The Logic Newly Translated, Book 2
THE SECONDE BOOKE OF DIALECTICKE CONtaining the diſpoſition.
CAP. I, Of the definition and deuiſion, of the diſpoſition and propoſition.
WE hauehave intreated in the former booke the firſt parte of Dialecticke, which is inuention: Now followethe conſequently the other parte, which we did name Iudgement and diſpoſition. Diſpoſition is a parte of Dialecticke, wich teachethe to diſpone and place orderly the argumentes inuented, to the ende we maye iudge well and rigthly: for we iudge of eueryevery thing according to the diſpoſition therof. And therfore this parte of Logicke is eyther called iudgement or diſpoſition vnderunder one ſignification. Diſpoſition is parted into the propoſition (otherwiſe called enunciation) or ſylogiſme and methode. Propoſition is a diſpoſition in the which one argumente is ſpoken for another. The propoſition hathe two partes, the firſt is called the antecedent, the ſecōde the conſequent: Of the which the qualities of propoſitions do ryſe. And firſt the affirmation and the negation. The propoſition affirmatiue, is when the conſequent affirmethe vponupon the antecedent: as, a man is mortall. The propoſition is negatiue, whē the conſequente denyethe vponupon the antecedent: as, Man is not mortall: and here ryſethe the contradiction of propoſitions, when one conſequente dothe bothe affirme and denie vponupon one antecedent
CAP. II. Of the true propoſition and falſe, contingent, neceſſarie, and impoſſible, and of the thre documents of artes.
THe propoſition is eyther true or falſe. It is tru when the conſequent is truly ioined with the antecedent, or truly ſeparated from the ſame: as here it is truly ioined: all man are ſynners: and here truly ſeparated: no man is iuſt. The propoſition is called contingent, when the conſequent be truly ſaid of the antecedēt, ſo that ſometyme it maye be falſe: as fortune helpethe hardye men, for granting it to be true to daye, it may be falſe to morowe: So that the veritie of this ſorte of proſitions is only certain in thinges preſent, or paſt, and not in thinges to come. The propoſition is neceſſary when the cōſequent maye at all times truly be ſayde of the antecedent: as, all men are mortall. And contrarywyſe, the propoſition impoſſible, is when the conſequent maye at no tyme be ſayde of the antecedent: as, A man is a horſe. The neceſſary is eyther of one kynde, or of a diuerſe kynde. The neceſſary of one kynde is when the partes are coeſſentiall amonge them ſelues, as when the generall is ſayde of the ſpeciall: as, A man is a liuing thing, or the difference of the forme, as, a man is reaſonable, or the adioincte of his proper ſubiecte, as, A man maye laughe. And this ſorte of propoſition is ſometyme reciprocate, when the conſequent, not only maye be ſayde alwaye of the antecedent, and of all thinges contained vnderunder the antecedent, but of it ſelf alſo, ſo that the antecedent contrariewyſe may be ſayde of the conſequent, on the ſame maner: as Man is a reaſonable lyuing thing. nomber is equall or vnequall. The propoſition of diuerſe kynde, is when the partes are not coeſſential: as, A man is blacke or white. And here we hauehave three generall documentes to be obſerued in all artes and ſciences. The firſt is that all the preceptes and rules ſhoulde be generall and of neceſſitie true: and this is called a documente of veritie. The ſeconde that eueryevery arte be contained within his owne boundes, and withholde nothing appartaining to other artes, and is named a documente of iuſtice. The third, that eueryevery thing be taught according to his nature, that is: generall thinges, generally: and particuler, particulerly: and this is called a documente of wyſdome.
CAP. III. Of the ſimple propoſition.
THe propoſition is eyther ſimple or compounde. The ſimple with the whiche a ſimple ſayng is declared: and therfore it contaynethe a ſimple conſequent: which yf it do affirme, makethe the whole to affirme, and contrarywyſe, yf it denyethe, the whole denyethe: as, fyer burnethe, fyer is hotte, fyer is not water. Here, burnethe, hotte, and water, are the ſimple conſequentes: vponupon the affirmation or negation of the wich dependethe the affirmation or negation of the whole. And this is the firſt diſpoſition of thinges inuented, when the cauſe is ioyned with the effecte, as in the firſt example. Or the ſubiecte with the adioynte as in the ſecond: Or the diſagreable with the diſagreable, as in the thyrd. After the which maner all ſortes of argumētes maye be pronounced (except full compariſons and diſtributions) the agreable by affirmyng, and the diſagreable by denying.
The ſimple propoſition is eyther generall or ſpeciall. Generall, when it ſpeakethe generally. And here the one parte of the contradiction is not alwayes true, & the other falſe. For in thinges contingent they maye be bothe falſe: as, All man are learned: No man is learned. And in thinges alſo which be not contingent: as, All lyuyng thinges are reaſonable. No lyuyng thing is reaſonable. The propoſition is ſpeciall, when it ſpeakethe ſpecially and of a parte. And here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other falſe. The ſpeciall is eyther indefinite, or proper: Indefinite when it ſpeakethe of no certain thing: as, Some man is learned, whoſe generall contradiction is, No man is learned. Proper when the conſequent is ſayde of ſome proper name: as, Fabella is fayre, whoſe contradiction is, fabella is not fayre.
CAP. IIII. Of the propoſition compounde,
THe propoſitiō compounde is when moe ſayinges then one are ioyned togeather by ſome coniunction. And therfore vponupon the affirmation or negation of the coniunction, dependethe the affirmation of the whole propoſition: and here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other is falſe. The compounde propoſition is eyther congregatiue or ſegregatiue: The propoſition is congregatiue, when the coniunction gatherethe, and is eyther copulatiue or connexiue. Copulatiue, when the coniunction is copulatiue, as. Bothe Eurus and Africus ruſht forthe. Whoſe negation and contradiction is, not bothe Eurus and Africus ruſht forthe. And here is to be noted, that the veritie of the propoſition copulatiue dependethe vponupon the veritie of bothe partes: for yf one parte be falſe, the whole is ſaid to be falſe, as in this example. Bothe man and beaſt are reaſonable, the whole propoſition is falſe, becauſe the laſt parte is falſe. Hereto maye be referred the propoſition containing the relation of qualities, in the which the relation ſtandethe in place of the coniunction: as.
Suche thing as ſlepe, and reſt on graſſe
To wearye men appeare:
The ſame to me, of thy ſwete verſe
The melodye ſo cleare.
As thoughe he woulde ſaye, Slepe is ſwete to wearye mē, ſo is thy verſe to me. Whoſe negation is,
Not that which ſlepe, and reſt on graſſe,
To wearye men appeare:
The ſame to me of thy ſwete verſe,
The melodie ſo cleare.
CAP. Ʋ. Of the propoſition connexiue.
THe propoſition is connexiue, whoſe cō iunction is connexiue: as, yf thou hauehave faythe, thou muſt hauehave charitie: Whoſe negation is, not althyoughe thou hauehave faythe, it folowthe that thou muſt hauehave charitie. Cicero de fratre. Neyther yf a propoſition be true or falſe, by and by it followethe that cauſes are immutable. The affirmation ſignifiethe that yf the antecedent be, the conſequent muſt be alſo. The negation or contradiction ſignifiethe, that althoughe the antecedent be, the conſequent muſt not be therfore. Wherby we muſt vnderſtande, that whenſoeuer this ſorte of propoſition is true, it muſt be neceſſarye alſo. The neceſſitie is knowen by the neceſſarye connextion of the partes, and not by the veritie of the ſame: for bothe the partes maye be falſe, and the connexion neceſſarye, as this: yf a man be an horſe, he hathe fower feete, is a neceſſary connextion. But if the connextiō be contingent, and only for his probabilitie ſuppoſed to be, there aryſethe no neceſſarye iudgement, but only opinion: as, Terence in andria. Yf thou do that (Pamphile) this is the laſt daye that euer thou ſhalt ſee me. The propoſition containing the relation of tyme is hetherto referred: as, when Iuſtice is mayntayned, then ſhall peace be in the Realme.
CAP. ƲI. Of the propoſition ſegregatiue.
THe propoſition ſegregatiue is, whoſe coniunction dothe ſegregate: and therfore it ſpeakethe only of diſagreable argumentes. It is parted into diſcerning propoſitions and vnioynyng. The diſcernyng is, whoſe coniunction dothe diſcerne. Cicero in Tuſc. 5. Althoughe that by the ſence of the bodye, they be Iudged, yet they are to be referred to the ſpirite: whoſe negation and contradictiō is, Not althoughe that by the ſence of the bodye they be iudged, they are therfore to be referred to the ſpirite. This ſorte of propoſition is true, when bothe the partes is true and diſcerned alſo. Otherwyſe it is falſe and ridiculous.
CAP. ƲII. Of the propoſition vnioynyng.
THe propoſition vnioynyng, is a propoſition ſegregated, whoſe coniunction dothe vnioyne: as, eyther it is night or daye: all lyuing thinges, are eyther man or beaſt: whoſe negations are, It is not eyther daye or night: all lyuyng thingeh are not eyther man or beaſt: Here the negatiō declarethe, that the one parte or the other is not true of neceſſitie. For yf the diſiunction be abſolutely true, it is alſo neceſſarye, and the partes opponed imediatlie one to another. Yet althoughe the true diſiunction be neceſſarie alſo, it is not requyred that the partes ſeparated be neceſſarye: as, This is a neceſſarie diſionctiō: A man is eyther good or not good: and yet this, (A man is good) is not neceſſarie: Nor this, (a man is not good:) But the neceſſitie of the diſiunction dependethe vponupon the neceſſarie oppoſition and diſiunction of the partes, & not of their neceſſarie veritie. The diſiunction is ſomtymes with a condition, as if one ſhoulde aſke, whether is Cleon, or Socrates come? becauſe it was ſo promyſed that the one ſhoulde only come. And therfore if the diſiunction be contingent, it is not abſolutely true, but only opynable, ſuche as oftentymes we vſe in commen ſpeakyng: as, Ouide in Leanders epiſtle.
Eyther happie courage ſhall ſaue me,
Or deathe of carefull lyfe the ende ſhalle.
CAP. ƲIII. Of the Sillogiſme.
A Sillogiſme is a diſpoſitiō in the which the queſtion beyng diſponed with the argumēte is neceſſarilie infered in the cōcluſion. For if the propoſitiō be doubtfull, it is made a queſtion: And to proue the queſtion, we take an argumēt, & diſpone it with the queſtion. The Sillogiſme hathe two partes: one which goethe before, another that followethe, & maye be called, the antecedent and the conſequent. The antecedent which prouethe or diſprouethe the queſtion, and hathe two partes: the propoſition and aſſumption, otherwyſe called the Maior and the Minor. The propoſitiō is the firſt parte of the antecedēt, in the which the whole queſtiō or the cōſequēt of the queſtiō is diſponed with the argument. The aſſumption is the 2. parte of the antecedent, which is aſſumed vnderunder the propoſition. The conſequent is the laſt parte of the Sillogiſme, which containethe the partes of the queſtion, and concludethe the ſame, and therfore it is called the Concluſion: yf any of thoſe partes be abſent, it is called a mutilet Sillogiſme, or Entymema) if any thing be more then thoſe thre partes, it is called a Proſillogiſme. Sometyme alſo the order is confounded: therfore yf any doubte ſhall ryſe throughe any of theſe thinges, it is good to putto that to which is abſent, and pull awaye that which aboundeth, and laſt to put eueryevery thing in his owne place.
CAP. IX. Of the firſt forme.
A Sillogiſme is eyther ſymple or compounde. Symple when the partes of the queſtion are diſponed with the argumē te, ſo that the conſequent be in the propoſition and the antecedent in the aſſumption. The Sillogiſme is affirmant, when the propoſition & aſſumption affirmethe: And negant, when eyther the one or the other is negant. Generall, when they are bothe generall: Speciall, when there is but one generall: Proper, when they are bothe proper. The ſymple ſillogiſme is eyther mutilate or whole. Mutilate, when the concluſion is brought in after on propoſition or on aſſumption: as,
All men be ſynners
Ergo Socrates.
And
Socrates is a man,
Ergo hi is a ſynner.
The ſymple ſillogiſme is of two ſortes: firſt the argumentt only goethe before, or followethe only. The firſt ſorte then of this kynde is, when the argument goyng before in the propoſition ſometyme affirmatiuely and ſomtyme negatiuely, and in the aſſumption only affirmatiuely inferethe a ſpeciall concluſion: as, in the examples followyng.
Affirmant generall, as.
Conſtancie is a vertue:
But Conſtancie is Confidence:
Therfore ſome Confidence is vertue.
Negant generall, as:
Folyſhehardines is no vertue:
But folyſhehardines is Confidence:
Some Confidence therfore is no vertue.
Affirmant ſpeciall, as,
A wyſeman is to be prayſed:
But ſome wyſeman is a poore man:
Therfore ſome poore man is to be prayſed.
Negant ſpeciall, as:
A foole is not alwayes happye:
But ſome foole is fortunate:
Therfore ſome fortunate is not alwayes happye.
Affirmant proper: as,
Socrates is a Philoſopher:
But Soceates is a man:
Therfore ſome man is a Philoſopher.
Negant proper, as.
Therſites is no Philoſopher:
But Therſites is a man,
Some man therfore is no Philoſopher.
But here, in comon ſpeakyng to the ende we maye iudge the more eaſly, we vſe to diſpone thus:
Some Confidence is a vertue, as Conſtancie:
Some is not, as, folyſhehardines.
CAP. X. Of the ſecond forme.
THe ſecond forme is, when the argument being conſequent affirmatiuely in the propoſition or aſſumption, in the propoſition definitelie: the concluſion is brought in lyke to the antecedent: as,
Generall. 1.
The troubled man reaſonethe not well
The wyſeman reaſonethe well:
The wyſeman therfore is not troubled.
And Cicero in 3. Tuſcul. As the eye (ſayethe he) being troubled, is not able to ſatisfie his office verie well: and the reſt of the partes, yea the whole bodie being moued out of his good ſtate, is not able to performe his office: euē ſo the ſpirite being troubled is not well diſpoſed to execute his dewtie well and wyſelie, and the dewtie of the ſpirite is, to vſe reaſon: but the wyſe man his ſpirite is alwayes ſo diſpoſed that it maye moſt perfectlie vſe reaſon, and therfore he is neuer troubled.
Generall 2. as.
Mortall thinges are compounde,
The ſpirite or ſoule is not compounde:
The ſoule therfore is not mortall.
As Cicero Tuſcul. 1. prouethe the immortalitie of the ſoule by this ſillogiſme.
In the knowledge (ſayeth he) of mans ſoule we maye not doubt (without we be moſt dull and ignorant in naturall thinges) But there is nothing admixt with the ſoule, nothing compacte or made of elementes, nothing compounde or dowble: Which, if it be ſo, ſuerly it maye neither be put a ſunder nor deuided, nor torne, nor pluckte in peces. For deathe is nothing els but the departing, ſeparating and deuiſion of thoſe partes, which before deathe were coupled togeather by ſome copulation.
Speciall 1. as.
The enuyous is not valyante,
Maximius is valyante:
Maximius therfore is not enuyous.
As Ouide in Elegia 3. dothe conclude,
Ill wyll and ſpyte full ſlouthfull vices be,
And neuer dothe to gentle manners tende,
And as the lurkyng vyperfull lowly,
Dothe alwaye crepe out throughe the loweſt ground
But (maxime) thy ſpirite is valyant
And dothe aboue thy lynage reche I winne,
But yet althoughe thy name be greate I grant
It dothe no waye excell thy ſwyfte engeynne
Therfore let others ouerthrowe the innocent,
And let them wyſhe that all men ſhould them feare,
Eke let them beare their dartes aboute the poynte,
Wel dyed with bytyng venym ſhyning cleare:
But (MAXIME) thy howſe and familie,
Is well accuſtomed all proſtrate for to mende,
Amonge the which I praye the haretefully,
To nomber me, and ſo I make an ende.
Speciall. 2. as,
A daunſer is Ryotous:
Murena is not Ryotous:
Murena therfore is no daunſer.
Which Cicero for Murena, hathe vnderunder this forme. Almoſt no ſober man without he be madde dothe leape eyther when he is alone, or yet amonge a moderate and honeſt companie: for immoderate daunſing is the companion and follower of inordinate bāketting, pleaſante & delectable places, and ſhortly of all delytes, and pleaſant phātaſies. But thou captiouſly takeſt that which moſt neadethe be the extreme of all vyce: and yet vnawares leaueſt thoſe thinges, without the which that vyce is not to be fownde, for thou ſheweſt no filthy bankettyng, no inopportunate louelove, no feaſting: no louelove of bodye: neyther any extraordinarie expences. And ſeyng thoſe thinges be not to be fownde, what maye theſe wordes, voluptuouſnes or ſenſualitie ſignyfie and thoſe thinges which be vyces? Beleueſt thou to fynde the vmber and ſhade of ryotouſnes in that in the which thou caeſt not fynde ryotouſnes it ſelf.
Proper. 1. as,
Ageſilaus is not paynted of Apelles:
Alexander is paynted of Apelles:
Alexander therfore is not Ageſilaus.
Proper. 2. as,
Caeſar oppreſſethe his natyue countreye:
Tullius oppreſſethe not his natyue countreye:
Tullius therfore is not Caeſat.
CAP, XI. Of the ſeconde kynde of Sillogiſme.
WE hauehave hitherto expounded the two ſortes of the firſt kynde of the ſymple Sillogiſme: Now folowethe the ſeconde. The ſymple ſillogiſme of the ſecond kynde is, when the argument definitely goyng before in the propoſition, and followyng affirmatiuely in the aſſumption, the concluſion is brought in lyke to the antecedent.
Affirmant generall.
That which is iuſt, is profitable,
But that which is honeſt, is iuſt,
Therfore that which is honeſt is profitable:
Which Cicero 2. Offic. concludethe thus. The Philoſophers of greateſt aucthoritie, yea very ſharply & honeſtly hauehave by cogitation diſtingued theſe thre, which be confuſed. For whatſoeuer is iuſt, that alſo they eſteme to be profitable: and that which is honeſt, the ſame to be iuſt: Of the which it is concluded, that whatſoeuer thing is honeſt, the ſame to be profitable.
Negant generall.
That thing which is voyde of all Counſell, can not be gouerned by Counſell:
But louelove is voyde of all Counſell:
LoueLove therfore cannot be gouerned by any Counſell.
As Terēce ſayethe in his Eunuche almoſt vnderunder the ſame forme.
Affirmant ſpeciall.
Theſe Cōſulls which for their vertue are choſen, ought diligētly to defēde the cōmō wealthe: Cicero is choſen Conſull for his vertue: Cicero therfore ought diligently to defende the Common wealthe. So the Orator 2. Agrar. concludethe his owne diligence and care: For ſeyng all Conſulls ought to hauehave a greate care and diligence in kepyng of the common wealthe: Thoſe ought moſt chieffly ſo to do, who not from their youthe, but in open place are choſen conſulls. My predeceſſors made no ſuertie to the people Romaine for me: They beleued my ſelf: It is your dutye to aſke of me that thing which myne office requyrethe, and to call myne owne ſelf into iudgement. For as when I ſued for this office, none of my predeceſſors cōmended me vntounto yow: Euen ſo yf I offende in any thing, there is no ſhyfte that maye deliuer me frō yow: wherfore, if God prolōge my dayes (althoughe I am the man who is able to defende the ſame from their miſcheuous & ſubtille conſpiraties) this I promiſe vntounto yow Quirites, that ye hauehave geuen the charge of your cōmon wealthe vntounto a vigilant man, & no fearefull fellowe: To a diligent man, and no Coward or feyntharted.
Negant ſpeciall.
He that deceyueth a louyng mayde is not to be prayſed:
Demophon is a deceauer of a louing mayde, as Phillidis:
Demophon therfore is not to be prayſed.
Phillis thus inferethe in Ouide.
For to deceaue a mayde of tender age,
Which truſtethe in thee, it is no vaſſalage,
Nor craftie gloire: For her ſymplicitie,
Had rather hauehave the conſtant louelove of thee.
I Phillis bothe a louer and a mayde,
Am by thy wordes (falſe Demophon) deceaued:
God graunte therfore which dwells in heuēs hye,
For thy deceipte, that thou rewarded be.
Affirmant proper.
Octauius was Caeſars heire:
I am Octauius:
I am therfore Caeſars heire.
Negant proper.
Anthonius is not Caeſars ſonne:
Thou art Anthonius:
Thou art not therfore Caeſars ſonne.
CAP. XII. Of the compounde Sillogiſme.
AS yet we hauehave intreated of the ſimple Sillogiſme: Now followethe the compounde: The compounde Sillogiſme is, when the whole queſtion is the one parte of the propoſition affirmant and compounde, and the argument the other parte. But the argument is ſomtyme conſequent to the antecedent of the queſtion, and ſomtyme it is the other whole parte of the propoſition: and than it is only aſſumed in the aſſumption. The compounde ſillogiſme is eyther ioyned or diſioyned. The ſillogiſme ioyned is a cumpounde ſillogiſme, whoſe propoſition is ioyned with this coniunctiō, if, and ſuche others, and is of two ſortes: The firſt affirmethe the antecedent, & concludethe the conſequent, as Cicero concludethe. 2. Diuinat.
If there be Godds, there is a diuination:
But there are Godds:
Ergo there is a deuination.
Cicer. 3. offic. Suerlye yf nature preſcribe that man ſhoulde wyſhe the commoditie & furtherance of man, whatſoeuer he be for that he is man, of neceſſitie it is required according to the ſelf ſame nature, that the vtilitie and profitt of all be comon: Which yf it be ſo, we are contayned all vnderunder one lawe of nature: And yf this be alſo, truly we are forbydden by the lawe of nature, that one ſhoulde miſuſe another. But the firſt is true, therfore the laſt is true. Here often tymes the ſame is not aſſumed, but ſome thing greater. 1. Catal. Yf thy parētes ſhoulde feare thee & hate thee, ſo that thou couldeſt by no meanes appeaſe thē, I beleue that thou wouldeſt get thee ſome waye out of their ſight. Now thy natyue countrey, which is the mother of vsus all, bothe hatethe & fearethe thee, & knowethe that thou thynkeſt nothing but her deſtruction and ruyne: Shalt thou neither feare her auctoritie, neither ſhalt thou followe her Iudgement, neither ſhalt thou be afrayed of her mightie power? The ſame ſorte of concluding is, when the propoſition contaynethe a relation of tyme, as Oenone concludethe her error of folyſhenes.
When Paris maye withowt Oenone be,
Then Xanthus ſhall run backward vp the vale:
Turne Xanthus, turne, run fluddes backwardly,
For Paris dothe withowt Oenone dwell.
The ſecōde ſorte of ioyned Sillogiſme pullethe awaye the conſequent, that it may pull awaye the antecedent alſo.
Yf a man were immortall, he woulde be a ſimple ſubſtance, without compoſition of elementes:
But he is neuer without the mixture of elementes.
He is neuer therfore immortall.
Alexāder the greate aſking one of his wyſe men by what meanes a man might be God: Yf (ſaid the wyſeman) he ſhall do thoſe thinges which a man is not able to do. Of the which anſwere I make this ſillogiſ.
Yf a man would be God, he muſt do that which is impoſſible for man to do:
But the conſequent can not be:
Nor yet the antecedent therfore.
CAP. XIII. Of the diſioined ſillogiſme.
THe diſioined ſillogiſme is a compounde ſillogiſme, whoſe propoſition is diſioined: And is of two ſortes: The firſt takethe awaye the one, & concludethe the other: as,
It is eyther night or daye:
But it is not daye:
It is night therfore.
Cicero for Cluentio. But when this choyſe was offered to hym that eyther he ſhoulde iustly and godly accuſe, or dye cruelly and vnworthely: he choſethe rather to accuſe how ſoeuer he might, then to hauehave dyed after that ſorte: as he woulde ſaye.
Eather he muſt accuſe or dye:
He wyll not dye:
He wyll accuſe therfore.
The ſecond ſorte of diſioined ſillogiſme takethe one in the propoſition for the moſt part affirmant, and pullethe awaye the reſt: as,
It is eyther night or daye:
It is daye:
It is not night therfore.
And ſometyme the propoſition negant, after this forme,
It is not bothe night and daye:
But it is daye:
It is not night therfore.
CAP. XIIII. Of the methode.
THe methode is a diſpoſitiō by the which amonge many propoſitions of one ſorte, and by their diſpoſition knowen, that thing which is abſolutely moſt cleare is firſt placed, and ſecondly that which is next: and therfore it contynually procedethe from the moſt generall to the ſpeciall and ſinguler. By this methode we proceade from the antecedent more abſolutely knowen to proue the conſequent, which is not ſo manifeſtly knowen: & this is the only methode which Ariſtotle did obſerue.
CAP. XƲ. Of the illuſtration of the methode by examples of artes.
THe chiefe examples of the methode are found in artes and ſciences: in the which although the rules be all generall, yet they are diſtinct by there degres: for eueryevery thing as it is more generall is firſt placed. The moſt generall therefore ſhalbe firſt placed: thē next ſhall followe theſe which be immediatly cōtained vnderunder the general, eueryevery one orderly vntounto the moſt ſpeciall which ſhalbe laſt diſponed. The definition therefore as moſt generall, ſhalbe firſt placed: next followeth the diſtribution, which yf it be manifold, and of diuers ſortes ſhalbe firſt diuided into his integrall partes, next into his formes and kindes. And eueryevery part and forme ſhalbe placed and deſcribed in the ſame order & place which he had in his diuiſion. It ſhalbe expedient alſo if the prolixt declaration part them far a ſonder, to gather them by a ſhort tranſition, for that doth recreate and refreſh the auditor. But that the matter may be the more eaſily vnderſtanded we muſt vſe ſome familiar example. If thou wilt aſke (hauing all the definitiones, diuiſiones, and rules of Grammer writtē in diuers tables, & mixt out of all order) what part of dialectick teachethe thee to diſpone orderly theſe rules ſo confunded: firſt thou haſt no neede of the places of inuē tion, ſeeing they be all ready found out: neither haſt thou neede of the firſt diſpoſition of propoſitions, ſeeing they are diſponed already: neither of the ſecōd diſpoſition, which is the iudgemēt of the ſillogiſme, ſeeing all thinges which might fall into controuerſie is proued and concluded: only the methode doth remaine. The Logitian therefore by the lyght of this artificiall methode, ſhall take a part out of this confuſed maſſe the definition (for it is moſt generall) and place it firſt of all: As, Grammer is an art which teathech to ſpeake well and cōgruſly. Then ſhall he ſeeke out of the ſayd maſſe the diuiſion of grammer, & ſhall diſpone the ſame in the ſecond place: Grammer is parted into two partes, Etymologie, and ſyntax. And thereafter he ſhall find out the definition of Etymologie, to the which he ſhall giuegive the thirde place. Then he ſhall ſeeke out the partes of the Etymologie, & firſt the moſt generall as letters: next ſyllabs & wordes. Hauing the partes, he muſt ſeeke the formes: as wordes hauing number, & without number. And laſt he ſhall knyt and ioyoe togeather with ſhort & apt tranſitiones the end of eueryevery declaratiō with the beginning of the next. And ſo hauing defined, deuided & knyt to geather the partes of the Etymologie, he ſhall make eueryevery thing more manifeſt and playne with moſt fitt and ſpeciall examples. And after the ſame order he ſhall intreate the ſyntax. This is a generall methode obſerued in all artes.
CAP. XƲI. Of the illustration of the methode by examples, of Poetes, Orators, and Historiographers.
WE doo not only vſe this methode in the declaration of artes and ſciences, but in the expounding of all thinges which we woulde plainely ſett forth. And therefore the poetes, orators & all ſort of writers how oft ſoeuer they purpoſe to teach there auditor, doo alwayes follow this order of methode, althoughe they do not eueryevery where inſiſt therein. Virg. in his Georgicks parted his matter as we hauehave ſayd into fower partes: & in the firſt booke he intreateth of common & generall thinges, as of Aſtrologie, and thinges engendred in the ayer, & of cornes and there manuring, which is the firſt part of his worke: then he vſeth a litle tranſition in the beginning of the ſecond booke:
This much is ſpoke of ſterres and huſbanding:
Now will I thee Bacche begin to ſing.
Next he writeth generally of trees, then ſpecially of vines: the ſecond tranſlation is put in the thirde part, but more imperfect and without the concluſion of the thirde booke, of oxen, hors, ſheepe and dogges:
Eke thee great Pales the goddeſ of paſture:
And thee Apollo of ſheepe the gouernour,
At Amphyſus with praiſes I will ſing.
And laſt the third trāſitiō of the fowrth part is put in the begnining of the fowrth booke:
Now by and by with ſonge I will you ſhewe
Thuplandiſh giftes of hony made of dewe.
Here therefore we may ſee that the poet hath ſtudied to place the moſt generall in the firſt place, and the next generall in the mideſt, and the moſt ſpeciall laſt of all. So doth Ouide in his faſtes firſt propone the ſomme of his worke, and ſhortly after parte the ſame: and laſt hauing declared the partes, knytteth them togither with ſhort trā ſitions: the Orators alſo in there proemes, narrationes, confirmationes, and perorationes labour to obſerue this order which they call the methode artificiall & naturall. Here Cicero firſt proponeth the matter and next parteth it. Thou haſt bene this fowerten yeares queſtor (ſayeth he) Cn. Papyrius being cōſul: & I accuſe thee of all thinges which thou haſt done frō that daye to this daye: there ſhall not be one hower found voyde of thy theft, malitious doyng, crueltie, and miſchief. Here is the ſomme: now follweth the generall partition. All the yeares (ſayeth he) are ſpent eyther in the office of the queſture: in the ambaſſade made in Aſia: in the office of the preture pertaining to the towne: or in the office of the preture, amonge the Siciliens. And therefore into theſe fower partes my whole accuſation ſhalbe parted. Of the which fower partes, and the leaſt member of eueryevery part he intreateth afterwarde, eueryevery on in his owne order and place. And in the thirde oration knytteth togeather the firſt three partes with tranſitiones. Now (ſayeth he) ſeeyng I hauehave ſhewne his office of queſture & firſt dignitie to be full of theft & miſhieuous doing, I pray you geue eare to the reſt. Then after he had ſhewne the faultes of the Ambaſſade, followeth the tranſitiō to the office of the preture. But now let vsus come (ſayeth he) to that worthie preturie and to thoſe faultes, which be more manifeſt to thoſe that be here preſent, thē to me although I hauehave ſtudied & prepared my ſelfe to declare the ſame. This tranſition is more imperfect lacking an epiloge. And laſt in the begīning of the fowerth oratiō he maketh ſuch a trāſition to the fowerth, part which is of the preturie amōg the Siciliēs. There is many thinges (honorable Iudges) which of neceſſitie I moſt pretermit, to thēde I maye ſpeake a litle of theſe thinges committed to my charge. For I hauehave taken vppon me the cauſe of Sicilia, that charge hath pulled me to this buſines. So Liuius in the beginning comprehendeth the ſome of ſeuentie yeares, and therafter deuideth the ſame by decades.
CAP. XƲII. Of the craftie and ſecrete methode.
THis methode then in dyuers enuntiatiōs of one kynde, being knowen eather by there owne diſpoſition, or the diſpoſition of the ſillogiſme ſhalbe obſerued how often ſoeuer the matter is clearly to be vnderſtanded: But when with delectation or ſome other motion thy chief purpoſe is to deceaue the auditor, then thou ſhall put ſome thing away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, diuiſions and tranſitions: & ſet in there places thinges appartaining nothing to the matter: as digreſſiones from the purpoſe, & long tarying vponupon the matter: but moſt chiefly ſee that in the begīning thou inuerte thy order, and place ſome antecedentes after there conſequentes. And ſurely this more imperfect forme of methode in reſpect of the exact rule obſerued in the other, is not only mutilate by reaſon of the taking away of ſome of the matter: and redoundeth by the eking to of thinges extraordinarie: but hauing ſome degrees of the order inuerted, is prepoſterous and out of all good faſhion and order.
FINIS.
FAVLTES ESCAPED.
Page 8 line 2 Reade argument or.
pag. 17 lin. 21 declareth.
pag. 24 lin. 11 agayne vvithout interrogation.
pag. 30 lin. 21 ignoranter.
pag. 45 lin. 26 Seing the, &c. his example ought to be put to the next Chap. 19.
pag. 49 lin. 20 Marcus Varro vvoulde thei.
pag. 72 lin. 1 of
End of the text · Petrus Ramus, The Logic Newly Translated (1574)