Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 2
The second Chapter.
That there is but onelyonly one God.
LEt vsus studie further in the booke of nature,The World leadeth to one onelyonly God. and see whether that as it hath taught vsus a Godhead, it teach vsus not also that the same consisteth in onelyonly one God. I hauehave tould you already, that of things, some hauehave being, some hauehave being and life, some hauehave being, lyfe and sence; and other some hauehave being, lyfe, fence, and reason. These fower sortes fall into three, from three into two, and from two into one, and that one is Beeing; afore the which (as I hauehave proued already) there went a Notbeeing. The residue therefore how diuers so euer they be, are all conueied in the one Beeing, and this one Beeing must needes rest in the power of one first Being, whereof the being which we sée, is but a shadowe. Againe, in all ye things which we sée; we reduce the particulars too an vnderkind, the vnderkinds to an vpperkind, and the vpperkind to a most generall. As for example, we reduce all particular humane persons vnderunder the terme of man; All men vnderunder the terme of Wight; all wights vnderunder the terme of liuing things; and all liuing things vnderunder the terme of things that are or be; alwayes referring eueryevery diuersitie to some vnitie, and the same vnitie to another vnitie which is more vniuersall. It remaineth then that when we can mount no higher, we must distinguish ye things that are, into the thing which is of it selfe, and the thing which is not of it selfe. That which is not of it selfe, is the World and all that euer is therein, as I hauehave proued afore. That which is of it selfe, is the thing which we cal God, beyond whom nothing can bee imagined, and by whome all things both are and hauehave bene, as which could hauehave no beeing of themselues. Now to produce from Notheeing into beeing, requireth an infinite power. For betweene nothing and something is an infinite distance; and two infinites cannot be abidden, no nor imagined together. For the infinitenesse of the one doth incloase and bynd the power of the other, and looke whatsoeuer is giuen too the one, is taken away from all others. Therefore like as there must néedes be one Infinite, so must there be but only one, yea and most simply one: from whose vnitie neuerthelesse flowe all the diuersities which we sée in the whole world, like as from a Pricke, procéedeth a Lyne, an outside, and all substantiall bodies. And of vnitie or one in nombering, proceedeth euen and odde, round and square, and all the multiplicities, proportions, and harmonies which wee sée: sauing that the Pricke and the vnitie of nomber are intermingled and interlaced with all things, whereas the foresayd most single and alonly One, abyding still one in it selfe, bringeth foorth all the other vnities, and conteineth them all.
Let vsus examine eueryevery sort of things seuerally by them selues, and we shall learne the like still in them. In the Elements wee see contrarie qualities & operations. And where contraries are, there néede but two heads to set them at warre. For they cannot dwell together, neither can they match together, and much lesse can they reigne together. The further that any of them extendeth his power, the lesse can hee away with any fellowe. Now then if one reigned ouer the Heate, and another ouer the Colde; one ouer the Dryth, and another ouer the Moysture; so as there were diuers makers or gouerners of the worlde: wee should also see diuersities of factions, Element against Element in the whole worlde and in eueryevery thing that is compounded, and continual warre in the middes of their Bowels. But now see we no such thing; but eueryevery of them imbraceth other, both in the whole and in eueryevery seuerall thing, notwithstanding that naturally they displace and destroy one another.
Furthermore they stand not at defyance alone by them selues, but the Sea becleapeth the Earth, the Sea and Earth togither are lapped vp in the Ayre, the Ayre is compast about with the Skye, and eueryevery of them stoopeth vnderunder other; insomuch that of their contrarieties ye see there procéedeth a goodly vniformitie. Séeing then that there are not two factions, there is but one maker, and seeing they yeeld all into one, it cannot be but also by one. In the Earth wee see Riuers, which runne a very long race, but yet from one head: and againe many streames, which yeeld themselues all into one, which one is the Sea; and the Sea also being vndiuidable passeth through the whole inferiour world. Like as they come out of one vnitie, so doe they yeeld themselues vp into one other vnitie. In the Heauen wee obserue infinite diuers mouings, but yet all obeying vntounto one. There is one light which sheadeth it selfe throughout all places, but yet it procéedeth from one onelyonly; which seemeth to multiply it selfe infinitely, & yet cannot by any meanes be parted: I meane one Sunne, whose beames spreading out on all sides, doe reach from the Skye vntounto the Earth, and yet neuerthelesse continue still fast knit together in one bond by one vnitie. Now all these parts, which procéede from one and tend to one, doe make vsus to beléeue that all procéede from one most single one.
Againe, in the things that hauehave life, as in Hearbes and Trées; wee see a barke, a stalke or trunke, many boughes or braunches, and an infinite number of leaues. The bodie hath no likenesse to the leaues, nor the leaues to the fruite, nor the fruite to the blossomes. And yet doe all these come from one roote, which hath his force vnited to it selfe; and the roote springing of a kernell or of a grayne, (which cannot be the work of any mo then one workman) conteyueth all the sayd diuersities in his vniformitie, and of it selfe alone yéeldeth foorth infinite of the same kinde; and of one beginning of life which is not multiplyed in it selfe, maketh it selfe a beginning of life (as well within it selfe as without it selfe) vntounto many things that hauehave life.
Likewise as touching wights, wee see in eueryevery of them a thousand diuers parts. Outwardly, Head, Eyes, Nose, Eares, Téeth, Tongue, Féete, Tayle, and so foorth: and inwardly the Heart, the Lungs, the Stomacke, the Liuer, the Bowelles, the Kidneys, the Bones, the Sinewes, the Heartstrings, the Ueynes, and such other things. The beginning of this whole Masse and of all those so manifold parts, is next cousen vntounto nothing; a very small drop, of one shape, but onelyonly one. Yet notwithstanding, it hath the beginning of life and sence vnited in it selfe; which multiplyeth it self into many abilities, sences, actions, and mouings: and that not inwardly onelyonly, but also outwardly in infinite numbers of the same kinde, which in processe of tyme doe fill whole Countries. So certeyne is this principle in nature, that all multitudes come from an vnitie or One, and that there cannot bee any multitude, vnlesse the same hauehave first bin no multitude. But wee take no héede of it, because wee see it eueryevery day: and yet is it giuen vsus to looke vponupon, to the end we should hauehave regard of it. Howbeit, forasmuch as man is both the image of God, and the Counterpane of the world together: wee cannot sée this vnitie so apparantly in any thing, as in man himselfe.Man leadeth vsus to one God. If we looke vponupon his bodie, all the parts thereof are made one for another, and minister one to another with mutuall dueties: and without so doing, he could not continue nor liue. The Eyes guyde the Féete; the Féete beare the Eyes; by one part the things that are néedful are taken in; and by another the things that are superfluous are voyded out: and all and eueryevery of them referre their doings to the benefite of the whole bodie. This vnion of diuers operations tending al to one poynt, shewes that the framing of man was made by one onelyonly workemanship. And as the workemanship is but one, so must the workemaister also néedes bée but one. For, like as by a building that is made by péeces and of diuers proportions, we deeme the diuersitie of the maysterbuilders; so by the vniformitie thereof we iudge it to be the deuise and wo…kmanship of one alone. The Ueynes are spred foorth throughout the whole bodie, howbeit from one welhead, that is to say from the Liuer: so be the Sinewes, howbeit from the Brayne; So likewise are the Heartstrings, howbeit from the Heart. By these thrée sorts of Cunditpypes, are life, sence, and breath shead foorth euen to the least and vttermost parts, and the braunches thereof are without number, but the originall of all is onelyonly one. But yet doth this shine foorth more cleerely in the Soule of man. It hath life, sence, and mouing. All these are dealt foorth, maynteyned, and guyded by the onelyonly one Soule. Here ye see alreadie one vnitie. The Soule which hath his powers so diuers and so farre spred, is whole thorowout all the whole bodie, and whole in eueryevery part thereof, as much in the least as in the greatest, and as much in the least as in the whole. There ye see yet a streighter vnitie. Againe, the Soule is yet more streightly shut vp into Mynde, which is the Soule of the Soule, as the Apple of the Eye is the Eye of the Eye; and yet notwithstanding, this Mynd (as entierly one as it is,) conceiueth and doth infinite things, entereth into a thousand places without remouing, passeth ouer the Seas, mounteth vp to the Heauens, and reacheth downe to the deapth of the Earth. Lo here an vnitie most streight in it selfe, and yet extended to the vtmost parts of the world.
Hermes saith that the Sunnebeames of God are his Actions, the Sunnebeames of the World are the Natures of things, and the Sunnebeames of Man are Artes and Sciences. Therefore let vsus see whether the Artes and Sciences will guyde vsus to the same vnitie, whereunto those Actions and the natures of things hauehave led vsus alreadie, beginning at the lower, and mounting vp to the higher. Grammer teacheth vsus to bring the diuers parts of spéech into oue congruetie, and the end thereof is to speake; and the end of speaking is societie. Rhetorike teacheth to drawe mennes minds to one selfsame opinion. Logike teacheth to sift out ye trueth from a nōber of falshods, which treuth can be but one. Their ends then are congruetie, societie, vnitie of mind and trueth, which are but sundrie sortes of vnitie. Arithmetick proceedeth from vnitie, Geometrie from a pricke; and Musick from agréement of sounds; and the end of them is to reduce things to one comon reason, to one proportion, and to one harmonie, all which are kinds of vnitie, and their braunches are braunches of the same. For Perspecttiue draweth all his lynes to one poynt: Masourie and Carpentrie tende to vniformitie. The handicraft indeuereth to bring many powers and many mouings vnderunder one, to ouerrule them all: All which again are but sundry sorts of vnitie. Phisick tendeth to the preseruation or restitution of health; and health is nothing els but a welproportioned vnion of diuers humors togither. The skill of Lawe tendeth to Right, and there is but one Right, though there be infinite wrongs. Then serues it but to mainteyne, restore, and bring men backe ageine vntounto vnitie. Let vsus proceede further; Morall Philosophie subdeweth many diuers passions and affections vntounto one reason, in one man. How shold gouernment bringeth many men to the obeying of one householder: Ciuillgouernment reduceth many households into one Commonweale, which is nothing but an vnitie of many people, whether it be vnderunder one Lawe or vnderunder one magistrate; insomuch that euē the most popular Comonweales hauehave (in their extremities) taken a Dictator, and in their ordinarie course of gouernment a Consull, the one after the other. Now then all that euer man conceiueth, inuenteth and disposeth, doth leade vsus alwayes to an vnitie. Where vnitie is lost, there things goe to wrecke, Artes are confounded, and Commonweales are dissolued. Then like as in vnvnited diuersitie wee finde waste and subuersion; so must we looke in vnity for the increase and preseruation of all things. Now if man, and all that is within man and without him doe leade vsus to one alone: shall he suffer himselfe to raunge out vntounto many? And if all the Sonnebeames of man, I meane his Arts and Sciences, tend too one vnitie: shall only diuinitie turne vsus aside to a pluralitie of Goddes? Nay rather, by so many vnities, she will make vsus stye vp to the true and perfect vnitie, and that vnitie is the onelyonly one God.
But let vsus sée now how all things being so diuers in the whole worlde, are referred one to another. The Water moysteneth the Earth,The linking in of things together. the Ayre maketh it fatte with his showers, the Sunne inlighteneth it and heateth it according to his seasons. The Earth nourisheth the Plants, the Plants …eede the Beastes, & the Beasts serue man. Againe, nothing is séene here to be made for itselfe. The Sunne shineth and heateth; but not for it selfe: the Earth heareth and yet hath no benefite thereby: the Winds blowe, and yet they sayle not: but all these things redound to the glory of the maker, to the accomplishment of the whole, and to the benefite of man. To be short, the noblest creatures hauehave néede of the bacest, and the bacest are serued by the noblest; and all are so linked together from the highest to the lowest, that the ring thereof cannot bée broken without confusion. The Sunne cannot be Eclipsed, the Plantes withered, or the Raine want; but all things féele the hurt thereof. Now then, can we imagine that this woorke which consisteth of so many & so diuers péeces, tending all to one end, so cuppled one to another, making one body, & ful of so apparant consents of affections; procéedeth from elsewhere than from the power of one alone? When in a féeld we sée many Battels, diuers Standerds, sundry Liueries, and yet all turning head with one swaye; wee conceiue that there is one Generall of the field, who commandeth them all. Also when in a Citie or a Realme wee sée an equalitie of good behauior in an vnequality of degrees of people, infinite trades which serue one another, the smaller reuerensing the greater, the greater seruing to the benefite of the smaller, both of them made equall in Iustice, and all tending in this diuersitie to the common seruice of their Countrie: we doubt not but there is one Lawe, and a Magistrate which by that Lawe holdeth the said diuersitie in vnion. And if any man tell of many Magistrates; we will by and by inquire for the soueraine. Yet notwithstanding, all this is but an order set among diuers men, who ought euen naturally to be vnited, by the communitie of their kind. But when things as wel light as heauy, whot as cold, moyst as dry, liuing as vnliuing, endewed with sence as sencelesse, and eche of infinite sortes, doe so close in one composition, as one of them cannot forbeare another; nay rather to our séeming, the worthiest doe seruice to the bacest, the greatest to the smallest, the strongest to the weakest, and all of them together are disposed to the accomplishment of the worlde, and to the contentment of man who alonly is able to consider it: ought we not forthwith to perceiue, that the whole worlde and all things conteyned therein, doe by their tending vntounto vsus, teach vsus to tend vntounto one alone? And séeing that so many things tende vntounto man; shall man scatter his doings vntounto diuers ends? Or shall hee bee so wretched as to serue many maysters? Nay further, to knit vp this poynt withall, séeing that all things the nobler they bee, the more they doe close into one vnitie, (as for example, wee sée that the things which hauehave but mere being are of infinite kynds, the things that hauehave life are of infinite sortes, the things that hauehave sence are of many sortes, howbeit not of so many; and the things that hauehave reason are many, onelyonly in particulars): doth it not followe also that the Godhead from whence they hauehave their reason (as nobler thā they) is also much more one than they, that is to say, only one as well in particularitie and nomber, as also in kynd?
Howbeit, notwithstanding all these considerations,The obiectiōs of such as mainteyne mo Gods thā one. forasmuch as there is diuersitie, yea and contraritie in worldly things; some hauehave gathered vponupon this diuersitie, that there be diuers Gods, acknowledging neuerthelesse one Almightie aboue them all. And othersome, in respect of the contrarietie, hauehave set downe but twoo Gods onelyonly.Iulian the Apostata, in Cyrillus. The first say, If onelyonly one God had made all things, there should hauehave bene no difference in things: but there is difference; and therefore it must néedes bee that there are many Gods. Surely had these men wel considered the things afore alledged by mée; they should hauehave séene that nature is wholly and altogether against this Consequence. There is great diuersitie in one Plant, in one Wight, in one Man: and yet notwithstanding the ground thereof is vniforme. Yea and it is so true that onelyonly vnitie is fruitfull, that we sée how the diuersitie it selfe and that which commeth thereof, is vtterly barrein, both in Wights, (as in Mules) and in Plants, as in the Stergon, Stergon is an herbe which groweth of an Onyon stuffed with Linseede or seede of Flax.and also in all other like things. If they consider the Sunne, hee maketh Plants to growe all at one tyme, diuers one from another, and as diuers in themselues. Hee maketh some of them too shootefoorth, some to rypen, and some to wither. At one instant he both worketh drought in the Earth, and draweth vp Clowdes out of it to moysten it: he giueth Sommer, Daylight, & fayre weather to some, and Winter, night, and fowle wether vntounto othersome: Hee maketh some folkes whyte, some blacke, some read, and some Tawny; and yet is hee but one selfesame Sunne, and one selfesame Creature, which at one selfesame instant, by one selfesame course, and with one selfesame qualitie of heate, doth all the sayd things, not onelyonly diuers, but also contrarie. And hee that should say that it is any other than one selfesame Sunne that maketh the Ethyopian blacke, and the Scotte yellowi…h, were not worthy to be answered. Now if a Creature doth by heate (which is but a qualitie) bréede so diuers effectes; what shall we say of the Creator, I meane the infinite Being of GOD, who imparteth himselfe to all things?
Again, if man consider himselfe, he féeleth, he séeth, he speaketh, he vnderstandeth a thousand diuers things, without any alteration in himselfe. Nay which more is, he conceiueth, he inuenteth, and he performeth so diuers workes, that Nations doe wonder one at another. One man portrayeth out the whole worlde in a little péece of Paper, peinting out all the Images of the Heauens, and all the Climates of the Earth. Some one other counterfeiteth all liuing wights, which Créepe, which Goe, which Flye, which Swimme. And all this commeth but of one mynd which conceiueth and bréedeth all these formes, because it hath no forme of it owne; for had it any of it owne, it could not breede them, because it owne would occupie it to the full. What hauehave we then to thinke of him, whose willings are powers, and whose thoughts are déedes? Who is an infinite mynd; in comparison of the brightnesse wherof our mynds are but a shadowe? If we, who (to speake properly) are but in outward showe, doe things in outward showe so diuers: do we doubt that he which is in very trueth, cannot do them also in very trueth? Moreouer, if the diuersitie make vsus to imagine diuers Gods, howbeit all procéeding of one alone: shall we say that he which in his vnitie, bred the rest of the Gods with their so diuers powers, had not the same powers in his vnitie? Againe, seeing the sayd diuersitie was once included within the sayd vnitie; is it to be sayd that he was fayne to hatch vp diuers Gods, for the bringing of that diuersitie to light? Nay, like as nature doth all things the shortest way: so also God made all things immediatly. And if they say it was his pleasure to make the high things himselfe, and to leaue the lowe things to be done by the pettie Gods: we must consider that High and Lowe, Noble and Unnoble, are but considerations of man. For to make the one or the other, is all one vntounto God; who of his infinite goodnesse and power, hath drawne both twayne of them out of nothing, which was no more the one than the other, as wée shall see hereafter.
Let vsus come to such as hauehave vphilde two beginnings,Against two beginnings. the one good whom they call Oromases; and the other euill whom they call Arimanius; Plutark in the lyfe of Osyris and Isis.which opinion men say procéeded first from Zoroastres, and afterward from the Persians and Manichies; but wee shall finde no foundation thereof in nature. Their meaning is, that the Elements, the Plants, Beastes, Men, yea and Spirites, were as yee would say parted betwixt these twoo Gods, so as the one should bee the Creator of the one, and the other of other; the good God, of the good; and the euill of the euill. If it be so, then is there a Ciuill warre fully furnished, of forces set in battelray on both sides: so as there remayneth nothing but fighting, and yet after so long tyme we see no such fight at all. And therfore let vsus conclude, that this cōtrarietie of beginnings is not. Unto the one, they alotted Light: and vntounto the other, Darknesse: vntounto the one, Sommer: and vntounto the other Winter: vntounto the one, Heate: and vntounto the other, Cold. In very déede these are Contraries, but yet is one selfsame Sunne the doer of them all, after as he goeth further from vsus or commeth neerer to vsus. And his going from vsus is not to forgoe his light, but to shine therewith the neerlyer vntounto others; nor to coole himselfe, but to heate other folkes. Then if these contraries come of one selfsame one, that is to wit of the Sunne: Much more likely is it in reason, that the Sunne himself should not come of two. Againe, why should the one of these contraries be good, and the other bad? Whosoeuer shall hauehave tryed the extremitie both of the Heate and of the Cold, shall not be able to discerne which is the worser. Likewise he that shall hauehave obserued the benefite that commeth of either of them in their seasons, shall not be able to discerne which of them to take for the better. The Heate ripeneth fruites; but it also seareth and parcheth them. The Colde starueth them; but it also maketh them to bud. Take away either of them both, and you take away all fruites. And like as both of them are needfull to one selfsame thing, that is to wit, to the bringing foorth of fruites: so be they also procured by ye course of one selfsame might, which is the Sunne. The same Sunne is the lightner of our eyes to our behoofe; and he is also the blinder of them if wee gaze vponupon him at the heyhth of the day. Yet notwithstanding, both in the Sunne and in our eyes is the selffame light which they call good, and which by his reckoning should bee to them both good and bad: and if it be so, on which side shall they turne themselues?
They adde further: Among Plants there are so many poysons, and among liuing wights, so many noysome Beastes: that how should a good God bee author of them? Sillie man that thou art! The Poysons thou occupyest in Tryacles for thy health, euen against the Plague. And of those Beastes thou canst skill to vse the skinnes to clothe thee against the Colde. And if thou hast an euill opinion of some of them, because thou canst not serue thy turne with them; as much wouldest thou hauehave sayd sometime of ye Horse, which as now doth thee seruice so many waies: & as much might the Satyre hauehave said of Fire when it burned him, notwithstanding that as now it be so many waies necessarie. Now then they might benefite thee, if thou wistest how to vse them: and whereas they anoy thee, it is not of their nature, but through thyne owne weakenesse or rather ignorance. But if they be good so farre forth as thou hast skill of them: shall they not bee good to him which knoweth them throughly? In the Closet of a Surgion who is but a man as thou art, thou shalt finde a thousand tooles; and thou wilt perchaunce esteeme him so wise, that thou wilt not thinke there is any one of them, which serueth not to some purpose. Yea, and if any of them doe cut thée or race thée; thou wilt not blame the toole nor the maister thereof, but thy selfe which tookest it by the blade, whereas thou shouldest hauehave taken it by the handle. And as little canst thou say, that the toole which did cut thee, as that the toole wherewith thou diddest cut what thou wouldest, had another maister or maker. Now then, wilt thou bring lesse regard with thée in this great shop of the Creator? It is his will that some things shall serue other liuing wights which serue thée, and othersome shall serue thee alone. Yea, and he will hauehave euen the harmes which thou receiuest by them, to serue thée to some purpose: and he serueth his owne turne better by thée, then thou canst serue thyne owne. And if thou which art nothing, hast yet so much wit as to drawe some peculiar good to thy self, out of another bodies workes, yea euen out of such as thou accountest euill; as out of Poyson, health; from the Wolfe, his skinne to couer thée; from the night, rest; and so foorth: Shall not the almightie and infinitie Spirit much better dispose them for the benefite of all men, yea and of all the whole world which comprehendeth so many things together?
They say yet againe; But why should a good God take pleasure in so many néedlesse things? For to what purpose serueth the Fly, and such other things? Tell me, wouldest thou like well that thine owne Children should speake such reproach of thy workes? Nay rather wherein doth the Flye anoye thée? And wherfore serued the Flye that Zeuxis paynted in his Table? It serued to make his greatest disdeyners, (euen those which would hauehave had that rather then all the rest wyped out of the Table) to confesse his arte and excellent skill. And this serueth to conuict thée of blockishnes, thée (I say) which haddest rather to finde fault with God and with the Flye, then to wonder at the excellencie of him, who hath inclosed so liuely a life, so quicke a moouing, and so great an excellencie in so little a thing. So then, it is not for vsus to chace her out of the table; but rather to confesse our owne ignoraunce, or els to chace it away. Hereby therefore we perceiue, that of all the things which they can alledge, there is none which is not good and behofefull in it self; and that the euilnesse thereof commeth onelyonly through vsus, and therfore that the thing hath but onelyonly one Beginner thereof, who is good.
But behold, they vrge the matter yet more strongly. Howsoeuer the case stād (say they) it cannot be denyed but there is euilnesse in things, seeing that they corrupt themselues, and the sinne that is in our selues is vtterly euill: and sith it is so, from whence may that bee? For if God be good, he cannot bee the author of euill; and therefore there must néedes bee another author thereof. This question shall bee handled more lightsomely when I come to treate of Mans fall, which is the bringer in of the two euilles, namely both of payne and fault; but yet may we assoyle it if we take heede. Wée say that making and creating are referred to natures or substances, and that all natures and substances are good; and therefore that God who is good, is the author and Creator of them. On the contrary part, we say that euill is neither a nature nor a substance, but an income or accident which is falne into natures and substances; It is (say I) a bereuing or diminishing of the good qualities which things ought naturally to hauehave. This euill hath not any being in it selfe; neither can hauehave any being but in the thing that is good. It is not an effect, but a default; nor a production, but a corruption. And therefore to speake properly, we must not seeke whence commeth the doing of euill, but whence commeth the vndoing of good. As for example, Wine is of Gods creating, and it is good. Now this good substance falling to decay, that is to say, to abate or diminish of his vertue, becommeth Uineger. Wherevpon no man asketh who made the substaunce that is become sharpe, for it is the selfsame that it was afore; but they aske whence cōmeth the sharpnes or eagernesse, that is to say, the alteration that is befalne to the substance. If thou say that it commeth of the foresayd euill Beginner the author of all euill, as the good Beginner is the author of all goodnesse: forasmuch as euill is nothing els but a default, want or fayling of good; it is the souereine or chiefe default or fayling, as the good is the souereine or chiefe being. And if it be the chiefe default, then is it not any more. For the default or fayling of a thing, is a tending of the thing to notbeing any more the same that it was: and the fayling of all, is a tending to the vtter vnbeing or notbeing of the whole.
Moreouer, the sayd euill Beginner, which worketh not but in the substance that is made or created by another, could do nothing if the good Beginner wrought not first; and so should he hauehave the Commencement of his power depending vponupon another than himselfe, which is a thing repugnant to a Godhead. And if you aske what is then the cause thereof:Nothing being … negatiue, canseth nothing which is the priuatiue. I tell you it is the very nothing it selfe; that is to wit, that God almightie, to shewe vsus that he made all of nothing, hath left a certeyne inclination in his Creatures, whereby they tend naturally to nothing, that is to say, to chaunge and corruption, vnlesse they bee vphild by his power, who hauing all in himselfe, abideth alonly vnchaungeable and free from all passions. As in respect then that things be, they be of God; but as in respect that they corrupt & tend to notbeing that which they were afore; that commeth of the sayd notbeing, whereof they were created. And so they be good, as in respect of their bare being; and euill as in respect that they forgo their formal being, that is to say, their goodnesse: Good on the behalfe of the [souereine] Good, the father of all substances; Euill as on the behalfe of the Nothing: And soothly neither by nature nor by iustice ought they to be made equall with the vnchaungeable Being of their Creator. And this is to be seene alike in all things. An Apple rotteth, and a man dyeth. The Apple and the man, that is to say, the natures of them are Gods Creatures. As for the rottennesse and the sicknesse, they bee but abatements and defaults of the good nature that was in either of them from the good Creator. Man againe becommeth a Sinner, and hereunto he néedeth no newe creation. It is a vanishing away of the good nature, which loseth her taste. And therefore S. Austine sayth, that the Latins terme an euill man Nequam, and an euillnesse Nequitiam, that is to say, Naughtie and Naughtinesse. Now, like as of rightnought there néedeth no beginner; so also is there none to bee sought of naughtinesse or euill. And by yt meanes there remayneth vntounto vsus but onelyonly one God the beginner and author of all things, as wee hauehave defined him alreadie afore. Plato, Plotin, Plato, in his Timaeus. Plotin, in Enn. 1. lib. 8.and other great Philosophers of all Sexts, are of opinion that Euill is not a thing of itselfe, nor can bee imagined but in the absence of all goodnes, as a depriuation of the good which ought to be naturally in eueryevery thing:Trisinegist in Asclepio. Simplicius vppon Epictetus. That euill is a kynd of notbeing, and hath no abyding but in the good, whereof it is a default or diminishing. That the cause thereof is in the very matter whereof God created things, which matter they termed the very vnbeing, that is to say, in very trothe no being atall, whereof the Creatures reteyne still a certeine inclination, whereby they may fall away from their goodnesse: And that in the very Soule of man, the euil that is there is a kind of darknesse, for want of looking vp to ye light of the souereyne mynde which should inlighten it; and through suffering it selfe too bee caried too much away to the materiall things which are nothing. But now that we hauehave doone with nature, it is good tyme to sée what the wysest men will teach vsus concerning the onelyonly one God.