The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book 1 (1 of 2)
The first Booke: Concerning Lawes, and their seuerall kindes in generall.
The matter conteined in this first Booke.
1 THe cause of writing this generall discourse concerning lawes▪
2 Of that lawe which God from before the beginning hath set for himselfe to doe all the things by.
3 The law which natural agents obserue, & their necessary maner of keeping it▪
4 The lawe which the Angels of God obey.
5 The lawe whereby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God.
6 Mens first beginning to vnderstand that lawe.
7 Of mans will, which is the first thing that lawes of action are made to guide.
8 Of the naturall finding out of lawes by the light of reason to guide the will vntounto that which is good.
9 Of the benefit of keeping that lawe which reason teacheth.
10 How reason doth lead men vntounto the making of humane lawes whereby politique societies are gouerned, and to agreement about lawes whereby the fellowship or communion of independent societies standeth.
11 Wherefore God hath by scripture further made knowne such supernaturall lawes as do serue for mens direction.
12 The cause why so many naturall or rationall lawes are set downe in holy scripture.
13 The benefit of hauing diuine lawes written.
14 The sufficiencie of scripture vntounto the end for which it was instituted.
15 Of lawes positiue conteined in scripture, the mutabilitie of certaine of them, and the generall vse of scripture.
16 A conclusion, shewing how all this belongeth to the cause in question.
HE that goeth about to perswade a multitude,The cause of writing this generall discourse. that they are not so well gouerned as they ought to be, shal neuer wāt attentiue & fauourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto eueryevery kind of regiment is subiect, but the secret lets and difficulties▪ which in publike proceedings are innumerable & ineuitable, they hauehave not ordinarily the iudgement to consider. And bec…se such as openly reproue supposed disorders of state are taken for principall friendes to the common benefite of all, and for men that carry singular freedome of mind; vnderunder this faire and plausible colour whatsoeuer they vtter passeth for good and currant. That which wanteth in the waight of their speech, is supplyed by the aptnes of mens minds to accept and beleeue it. Whereas on the other side, if we maintaine thinges that are established, wee hauehave not onelyonly to striue with a number of heauie preiudices deepely rooted in the hearts of men, who thinke that herein we serue the time, and speake in fauour of the present state, because thereby we eyther hold or seeke preferment; but also to beare such exceptions as minds so auerted before hand vsually take against that which they are loath should be powred into them. Albeit therefore much of that we are to speake in this present cause, may seeme to a number perhaps tedious, perhaps obscure, darke, and intricate, (for many talke of the truth, which neuer sounded the depth from whence it springeth, and therfore when they are led thereunto they are soone weary, as men drawne from those beaten pathes wherewith they hauehave bene inured): yet this may not so farre preuaile, as to cut off that which the matter it selfe requireth, howsoeuer the nice humour of some be therewith pleased or no. They vntounto whom we shall seeme tedious, are in no wise iniuried by vsus, because it is in their owne hands to spare that labour which they are not willing to endure. And if any complaine of obscuritie, they must consider, that in these matters it commeth no otherwise to passe, then in sundry the workes both of art and also of nature, where that which hath greatest force in the very things we see, is notwithstanding it selfe oftentimes not seene. The statelinesse of houses, the goodlines of trees, when we behold them delighteth the eye; but that foundation which beareth vp the one, that roote which ministreth vntounto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosome of the earth concealed; & if there be at any time occasion to search into it, such labour is then more necessary then pleasant, both to them which vndertake it, and for the lookers on. In like manner the vse and benefite of good lawes, all that liue vnderunder them may enioy with delight and comfort, albeit the groundes and first originall causes from whence they hauehave sprung be vnknowne, as to the greatest part of men they are. But when they who withdraw their obedience, pretend that the lawes which they should obey are corrupt and vitious; for better examination of their qualitie, it behoueth the very foundation and roote, the highest welspring and fountaine of them to be discouered. Which because wee are not oftentimes accustomed to doe, when wee doe it, the paines wee take are more needefull a great deale then acceptable, and the matters which wee handle seeme by reason of newnesse, (till the minde grow better acquainted with them) darke, intricate and vnfamiliar. For as much helpe whereof as may be in this case, I hauehave endeuoured throughout the body of this whole discourse, that eueryevery former part might giuegive strength vntounto all that followe, and eueryevery later bring some light vntounto all before. So that if the iudgements of men doe but holde themselues in suspence as touching these first more generall meditations, till in order they hauehave perused the rest that ensue: what may seeme darke at the first will afterwardes be founde more plaine, euen as the later particular decisions will appeare I doubt not more strong, when the other hauehave beene read before. The lawes of the Church, whereby for so many ages together wee hauehave bene guided in the exercise of Christian religion and the seruice of the true God, our rites, customes, and orders of Ecclesiasticall gouernment, are called in question; wee are accused as men that will not hauehave Christ Iesus to rule ouer them, but hauehave wilfully cast his statutes behinde their backes, hating to bee reformed, and made subiect vntounto the scepter of his discipline. Behold therefore wee offer the lawes whereby wee liue vntounto the generall triall and iudgement of the whole world; hartily beseeching almightie God, whome wee desire to serue according to his owne will, that both wee and others (all kinde of partiall affection being cleane laide aside) may hauehave eyes to see, and hearts to embrace, the things that in his sight are most acceptable. And because the point about which wee striue is the qualitie of our lawes, our first entrance hereinto cannot better be made, then with consideration of the nature of lawe in generall, and of that lawe which giueth life vntounto all the rest which are commendable iust and good, n…mely the lawe whereby the Eternall himselfe doth worke. Proceeding from hence to the lawe, first of nature, then of scripture, we shall hauehave the easier accesse vntounto those things which come after to be debated, concerning the particular cause and question which wee hauehave in hand.
2 All thinges that are, hauehave some operation not violent or casuall.Of that lawe which God from before the beginning hath set for himselfe to do all things by. Neither doth any thing euer begin to exercise the same, without some foreconceiued ende for which it worketh. And the ende which it worketh for is not obteined, vnlesse the worke bee also fit to obteine it by. For vntounto eueryevery ende eueryevery operation will not serue. That which doth assigne vntounto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the forme and measure of working, the same we tearme a Lawe. So that no certaine ende could euer bee attained, vnlesse the actions whereby it is attained were regular, that is to say, made suteable, fit and correspondent vntounto their ende, by some Canon rule or lawe. Which thing doth first take plac… in the workes euen of God himselfe. All thinges therefore doe worke after a sort according to lawe: all other thinges according to a lawe, whereof some superiours vntounto whome they are subiect is author; onelyonly the workes and operations of God, hauehave him both for their worker, and for the lawe whereby they are wrought. The being of God, is a kinde of lawe to his working: for that perfection which God is, giueth perfection to that hee doth. Those naturall, necessary, and internall operations of God, the generation of the Sonne, the proceeding of the Spirit, are without the compasse of my present intent: which is to touch onelyonly such operations as hauehave their beginning and being by a voluntary purpose, wherewith God hath eternally decreed when and how they should bee. Which eternall decree is that wee tearme an eternall lawe. Dangerous it were for the feeble braine of man to wade farre into the doings of the most High; whome although to knowe bee life, and ioy to make mention of his name; yet our soundest knowledge is, to know that wee know him not as indeede hee is, neither can know him; and our safest eloquence concerning him is our silence when we confesse without confession, that his glory is inexplicable, his greatnesse aboue our capacitie and reach. Hee is aboue, and wee vponupon earth; therefore it behoueth our wordes to bee warie and fewe, Our God is one, or rather very onenesse, and meere vnitie, hauing nothing but it selfe in it selfe, and not consisting (as all things doe besides God) of many things. In which essentiall vnitie of God, a Trinitie personall neuerthelesse subsisteth, after a maner far exceeding the possibilitie of mans conceipt. The works which outwardly are of God, they are in such sort of him being one, that each person hath in them somewhat peculiar and proper. For being three, and they all subsisting in the essence of one deitie; from the Father, by the Sonne, through the Spirit,Ioh. 1….13.14.15. all things are. That which the Sonne doth heare of the Father, and which the Spirit doth receiue of the Father & the Sonne, the same we hauehave at the hāds of the Spirit, as being the last, and therfore the nearest vntounto vsus in order, although in power the same with the second and the first. The wise and learned among the very Heathens themselues, hauehave all acknowledged some first cause, whereupon originally the being of all things dependeth. Neither hauehave they otherwise spoken of that cause, then as an Agent, which knowing what and why it worketh, obserueth in working a most exact order or lawe. Thus much is signified by that which Homer mentioneth, aIupiter… Counsell was accomplished.foreign. Thus much acknowledged by Mercurius Trismegist. bThe creator made the whole world, not with hands, but by Reason. Stob in eclog. phys.foreign. Thus much cōfest by Anaxagoras & Plato terming the maker of the world an Intellectual worker. Finally the Stoikes, although imagining the first cause of all things to be fire, held neuerthelesse yt the same fire hauing arte, did cProceed by a certaine and a … Waie in the making of the world.foreign. They all confesse therfore in the working of that first cause, that counsell is vsed, reason followed, a way obserued, that is to say, constant order and law is kept, wherof it selfe must needs be author vntounto it selfe. Otherwise it should hauehave some worthier and higher to direct it, and so could not it selfe be the first. Being the first, it can hauehave no other then it selfe to be the author of that law which it willingly worketh by▪ God therefore is a law both to himselfe, and to all other things besides. To himselfe he is a law in all those things whereof our Sauiour speaketh, saying, My Father worketh as yet, Ioh. 5.17.so I. God worketh nothing without cause. All those things which are done by him, hauehave some ende for which they are done: and the ende for which they are done, is a reason of his will to do them. His will had not inclined to create woman, but that he saw it could not be wel if she were not created,Gen. 2.18. Non est bonum, It is not good man should be alone, Therfore let vsus make an helper for him. That and nothing else is done by God, which to leaue vndone were not so good. If therfore it bee demanded, why God hauing power & hability infinit, th'effects notwithstāding of that power are all so limited as wee see they are: the reason hereof is, the end which he hath proposed, and the lawe whereby his wisedome hath, stinted th'effects of his power in such sort, that it doth not worke infinitely, but correspōdently vntounto that end for which it worketh, euen al things foreign,Sap. 8.1. Sap. 11.17. in most decent and comely sort, all things in measure, number, & waight. The generall ende of Gods external working, is the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant vertue: Which abundance doth shew it selfe in varietie, and for that cause this varietie is oftentimes in scripture exprest by the name of riches. The Lord hath made all things for his owne sake. Eph. 1.7.Not that any thing is made to be beneficial vntounto him,Phil. 4.19. Col. ….3. but all things for him to shew beneficence and grace in them. The particular drift of eueryevery acte proceeding externally from God,prou. 16.6. we are not able to discerne, and therefore cannot alwaies giuegive the proper and certaine reason of his works. Howbeit vndoubtedly a proper and certaine reason there is of eueryevery finite worke of God, in as much as there is a law imposed vponupon it; which if there were not, it should be infinite euen as the worker himselfe is. They erre therfore who think that of the will of God to doe this or that, there is no reason besides his will. Many times no reason knowne to vsus; but that there is no reason thereof, I iudge it most vnreasonable to imagine, in as much as hee worketh all things foreign, not onelyonly according to his owne will,Ephe. 1.13. but the counsell of his owne will. And whatsoeuer is done with counsell or wise resolution, hath of necessitie some reason why it should be done, albeit that reason bee to vsus in somethings so secret, that it forceth the wit of man to stand, as the blessed Apostle himself doth, amazed therat,Rom. 11.33. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdome and knowledge of God, How vnsearchable are his iudgements, &c! That law eternall which God himself hath made to himselfe, and therby worketh all things wherof he is the cause and author; that law in the admirable frame wherof shineth with most perfect beautie the countenance of that wisdome which hath testified concerning her self, The lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, prou. ….23.euē before his works of old I was set vp; that lawe which hath bene the patterne to make, and is the Carde to guide the world by; that law which hath bene of God, and with God euerlastingly; that law the author and obseruer whereof is one only God to be blessed for euer; how should either men or Angels be able perfectly to behold? The booke of this law we are neither able nor worthy to open and looke into. That little thereof which we darkly apprehend, we admire; the rest with religious ignorance we humbly & meekly adore. Seeing therfore that according to this law he worketh, of whom, through whom, & for whom are all things; althogh there seeme vntounto vsus cōfusion & disorder in th'affaires of this present world▪ Rom. 11.10. Bor…. lib. 4▪ desTamen quon! am bonus mund… rector temperat, rectè fieri cuncta ne dubites, Let no man doubt but that eueryevery thing is wel done, because the world is ruled by so good a guide,Consol. philo… as transgresseth not his owne law, then which nothing can be more absolute, perfect & iust. The law wherby he worketh, is eternall, and therfore can hauehave no shew or colour of mutability: for which cause a part of that law being opened in the promises which God hath made, (because his promises are nothing else but declarations what God will do for the good of men) touching those promises the Apostle hath witnessed, that God may as possibly denie himselfe and not be God;2. Tim. 2.13. as faile to performe them. And cōcerning the counsel of God, he termeth it likewise a thing vnchangeable; the counsel of God,Heb. 6.17. and that law of God wherof now we speake, being one. Nor is the freedome of the wil of God any whit abated, let or hindered by meanes of this; because the impositiō of this law vpō himselfe is his own free & volūtary act. This law therfore we may name eternal, being that order which God before al ages hath set down with himself, for himself to do all things by.
3 I am not ignorant that by law eternall the learned for the most part do vnderstand the order,The lawe which natural ag…nts hauehave giuen t…em to obserue, and their necessary maner of keeping it. not which God hath eternally purposed himselfe in all his workes to obserue, but rather that which with himselfe he hath set downe as expedient to be kept by all his creatures, according to the seuerall conditiō wherwith he hath indued them. They who thus are accustomed to speake, apply the name of Lawe vntounto that onelyonly rule of working which superiour authority in poseth; whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof, terme any kind of rule or Canon whereby actions are framed, a lawe. Now that lawe which as it is laid vp in the bosome of God, they call eternall, receiueth according vntounto the different kinds of things which are subiect vntounto it, different and sundry kinds of names. That part of it which ordereth naturall agēts, we call vsually natures law: that which Angels doe clearely behold, and without any swaruing obserue, is a law coelestiall and heauenly: the law of reason, that which bindeth creatures reasonable in this world, and with which by reason they may most plainely perceiue themselues bound; that which bindeth them, and is not knowne but by speciall reuelation from God, Diuine law; humane law, that which out of the law either of reason or of God, men probably gathering to be expedient, they make it a lawe. All things therfore, which are as they ought to be, are conformed vntounto this second law eternall, and euen those things which to this eternal law are not conformable, are notwithstanding in some sort ordered by the first eternall lawe. For what good or euill is there vnderunder the sunne, what action correspondent or repugnant vntounto the law which God hath imposed vpō his creatures, but in or vponupon it God doth worke according to the law which himselfe hath eternally purposed to keep, that is to say, the first law eternall? So that a twofold law eternall being thus made, it is not hard to conceiue how they both take place in aId omne quod in rebus creatis fit, est materia legis oeternae. Th 1.2. q 93. art 4 ….6. Nullo modo aliquid legibus summi creato ris ordinationi que subtrahitur, a quo pax vniuersitatis administratur. August. de ciu. de… lib. 19. c. 22. Immo & pece… tum, quatenus … Deo …ustè permittitu…, cadit …n legemaeter…am. E…a…leg…aetern… sub…icitur peccatum▪ quatenus Voluntaria legis transgressio poenale quodd… incommodum animae …ser…t, …uxta ill…d Augustini, Ius…isti D…mine & sic est, vt poe…ia su …sib… sit omnis animus inordin…tus. Co…fe…. lib 1. c. 1… Nec male sc…ola…t…ci. Quemadmodum inquiunt videmus res naturales contingentes, hoc ipso quod à fine particular… suo at que adeu à lege aeternâ exor…itant, in candem legem ae ernam incidere, qu…t…nucons…q iu…tur alium fine … à lege …riam aeternâ ipsis in casu particulari consti…utum: sic verisimile e…t homines etiam cù n peccant & desciscunt à lege aeternâ …praecipiente, re neidere in ordinē aeternae legisvt punientis.all things. Wherfore to come to the law of nature, albeit therby we sometimes meane that manner of working which God hath set for each created thing to keepe: yet for as much as those things are tearmed most properly naturall agents, which keepe the lawe of their kind vnwittingly, as the heauens and elements of the world, which can do no otherwise then they doe; and for as much as we giuegive vntounto intellectuall natures the name of voluntary agents, that so we may distinguish them from the other▪ expedient it will be, that we seuer the law of nature obserued by the one, from that which the other is tied vntounto. Touching the former, their strict keeping of one tenure statute and law is spoken of by all, but hath in it more then men hauehave as yet attained to know, or perhaps euer shall attaine, seeing the trauell of wading herein is giuen of God to the sonnes of men, that perceiuing how much the least thing in the world hath in it more then the wisest are able to reach vntounto, they may by this meanes learne humilitie. Moses in describing the worke of creation, attributeth speech vntounto God, God said, Let there be light: Let there bee afirmamēt: Let the waters vnderunder the heauē be gathered together into one place: Let the earth bring forth: Let there be lights in the firmament of heauen. Was this only the intent of Moses, to signifie the infinite greatnes of Gods power by the easines of his accomplishing such effects, without trauell, paine or labour? Surely it seemeth that Moses had herein besides this a further purpose, namely, first to teach that God did not worke as a necessary, but a voluntary agent, intending before hand and decreeing with himselfe that which did outwardly proceed from him: secondly to shew that God did then institute a law natural to be obserued by creatures, and therefore according to the manner of lawes, the institution thereof is described, as being established by solemne iniunction. His commaunding those things to be which are, and to be in such sort as they are, to keep that tenure and course which they do, importeth the establishment of natures law. This worlds first creation, & the preseruation since of things created, what is it but only so far forth a manifestation by execution, what the eternall lawe of God is concerning things natural? And as it cōmeth to passe in a kingdom rightly ordered, that after a law is once published, it presently takes effect far & wide, al states framing thē selues therunto; euen so let vsus thinke it fareth in the naturall course of the world: since the time that God did first proclaime the edicts of his lawe vponupon it, heauen & earth hauehave harkned vntounto his voice, and their labour hath bene to do his will: He made a law for the raine, He gaue his decree vntounto the sea, that the waters should not passe his commandement. Now if nature should intermit her course, and leaue altogether, though it were but for a while, the obseruation of her own lawes; if those principall & mother elemēts of the world, wherof all things in this lower world are made, should loose the qualities which now they hauehave; if the frame of that heauenly arch erected ouer our heads should loosen & dissolue it selfe; if celestiall spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubilitie turne themselues any way as it might happen; if the prince of the lightes of heauen, which now as a Giant doth runne his vnwearied course, should as it were through a languishing faintnes begin to stand & to rest himselfe;psal. 19.5. if the Moone should wander from her beaten way▪ the times and seasons of the yeare blend themselues by disordered and confused mixture, the winds breath out their last gaspe, the cloudes yeeld no rayne, the earth be defeated of heauenly influence; the fruites of the earth pine away as children at the withered breastes of their mother no longer able to yeeld them reliefe; what would become of man himselfe, whom these things now do all serue? See we not plainly that obedience of creatures vntounto the lawe of nature is the stay of the whole world? Notwithstanding with nature it cōmeth somtimes to passe as with arte. Let Phidias hauehave rude & obstinate stuffe to carue, though his arte do that it should, his worke will lacke that beautie which otherwise in fitter matter it might hauehave had. He that striketh an instrument with skill, may cause notwithstanding a very vnpleasant sound, if the string whereon hee striketh chaunce to bee vncapable of harmonie. In the matter whereof things naturall consist, that of Theophrastus taketh place,Pheophr. in Metaph. foreign, much of it is oftentimes such as will by no meanes yeeld to receiue that impression which were best and most perfect. Which defect in the matter of thinges naturall, they who gaue themselues vntounto the contemplation of nature amongst the heathen obserued often: but the true originall cause therof, diuine malediction, laid for the sinne of man vponupon these creatures which God had made for the vse of niā; this being an article of that sauing truth which God hath reuealed vntounto his Church, was aboue the reach of their meerely naturall capacitie and vnderstanding. But howsoeuer these swaruings are now and then incident into the course of nature, neuerthelesse so constantly the lawes of nature are by naturall agents obserued,Arist. Rhet. 1. cap. 39. that no man denieth but those thinges which nature worketh, are wrought either alwaies or for the most part after one and the same manner. If here it be demaunded what that is which keepeth nature in obedience to her owne lawe, wee must hauehave recourse to that higher lawe wherof we hauehave already spoken, and because all other lawes do thereon depend,foreign from thence we must borrow so much as shall neede for briefe resolution in this point. Although we are not of opinion therfore, as some are, that nature in working hath before her certaine exemplary draughts or patternes, which subsisting in the bosome of the Highest, and being thence discouered, shee sixeth her eye vponupon them, as trauellers by sea vponupon the pole starre of the world, and that according there vntounto she guideth her hand to worke by imitation: although wee rather embrace the Oracle of Hippocrates, that Each thing both in small and in great fulfilleth the taske which destenie hath set downe: and concerning the manner of executing and fulfilling the same, What they doe they knowe not, yet is it in shewe and appearance, as though they did know what they doe, and the truth is they do not discerne the things which they looke on: neuerthelesse for as much as the works of nature are no lesse exact, then if she did both behold and studie how to expresse some absolute shape or mirror alwayes present before her; yea such her dexteritie and skill appeareth, that no intellectuall creature in the world were able by capacitie to do that which nature doth without capacitie and knowledge; it cannot bee, but nature hath some director of infinite knowledge to guide her in all her wayes.Act. 17.2…. Who the guide of nature, but onelyonly the God of nature? In him wee liue, moue, and are. Those thinges which nature is said to do, are by diuine art performed, vsing nature as an instrument: nor is there any such art or knowledge diuine in nature her selfe working, but in the guide of natures worke. Whereas therefore things naturall which are not in the number of voluntary agents (for of such onelyonly we now speake and of no other) do so necessarily obserue their certaine lawes, that as long as they keepe those aForme in other creatures, is a thing proportionable vntounto the soule in liuing creatures. Sensible it is not, nor otherwise discernable, then only by effects. According to the diuersitie of inward formes, things of the world are distinguished into their kindes.formes which giuegive them their being, they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise then they doe; seeing the kindes of their operations are both constantly and exactly framed according to the seuerall ends for which they serue, they themselues in the meane while though doing that which is fit, yet knowing neither what they doe, nor why: it followeth that all which they do in this sort, proceedeth originally from some such agent, as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth vp, and euen actually frameth the same. The manner of this diuine efficiencie being farre aboue vsus, we are no more able to conceiue by our reason, then creatures vnreasonable by their sense are able to apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affaires. Only thus much is discerned, that the naturall generation and processe of all thinges receiueth order of proceeding from the setled stabilitie of diuine vnderstanding. This appointeth vntounto them their kinds of working, the disposition whereof in the puritie of Gods owne knowledge and will is rightly tearmed by the name of Prouidence. The same being referred vntounto the things themselues here disposed by it, was woont by the auncient to bee called naturall destinie. That lawe the performance whereof we behold in things naturall, is as it were an authenticall, or an originall draught written in the bosome of God himselfe; whose spirite being to execute the same, vseth eueryevery particular nature, eueryevery meere naturall agent, onelyonly as an instrument created at the beginning, and euer since the beginning vsed to worke his owne will and pleasure withall.Vide Thom. in Compend. theol, cap. 3. Omne quod mouetur ab aliquo est quasi instrumentum quoddam primi mouentis. Ridiculum est autem e…am apud indoctos ponere instrumentum moueri non ab aliquo principale agente. Nature therefore is nothing else but Gods instrument: in the course whereof Dionysius perceiuing some suddaine disturbance, is said to hauehave cried out, Aut Deus naturae patitur, aut mundi machina dissolu…tur, Either God doth suffer impediment, and is by a greater then himselfe hindered; or if that be impossible, then hath he determined to make a present dissolution of the world, the execution of that law beginning now to stand stil, without which the world cannot stand. This workman, whose seruitor nature is, being in truth but onelyonly one, the Heathens imagining to be moe, gaue him in the skie the name of Iupiter, in the aire the name of Iuno, in the water the name of Neptune, in the earth the name of Vesta and sometimes of Ceres, the name of Apollo in the Sunne, in the Moone the name of Diana, the name of Aeolus and diuers other in the windes; and to conclude euen so many guides of nature they dreamed of, as they sawe there were kindes of thinges naturall in the world. These they honored, as hauing power to worke or cease accordingly as men deserued of them. But vntounto vsus there is one onelyonly guide of all agents naturall, and hee both the creator and the worker of all in all, alone to be blessed, adored and honoured by all for euer. That which hitherto hath beene spoken, concerneth naturall agents considered in themselues. But we must further remember also (which thing to touch in a word shall suffice) that as in this respect they hauehave their law, which lawe directeth them in the meanes whereby they tende to their owne perfection. So likewise an other lawe there is, which toucheth them as they are sociable partes vnited into one body; a lawe which bindeth them each to serue vntounto others good, and all to preferre the good of the whole before whatsoeuer their owne particular; as we plainely see they doe, when things naturall in that regard forget their ordinary naturall woont, that which is heauie mounting sometime vpwardes of it owne accord, and forsaking the center of the earth, which to it selfe is most naturall, euen as if it did heare it selfe commaunded to let goe the good it priuately wisheth, and to relieue the present distresse of nature in common.
* But now that wee may lift vp our eyes (as it were) from the footstoole to the throne of God, and leauing these naturall,The law which Angels doe worke by. Psal. 104.4. Heb. 1.7. Eph. 3.10. consider a little the state of heauenly and diuine creatures; touching Angels which are spirits immateriall and intellectuall, the glorious inhabitants of those sacred pallaces, where nothing but light and blessed immortalitie, no shadow of matter for teares, discontentments, griefes, and vncomfortable passions to worke vponupon, but all ioy▪ tranquilitie, and peace, euen for euer and euer doth dwell;Dan. 7.10. Matth. 26.53. as in number and order they are huge, mightie, and royall armies; so likewise in perfection of obedience vntounto that lawe, which the Highest, whom they adore, louelove, and imitate,Heb. 12.22. Luc. 2.13. hath imposed vponupon them, such obseruantes they are thereof, that our Sauiour himselfe being to set downe the perfect idea of that which wee are to pray and wish for on earth, did not teach to pray or wish for more, then onelyonly that heere it might be with vsus, as with them it is in heauen.Matth. 6.10. God which mooueth meere naturall agents as an efficient onelyonly, doth otherwise mooue intellectuall creatures, and especially his holy Angels. For beholding the face of God,Matth. 18.10. in admiration of so great excellencie they all adore him; and being rapt with the louelove of his beautie, they cleaue inseparably for euer vntounto him.Psal. 91.11.12. Luc. 15.7. Desire to resemble him in goodnesse, maketh them vnweariable,Heb. 1.14. and euen vnsatiable in their longing to doe by all meanes all maner good vntounto all the creatures of God,Act. 10.3. Dan. 9.23. but especially vntounto the children of men; in the countenance of whose nature looking downeward they behold themselues beneath themselues,Matth. 1….…0. Dan. 4.10. foreign euen as vpwarde in God, beneath whom themselues are, they see that character which is no where but in themselues and vsus resembled. Thus farre euen the Painims hauehave approched; thus farre they hauehave seene into the doings of the Angels of God; Orpheus confessing, that the fiery throne of God is attended on by those most industrious Angels, carefull how all things are performed amongst men; and the mirror of humaine wisedome plainely teaching, that God mooueth Angels, euen as that thing doth stirre mans heart, which is thereunto presented amiable.Arist. Metaph. 12. cap. 7. Angelicall actions may therefore be reduced vntounto these three generall kindes; first,Iob. 38.7. most delectable louelove, arising from the visible apprehension of the puritie, glory,Math. 18.10. and beautie of God, inuisible sauing onelyonly vntounto Spirites that are pure; secondly adoration,psal. 148.2. Heb. 1.6. Esa. 6.3. grounded vponupon the euidence of the greatnes of God, on whom they see how all things depende; thirdly imitation, bred by the presence of his exemplary goodnes,This is intimated wheresoeuer we finde them termed the sonnes of God: as Iob. 1.6. & 38.7. …. pet. 2.4. Ep. Iud. ver. 6. who ceaseth not before them daily to fill heauen and earth with the rich treasures of most free and vndeserued grace. Of Angels wee are not to consider onelyonly what they are, and doe, in regard of their owne being; but that also which concerneth them as they are lincked into a kinde of corporation amongst themselues, and of societie or fellowship with men. Consider Angels each of them seuerally in himself, and their law is that which the Prophet Dauid mentioneth, All ye his Angels praise him. Consider the Angels of God associated,psal. 148.2. Luk. 2.13. and their lawe is that which disposeth them as an Army, one in order and degree aboue an other.Matth▪ 26.53. psal. 148.2. Consider finally the Angels as hauing with vsus that communion which the Apostle to the Hebrewes noteth,Heb. 12.22. and in regard whereof Angels hauehave not disdained to professe themselues our fellowseruants; from hence there springeth vp a third law,Apoc, 22.9. which bindeth them to workes of ministeriall imployment. EueryEvery of which their seuerall functions are by them performed with ioy. A part of the Angels of God notwithstanding (we know) hauehave fallen, and that their fall hath beene through the voluntary breach of that lawe, which did require at their hands continuance in the exercise of their high and admirable vertue. Impossible it was that euer their will should chaunge or incline to remit any part of their dutie, without some obiect hauing force to auert their conceit from God, and to draw it an other way; and that before they attained that high perfection of blisse, wherein now the elect Angels are without possibilitie of falling. Of any thing more then of God they could not by any meanes like, as long as whatsoeuer they knew besides God, they apprehended it not in it selfe without dependencie vponupon God; because so long God must needes seeme infinitely better then any thing which they so could apprehend. Thinges beneath them could not in such sort be presented vntounto their eyes, but that therein they must needs see alwayes how those things did depend on God. It seemeth therefore that there was no other way for Angels to sinne, but by reflex of their vnderstanding vponupon themselues; when being held with admiration of their owne sublimitie and honor, the memorie of their subordination vntounto God and their dependencie on him was drowned in this conceipt; whereupon their adoration, louelove, and imitation of God, could not choose but be also interrupted. The fall of Angels therefore was pride. Since their fall, their practises hauehave beene the cleane contrary vntounto those before mentioned. For being dispersed some in the ayre,Ioh. 8.44▪ 1. pet. 5.8. some on the earth, some in the water, some amongest the minerals, dennes,Apoc. 9.11. Gen. 3.15. and caues, that are vnderunder the earth: they hauehave by all meanes laboured to effect an vniuersall rebellion against the lawes, and as farre as in them lyeth, vtter destruction of the workes of God.1. Chr. 21, 1, Iob. 1.7, & 2, 5 These wicked Spirites the Heathens honoured in stead of Gods,Ioh. 13, 27, both generally vnderunder the name of Dii inferi Gods infernall;Act. 5, 3, Apoc. …0, 8. and particularly, some in Oracles, some in Idoles, some as household Gods, some as Nymphes; in a word no foule and wicked spirite which was not one way or other honored of men as God, till such time as light appeared in the world, and dissolued the workes of the diuell. Thus much therefore may suffice for Angels, the next vntounto whom in degree are men.
5 God alone excepted, who actually and euerlastingly is whatsoeuer he may be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now he is not;The law wherby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God. all other things besides are somewhat in possibilitie, which as yet they are not in act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they incline to something which they may be: and when they are it, they shall be perfecte… then now they are. All which perfections are contained vnderunder the generall name of Goodnesse. And because there is not in the world any thing wherby another may not some way be made the perfecter, therefore all things that are, are good. Againe sith there can be no goodnesse desired which proceedeth not from God himselfe, as from the supreme cause of all things; and euerie effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise resemble the cause from which it proceedeth: all things in the world are sayd in some sort to seeke the highest,foreign. and to couet more or lesse the participation of God himselfe. Yet this doth no where so much appeare as it doth in man:Arist. de an. lib. 2. cap. 4. because there are so many kindes of perfections which man seeketh. The first degree of goodnesse is that generall perfection which all things do seeke▪ in desiring the continuance of their beeing. All thinges therefore coueting as much as may be to be like vntounto God in being euer, that which cannot hereunto attaine personally, doth seeke to continue it selfe another way, that is by ofspring and propagation. The next degree of goodnesse, is that which each thing coueteth by affecting resemblance with God, in the constancy and excellencie of those operations which belong vntounto their kind. The immutabilitie of God they striue vntounto, by working either alwayes or for the most part after one and the same manner; his absolute exactnes they imitate, by tending vntounto that which is most exquisite in eueryevery particular.foreign. Ari. 2. de cael. ca. 5. Hence hauehave risen a number of axiomes in Philosophie, shewing, how The workes of nature do alwayes ayme at that which cannot be bettered. These two kinds of goodnesse rehe…rsed are so neerely vnited to the things themselues which desi…e them, that we scarcely perceiue the appetite to stirre in reaching foorth her hand towards them. But the desire of those perfections which grow externally is more apparent; especially of such as are not expressely desired vnlesse they be first knowne, or such as are not for any other cause then for knowledge it selfe desired. Concerning perfections in this kind, that by proceeding in the knowledge of truth, and by growing in the exercise of vertue, man amongst the creatures of this inferiour world, aspireth to the greatest conformity with God;Matth. 5.48. Sap. 7.27. this is not only knowne vntounto vsus, whom he himselfe hath so instructed, but euen they do acknowledge, who amongst men are not iudged the neerest vntounto him.foreign. With Plato what one thing more vsuall, then to excite men vntounto the louelove of wisedome, by shewing how much▪ wise men are thereby exalted aboue men; how knowledge doth rayse them vp into heauen; how it maketh them, though not Gods, yet as Gods, high, admirable and diuine? And Mercurius Trismegisl…s speaking of the vertues of a righteous soule, Such spirits (sayth he) are neuer cl…yed with praising and speaking well of all men, with doing good vntounto eueryevery one by word and deed, because they studie to frame themselues according to THE PATERNE of the father of spirits.
6 In the matter of knowledge, there is betweene the Angels of God and the children of men this difference.Mens first beginning to grow to the knowledge of that law which the… are to obserue. vide Isa. 7.16. Angels alreadie hauehave full and complete knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted vntounto them: men if we view them in their spring, are at the first without vnderstanding or knowledge at all. Neuerthelesse from this vtter vacuitie they grow by degrees, till they come at length to be euen as the Angels themselues are. That which agreeth to the one now, the other shall attaine vntounto in the end; they are not so farre disioyned and seuered, but that they come at length to meete. The soule of man being therefore at the first as a booke, wherein nothing is, and yet all thinges may be imprinted; we are to search by what steppes and degrees it riseth vntounto perfection of knowledge. VntoUnto that which hath bene alreadie set downe concerning naturall agents this we must adde, that albeit therein we hauehave comprised as well creatures liuing, as void of life, if they be in degree of nature beneath men; neuerthelesse a difference we must obserue betweene those naturall agents that worke altogether vnwittingly, and those which hauehave though weake, yet some vnderstanding what they do, as fishes, foules, and beasts hauehave. Beasts are in sensible capacitie as ripe euen as men themselues, perhaps more ripe. For as stones, though in dignitie of nature inferior vntounto plants, yet exceed them in firmenesse of strength or durability of being; and plants though beneath the excellency of creatures indued with sense, yet exceed them in the faculty of vegetation and of fertility: so beasts though otherwise behind men, may notwithstanding in actions of sense and phancie go beyond them; because the endeuors of nature, when it hath an higher perfection to seeke, are in lower the more remisse, not esteeming thereof so much as those things do, which hauehave no better proposed vntounto them. The soule of man therefore being capable of a more diuine perfection, hath (besides the faculties of growing vntounto sensible knowledge which is common vntounto vsus with beasts) a further hability▪ whereof in thē there is no shew at all,foreign. Merc. Trism. Aristot…li…all demonstration the ability of reaching higher then vntounto sensible things. Till we grow to some ripenesse of yeares, the soule of man doth only store it selfe with conceipts of things of inferiour and more open qualitie, which afterwards do serue as instruments vntounto that which is greater: in the meane while aboue the reach of meaner creatures it ascendeth not. When once it comprehendeth any thing aboue this, as the differences of time, affirmations, negations▪ and contradictions in speech; we then count it to hauehave some vse of naturall reason. Whereunto if afterwards there might be added the right helpes of true art and learning, (which helpes I must plainely confesse this age of the world, carying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor greatly regard) there would vndoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturitie of iudgement betweene men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as betweene men that are now and innocents. Which speech if any condemne, as being ouer hyperbolicall, let them consider but this one thing. No art is at the first finding out so perfect as industrie may after make it. Yet the very first man that to any purpose knew the way we speake of and followed it, hath alone thereby performed more very neere in all parts of naturall knowledge, then sithence in any one part thereof, the whole world besides hath done. In the pouertie of that other new deuised aide, two things there are notwithstanding singular.A…misty. Of maruellous quicke dispatch it is, and doth shew them that hauehave it as much almost in three dayes, as if it dwell threescore yeares with them. Againe because the curiositie of mans wit, doth many times with perill wade farther in the search of things, then were conuenient: the same is thereby restrained vntounto such generalities▪ as eueryevery where offering themselues, are apparant vntounto men of the weakest conceipt that need be. So as following the rules & precepts thereof, we may find it to be, an Art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restraineth the minde of man that it may not waxe ouer wise. Education and instruction are the meanes, the one by vse, the other by precept, to make our naturall faculty of reason, both the better and the sooner able to iudge rightly betweene truth and error, good and euill. But at what time a man may be sayd to hauehave attained so farre foorth the vse of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those lawes, whereby he is thē bound to guide his actions; this is a great deale more easie for common sense to discerne, then for any man by skill and learning to determine: euen as it is not in Philosophers, who best know the nature both of fire and of gold, to teach what degree of the one will serue to purifie the other, so well as the artisan (who doth this by fire) discerneth by sense when the fire hath that degree of heate which sufficeth for his purpose.
7 By reason man attaineth vntounto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible:Of mans will which is the thing that lawes of action are made to guide. It resteth therfore that we search how mā attaineth vntounto the knowledge of such things vnsensible, as are to be knowne that they may be done. Seeing then that nothing can moue vnlesse there be some end, the desire whereof prouoketh vntounto motion; how should that diuine power of the soule, that Spirit of our mind as the Apostle termeth it, euer stir it selfe vntounto action,Eph. 4.23. vnlesse it hauehave also the like spurre? The end for which we are moued to worke, is somtimes the goodnes which we conceiue of the very working it selfe, without any further respect at all; and the cause that procureth action is the meere desire of action, no other good besides being thereby intended.Salust. Of certaine turbulent wits it is said, Illis quieta mouere magna merces videbatur, They thought the very disturbāce of things established an hyre sufficient to set them on worke. Sometimes that which we do is referred to a further end, without the desire whereof we would leaue the same vndone, as in their actions that gaue almes to purchase thereby the prayse of men.Matth. 6.2. Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likenes of his maker, resembleth him also in the maner of working; so that whatsoeuer we worke as men, the same we do wittingly worke and freely; neither are we according to the maner of naturall agents any way so tied, but that it is in our power to leaue the things we do vndone. The good which either is gotten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing it selfe, causeth not action, vnlesse apprehending it as good, we so like and desire it. That we do vntounto any such ende, the same we choose and preferre before the leauing of it vndone. Choice there is not, vnlesse the thing which we take, be so in our power that we might hauehave refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend our soules to the hauing or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodnesse is seene with the eye of the vnderstanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two principall fountaines there are of humaine action, Knowledge and Will; which will in things tending towards any end is termed Choice. Concerning knowledge, Behold sayth Moses, Deut. 30.19.I hauehave set before you this day good and euill, life and death. Concerning Will, he addeth immediatly, Choose life; that is to say, the things that tend vntounto life, them choose. But of one thing we must hauehave speciall care, as being a matter of no small moment, and that is, how the will properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred vntounto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferiour naturall desire which we call appetite. The obiect of appetite is whatsoeuer sensible good may be wished for; the obiect of wil is that good which reason doth leade vsus to seeke. Affections, as ioy, and griefe, and feare, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and formes of appetite, can neither rise at the conceipt of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no: whereas actions which issue from the dispositiō of the wil, are in the power therof to be performed or staied. Finally appetite is the wils sollicitor, and the will is appetites controller; what we couet according to the one, by the other we often reiect: neither is any other desire termed properly will, but that where reason and vnderstanding, or the shew of reason, prescribeth the thing desired. It may be therfore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible prouoketh appetite, and appetite causeth action, reason being neuer called to councell; as when we eate or drinke, or betake our selues vntounto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men hauing attained to the vse of reason are voluntary. For as the authoritie of higher powers hath force euen in those things which are done without their priuitie, and are of so meane reckening that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not: in like sort voluntarily we are said to do that also▪ which the will if it listed might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressely vse our reason or vnderstanding, and so immediatly apply our wils thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the will doth yeeld her assent, as it were with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparant, as in expresse mandates or prohibitions, especially vponupon aduice and consultation going before. Where vnderstanding therefore needeth, in those things reason is the director of mans will, by discouering in action what is good. For the lawes of well doing are the dictates of right reason. Children which are not as yet come vntounto those yeares whereat they may hauehave; againe innocentes which are excluded by naturall defect from euer hauing; thirdly mad men which for the present cannot possibly hauehave the vse of right reason to guide themselues, hauehave for their guide the reason that guideth other men, which are tutors ouer them to seeke and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of reason, whereby good may be knowne from euill, and which discouering the same rightly is termed right. The will notwithstanding doth not incline to hauehave or do that which reason teacheth to be good, vnlesse the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the appetite, being more generall, may wish any thing which seemeth good,O mihi praeter…tos referat si Iupiter annos. be it neuer so impossible: yet for such things the reasonable will of man doth neuer seeke. Let reason reach impossibilitie in any thing, and the will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest. There is in the will of man naturally that freedome, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular obiect whatsoeuer being presented vntounto it. Whereupon it followeth; th…t there is no particular obiect so good, but it may hauehave the shew of some dif…icultie or vnplesant qualitie annexed to it; in respect whereof the will may shrinke and decline it: contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular euill, which hath not some appearance of goodnes whereby to insinuate it selfe.foreign. Paulo post▪ foreign. A cin de doge ma…. Pla…. For euill as euill cannot be desired: if that be desired which is euill, the cause is the goodnes which is or seemeth to be ioyned with it. Goodnesse doth not moue by being, but by being apparant; and therefore many things are neglected which are most pretious, onelyonly because the value of them lyeth hid. Sensible goodnesse is most apparent, neere, and present; which causeth the appetite to be therewith strongly prouoked. Now pursuit & refusall in the will do follow, the one the affirmation, the other the negation of goodnes; which the vnderstanding apprehendeth▪ grounding it selfe vponupon sense, vnlesse some higher reason do chance to teach the cōtrary. And if reason hauehave taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiueth it with vtter im…ossibility of being ot…erwise; still there is place left for the will to take or leaue. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodnes wherof reasō in such sort doth or easily can discouer; we are not to m…ruaile at the choyce of euill, euē then when the cōtrary is probably knowne. Hereby it cometh to passe, that custome inuring the mind by lō … practise, & so leauing there a sensible impression, preuaileth more thē reasonable perswasiō wh…t way so euer. Reason therfore may rightly discerne the thing which is good, & yet the will of mā not incline it selfe theru…to, is oft as the preiudice of sensible experience doth ouersway. Nor let any man thinke that this doth make any thing for the iust excuse of iniquity. For there was neuer sin cōmitted, wherein a lesse good was not preferred before a greater, & that wilfully; which cānot be done without the singular disgrace of nature, & the vtter disturbance of that diuine order, wherby the preeminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily chalenged. There is not that good which cōcerneth vsus, but it hath euidence …nough for it selfe, if reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the shew of that which is not; somtimes the subtilty of Satan inueagling vsus, as it did a2. Cor. 11.3.Eue;co…ruptible body is heauy vntounto the soule and the earthly mansion keepeth down the min… that is ful of cares. And hardly can we discern the things that are vpō earth, & with great labor find we out the things which are before vsus. VVho can then seeke out the things that are in heauen? sometimes the hastinesse of our wils preuenting the more considerate aduice of foūd reasō, as in bLuc. 9.…4.the Apostles, whē they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fit frō heauen; sometimes the very custome of euil making the hart obdurate against whatsoeuer instructions to the cōtrary, as in thē ouer whō our Sauior spake weeping, cMath. 23.37O Ierusalē how often, & thou wouldst not? Still therfore that wherw…th we stand blameable, & can no way excuse it is, In doing euill, we prefer a lesse good before a greater the greatnes whereof is by reasō inuestigable & may be known. The search of knowledge is a thing painful; & the painfulnes of knowledge is that which maketh the will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, diuine maledictiō ▪ wherby the dSap 9.15.instrumēts being weakned wherwithall the soule (especially in reasoning) doth worke, it preferreth rest in ignorance, before wearisome labour to know. For a spurre of diligence therefore we hauehave a naturall thirst after knowledge ingrafted in vsus. But by reason of that originall weaknesse in the instruments, without which the vnderstanding part is not able in this world by discourse to worke, the very conceipt of painefulnesse is as a bridle to stay vsus.Eph. 5.14. Heb. 1….1.12 1. Cor. 16 13. Prou 2.4. Luc. 13.…4. For which cause the Apostle who knew right well that the wearines of the flesh is an heauy clog to the will, striketh mightily vponupon this key, Awake thou that sleepest, Cast off all which presseth downe, Watch, Labour, striue to go forward and to grow in knowledge.
Of the natural way of finding out laws by reason, …o guide …he will vntounto that which is good.8▪ Wherefore to returne to our former intent of discouering the naturall way, whereby rules hauehave bene found out concerning that goodnes wherewith the wil of man ought to be moued in humaine actions; As eueryevery thing naturally and necessarily doth desire the vtmost good and greatest perfection whereof nature hath made it capable, euen so man. Our felicitie therefore being the obiect and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and couet it. All particular things which are subiect vntounto action, the will doth so farre foorth incline vntounto, as reason iudgeth them the better for vsus, and consequently the more auaileable to our blisse. If reason erre, we fall into euill, and are so farre forth depriued of the generall perfection we seeke. Seeing therefore that for the framing of mens actions the knowledge of good from euill is necessarie; it onelyonly resteth that we search how this may be had. Neither must we suppose that there needeth one rule to know the good,foreignA…st. de an. L. 1. and another the euill by. For he that knoweth what is straight, doth euen thereby discerne what is crooked, because the absence of straightnesse in bodies capable thereof is crookednesse. Goodnesse in actions is like vntounto straitnesse▪ wherfore that which is done well we terme right. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that trauaileth, because by it he commeth soonest to his iourneys end: so in action, that which doth lye the euenest betweene vsus and the end we desire, must needes be the fittest for our vse. Besides which fitnes for vse, there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that which is good in the actions of men, doth not onelyonly delight as profitable, but as amiable also. In which consideration the Grecians most diuinely hauehave giuen to the actiue perfection of men, a name expressing both beauty and goodnesse,foreign. because goodnesse in ordinary speech is for the most part applied onelyonly to that which is beneficiall. But we in the name of goodnesse, do here imploy both. And of discerning goodnes there are but these two wayes; the one the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other the obseruation of those signes and tokens, which being annexed alwaies vntounto goodnes, argue that where they are found, there also goodnes is, although we know not the cause by force whereof it is there. The former of these is the most sure & infallible way, but so hard that all shunne it, and had rather walke as men do in the darke by hap hazard, then tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge sake. As therefore Physitians are many times forced to leaue such methods of curing as themselues know to be the fittest, and being ouerruled by their patients impatiency are fame to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure, which the cured will yeeld vntounto: in like sort, cōsidering how the case doth stād with this present age full of tongue & weake of braine, behold we yeeld to the streame thereof; into the causes of goodnes we will not make any curious or deepe inquiry; to touch them now & then it shalbe sufficient, when they are so neere at hand that easily they may be conceiued without any farre remoued discourse: that way we are contented to proue, which being the worse in it selfe, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecillity the fitter & likelier to be brookt. Signes and tokens to know good by, are of sundry kinds: some more certaine▪ and some lesse. The most certaine token of euident goodnesse is, if the generall perswasion of all men do so account it. And therefore a common receiued error is neuer vtterly ouerthrowne, till such time as we go from signes vntounto causes, and shew some manifest root or fountaine thereof common vntounto all, whereby it may clearly appeare how it hath come to passe that so many hauehave bene ouerseene. In which case surmises and sleight probabilities will not serue; because the vniuersall consent of men is the perfectest and strongest in this kind which comprehendeth onelyonly the signes and tokens of goodnesse. Things casuall do varie, and that which a man doth but chaunce to thinke well of, cannot still hauehave the like hap. Wherefore although we know not the cause, yet thus much we may know, that some necessary cause there is, whensoeuer the iudgements of all men generally or for the most part run one & the same way, especially in matters of naturall discourse. For of things necessarily & naturally done there is no more affirmed but this, aforeign. Arist. Rhet. 1. cap. 39.They keepe either alwaies or for the most part one tenure. The generall and perpetuall voyce of men is as the sentence of God himselfe. bNon potest error contingere, vbi omnes idem opinantur. Monticat. in 1. Polit. Quicquid in omnibus indiuiduis vniu… …peciei communiter inest, id cause… cō munem habeat opo…tet, quaest eorum indiuiduorum species & natura. Idem. Quod à t…ta aliqua specie fit, vniuersali… particularis que naturae fit instinctu Ficin. de. Christ▪ relig. Si pro…icer… cupis, primo firmé id ve…um puta quod sanmen… omniū hominum attestatur. Cusa. in compend. cap. 1. Non li…er naturalé vniuersalé que hominum iudicium falsum van um que existima…e Teles▪ foreign ▪ A…ist. Eth. 10. cap. 2.For that which all men hauehave at all times learned, nature her selfe must needes hauehave taught; and God being the author of nature, her voyce is but his instrument. By her from him we receiue whatsoeuer in such sort we learne. Infinite duties there are, the goodnes wherof is by this rule sufficiently manifested, although we had no other warrant besides to approue them. The Apostle S. Paul hauing speech cōcerning the Heathen saith of thē, cRom. 2.14.They are a law vntounto thēselues▪ His meaning is, that by force of the light of reasō, wherewith God illuminateth eueryevery one which cometh into the world, mē being inabled to know truth from falshood, and good from euill, do thereby learne in many things what the will of God is; which will himselfe not reuealing by any extraordinary meanes vntounto them, but they by naturall discourse attaining the knowledge thereof, seeme the makers of those lawes which indeed are his, and they but onelyonly the finders of them out. A law therefore generally taken, is a directiue rule vntounto goodnesse of operation. The rule of diuine operations outward, is the definitiue appointmēt of Gods owne wisedome set downe within himselfe. The rule of naturall agents that worke by simple necessity, is the determination of the wisedome of God▪ known to God himselfe the principall director of them, but not vntounto them that are directed to execute the same. The rule of naturall agents which worke after a sort of their owne accord, as the beasts do, is the iudgement of common sense or phancy concerning the sensible goodnes of those obiects wherwith they are moued. The rule of ghostly or immateriall natures, as spirits & Angels, is their intuitiue intellectual iudgement concerning the amiable beauty & high goodnes of that obiect, which with vnspeakeable ioy and delight doth set them on worke. The rule of voluntary agents on earth, is the sentence that reason giueth cōcerning the goodnes of those things which they are to do. And the sentences which reason giueth, are some more, some lesse general, before it come to define in particular actiōs what is good. The maine principles of reason are in thēselues apparent. For to make nothing euidēt of it selfe vntounto mās vnderstāding, were to take away al possibility of knowing any thing. And herein that of Theophras…us is true,foreign. Theoph. i… Metaph. They that seeke a reason of all things do vtterly ouerthrow reason. In eueryevery kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed, the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibilitie of error, cleare and manifest without proofe. In which kind, axiomes or principles more generall are such as this, That the greater good is to be chosen before the lesse. If therefore it should be demanded, what reason there is why the will of man, which doth necessarily shun harme and couet whatsoeuer is pleasant and sweete, should be commanded to count the pleasures of sinne gall, & notwithstanding the bitter accidents wherwith vertuous actions are compast, yet stil to reioyce and delight in them; surely this could neuer stand with reason: but that wisedome thus prescribing, groundeth her lawes vponupon an infallible rule of comparison, which is, that small difficulties, when exceeding great good is sure to ensue; and on the other side momentanie benefites, when the hurt which they drawe after them is vnspeakeable, are not at all to be respected. This rule is the ground whereupon the wisedom of the Apostle buildeth a law, inioyning patience vntounto himselfe; The present lightnes of our affliction worketh vntounto vsus euen with aboundance vponupon aboundance an eternall waight of glory, …. Cor. 4.17.while we looke not on the things which are seene, but on the things which are not seene. For the things which are seene are temporal, but the things which are not seene eternall. Therefore Christianity to be embraced, whatsoeuer calamities in those times it was accompanied withall. VponUpon the same ground our Sauiour proueth the law most reasonable, that doth forbid those crimes which mē for gaines sake fall into. For a man to win the world, if it be with the losse of his soule,Matth. 16.26. what benefit or good is it? Axiomes lesse generall, yet so manifest that they need no further proofe, are such as these, God to be worshipped, Parents to be honored, Others to be vsed by vsus as we our selues would by them. Such things, as soone as they are alleaged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proofe or further discourse to be assured of their goodnes. Notwithstanding whatsoeuer such principle there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, & drawne from out of the very bowels of heauen and earth. For we are to note, that things in the world are to vsus discernable, not onelyonly so farre forth as serueth for our vitall preseruation, but further also in a twofold higher respect. For first if all other vses were vtterly taken away; yet the mind of man being by nature speculatiue and delighted with cōtemplation in it selfe, they were to be known euen for meere knowledge and vnderstandings sake. Yea further besides this, the knowledge of eueryevery the least thing in the whole world, hath in it a secōd peculiar benefit vntounto vsus, in as much as it serueth to minister rules, Canons, and lawes for men to direct those actions by, which we properly terme humane. This did the very Heathens themselues obscurely insinuate, by making Themis which we call Ius or Right to be the daughter of heauen and earth. Wee knowe things either as they are in themselues, or as they are in mutuall relation one to another. The knowledge of that which man is in reference vntounto himselfe, and other things in relation vntounto man, I may iustly terme the mother of al those principles, which are as it were edicts, statutes, and decrees in that law of nature, wherby humaine actions are framed. First therefore hauing obserued that the best things, where they are not hindered, do still produce the best operations; (for which cause where many things are to concurre vntounto one effect, the best is in all congruity of reason to guide the residue, that it preuailing most, the worke principally done by it may hauehave greatest perfection:) when hereupon we come to obserue in our selues, of what excellencie our soules are in comparison of our bodies, and the diuiner part in relation vntounto the baser of our soules; seeing that all these concurre in producing humaine actions, it cannot be well vnlesse the chiefest do commaund and direct the rest.Arist. Polit. …. cap. 5. The soule then ought to conduct the bodie, and the spirit of our mindes the soule. This is therefore the first lawe, whereby the highest power of the minde requireth generall obedience at the hands of all the rest concurring with it vntounto action. Touching the seuerall graund mandates, which being imposed by the vnderstanding facultie of the minde, must be obeyed by the will of man, they are by the same method found out, whether they import our dutie towardes God or towards man. Touching the one, I may not here stand to open, by what degrees of discourse the mindes euen of meere naturall men, hauehave attained to knowe, not onelyonly that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisedome, and other properties that God hath, and how all thinges depend on him. This being therefore presupposed, from that knowne relation which God hath vntounto vsus aforeign. Plat. in Theaet.as vntounto children, and vntounto all good thinges as vntounto effectes, whereof himselfe is the bforeign. Arist▪ Metop. lib. 1. cap. 2.principall cause, these axiomes and lawes naturall concerning our dutie hauehave arisen; cforeign. Plat. in Tim.That in all things we go about, his ayde is by prayer to be craued; dArist. Ethi•. lib. 8. ca. vlt.That he cannot hauehave sufficient honor done vntounto him, but the vttermost of that we can do to honour him we must; which is in effect the same that we read, eDeut. 6.5.Thou shalt louelove the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soule, and with all thy mind. Which law our Sauiour doth terme the fMath. 22.2….First and the great Commaundement. Touching the next, which as our Sauiour addeth, is like vntounto this (he meaneth in amplitude and largenesse▪ in as much as it is the roote out of which all laws of dutie to men-ward hauehave growne, as out of the former all offices of religion towards God) the like naturall inducement hath brought men to know, that it is their duty no lesse to louelove others then themselues. For seeing those things which are equall, must needes all hauehave one measure: if I cannot but wish to receiue al good, euen as much at eueryevery mans hand as any man can wish vntounto his owne soule; how should I looke to hauehave any part of my desire herein satisfied, vnlesse my self be careful to satisfie the like desire, which is vndoubtedly in other men, we all being of one and the same nature? To hauehave any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieue them as much as me: so that if I do harme, I must looke to suffer; there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of louelove to me, then they hauehave by me shewed vntounto them. My desire therefore to be loued of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth vponupon me a naturall dutie of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection. From which relation of equalitie betweene our selues and them that are as our selues, what seuerall rules and Canons naturall reason hath drawne for direction of life, no man is ignorant; as namely, gQuod quis in se approbat, in alio reprobare nō posse. …an arenam C. de ino…. test. Quod quisque iuris in alium sta…u…it, ipsum quo que codem vti debere. l. quod quisque. Ab omni penitu… iniu…â atque vi. abstinendū. l. 1 § 1. quod vi. autclam.That because we would take no harme, we must therefore do none; That sith we would not be in any thing extreamely dealt with, we must our selues auoide all extremitie in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong wee are vtterly to abstaine, with such like; which further to wade in would bee tedious, and to our present purpose not altogether so necessary,Matth. 22.40. On these two commandements hangeth the whole law. seeing that on these two generall heads alreadie mentioned all other specialties are dependent. Wherefore the naturall measure wherby to iudge our doings, is the sentence of reason, determining and setting downe what is good to be done. Which sentence is either mandatory, shewing what must be done; or else permissiue, declaring onelyonly what may be done; or thirdly admonitorie, opening what is the most conuenient for vsus to doe. The first taketh place, where the comparison doth stand altogether betweene doing and not doing of one thing which in it selfe is absolutely good or euill; as it had bene for Ioseph to yeeld or not to yeeld to the impotent desire of his lewd mistresse,Gen. 39.9. the one euill, the other good simply. The second is, when of diuerse things euill, all being not euitable, we are permitted to take one; which one sauing only in case of so great vrgency were not otherwise to be taken;Mar. 10.4. as in the matter of diuorce amongst the Iewes. The last, when of diuers things good, one is principall and most eminent;Act. 4.37. Act. 5.4. as in their act who sould their possessions and layd the price at the Apostles feete, which possessions they might hauehave retained vntounto themselues without sinne; againe in the Apostle S. Paules owne choyce to maintaine himselfe by his owne labour,…. Thes. 3.8. whereas in liuing by the Churches maintenance, as others did, there had bene no offence committed. In goodnes therefore there is a latitude or extent, whereby it commeth to passe that euen of good actions some are better then other some; whereas otherwise one man could not excell another, but all should be either absolutely good, as hitting iumpe that indiuisible point or Center wherein goodnesse consisteth; or else missing it they should be excluded out of the number of wel-doers. Degrees of wel doing there could be none, except perhaps in the seldomnes & oftennes of doing well. But the nature of goodnesse being thus ample, a lawe is properly that which reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the law of reason or humaine nature is that, which men by discourse of naturall reason hauehave rightly found out themselues to be all for euer bound vntounto in their actions. Lawes of reason hauehave these markes to be knowne by. Such as keepe them, resemble most liuely in their voluntarie actions, that very manner of working which nature her selfe doth necessarily obserue in the course of the whole world. The workes of nature are all behoouefull, beautifull, without superfluitie or defect: euen so theirs, if they be framed according to that which the law of reason teacheth. Secondly those lawes are inuestigable by reason, without the helpe of reuelation supernaturall and diuine. Finally in such sort they are inuestigable, that the knowledge of them is generall, the world hath alwayes bene acquainted with them; according to that which one in Sophocles obserueth corcerning a branch of this law,foreign. Soph. Anti. It is no child of two dayes or yeasterdayes birth, but hath bene no man knoweth how long sithence. It is not agreed vponupon by one, or two, or few, but by all: which we may not so vnderstand, as if eueryevery particular man in the whole world did know and confesse whatsoeuer the law of reason doth conteine; but this lawe is such that being proposed no man can reiect it as vnreasonable and vniust. Againe there is nothing in it, but any man (hauing naturall perfection of wit, and ripenesse of iudgement) may by labour and trauaile find out. And to conclude, the generall principles thereof are such, as it is not easie to find men ignorant of them. Law rationall therefore, which men commonly vse to call the law of nature, meaning thereby the law which humaine nature knoweth it selfe in reason vniuersally bound vntounto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the lawe of reason▪ this law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the light of their naturall vnderstanding euidently know, or at least wife may know, to be beseeming or vnbeseeming, vertuous or vitious; good or euill for them to do.Th. 1.2. q. 94. art. 3. Omnia peccata sunt in vniuersum contra rationem & naturae legem. Aug. de ciu. dei. lib. 12. …ap. 1. Omne vitium naturae noc…t, ac per hoc contra naturam est. De doctr. Christ. lib. 3. cap. 14. Now although it be true, which some hauehave said, that whatsoeuer is done amisse, the law of nature and reason therby is transgrest; because euen those offences which are by their speciall qualities breaches of supernaturall lawes, do also, for that they are generally euill violate in generall that principle of reason, which willeth vniuersally to flie from euill: yet do we not therfore so far extend the law of reason, as to conteine in it all maner lawes whereunto reasonable creatures are bound; but (as hath bene shewed) we restraine it to those onelyonly duties, which all men by force of naturall wit either do or might vnderstand to be such duties as concerne all men. Certaine half waking men there are, (as Saint Augustine noteth) who neither altogether asleepe in folly, nor yet throughly awake in the light of true vnderstanding, hauehave thought that there is not at all any thing iust and righteous in it selfe: but looke wherwith nations are inured, the same they take to be right and iust. Wherupon their conclusion is, that seeing each sort of people hath a different kind of right from other, and that which is right of it owne nature must be eueryevery where one and the same, therefore in it selfe there is nothing right. These good folke (saith he, that I may not trouble their wits with rehearsal of too many things) hauehave not looked so far into the world as to perceiue, that Do as thou wouldest be done vntounto, is a sentence which all nations vnderunder heauen are agreed vponupon. Refer this sentence to the louelove of God, & it extinguisheth all heinous crimes▪ referre it to the louelove of thy neighbor, and all grieuous wrongs it banisheth out of the world. Wherefore as touching the law of reason, this was (it seemeth) Saint Augustines iudgement, namely, that there are in it some things which stand as principles vniuersally agreed vponupon: and that out of those principles, which are in themselues euident, the greatest morall duties we owe towards God or man, may without any great difficultie be concluded. If then it be here demaunded, by what meanes it should come to passe (the greatest part of the law morall being so easie for all men to know) that so many thousands of men notwithstanding hauehave bene ignorant euen of principall morall duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sinne: I deny not but lewd and wicked custome; beginning perhaps at the first amongst few, afterwards spreading into greater multitudes, and so continuing from time to time, may be of force euen in plaine things to smother the light of naturall vnderstanding, because men will not bend their wits to examine, whether things wherewith they hauehave bene accustomed, be good or euill. For examples sake, that grosser kind of heathenish idolatrie, wherby they worshipped the very workes of their owne hands, was an absurdity to reason so palpable, that the Prophet Dauid comparing idols and idolaters together, maketh almost no ods betweene them, but the one in a maner as much without wit and sense as the other, They that make them are like vntounto them, and so are all that trust in them. That wherein an idolater doth seeme so absurb and foolish,Psal. 35.18. is by the Wiseman thus exprest, He is not ashamed to speake vntounto that which hath no life, Sapi. 13.17.he calleth on him that is weake for health, he prayeth for life vntounto him which is dead, of him which hath no experience he requireth helpe, for his iourney be s…th to him which is not able to go, for gaine and worke and successe in his affaires he seeketh furtherance of him that hath no maner of power. The cause of which senselesse stupidity is afterwards imputed to custome.S…pi. 1….12. When a father mourned grieuosly for his son that was taken away suddenly, he made an image for him that was once dead, whom now he worshipped as a God, ordeining to his seruants ceremonies & sacrifices. Thus by processe of time this wicked custome preuailed, & was kept as a law; the authority of Rulers, the ambition of craftsmen, and such like meanes thrusting forward the ignorant, and increasing their superstition. VntoUnto this which the Wiseman hath spoken, somwhat besides may be added. For whatsoeuer we hauehave hitherto taught, or shal hereafter, cōcerning the force of mans naturall vnderstanding, this we alwayes desire withall to be vnderstood, that there is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other creature, which can rightly performe the functions alotted to it, without perpetuall aide & concurrence of that supreme cause of all things. The benefit whereof as oft as we cause God in his iustice to withdraw, there can no other thing follow▪ then that which the Apostle noteth, euen men indued with the light of reason to walke notwithstanding in the vanity of their mind, hauing their cogitations darkned Eph. 4.17.& being strangers from the life of God through the ignorance which is in them, because of the hardnes of their harts. And this cause is mētioned by the Prophet Esay ▪ speaking of the ignorance idolaters, who see not how the manifest reason condemneth their grosse iniquity and sinne.Esay. 44.19.18. They hauehave not in them, saith he▪ so much wit as to thinke, shall I bow to the stocke of a tree? All knowledge and vnderstanding is taken from them. For God hath shut their eyes that they cannot see. That which we say in this case of idolatry, serueth for all other things, wherein the like kind of generall blindnes hath preuailed against the manifest lawes of reason. Within the compasse of which lawes we do not onelyonly comprehend whatsoeuer may be easily knowne to belong to the duty of all men; but euen whatsoeuer may possibly be known to be of that quality, so that the same be by necessary consequence deduced out of cleere and manifest principles. For if once we descend vntounto probable collections what is conuenient for men, we are then in the territory where free and arbitrarie determinations, the territory where humane lawes take place, which lawes are after to be considered.
The benefit of keeping that law which reason teacheth.9 Now the due obseruation of this law which reason teacheth vsus, cannot but be effectuall vntounto their great good that obserue the same. For we see the whole world and each part thereof so compacted, that as long as each thing performeth onelyonly that worke which is naturall vntounto it, it thereby preserueth both other things, and also it selfe. Contrariwise let any principall thing, as the Sun, the Moone, any one of the heauēs or elemēts, but once cease or faile, or swarue; and who doth not easily conceiue, that the sequele thereof would be ruine both to it selfe, & whatsoeuer dependeth on it? And is it possible that man, being not only the noblest creature in the world, but euen a very world in himselfe, his transgressing the law of his nature should draw no maner of harme after it? Yes, tribulation and anguish vntounto euerie soule that doth euill. Good doth followe vntounto all things by obseruing the course of their nature, and on the contrarie side euill by not obseruing it: but not vntounto naturall agents that good which wee call Reward, not that euill which wee properly tearme Punishment. The reason whereof is, because amongst creatures in this world, onelyonly mans obseruation of the lawe of his nature is Righteousnesse, onelyonly mans transgression Sinne. And the reason of this is the difference in his maner of obseruing or transgressing the lawe of his nature. Hee doth not otherwise then voluntarily the one or the other. What we do against our wils, or constrainedly, we are not properly said to do it, because the mo…iue cause of doing it is not in our selues but carrieth vsus, as if the winde should driue a feather in the aire, wee no whit furthering that whereby we are driuen. In such cases therefore the euill which is done, moueth compassion; men are pi…ied for it, as being rather miserable in such respect thei… culpable. Some things are likewise done by man, though not through outward force and impulsion, though not against, yet without their wils; as in alienation of minde, or any the like ineuitable vtter absence of wit and iudgement. For which cause, no man did euer thinke the hurtfull actions of furious men and innocents to be punishable. Againe some things wee doe neither against nor without, and yet not simply and meerely with our wils; but with our wils in such sor… moued, that albeit there b… no impossibilitie but that wee might, neuerthelesse we are not so easily able to doe otherwise. In this consideration one euill deede is made more pardonable then an other. Finally, that which we do being euill, is notwithstanding by so much more pa…donable, by how much the exigence of so doing, or the difficultie of doing otherwise is greater; vnlesse this necessitie or difficultie hauehave originally risen from our selues. It is no excuse therefore vntounto him, who being drunke committeth incest, and alleageth that his wits were not his owne, in as much as himselfe might hauehave chosen whether his wits should by that meane hauehave been taken from him. Now rewards and punishments do alwaies presuppose some thing willingly done well or ill▪ without which respect though we may sometimes receiue good or harme, yet then the one is only a benefite, and not a reward; the other simply an hurt, not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of mans will, which is the roote of all his actions, there groweth varietie in the sequeie of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: Take away the will, and all actes are equall: That which we doe not and would doe, is commonly accepted as done. Voluntate subla…â omnem actum parem esse. l. …oedissimam C. de adult. Bonam voluntatem plerun… que pro facto reputari. l. si quis in testamen.By these and the like rules mens actions are determined of and iudged, whether they bee in their owne nature rewardable or punishable. Rewards and punishments are not receiued, but at the handes of such as being aboue vsus, hauehave power to examine and iudge our deedes. How men come to hauehave this authoritie one ouer an other in externall actions, wee shall more diligently examine in that which followeth. But for this present, so much all do acknowledge, that sith eueryevery mans hart and conscience doth in good or euill, euen secretly committed and knowne to none but it selfe, either like or disallow it selfe, and accordingly eyther reioyce, very nature exulting as it were in certain hope of reward, or else grieue as it were in a sense of future punishment; neither of which can in this case bee looked for from any other, sauing only from him, who discerneth and iudgeth the very secrets of all hearts: therefore he is the onelyonly rewarder and reuenger of all such actions, although not of such actions onelyonly,Diuo… cast… adeunto, pi… tatent adhi…bento. Qui secus faxir, Deus ipsi …in… dex crit. but of all whereby the lawe of nature is broken, whereof himselfe is author. For which cause… ▪ the Romane lawes called the lawes of the twelue tables, requiring offices of inward affection, which the eye of man cannot reach vntounto, threaten the neglecters of them with none but diuine punishment.
10 That which hitherto wee hauehave set downe, is (I hope) sufficient to shew their brutishnes,How reason doth leade men vntounto the making of humane lawes, whereby politique societies are gouerned, and to agreement about lawes, whereby the fellowship or communion of independent societies stādeth. foreign. Arist. Rhet. 1 which imagine that religion and vertue are only as men wil accompt of them; that we might make as much accompt, if we would, of the contrarie, without any harme vntounto our selues, and that in nature they are as indifferent one as the other. Wee see then how nature it selfe teacheth lawes and statutes to liue by. The lawes which hauehave bene hitherto mentioned, doe bind men absolutely, euen as they are mē, although they hauehave neuer any setled fellowship, neuer any solemne agreemēt amongst themselues what to doe or not to do. But for as much as we are not by our selues sufficient, to furnish our selues with competent store of thinges needfull for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignitie of man: therefore to supply those defectes and imperfections which are in vsus liuing single and solely by our selues, wee are naturally induced to seeke communion and fellowship with others. This was the cause of mens vniting themselues at the first in politique societies; which societies could not bee without gouernment, nor gouernment without a distinct kind of law from that which hath bene alreadie declared. Two foundations there are which beare vp publique societies; the one, a naturall inclination, wherby al men desire sociable life & fellowship; the other, an order expresly or secretly agreed vponupon, touching the manner of their vnion in liuing together. The later is that which wee call the law of a common weale, the very soule of a politique body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on worke in such actions as the common good requireth. Lawes politique, ordained for externall order and regiment amongst men, are neuer framed as they should be, vnlesse presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and auerse from all obediēce vntounto the sacred lawes of his nature… in a word, vnlesse presuming man to be in regard of his depraued minde little better then a wild beast, they do accordingly prouide notwithstanding so to frame his outward actions, that they bee no hinderance vntounto the common good for which societies are instituted: vnlesse they doe this, they are not perfect. It resteth therefore that we consider how nature findeth out such lawes of gouernmēt, as serue to direct euen nature depraued to a right end. All men desire to lead in this world an happie life. That life is led most happily, wherein all vertue is exercised without impedimēt or let.1. Tim. 6.8. The Apostle in exhorting men to contentment, although they hauehave in this world no more then very bare food and raiment, giueth vsus thereby to vnderstand, that those are euen the lowest of thinges necessary, that if we should be stripped of al those things without which we might possibly be, yet these must be left; that destitution in these is such an impedimēt, as till it be remoued, suffereth not the mind of man to admit any other care.Gen. 1.29. Gen. 2.17. For this cause first God assigned Adam maintenance of life and then appointed him a law to obserue. For this cause after mē began to grow to a number,Gen. 4.2. the first thing we reade they gaue thēselues vntounto, was the tilling of the earth,Gen. 4.26. and the feeding of cattle. Hauing by this meane whereon to liue, the principall actions of their life afterward are noted by the exercise of their religion.Mat. 6.33 True it is that the kingdome of God must be the first thing in our purposes & desires. But in as much as righteous life presupposeth life, in as much as to liue vertuously it is impossible except we liue; therefore the first impediment, which naturally we endeuor to remoue, is penurie and want of thinges without which we cannot liue. VntoUnto life many implements are necessary; moe, if we seeke (as all men naturally doe) such a life as hath in it ioy, comfort, delight and pleasure. To this end we see how quickly sundry artes Mechanical were found out in the very prime of the world.Gen. 4.20.21.…2. As things of greatest necessitie are alwaies first prouided for, so things of greatest dignitie are most accounted of by all such as iudge rightly. Although therefore riches be a thing which eueryevery man wisheth; yet no man of iudgement can esteeme it better to be rich, then wise, vertuous & religious. If we be both or either of these, it is not because we are so borne. For into the world we come as emptie of the one as of the other, as naked in minde as we are in body. Both which necessities of man had at the first no other helpes and supplies, then only domesticall; such as that which the prophet implieth, saying, Can a mother forget her child? such as that which the Apostle mentioneth, saying▪ Esay. 49.15. 1. Tim. 5.8.He that careth not for his owne is worse then an Infidell;Gen. 18.19. such as that concerning Abraham, Abraham will commaund his sonnes and his household after him that they keepe the way of the Lord. But neither that which we learne of our selues, nor that which others teach vsus can preuaile, where wickednes and malice hauehave takē deepe roote. If therefore when there was but as yet one only family in the world, no meanes of instruction humane or diuine could preuent effusion of bloud:Gen. 4.8. how could it be chosen but that when families were multiplied and increased vponupon earth, after seperation each prouiding for it selfe, enuy, strife, cōtention & violence must grow amongst thē? for hath not nature furnisht man with wit & valor, as it were with armor, which may be vsed as well vntounto extreame euill as good? yea, were they not vsed by the rest of the world vntounto euill; vntounto the contrary only by Seth, Gen. 6.5. Gen. 5.Enoch, and those few the rest in that line? We all make complaint of the iniquitie of our times: not vniustly; for the dayes are euill. But compare them with those times, wherein there were no ciuil societies, with those times wherein there was as yet no maner of publique regimēt established, with those times wherin there were not aboue 8. persons righteous liuing vponupon the face of the earth:2. Pet. 2.5. and wee hauehave surely good cause to thinke that God hath blessed vsus exceedingly, and hath made vsus behold most happie daies. To take away all such mutuall greeuances, iniuries & wrongs, there was no way but only by growing vntounto compositiō and agreement amongst thēselues, by ordaining some kind of gouernment publike, and by yeelding themselues subiect thereunto; that vntounto whom they graunted authoritie to rule & gouerne, by them the peace, tranquilitie, & happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men alwaies knew that when force and iniurie was offered, they might be defendors of themselues; they knew that howsoeuer men may seeke their owne cōmoditie, yet if this were done with iniury vntounto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men and by all good means to be withstood, finally they knew that no man might in reason take vponupon him to determine his owne right, and according to his owne determination proceed in maintenance therof, in as much as eueryevery man is towards himselfe, and them whom he greatly affecteth partiall; and therfore that strifes & troubles would bee endlesse, except they gaue their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree vponupon: without which consent, there were no reason that one man should take vponupon him to be Lord or Iudge ouer an other; because although there be according to the opinion of some very great and iudicious men, a kind of naturall right in the noble, wise, and vertuous,Arist. Pol. l▪ …. & 4. to gouerne them which are of seruile disposition; neuerthelesse for manifestation of this their right, & mens more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be gouerned, seemeth necessarie. To fathers within their priuate families nature hath giuen a supreme power; for which cause we see throughout the world euen from the first foundation therof, all men hauehave euer bene taken as lords & lawfull kings in their own houses. Howbeit ouer a whole grand multitude, hauing no such dependē cie vponupon any one, & consisting of so many families as eueryevery politique societie in the world doth, impossible it is that any should hauehave complet lawful power but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not hauing the naturall superioritie of fathers, their power must needs be either vsurped, & then vnlawfull; or if lawfull, then either graunted or consented vntounto by them ouer whom they exercise the same, or else giuen extraordinarily frō God, vntounto whom all the world is subiect.Arist. polit. lib. 1. cap. 3. Vide & platonem in 3. de legibus. It is no improbable opinion therefore which the Archphilosopher was of, that as the chiefest person in eueryevery houshold was alwaies as it were a king; so when numbers of housholds ioyned themselues in ciuill societie together, kings were the first kind of gouernors amongst them. Which is also as it seemeth the reason, why the name of Father continued still in them, who of fathers were made rulers: as also the ancient custome of gouernors to do as Melchisedec, and being kings to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit not this the only kind of regiment that hath bene receiued in the world. The inconueniences of one kinde hauehave caused sundry other to be deuised. So that in a word all publike regimēt of what kind soeuer, seemeth euidently to hauehave risen from deliberate aduice, consultation, & compositiō betweene men, iudging it cōuenient & behoueful; there being no impossibilitie in nature considered by it self, but that men might hauehave liued without any publike regiment. Howbeit the corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny but that the lawe of nature doth now require of necessitie some kinde of regiment; so that to bring things vntounto the first course they were in, & vtterly to take away all kind of publike gouernmēt in the world, were apparantly to ouerturn the whole world. The case of mans nature standing therfore as it doth, some kind of regiment the law of nature doth require; yet the kinds therof being many, nature tieth not to any one, but leaueth the choice as a thing arbitrarie. At the first when some certaine kinde of regiment was once approued, it may be that nothing was then further thought vponupon for the maner of gouerning, but all permitted vntounto their wisedome and discretion which were to rule; aCum premeretur initio multitudo ab lis qui maiores opes habebāt, ad vnum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem; qui cum prohiberet iniuriâ tenuiores, aequitate constituendâ summos cum infimis pari iu re retinebat. Cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt inuentae. Cic. off. lib. 2. foreign Arist. Rhet. ad Alex.till by experience they found this for all parts very inconuenient; so as the thing which they had deuised for a remedie, did indeede but increase the soare which it should hauehave cured. They saw that to liue by one mans will, became the cause of all mens misery. This constrained them to come vntounto lawes, wherein all men might see their duties before hand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. b If things be simply good or euill, and withall vniuersally so acknowledged, there needs no new law to be made for such things. The first kind therefore of things appointed by lawes humane, containeth whatsoeuer being in it selfe naturally good or euill, is notwithstanding more secret then that it can be discerned by eueryevery mans present conceipt, without some deeper discourse and iudgement. In which discourse, because there is difficultie and possibilitie many waies to erre, vnlesse such things were set downe by lawes, many would be ignorant of their duties which now are not; & many that know what they should do, would neuerthelesse dissemble it, and to excuse themselues pretend ignorance and simplicitie which now they cannot.Tanta est enim vis voluptatum, vt & ignorantiam pro telet in occasionem, & conscientiam corrumpat in dissimulationem. Tertul. lib. de Spectacul. And because the greatest part of men are such as prefer their owne priuate good before all things, euen that good which is sensuall before whatsoeuer is most diuine; & for that the labor of doing good, together with the pleasure arising from the cōtrary, doth make men for the most part slower to the one, & proner to the other, then that dutie prescribed them by law can preuaile sufficiently with them: therefore vntounto lawes that men do make for the benefit of mē, it hath seemed alwaies needful to ad rewards which may more allure vntounto good then any hardnes deterreth from it, & punishments which may more deterre from euil then any sweetnes therto allureth. Wherin as the generalitie is naturall, Vertue rewardable and vice punishable: so the particular determination of the rewarde or punishment, belongeth vntounto them by whom lawes are made. Theft is naturally punishable, but the kinde of punishment is positiue, and such lawfull as men shall thinke with discretion conuenient by lawe to appoint. In lawes that which is naturall bindeth vniuersally, that which is positiue not so. To let goe those kind of positiue lawes which men impose vponupon thē selues, as by vow vntounto God, contract with men, or such like; somewhat it will make vntounto our purpose a little more fully to cōsider, what things are incident into the making of the positiue lawes for the gouernment of thē that liue vnited in publique societie. Lawes do not onelyonly teach what is good, but they inioyne it, they hauehave in thē a certain cōstraining force. And to cōstraine mē vntounto any thing inconuenient doth seeme vnreasonable. Most requisite therefore it is, that to deuise lawes which all men shal be forced to obey, none but wise mē be admitted. Lawes are matters of principall consequence; men of cōmon capacitie & but ordinary iudgemēt are not able (for how should they?) to discerne what things are fittest for each kind and state of regiment. Wee cannot be ignorant how much our obedience vntounto lawes dependeth vponupon this point. Let a man though neuer so iustly, oppose himselfe vntounto thē that are disordered in their waies, & what one amongst them commonly doth not stomacke at such contradiction, storme at reproofe, and hate such as would reforme them? Notwithstanding euen they which brooke it worst that men should tell them of their duties, when they are told the same by a lawe, thinke very wel & reasonably of it. For why? They presume that the lawe doth speake with all indifferencie, that the lawe hath no side respect to their persons, that the law is as it were an oracle proceeded from wisedome and vnderstanding. Howbeit laws do not take their constraining force frō the qualitie of such as deuise them, but from that power which doth giuegive them the strength of lawes. That which we spake before concerning the power of gouernment, must here be applyed vntounto the power of making lawes wherby to gouerne; which power God hath ouer all; and by the naturall lawe whereunto hee hath made all subiect, the lawfull power of making lawes to commaund whole politique societies of men, belongeth so properly vntounto the same intire societies, that for any Prince or potentate of what kinde soeuer vponupon earth to exercise the same of himselfe, and not either by expresse commission immediatly and personally receiued from God, or else by authoritie deriued at the first frō their consent vponupon whose persons they impose lawes, it is no better then meere tyrannie. Lawes they are not therefore which publique approbation hath not made so. But approbation not only they giuegive who personally declare their assent by voice sign or act, but also whē others do it in their names by right originally at the least deriued from them. As in parliaments, councels, & the like assemblies, although we be not personally our selues present, notwithstanding our assent is by reasō of others agents there in our behalfe. And what we do by others, no reason but that it should stand as our deede, no lesse effectually to binde vsus then if our selues had done it in person. In many things assent is giuen, they that giuegive it not imagining they do so, because the manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute Monark commandeth his subiects that which seemeth good in his owne discretion, hath not his edict the force of a law, whether they approue or dislike it? Againe that which hath bene receiued long sithence and is by custome now established, we keep as a law which we may not transgresse; yet what consent was euer thereunto sought or required at our hands? Of this point therefore we are to note, that sith men naturally hauehave no ful & perfect power to commaund whole politique mul…itudes of men; therefore vtterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no mans commandement liuing. And to be commanded we do consent, when that societie wherof we are part, hath at any time before consented, without reuoking the same after by the like vniuersall agreement. Wherfore as any mans deed past is good as long as himself continueth: so the act of a publique societie of men done fiue hundred yeares sithence, standeth as theirs, who presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortall: we were then aliue in our predecessors, and they in their successors do liue stil. Lawes therefore humaine of what kinde soeuer are auaileable by consent. If here it be demaunded how it commeth to passe, that this being common vntounto all lawes which are made, there should be found euen in good lawes so great varietie as there is: wee must note the reason hereof to bee, the sundry particular endes, whereunto the different disposition of that subiect or matter for which lawes are prouided, causeth them to hauehave especiall respect in making lawes.Arist. polit. lib. …. c. v…t. A lawe there is mentioned amongst the Graecians, whereof Pittacus is reported to hauehave bene author: And by that lawe it was agreed, that hee which being ouercome with drinke did then strike any man, should suffer punishment double as much as if hee had done the same being sober. No man coulde euer hauehave thought this reasonable, that had intended thereby onelyonly to punish the iniury committed, according to the grauitie of the fact. For who knoweth not, that harme aduisedly done is naturally lesse pardonable, and therefore worthy of the sharper punishment? But for as much as none did so vsually this way offende as men in that case, which they wittingly fell into, euen because they would bee so much the more freely outragious: it was for their publique good where such disorder was growne, to frame a positiue lawe for remedie thereof accordingly. To this appertaine those knowne lawes of making lawes; as that lawemakers must hauehave an eye to the place where, and to the men amongst whome; that one kinde of lawes cannot serue for all kindes of regiment: that where the multitude beareth sway, lawes that shall tend vntounto the preseruation of that state, must make common smaller offices to go by lot, for feare of strife and deuision likely to arise; by reason that ordinary qualities sufficing for discharge of such offices, they could not but by many bee desired, and so with daunger contended for, and not missed without grudge and discontentment, whereas at an vncertaine lot none can find themselues grieued on whomsoeuer it lighteth; contrariwise the greatest; whereof but few are capable, to passe by popular election, that neither the people may enuie such as hauehave those honours, in as much as themselues bestow them, and that the chiefest may bee kindled with desire to exercise all partes of rare and beneficiall vertue; knowing they shal not loose their labour by growing in same and estimation amongst the people: if the helme of chiefe gouernment bee in the handes of a few of the wealthiest, that then lawes prouiding for continuance thereof must make the punishment of contumelie and wrong offered vntounto any of the common sorte sharpe and grieuous, that so the euill may be preuented, whereby the rich are most likely to bring themselues into hatred with the people, who are not wonte to take so great offence when they are excluded from honors and offices, as whē their persons are contumeliously troden vponupon. In other kindes of regiment the like is obserued concerning the difference of positiue lawes, which to be euerie where the same is impossible and against their nature.Staundf. pref, to the pleas of the Crowne. Now as the learned in the lawes of this land obserue, that our statutes sometimes are onelyonly the affirmation or ratification of that which by common law was held before: so heere it is not to be omitted, that generally all lawes humaine which are made for the ordering of politike societies, bee either such as establish some dutie whereunto all men by the law of reason did before stand bound; or else such as make that a dutie now which before was none. The one sort wee may for distinctions sake call mixedly, and the other meerely humane. That which plaine or necessary reason bindeth men vntounto, may be in sundrie considerations expedient to be ratified by humane law: For example, if confusion of blood in marriage, the libertie of hauing many wiues at once, or any other the like corrupt and vnreasonable custome doth happen to hauehave preuailed far, and to hauehave gotten the vpper hand of right reason with the greatest part, so that no way is left to rectifie such soule disorder, without prescribing by law the same thinges which reason necessarilie doth enforce, but is not perceiued that so it doth; or if many be grown vntounto that which thapostle did lament in some, concerning whom he writeth saying,Epis. Iud. v. 10 foreign. Arist. Ethi. lib. 10 cap. 10. that Euen what things they naturally know, in those very things as beasts void of reason they corrupted themselues; or if there be no such speciall accident, yet for as much as the common sort are led by the sway of their sensuall desires, and therefore doe more shun sinne for the sensible euils which follow it amongst men, then for any kinde of sentence which reason doth pronounce against it▪ this very thing is cause sufficient why duties belonging vntounto each kinde of vertue, albeit the law of reason teach them, should notwithstanding be prescribed euen by humane law. Which law in this case we terme mixt, because the mat…er whereunto it bindeth, is the same which reason necessarily doth require at our handes, and from the law of reason it differeth in the maner of binding onelyonly. For whereas men before stoode bound in conscience to doe as the law of reason teacheth, they are now by vertue of humane law become constrainable, and if they outwardly transgresse, punishable. As for lawes which are meerely humane, the matter of them is any thing which reason doth but probably …each to bee fit and conuenient; so that till such time as law hath passed amongst men about it, of it selfe it bindeth no man. One example whereof may be this. Landes are by humane law in some places after the owners decease diuided vntounto all his children▪ in some all descendeth to the eldest sonne. If the lawe of reason did necessarily require but the one of these two to be done, they which by lawe hauehave receiued the other, should be subiect to that heauy sentence, which denounceth against all that decree wicked vniust, & vnreasonable things, woe. Whereas now which soeuer be receiued,Esa. 10.1. there is no law of reason transgrest; because there is probable reason why eyther of them may be expedient, and for eyther of them more then probable reason there is not to bee found. Lawes whether mixtly or meerely humane are made by politique societies: some, onelyonly as those societies are ciuilly vnited; some, as they are spiritually ioyned and make such a body as wee call the Church. Of lawes humane in this later kinde wee are to speake in the third booke following. Let it therefore suffice thus far to hauehave touched the force wherewith almightie God hath gratiously endued our nature, and thereby inabled the same to finde out both those lawes which all men generally are for euer bound to obserue, and also such as are most fit for their behoofe who leade their liues in any ordered state of gouernment. Now besides that lawe which simply concerneth men as men, and that which belongeth vntounto them as they are men linked with others in some forme of politique societie; there is a third kinde of lawe which toucheth all such seuerall bodies politique, so farre forth as one of them hath publique commerce with another. And this third is the Lawe of nations. Betweene men and beastes there is no possibilitie of sociable communion; because the w…lspring of that communion is a naturall delight which man hath to transfuse from himselfe into others, and to receiue from others into himselfe, especially those things wherein the excellencie of his kinde doth most consist. The chiefest instrument of humane communion therefore is speech, because thereby we impart mutually one to another the conceiptes of our reasonable vnderstanding.Arist. pol. 1. c. And for that cause seeing beasts are not hereof capable, for as much as with them wee can vse no such conference, they being in degree although aboue other creatures on earth to whom nature hath denied sense, yet lower then to be sociable companions of man to whome nature hath giuen reason;Gen. 2.20. it is of Adam said that amongst the beastes Hee found not for himselfe any meete companion. Ciuill societie doth more content the nature of man, then any priuate kinde of solitary liuing; because in societie this good of mutuall participation is so much larger then otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding wee are not satisfied, but we couet (if it might be) to hauehave a kinde of societie & fellowship euen withal mākind. Which thing Socrates intending to signifie, professed himselfe a Citizen,Cic. Tusc. 5. & 1. de legib. not of this or that cōmon-welth, but of the world. And an effect of that very natural desire in vsus, (a manifest…token that we wish after a sort an vniuersall fellowship with all men) appeareth by the wonderfull delight men hauehave, some to visit forrein countries, some to discouer natiōs not heard of in former ages, we all to know the affaires & dealings of other people, yea to be in league of amitie with them:1. Reg. 10.1. & this not onelyonly for traffiques sake, or to the end that when many are cōfederated each may make other the more strong;2. Chr. 9.1. but for such cause also as moued the Queene of Saba to visit Salomon;Math. 13.42. Luk. 11.31. & in a word because nature doth presume that how many mē there are in the world, so many Gods as it were ther are, or at least wise such they should be towardes men. Touching lawes which are to serue men in this behalfe; euen as those lawes of reason, which (man retaining his original integritie) had bin sufficient to direct each particular person in all his affaires & duties, are not sufficient but require the accesse of other lawes, now that man and his offspring are growne thus corrupt & sinfull; againe as those lawes of politie & regiment, which would hauehave serued men liuing in publique societie together with that harmlesse disposition which then they should hauehave had▪ are not able now to serue when mens iniquitie is so hardly restrained within any tolerable bounds in like maner the nationall lawes of mutuall commerce be…weene societies of that former and better qualitie might hauehave bene other then now, when nations are so prone to offer violence, iniurie and wrong. Here upon hath growne in eueryevery of these three kinds, that distinction between Primarie & Secundarie lawes; the one grounded vponupon sincere, the other built vponupon depraued nature. Primarie lawes of nations are such as concerne embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertainment of forreiners and strangers, such as serue for commodious traffique and the like. Secundary lawes in the same kinde, are such as this present vnquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with, I meane lawes of armes▪ which yet are much better known then kept. But what matter the law of nations doth containe I omit to search. The strength and vertue of that law is such, that no particular natiō can lawfully preiudic… the same by any their seueral laws & ordinances, more then a man by his priuate resolutions the law of the whole cōmon-welth or state wherin he liueth. For as ciuill law being the act of a whole body politique, doth therfore ouerrule each seuerall part of the same body: so there is no reason that any one commō-welth of it self, should to the preiudice of another annihilate that whereupon the whole world hath agreed. For which cause the Lacedemonians forbidding all accesse of strangers into their coasts,Iose. lib. 2. contra Applou. Theod. lib. 9. de Sanand … affec… ▪ are in y• respect both by Iosephus & Theodoret deseruedly blamed, as being enimies to that hospitality which for cōmon humanities sake al the nations on earth should embrace. Now as there is great cause of cōmuniō, & consequently of laws for the maintenance of cōmunion, amongst nations: So amongst nations Christian the like in regard euen of Christianitie hath bene a…waies iudged needfull. And in this kinde of correspondence amongst natiōs, the force of general councels doth stand: For as one & the same law diuine, wherof in the next place we are to speak, is vntounto al Christiā churches a rule for the chiefest things, by meanes whereof they al in that respect make one Church, as hauing all but One Lord, one faith, and one baptisme: Eph. 4.….So the vrgent necessitie of mutual communion for preseruation of our vnitie in these things, as also for order in some other things cōuenient to be eueryevery where vniformly kept, maketh it requisit that the church of God here on earth hauehave her lawes of spirituall commerce betweene Christian nations, lawes by vertue wherof all Churches may enioy freely the vse of those reuerend religious and sacred consultations which are termed councels generall. A thing whereof Gods owne blessed spirit was the author; a thing practised by the holy Apostles themselues;Act. 1….…9. a thing alwaies afterwardes kept and obserued throughout the world; a thing neuer otherwise then most highly esteemed of, till pride ambition and …yranny began by factious and vile endeuors, to abuse that diuine inuention vntounto the funherance of wicked purposes. But as the iust authoritie of ciuill courtes and Parliaments is not therefore to be abolished, because sometime there is cunning vsed to frame them according to the priuate intents of men ouer-potent in the common-welth: So th… grieuous abuse which hath bene of councels, should rather cause men to studie how so gratious a thing may againe be reduced to that first perfection, then in regard of staines and blemishes sithens growing be held for euer in extreame disgrace. To speake of this matter as the cause requireth, would require very long discourse. All I will presently say is this. Whether it be for the finding out of any thing whereunto diuine lawe bindeth vsus, but yet in such sort, that men are not thereof on all sides resolued; or for the setting downe of some vniforme iudgement to stand touching such thinges, as being neither way matters of necessitie, are notwithstanding offensiue and scandalous when there is open opposition about them; be it for the ending of strifes touching matters of Christian beliefe, wherein the one part may seeme to hauehave probable cause of dissenting from the other; or be it concerning matters of politie, order, and regiment in the Church;Ioh. 14.27… I nothing doubt but that Christiā men should much better frame themselues to those heauenly precepts, which our Lord and Sauiour with so great instancie gaue as concerning peace and vnitie, if we did all concurre in desire to hauehave the vse of auncient councels againe renued, rather then these proceedings continued, which eyther make all contentions endlesse, or bring them to one onelyonly determination, and that of all other the worst, which is by sword. It followeth therefore that a new foundation being laid, wee now adioyne hereunto that which commeth in the next place to be spoken of, namely, wherefore God hath himselfe by scripture made knowne such lawes as serue for direction of men.