooke this word eternitie (as well in the whole world as in the parts thereof,) not to betoken an euerlastingnesse [that is to say, a perpetuitie or continuance without beginning or end,] but only a difference of continuance; there would be the lesse doubtfulnesse in the matter. But all shall be out of doubt, if we father the same eternitie vponupon the will of GOD, which of it selfe is able enough to vphold the World; for so shall things hauehave their continuance according to his pleasure, some in their kyndes, and some particularly in themselues. Now, if the World were eternall; were it not impossible that it should be otherwise than it is? But if it hauehave this being from the will of GOD; is it not discharged of that necessitie? And what shal then become of this saying of his, which he setteth doune in diuers other places, namely that the World is of necessitie, because it would behoue a second Nature to accompanie the first; vnlesse we vnderstand it to be spoken of the necessitie that is conditionall, and not of the necessitie that is absolute as they terme it. Againe, the same will which made the World to bée, and hath giuen continuance to the parts thereof, some after one sort and some after another, and hath disposed of them as it listed it selfe; shal it not also hauehave made them when it listed it selfe? Whosoeuer then …aith, that the béeing of the world, as well in the whole as in the partes, dependeth vponupon the will of God, taketh from the world all necessitie of béeing. And hee that sayeth that there is no necessitie that it should hauehave bin from euerlasting, (let vsus vse those words for want of other,) sayth therewithall that it is not euerlasting.

In his booke of Eternitie and of Tyme,Plotinus Ennead. 3. lib. 2. Chap. 2. he sayth that eternitie and tyme differ in this respect, that eternitie is verifyed but of the euerlasting nature, and tyme is to be verified of the things that are created: So as eternitie, is and abideth in God alone, whom he calleth the World that is to bee conceyued but in mynd or vnderstanding; and tyme abydeth in the worlde that is subiect to the sences: adding neuerthelesse, that the world (to speake properly) was not made in tyme; after which maner wee also doe say that it was not made in tyme but together with the tyme. But when he hath deliberatly scanned all the definitions of time made by the former Philosophers, and hath searched all the corners of his wit too find out the best; in the ende he… concludeth thus. Wee must needes come backe (sayth hee) too the sayd first nature, which I affirmed heretofore to be in eternitie, I meane the vnmouable nature, which is wholly all at once the infinite and endlesse lyfe, and which consisteth whole in one, and tendeth vntounto one. But as yet there was no tyme at all, foreign.or at leastwise it was not among the Natures that consist in vnderstāding, but was to come afterward, by a certeine maner and kynd of posterioritie. Now then if a man will vnderstand, how tyme proceeded first from the hygher Natures which rested in themselues; good cause shall he hauehave to call the Muses too his helpe, for the vttering therof: For it may be that the Muses also were as then. Therefore let vsus say thus; Afore such time as Forenesse issued foorth and had neede of afternesse; Tyme, (which as then was not,) rested in God with the residew of all things that now are. But a certein nature bent to many doings, that is to wit the Soule of the world, beeing desirous to hauehave more than the present, began to moue it self, and so from thence immediatly issewed tyme, which passeth on continualy and is neuer the selfsame. And we beholding the length therof, hauehave imagined tyme to be the image of eternitie. And what is ment by all this contemplation, but that a certeine Soule or mynd proceeding from God, that is to wit the Spirit of God, did mooue and cary the worlde about. That with that mouing and of that mouing, tyme was bred and brought foorth? That afore that moouing, there was a settled state or rest, as eternitie afore time? And that (as he himselfe saieth there) Tyme and Heauen were made both at once, and eternitie was afore them both.

As touching that it is demaunded what God did afore the World: doth not Plotinus himselfe furnish vsus with sufficient answere, in that he sayth that God not woorking at all but resting in himself, doth and performeth very greate things? And is not the lyke concluded by the godly doctrine of Gods prouidence, whereof he treateth in bookes expresly bearing that tytle? for if it be possible for the World to be eternall as well as God: where then can there bee any prouidence? For what else is Prouidence, than the will of God vttered foorth with Reazon, and orderly dispozed by vnderstanding? And if Gods will bee required: where is then the necessitie of béeing, which in other places hee attributeth too the world? Also where is this saying of his become, that our Soules are immortall? and that some of them are eternall and afore all tyme? And lykewise this;foreign. that afore God had created the world and breathed a soule into it; it was but a dead corse, a mingle-mangle of earth and water, a darke matter; a thing of nothing, and (at a woorde) such a thing as euen the Goddes themselues were abashed at it: and that after that God had shed this Soule into the world, both lyfe & mouing were therby breathed into the Starres, Planets, and Liuing wyghts. For seeing that from notbeing, notliuing, and notmouing, there is an infinite distance to being liuing and mouing: Doth it not follow also that there is infinite odds betweene him that is, liueth, and moueth, that is to say God; and the thing that wayteth to hauehave being lyfe and mouing at his hand, that is to wit the forementioned Chaos. And what is it that hath boū ded or filled vp this distance, but only the will of him who only is? And if will were the dooer thereof; then was it not of necessitie: And if it was not of necessitie; then where is the eternitie thereof?

Porphyrius disputing of the Mind or Understanding, the which hee termeth the beginning, ground, or welspring of the World; sayeth that it was bred of God from euerlasting, by a certeine eternall or beginninglesse breeding, euen such a one as was afore all eternitie. It was not bred in tyme (sayth he) for as yet there was no tyme at all: and after that tyme was made, the world can scar…ly bee sayd in very dede to be, if it be compared with the foresayd Vnderstanding or Mynd. This is all one with the saying of Trismegistus in a certeine place, where he calleth this mind, the trew, euerlasting, and first borne Sonne of God; and this world Gods yonger Sonne: the one begotten of his verie nature, and the other of his will.

Proclus Porphyrius.and Simplicius keepe a greate coyle in mayntenance of the eternitie of the world, and hauehave made bookes therof ageinst Philoponus: but all their reasons are sufficiently refuted, by the things which I hauehave discoursed against Aristotle. But seing they maynteyne Gods Prouidence and the immortalitie of the Soule, doo they not reiect eternitie whither they will or no? And whereas Proclus wryting against such as vpheld that there bee infinite worlds without nomber, sayth that such infinitenes is ageinst reason and knowledge; and that the admitting therof excludeth God, and abandoneth all things to fortune: why should he rather admi… infinitenesse of time in this one world than infinitenesse of nomber in many, specially seeing hee alloweth Gods prouidence? And wheras Simplicius condemneth those to hell which beleeue no… the Prouidence vppon the Reasons of Epictetus: dooth hee not consequently condemne the defenders of the eternitie of the world too the same punishment? And when Auerrhoes himselfe sayth that it is our dewtie to magnifie God by prayer and sacrifize, and that it is planted euen in nature to offer sacrifize; is he not contrarie to himself? for to what end reuerence we God, if we be nothing beholden to him? neuerthelesse my alledging of these things is not as though I knew not well that the Platonists, yea and euen these aformentioned philosophers also, do call the world euerlasting and vnbegotten: but to shew that the very surest of them hauehave wauered in this opinion: insomuch that they hauehave left vsus principles contrarie to their conclusions: and after all their long skirmishes, they find no rest but in our Camp. And soothly the most part of them be driuen to acknowledge certeine Degrees of eternitie. Wherof the first should be, that which is measured by the continewance of that which is euermore of it selfe, and becometh neither the longer for aught that is to come, nor yet the shorter for aught that is past; and that is it which is to be ascribed alonly vntounto God. The second as the measure of such things as hauehave a fixed and béeing stable, and yet hauehave also a certeine succession in their operations, of which sort are the vnderstanding spirits or Angells; and this is properly called Aynesse. The third as the measuring of durablenesse continued by forenesse and afternesse, hauing a beginning but not an end, and this they call Tyme, attributing it properly to the World. And what else is this than to speake that thing by circumstance, which we vtter in one word? For to what purpose cal they a thing eternall or euerlasting, if by the termes Eternall and Euerlasting, they meane temporall? After which maner the Emperour Iustinian Iustinian in the preface to his Digests.speaking vnproperly of his owne Lawes, sayd he hoped that they should be eternall and euerlasting.

As tou…hing the opinion of Epictetus the Stoik & of Plutarke, no man can doubt except he quite and cleane disanull their bookes. GOD (sayth Epictetus) hath ordeined that there should bee Wiinter and Sommer, good seasons and bad: he hath giuen to the Earth both fruitfulnes and barrennes; and his disposing of things so by contraries, is to mainteyne the harmony of the whole. He hath brought vsus into the world, giuen vsus bodies and members, and assigned vsus heritages & fellowheires. It is hee that hath made both the sight and the colours, and neither sight nor colours were aught worth, if it were not for the light; and therefore hath he also made the light. Thus from poynt to poynt he leadeth vsus to this conclusion, that GOD made the World and all that is therein. Plurarke sayth thus: Plutark in his Psychogonie.If God were not the maker of all things, then should he bee restreyned in some things, and so were he not Lord of all: But he is to be acknowledged for Lord of all, and therefore of cō sequence he is the maker of them all.Galen in his third booke of the vse of the Partes of mens bodyes. And here might a great nomber of the forealledged sentences of the selfesame Authors be alledged againe.

But what shall we say if Galien (who in comon account is the most heathenish of al writers,) after he hath throughly ript vp both man and the world it selfe, be in the end constreyned too come backe to the same poynt? I make here (sayth he in his booke of the vse of parts) a true Hymne in the honour of our Maker. Whose seruice I beleeue verily consisteth not in the sacrifising of hundreds of Oxen vntounto him, or in burning great heapes of Frankincense before him; but in acknowledging the greatnesse of his wisdome, Powre, and goodnes, and in making the same knowen vntounto others. For whereas of his owne free will hee hath voutsafed to garnish and beawtifie all things in the best maner that could be, and hath not enuied so great a benefite to any thing; I hould it for a proofe of perfect goodnes: and so farre praysed be his goodnes. Again, to hauehave found out the meanes how to adorne things so richly, sheweth a souereigne Wisdome, and to hauehave brought to passe and perfected al that euer he had forepurposed, betokeneth an incōparable might and power.Gal. lib. 11. & 17. And in his seauentéenth booke, who so considereth (sayth he) the composing & knitting togither of eueryevery liuing thing, shall find that it caryeth in it a proofe of the Creators wisdom. And seeing that in the middes of that Puddle of humors eche liuing wight hath a Soule dwelling, indued with so great force and vertue: he ought of reason the more to wonder at the greatnes and excellencie of the Mind that dwelleth in heauen.Galen in his booke of the breeding of Children. And who is he (had he sayd afore) which looking but onelyonly vponupon the Skinne of a thing, woondereth not at the cunning of the Creator? Yet notwithstanding hee dissembleth not that he had tryed by all meanes to find some reason of the composing of liuing wights, and that hee would rather hauehave fathered the doing thereof vponupon nature, then vppon the very author of nature. But yet for all that, Galen in his fifteenth book of the vse of Partes.in the end he concludeth thus. I confesse (saith he) that I knowe not what the Soule is, nothwithstanding that I hauehave sought very narrowly for it, neither can I yeeld a reason how the Babe is formed in the Mothers Wombe. Well doe I see that in that case there is very greate Wisdome; and therefore I am of that opinion that it is not for any man too meddle with the searching out of it, but that it ought to suffice vsus that our Creator hath willed it to be after that fashion. For shall wee presume to seeke a reason of the dooing of that thing, which (without making of an Anatomie) we should neuer knowe to hauehave bene done? It is all one as if he should say, that Nature whereat wee woonder so much, is nothing els but whatsoeuer it pleaseth God to commaund.

And now what remaineth more but to heare Apollo (that is to say, the very Diuell himselfe) who being prayed to say an Hymne to the great God, beginneth it with this verse.

Which made the first Man and called him Adam: which verse Iustine the Martyre affirmeth to hauehave be…e commonly soong in his tyme.

After the confession of wickednesse it self, if we list also to heare the confession of Ignorance, there is not at this day so brutish a Nation, which either by reading it in the great letters of the Heauens, or by tradition from their predecessors, reteine not the opinion that the worlde was created, howbéeit that the case doth stand with them as it dooth with the diuersitie of Portratures drawen out, the first from the lynely patterne it selfe, the second from that first, a third from the second, and so foorthon vntill the last counterfet reteyne scarse any feature at all of the first originall paterne. Of the Nations which we call Sauage or Wyld, some affirme themselues to keepe and reuerence the places where they furmyse too hauehave bin the originall of the Sea, of the Sonne, of the Moone, of the first man and of the first woman, &c. Othersome holde opinion that there came one frō the North into their country which heighthened the Ualleyes and leueled the Hilles, and replenished their Country with Men and Women whom he had created, and that the same partie giueth them fruites of all sortes abundantly. Who (whensoeuer they prouoke him too wrath,) will chaunge their good soyle into barrein land, and take from them the fatnesse of the heauen. May ye not sée clearly here the creation of the world, the sinne of man, and the curse which God hath giuen to the earth for mans sake? And as for the partie whom they speake of, it is a mingling of the storie of the Creation, with the story of some partie that first brought people from the North into those Countries too inhabite them euen long tyme after, ioyning the creation of the world with the peopling of Countries, as things not farre diuers, accordingly as is doone in diuers Histories. And I pray you how many euen of our Neighbournations that inhabite the vttermost borders of the world, could euen at this day answere more fitly too that question?

Now séeing that the World and all the partes thereof doo sing out the creation; séeing the wisdom of the world teacheth it, vngodlines (euen whither it will or no) a…oweth it, Ignorance séeth it, and all togither in all ages both taught, auowed, and perceiued it: may not wee with the allowance euen of the blockishest and of the wickeddest, pronounce this definitiue sentence, That the World had a beginning, and that it had it at such tyme as it pleased God the Creator thereof? But there remayneth yet one poynt to be discussed; namely, wherof God created the World: and that is matter enough for another Chapter.