An Answer to Blasphemous Cavillations by an Anabaptist, Section 1
The first error of the careles by necessitie.The first section.
ANSWER.
WE are not ignorant, nether yet do ye dissemble, whom ye accuse, but how iustly you term our doctrine error, and vsus careles, at this tyme I omit to speak becaus that after we shal, hauehave occasion more largely to comō with you in that mater. OnelyOnly at this present I demand of you with what conscience can you burden vsus with the odious name of stoicall necessitie, which so often most impudently ye laye to our charge in this your moste vngodlie and confused worke: seing that no men do more abhorre that deuelishe opinion and prophane name then we do? It is easie to persuade you as I suppose that we dissent not from the iudgement of the reuerend seruant of Christ Iesus Iohn Caluin (whome ye in skoffing and dispite vse to terme and call our God.) And therefore from hencefurth to put silence to your venemous tongues and to cause your impudencie more appere to such whose eyes sathan hath not blinded with like pryde and malice as in you are more then euident: I will faithfully recyte his wordes and sentences in this behalf written thus in his Christian institutions.Cap. 14. Sectiō 40
Those (saieth he, that studie to make this doctryn meaning of Gods eternall prouidēce and praedestination odious falsly do calumniate, that it is the Paradox, that is doubtfull and hard opinion, of the Stoiks who did affirm that all things chanced and come to passe by fatall or mere necessitie.Libr. ad bonifa. 2. The which also was ob…ected to saint Augustine. As touching vsus, we do not willingly debate nor striue for wordes,Cap. 6. & 40. neuertheles in no case admit we nor receaue the terme which the Stoikes vsed in latyn called Fatum. Aswel becaus it is of the nombre of those wordes, the prophane and vnprofitable nouities whereof Paul willeth vsus to auoyd, as also because that by hatred of it, our ennemies go about to charge the veritie of God. As touching the opinion, we are falsly and maliciously burdened therewith: for we imagin not a necessitie which is conteined within nature by a perpetnal coniunction of natural causes, as did the Stoiks, but we affirme and menteine that God is Lord, moderator and Gouernor of all things, whom we affirm to hauehave determined from the beginning according to his wisdom what he wold do, and now we say, that he doth execute according to his power what so euer he hath determined. Whereof we cōclude, that not onelyonly the heauen and earth ād creatures insensible, but also the coūseles, and the willes of men are gouerned by his prouidence, so that they tēd and are led to the scope and end which he hath purposed. He procedeth further answering the obiectiō which may be made, saing: what then, is there nothing done by fortune and chance? I answer. That wel and godly it is written by Basilius called the great: That fortune and aduenture are the wordes of paynims, the signification whereof oght in no wise to enter in to the heart of the faithfull. For is all prosperitie be the benedictiō of God, and aduersitie, his malediction, there remaineth no place the fortune in such things as come to mē.Retract. lib. 1. cap. 2. And further to the end of that section he bringeth furth the mynde of Augustine concerning fortune, whereof parchance we may after somwhat speake. This one sentence is sufficient to cōuict bothe your master and you of malicious enuie and most vniust accusation: for herein doeth not onelyonly Iohn Caluin, and we all with him abhorre from the terme of Fatum called destinie, but also from that diabolicall opinion which the Stoikes mainteined. When I consider what should be the caus that thus maliciously ye should burdē vsus with that which so planely by word and writing we oppugne, I am compelled to suspect, that either ye vnderstād not the nature of the terme which ye lay to our charge, orels that ye hauehave a further fetch, then at the first sight doth appere.
We planely do affirme, that the opinion of the Stoikes is damnable and fals:Stoi… necessitie for they did place such power in the sterres and in their oppositious, that impossible (they affirmed) it was to change or auoyd that which by their constellation and influence was appointed to come. In so much that they helde, that Iupiter him self (whom they called the great, and supreme God) could neither alter nor stop the operation of the sterres and the effectes that should folow therevpō: and so they affirmed, that the mutatiōs of kīgdomes the honors of some men, the deiectiō of others, and finally that bothe vice and vertue were all togither in the power of the sterres. Against this pestilent opinion strongly and learnedly disputeth Augustin in diuerse places,Cap. 1. 2▪ 3. 4. & 5. but chefely in his fift booke of that worke intituled of the citie of God: affirming, that onelyonly by the prouidence of God are kingdoms erected, mainteined ād changed: that sterres hauehave no power, neither to incline man to vertue nor to vice: that such blasphemies oght to be repelled from the eares of all men. Which sentences, becaus they do most perfectly aggre with gods infallible worde, we reuerentlye embrace, and constantly do beleue: And so, why that ye shuld thus impudently accuse vsus of that which we neuer thoght, wise men may wonder.… O say, you, ye take away the worde of Stoicall necessitie, but yet ye affirme the selfe same thing which they affirmed. I answer: if ye can make no difference betwext the omnipotent, moste perfect, most iust, and immutable will of God, and the opposition of sterres, called constellation, you hauehave euill profited, not onelyonly in Gods scoole, but also in those artes, in which … of you wold seme to be subtill. Do we affirme, that of necessitie it was, that Pharao after many plagues susteined, should with his greate hoste be drowned? that Nabuchadnezer should be trāsformed in to a brute beast? that Cyrus should first distroy Babilon, and after proclame libertie to the people of God (after their long and dolorous captiuitie) because the influence of the sterres did lead them to that end? or do we not rather most constantly affirm, that the aeternall counsel of God, his immutable decre, and most holie wil (which onelyonly is the most perfect rule of all iustice and equitie) did bring all these thinges to passe by such meanes as he had appointed, and by his Prophetes fore spoken? But here you storme, crying in your accustomed furie: What is this els but stoicall necessitie, to make Gods wil the only cause of all thyngs, be they good or bad? How dull and ignorant you are, if ye can not make differēce betwext Gods will and that necessitie which the Stoikes mainteaned, I hauehave before touched, and how maliciously ye impute vntounto vsus, wordes and sentences, whereof ye be neuer able to conuict vsus, shall shortly God willing) be declared. But by this I perceaue where the shoe doeth wring you. If Gods wil, his counsel, his prouidence and decre beare rule in the actions of mānes lief,Why the Anabap. mystlyketh the doctryn of predestination. then foresee you and feare, that your free will shall be broght into bondage: and so can ye not com first to the perfection of Angels, and in processe of tyme to the iustice of Christe by the meanes of your free will. Whether I wrongously suspect you, and so hauehave erred in my iudgement, your own wordes shall after witnes. For seing that we hauehave planely proued, vt most vniustly and moste maliciously ye accuse and traduce vsus of the vane opinion of the Stoikes, I will procede to that which ye call our first error, after that I hauehave (for the better instructiō of the simple reader) declared, what we vnderstand by Prescience, Prouidence, and praedestination, which termes do so offend you, that ye can not heare them named.
When we attribute prescience to God,Presciē ce. we vnderstād, that all things hauehave euer bene and perpetually abyde present before his eyes, so that to his eternall knowledge nothing is bypast, nothing to com, but all thinges are present, and so are they present that they are not as conceaued imaginations or formes and figures, whereof other innumerable thinges procede (as Plato teacheth that of the form and exemple of one man, many thousandes of men are fashioned) But we say, that all things be so present before God, that he doeth contemplat and beholde them in their veritie and perfection. And therefor it is, that the Prophetes often tymes speak of things being yet after to com, with such certentie, as that they were alreadie done. And this praescience of God do we affirm to be extended to the vniuersall compasse and circuite of the world, yea and vntounto eueryevery particuler creature of the same.
Gods prouidence we call,Prouidence. that souerane empire and supreme dominiō, which God alwayes kepeth in the gouernement of all thinges in heauen and earth contei…ed. And these two (that is, Prescience and prouidence) we so attribute to God, that with the Apostle we fear not to affirme, that in him we hauehave our being, …uing, and lief: We feare not to affirme,Ioan. 10. that the way of man is not in his owne power, but that his foot steppes ar directed, by the eternall:Prouerb. 20. That the sortes and lottes (which appere most subiect to fortune) go so furth by his prouidence: That a Sparro falleth not vponupon the ground without our heauenlie father.Prou…r. 16. And this we giuegive not to God only praescience by an ydle sight, and a prouidence by a general mouing of his creatures (As not only som Philosophers,Matth. 10▪ 29. but also mo then is to be wished in our daies do) but we attribute vntounto him such a knowledge and prouidence, as is extended to eueryevery one of his creatures. In which he so worketh, that willingly they tend and incline to the end, to which they are appointed by his. What comforte do the sonnes of God receaue in earnest meditations hereof this tyme will not suffer to intreate. But at one word to finish, alas to what miserie were we exponed, if we should be persuaded, that sathan and the wicked might or could do any thing, otherwiese then God hath appointed: Let the godlye consider.Predestinatiō
Predestination (whereof now this question is, we call the eternall and immutable decre of God, by the which he hath once determined with him self, what he will hauehave to be done with euerie man. For he hath not created all (as after shalbe proued) to be of one condition. Or if we will hauehave the definition of Predestination more large: we say, that it is, the most wise and most iust purpose of God, by the which before all tyme he constantly hath decreed to cal those whom he hath loued in Christ, to the knowledge of him self and of his sonne Christ Iesus, that they may be assured of their adoption by the iustification of faith, which working in them by charitie, maketh their workes to shyne before men to the glorie of their father, so that they (made conforme to the image of the sonne of God) may finally receaue that glorie, which is prepared for the vessels of merciemercy. These latter partes (to wit of vocation, iustification of faith▪ and of the effect of the same) hauehave I added, for such as thīk that we imagin it sufficient, that we be predestinate, how wickedly so euer we liue. We constantly affirme the plane contrarie: To wit, that none liuing wickedly, can hauehave the assurance, that he is predestinate to lief euerlasting. Yea althogh man and Angell wolde beare record with him, yet will his own conscience condemne him, vntounto such tyme as vnfeanedly he turne from his wicked conuersation. These termes I thoght good in the beginning to explane, to the end that the reader may the better vnderstand our meaning in the same, and that we be not after often cōpelled to repete thē againe. Now to that Wc ye call the first error.