Reply to Answers of Mr Gataker, Reply to answers

Reply to Answers of Mr Gataker · Reply to answers

p. 57A Reply to M. Gataker's anſwers to arguments conteined in a Dialogue against the vnlawfulnes of games conſiſting in chaunce.

Dialog.WHatſoever directly, or of it ſelfe, or in a ſpeciallMal. 6. 7 Exo. 20. 7. Iſa. 29. 13. Ier. 4. 2. Prov. 16 33.Exod 20:7Isa 29:13Jer 4:2Prov 16:33 manner tendeth to the advauncing of God's Name is to be vſed religiouſly, & not to be vſed in ſporte, as we may not pray, or ſweare in ſporte: But the vſe of Lotts directly, or of it ſelfe, and in ſpeciall manner tendeth to the advauncing of the name of God in attributing to his ſpeciall Providence p. 88in the whole, and immediateActs. 1. 14. 26.Acts 1:14Acts 1:26 diſpoſing of the Lot, & expecting the event. Therefore the vſe of Lotts is not to be in ſport.

Aunſw. pa. 149.The Aſſumption is not true, if it be underſtood vniverſally. The proofe annexed I deny; Neither doe the places produced proove it. The former of them, concerning ordinary Lotts, or Lotts in generall, was anſwered ſufficiently before. The latter is an example of an extraordinary Lott, wherein was (indeed) an immediate, and ſpeciall Providence. But extraordinary examples make no generall rules Neither is it a good courſe of arguing to reaſon from the ſpeciall, or a ſingular, to the generall, and vniverſall: Much leſſe from one extraordinary act or event, to all ordinary courſes of the ſame kinde. Herein is the difference betweene the one, and the other p. 89That the one could not but fall certainly, were it never ſo often caſt, whereas the other, caſt often in the ſame caſe, would not certainely fall out ſtill the ſame.

The aſſumption vnderſtood vniverſallyReply 1. is true, and the places quoted make good the proofe thereof, as shall be made manifeſt. Firſt therefore let vsus conſider the1. ſuppoſed diſtinction betweene ordinary, and extraordinary Lottes Mr. Gataker ſpeaketh of a diſtinction, but sheweth not wherein, (touching the Lottes themſelves,) it doth conſiſt. Indeed, touching themſelves, (as they be Lottes,) there is no difference; For in an ordinary, as well as in an extraordinary Lott, the things are by man, of purpoſe intentionally diſpoſed vntounto a variable event, & they are wholy diſpoſed by God vntounto this, or vntounto that event, p. 90which the vſer of a Lott expecteth. If ſo, then it followeth, That the vſe of all Lottes, (as they be Lottes) whether ordinary, or extraordinary, directly, or of it ſelfe, & in ſpeciall ma…ner, tendeth to the advauncing of the Name of God. How? The vſe of Lottes attributeth to Gods ſpeciall Providence In the whole, and immediate diſpoſing of the Lott, & In expecting the event- Doth this ſcarce carry good ſence? Is there then no difference betweene an ordinary, and extraordinary Lott? The onelyonly difference is the ſubiect-matter whereabout the Lott is imployed. The ſubiect-matter of an ordinary Lott, is, by God's allowance, A Controverſy to be ended: The ſubiect-matter of an extraordinary Lott is any other matter, whereabout a Lott is imployed by God's ſpeciall direction; otherwiſe it is p. 91vnlawfull, as be luſorious, and Divinatory Lotts. In regard of which difference onelyonly, Mr. Gatakers Logique holdeth good, as thus. From the vſe of a Lott about an other matter than ending a Controverſy and that by God's ſpeciall direction, it followeth not, that it is lawfull to vſe a Lott about any other matter, than ending a Controverſy, as gaming, without God's ſpeciall direction. But Mr. Gataker maketh an other difference to witt, An immediate, and ſpeciall Providence in an extraordinary Lott, which is not in an ordinary Lott. He doth ſo; and therefore in his Logique, he cunningly ioyneth a ſuppoſed extraordinary Event to a ſuppoſed extraordinary Act, & declineth the proofe of an extraordinary act, which rather he should have done, becauſe mine argument ſtandeth vponupon the Vſe p. 92of Lottes. Neither doth he foundly proove an immediate, and ſpeciall Providence, or extraordinary event, to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lott. For, as it is a tempting of God to caſt an extraordinary Lott the firſt time without God's ſpeciall direction, pag. 313. ſo it is a tempting, yea, a greater tempting of God, when he hath given his iudgmentalready by the event of the Lott, to caſt the Lott againe without his ſpeciall direction. How then can Mr. Gataker ſo confidently affirme, that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly, were it never ſo oft caſt? Indeed, The certaine event of an extraordinary Lot may, in faith, be expected, becauſe of Gods ſpeciall direction. And why not ſo in an ordinary Lott? Seeing God adviſeth vsus, pag. …35. to vſe Lottes for the ending p. 93of controverſies. Prov. 18. 18. and aſſureth vsus that the whole diſpoſing of them is of him, Prov. 16. 33. But Mr. Gataker hath anſwered this place before. Let vsus then conſider what he hath anſwered. Before he ſaith, pag. 144. Good Authours expound this place of ſingular, extraordinary, and miraculous Lottes onelyonly. But (ſaith he) the wordes ſeeme to be more generall, and are, word for word, thus in the Originall, [The Lord is cast into the Lappe, but every iudgment, or diſpoſing of it, is of God.] Doth not confuting them, who holde onelyonly extraordinary Lottes to be meant in this place, and tranſlating the Text [Every iudgment] and expounding it, [Or diſpoſing of it,] shew plainely that this place prooveth mine Aſſumption to be vniverſally true? So that I much mervaile that he denieth p. 94this place to prooue mine Aſſumption, becauſe it concerneth Lottes in generall. For if it doe ſo, then it prooveth that ordinary, as well as extraordinary Lottes tend to the advauncing of the Name of God. Againe pag. 145. Mr. Gataker taking the wordes, as they are vſually read in the Genevatranſlation, and the King's edition, to witt, [The Lott is cast into the lappe, but the whole diſpoſition, or diſpoſing thereof is of the Lord,] graunteth that the whole event is of God. A graunt though true, yet turning the reader aſide from ſeeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole diſpoſing of the Lott caſt into the lappe.] If then the Lot caſt into the lap, that is, of purpoſ… diſpoſed by man vntounto a variable event, be wholy diſpoſed by God, ſo, as the event be that, which pleaſeth him, then God doth not mediately diſpoſe the Lot to this, or that p. 95event, if not mediately, then immemediately, becauſe the whole diſpoſing is of him. Doth not then this place make good mine Aſſumption? But for all this Mr. Gataker will not have it ſo; For as he tranſlateth this place, he ſaith It importeth thus much, [That there is a Providence in all things, even the leaſt, and moſt caſuall] and this he would confirme by theis my wordes, viz: [The diſpoſingꝭ of the chaunce is ſecret, that it might be chaunce indeed, & wholy of God, who directed all things.] Doe theis wordes iuſtifie Mr. Gatakers interpretation of this place? Yes; For they ſay plainely, God directed all things, and, they ſay withall; The diſpoſing of the chaunce (that is of the things purpoſedly diſpoſed by a man vntounto a variable event) vntounto a certaine event, is ſecret, that it may be chaunce indeed, that p. 96is, an event not by the will of man, but wholy of God. So that my wordes imply this argument. God directeth all things, Therefore much more, in our diſcerning, a Lot, the whole diſpoſing whereof is of him. This is farre from ſaying that this place importeth onelyonly, That there is a Providence in all things. Neither doth Mr. Gatakers tranſlation inferre this imported interpretation. For this diſcretion. [But] doth ſo oppoſe every iudgment, or diſpoſing of it (as he expoundeth Iudgment) to a Lot caſt into the lappe, as that Every diſpoſing, is all one with The whole diſpoſing. This place ſo troubleth Mr. Gataker that from it he would have no more gathered, than that the whole event (as of all things, ſo) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet ſo, as working by meanes in the moſt of them, and not implying and immediate p. 97Providence vniverſally in them. I neede not examine the meanes, or immediate Providence of all the inſtances quoted in the margent For here it is impliedly graunted (for he faith not All, but the most of them) that in ſome things God worketh not by meanes, and that there is an immediate Providence Particularly, for he denieth ſuch a Providence onelyonly, as being univerſally. Howſoever it be in other things, I thinke it is manifeſt to all, that will ſee, that God, without meanes, and therefore immediately, doth wholy diſpoſe the Lot caſt into the lappe vntounto this, or that event, what pleaſeth him, whereas man diſpoſeth the things onelyonly vntounto a variable event. As at cardes, man shuffleth them of purpoſe to diſpoſe them vntounto a variable event: But, by the immediate Providence of God, they are p. 98ſo shuffled, as that this, or that event followeth. Therefore (with Mr. Gataker favour) any reaſonable man may iudge it not ſenſeleſſe to ſay (which he doubteth of pa. 147.) that in childrens playes, at Even, and Odde, or at Heades, & Points, there is an immediate Providence, In inclining the will of the childe, and guiding his coniecture. Thus we ſee this place doth confirme mine aſſumption, and the proofe annexed, Mr. Gatakers interpretation notwithſtanding. But he giveth 2. reaſons againſt an immediate providence in ordinary Lottes, which1. are alſo to be conſidered. The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing, as it is ſuch, agreeth neceſſarily to ȧll things, that are ſuch. Therefore if there be an immediate Providence in a Lot, as it is caſuall, then there is an immediate providence in all thinges, that are p. 99caſuall: But the latter is not true; ergo not the former, pag. 143. Why not the latter? if the is Poſitions be true. That which ſeemes Chaunce to us, is a certaine Word of God (ſaith Bernard, But Mr. Gatak. tranſlatethSermo quidam it, Is as a word of God) acquainting vsus with his Will, pag. 17. and In caſuall events there is nothing guiding them, but God's Providence, pag. 22. But ſuppoſe that there is not an immediate Providence in all things, that be caſuall, what is that to the purpoſe? For all things caſuall are not ſuch, with a Lott, wherein things are of purpoſe diſpoſed by man vntounto an vncertaine event, which things, ſo diſpoſed by man, are wholy diſpoſed by God vntounto a certaine event, this or that; ſo it is not in all other things, that be caſuall. Therefore all other caſuall things, and Lotts are not ſuch▪ Neither is it ſaid an p. 100immediate Providence is in a Lot, as it is caſuall, but as the Lot being made caſuall is wholy diſpoſed by God to this, or that event. So that from Mr▪ Gatakers axiome this argument may be framed. An immediate Providence, in an extraordinary Lot, is acknowledged by Mr. Gataker as it is a Lot (ſay I) wholy diſpoſed by God; Therefore an immediate Providence is in an ordinary Lot (as it is a Lot) wholy diſpoſed by God. For there is no difference betweene theis ſorts of Lotts, (as they be Lotts) and ſo diſpoſed. For Mr. Gataker hath shewed that Prov. 16. 33. ſpeaketh as well of one ſort of Lotts, as of another. The other argument is this▪ which is the kill-kow. If in every Lott there be neceſſarily an immediate worke, and Providence of God, then is it in the naturall of man to make God worke immediately p. 101at his pleaſure: But to ſay, that it is in man's power naturally to ſett God on working, immediately, at his pleaſure, is abſurd. There is not therefore an immediate worke, and Providence of God neceſſarily in every Lott. Mr. Gataker like an Oratour, ſeemeth deſirous to draw his adverſary into hatred by thei wordes [Neceſſarily, Naturall power, Sett God on working, At pleaſure, To ſay, and Abſurd] Verba dum ſint, ſurdo canit. But hoping better, I aunſwering his Logique, deny the Aſſumption. For it is as much in man's naturall power to ſet God on worke immediately, in an ordinary, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God, and man doe reſpectively as much in the one Lott, as in the other. But an extraordinary Lot is by the ſpeciall direction of God: True; So is an ordinary Lott by God's p. 102ſpeciall adviſe to ende a controverſy. If then every Lot be a ſetting of our glorious God on worke, there ought to be prayer, if not by wordes; yet in heart in the vſe as well of ordinary, as extraordinary Lotts. If ſo, then Lotts are not to be vſed in ſport. Here then will I proceed to the defence of my ſecond argument, which is this, pag. 150.

Dialog.We are not to tempt the AlmightyPſal. 78. 18. …9. Iſa. 7. 12 Math. 4. 6. 7.Ps 78:18Ps 78:9Isa 7:12Matt 4:6Matt 4:7 by a vaine deſire of manifeſting his power, and ſpeciall Providence: But by vſing Lotts in ſport we tempt the Almighty, vainely deſiring the manifeſtation of his ſpeciall Providence in his immediate diſpoſing; Therefore we may not vſe Lotts in ſport▪ The Aſſumption (ſaith Mr. Gataker) they ſeeme to proove on this wiſe. To call God to ſitt in iudgment, where there is no p. 103neceſſity ſo to doe, for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mocke God: But by the vſe of Lotts in ſport, God is called to ſitt in iudgment, where is no neceſſity, for the determining of trifles. By the vſe of Lotts in ſport therefore, we doe tempt, and dishonour God. This argument Mr. Gataker hath from Dan…eus that learned man of reverend memory. To proove the Aſſumption whereof, he alleadgeth theis wordes out of my Dialogue. A Lot in the nature thereof doth as neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Providence, and determining preſence of God, as an Oath, in the nature thereof, doth ſuppoſe the teſtifying preſence of God, yea ſo, that, as in an Oath, ſo in a Lot, prayer is expreſſed, or to be vnderſtood.

p. 104Aunſw.The Aſſumption of the maine Argument is not true, but onelyonly in extraordinary Lottes, vſed not with out ſpeciall direction. Yea rather, if a Lot be ſuch as is here ſaid, it is not lawful to vſe Lottes in any caſe whatſoever. Becauſe thereby we require a worke of God's immediate Power, and Providence, and ſo tempt God. And to ſpeake as the truth is. By this courſe, and force of this diſcourſe, the onelyonly lawfull vſe of a Lot is condemned, & an vnlawfull vſe of it is allowed in the roome of it. Againe: An Oath, and a Lot are not alike. The compariſon therefore laide betweene them will not holde. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot, put to the ſpeciall providence, and imediate worke of God, as the truth of the thing teſtified is in an Oath, put to his Teſtimony: Neither is there in p. 105every Lot any ſuch ſolemne invocation of God, as there is in an Oath ever, either expreſſed, or implied. For the definition of each thing conteineth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without mention of Prayer, as appeareth in the definition thereof in the Dialogue: But ſo cannot an Oath. Therefore Prayer is not of the eſſence of a Lot. Neither doe the places, 1. Sam. 14. 41. Acts 1. 24. (whereof the former was a faithleſſe prayer) proove it. They proove onelyonly, that prayer was ſometimes vſed before an extraordinary Lot, for an immediate Providence to direct the event of it. Which is not lawfull in ordinary Lotts. For in ſetting forth tithes, Levit. 27. 32. it was not lawfull to pray God to give a right Lot. In election of offices ſacred, or civill prayer p. 106ought to be vſed, yet it followeth not therefore, that Prayer is part of the choiſe, or that therefore the Election, in the nature thereof, doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe a ſpeciall providence, and determining preſence of God. Laſtly, A Lott is not in it ſelfe an holy thing alwayes, and neceſſarily, as hath beene shewed, nor indeed was ever any ſo ſave extraordinarily. Therefore there is difference betweene Lotts and Oathes. Indeed, Whoſoever shall contemne an extraordinary Lot, he shall abuſe an holy thing, and Gods Name.

Reply 2.To this long anſwer I might make a short reply. For whereas Mr. Gatakers maine ground is this. There is no immediate providence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinrry Lot, and therevpon he buildeth theis anſweres, Therefore there is no tempting of God p. 107by vſing Lotts in ſport: Therefore no prayer expreſſed, or to be vnderſtood is required in ordinary Lotts: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is not an holy thing in it ſelfe; I might, (referring my ſelfe to the defence of my former argument,) breifely reply, and ſay. There is an immediate providence in an ordinary Lot. Therefore God is tempted by vſing Lotts in ſporte: Therefore Prayer expreſſed, or to be vnderſtood, is required of them who vſe an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is an holy thing: But ſomething more in replying, will have more ſavour in reading. Therefore I firſt mervaile that M. G. forgetteth himſelfe in concluding. That all Lotts be vnlawfull, if there be an immediate providence in all Lotts. What? Were extraordinary Lotts vnlawfull too? Nay; He p. 108vnderſtandeth an exception of them becauſe they were commaunded by God. So I ſay, ordinary Lotts were adviſed by God to end controverſies. Therefore vſing them, in that caſe, is no tempting of God. I mervaile alſo, why Mr. Gataker should ſo confidently affirme, that, by this courſe, that is, by maintaining an immediate Providence in all Lotts, an vnlawfull vſe of a Lott is allowed in the roome of the onelyonly lawfull vſe. But I referre the diſcuſſing thereof to the defence of my 3. argument▪ Againe, It is to be obſerved, that he ſett's downe a compariſon betweene an Oath, and a Lott, which I ſett not downe, whereby the minde of the reader may be troubled▪ For I ſay not, As the Truth of a thing is, by an Oath, put to Gods Teſtimony: ſo in an ordinary Lot the R…ght of a thing is put p. 109to Gods immediate Providence. This is that I ſay, As an Oath, in the nature thereof, ſuppo…eth the testifying preſence of God: ſo a Lot, in the nature thereof, ſuppoſeth the determining preſence of God. My reaſon is, Ending a controverſy (I ſay not, Deciding a Right, for, before dividing the land of Promiſe by Lot, no tribe, or family could chalenge more Right to one portion, than to another) Ending (I ſay) a Controverſy is, by a Lot referred to God's determining the ſame by his whole, or immediate diſpoſing the vncertaine Lot) to a certaine event. It is alſo to be obſerved that in the 2. compariſon betweene an Oath, and a Lot, touching Prayer, he ſaith, Neither is there in every Lot any ſuch ſolemne invocation. Therefore in ſome Lot, that is, an extraordinary Lot, becauſe of an immediate Providence p. 110to direct the event of it. For the ſame cauſe (ſay I) is prayer to be expreſſed, or vnderſtood in the vſe of an ordinary Lot too. But (ſaith Mr. Gataker) Prayer is of the eſſence of an Oath, and not of a Lott. I have ſaid nothing to the contrary; So that he might have ſpared his definition of a Lot: But becauſe he taketh a definition (ſuch as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will ſay ſomewhat thereto. The Definition (ſo called) is from Lyrd, viz. To vſe Lotts is by a variable event of ſome ſenſible thing to determine ſome doubtfull, or vncertaine matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Even by God's whole, or immediate diſpoſing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination? and Is not then Prayer to be expreſſed, or vnderſtood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vſers thereof? p. 111Now then let vsus conſider the places produced to proove it. The former (ſaith Mr. Gataker) was faithleſſe, I ſay ſo too, Becauſe that Lot was without any warrant. This (notwithſtanding Prayer in this, and the other place) doth shew that God's people beleiving that God doth ſignifie his iudgment by the whole, or immediate diſpoſing of that Lot, did therefore thinke themſelves bound to pray. But both theis Lotts were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate providence of God. Therefore they might well beleive they should pray. True; So all Chriſtians may, yea and muſt beleive they ought to pray in the vſing ordinary Lotts, becauſe of God's immediate Providence exerciſed therein. Nay▪ It was vnlawfull in ſetting out Tithe. If ſo▪ Not becauſe p. 112it was an ordinary Lot (If a Lot) but becauſe the Lord expreſly ſaid Of all that goeth vnderunder the rodde the tenth shall be holy. The inſtance of election of offices is beſides the purpoſe- For it is not argued thus. Becauſe Gods people prayed when they vſed a Lot, therefore there is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot: But thus. There is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot, therefore Gods people prayed when they vſed a Lot. If then there be an immediate Providence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof, Prayer is to be expreſſed, or vnderſtood in lawfull vſe of a Lot, then Praying and Playing, (though they rime well together, yet) runne not well together in the lawfull vſe of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both That a Lot is not to be vſed but in a caſe of neceſſity more, or leſſe; and Therefore p. 113ſtra…nge (I will not ſay abſurd) is Mr. Gataker his Poſition, pag. 111. to witt, The leſſe weighty the matter is wherein a Lot vſed, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be prooved, That the leſſe weighty the m…tter is, the greater is the neceſſity of ending the controverſy by a Lot. The ſaid Poſition is more ſtrange becauſe he graunteth, pag. 95. That Prayer ſpecially applyed to the Lot may, (in ſome caſe,) be conceived, where the matter is more weighty, and the event of ſome conſequence, as in the choiſe of a Magiſtrate. But concerning this alſo more shall be ſaid in my next Reply. Lastly; It ſerves my turne that Mr. Gataker acknowledgeth that God's Name, and an Holy thing is abuſod whenſoever an extraordinary p. 114Lot it contemned, becauſe an immediate Providence of God is therein. For the ſame cauſe an ordinary Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and the…efore not to be abufed in ſport. But Mr. Gataker hath shewen before that a Lot is not, in it ſelfe, an holy thing. Indeed; He would have shewen in his 3▪ reaſon inducing him to allow luſorious Lotts▪ as not evill in themſelves, that a Lot is not holy either in it ſelfe, or by divine inſtitution. Wherevnto I have already anſwered ſomewhat. But having learned more (occaſionally) by his further diſpute, I will now, for ſome more ſatisfaction, anſwere ſomewhat more. A Lot (ſaith Mr▪ Gataker, pag. 132. and 133.) is not holy, either in it ſelfe, becauſe a Caſualty hath no holineſſe in it ſelfe; For then all Caſualties should be holy: or By divine inſtitution i… p. 115the Word, ſanctifying it to ſom… holy vſe. I anſwere breifely. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an Holy thing in it ſelfe, becauſe of God's immediate Providence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in reſpect of the ſame Providence? If it be, Then, though all caſualties be not holy in themſelves, yet all lawfull Lotts be holy in themſelves. So that as …he Bush that burnt, and waſted not, was holy, when God manifeſted himſelfe to Moſes in it, pag. 156, ſo a Lot is holy, becauſe of God's ſpeciall Preſence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, becauſe God was preſent in it but for a time: Whereas a Lot is holy from time to time, ſo oft as it is lawfully vſed, becauſe of God's ſpeciall preſence therein from …ime to time, Therefore Howſ…e…er ſport might have beene made with the Bush the ſpeciall preſēce of God be…ng remooved, yet ought ſport never be mad… p. 116with a Lot, becauſe God's ſpeciall preſence is ever therein. Againe; I neede not proove that an ordinary Lot to ende controverſies is by divine inſtitution in the word, ſeeing Mr. Gataker graunteth that God in Prov. 18. 18. adviſeth vsus to vſe it to that ende. But it is not ſanctified to an holy vſe. I have shewed otherwiſe. But what then? Is not a Lot therefore alwayes holy in it ſelfe, as Mr. Gataker ſaith in this paſſage? Were all extraordinary Lotts ſanctified to holy vſes? Yet Mr. Gataker deemeth them all holy in themſelves, becauſe of God's immediate Providence in them. Why may not I, for the ſame cauſe, thinke the ſame of all ordinary Lotts? And the rather, becauſe Mr. Gataker ſaith, pag. …27.▪ Marriage, being Gods Ordinaunce, is holy in it ſelfe: But (as he acknowledgeth, pag. 1.) a Lot is p. 117Gods Ordinaunce; Therefore, from his graunt, a Lot is holy in it ſelfe. If then a Lot be holy in it ſelfe I conclude with Mr. Gataker, pag. 133. It may in no caſe, with no caution, be made matter of ſport. Now then I proceed to my 3. argument, which is this, pag. 166.

Dialog. Mat. 21. 12. 13. Numb. 26. 5…. Prov. 18. 18. Heb: 6▪ 16.Matt 21:12Matt 21:13Num 26:5Prov 18:18Whatſoever God hath ſanctified to a proper end is not to be perverted to a worſe end: But God hath ſanctified Lotts to a proper end, viz: To end Controverſies▪ Therefore man is not to pervert them to a worſe, viz: To play, and by playing to get away another mans money, which, without controverſy is his owne. The Aſſumption is amplified by the like vſe of an Oath.

Aunſ….This Argumēt is faulty. But may be mended thus. That which God hath ſanctified to ſome proper vſe is not to be applied to any other, eſpeciala worſe. But God hath ſauctifyed p. 118Lotts to this propre vſe, to witt, the deciding of Controverſies in matters of weight; A Lott therefore may not be applied to any other vſe, much leſſe to a worſe. But to aunſwere the argument. The Propoſition is graunted, if, [To Sanctiſie] be vnderſtood in a larger ſenſe, as meates are ſaid to be ſanctiſied, by God's word, for man's food, and The vnbeleiving mate ſanctified to the maried beleever, and if thereby be alſo vnderſtood the ſanctification, and approbation of the whole kinde. To the Aſſumption, and amplification thereof, it is anſwered. That place, Prov. 18. 18. doth not inioyne tho vſe of a Lot; Nor reſtraineth it to the ending of ſtrife, Much leſſe to the ending of great quarrells onelyonly, For, ending ſtrife is but one vſe amongſt many, Ioshua, 7. 14. Ionas 1. 7. 1. Sam. 14. 42. Levit. 16. 8; 9. So p. 119…ebr. 6. 16. doth not she w that ending a Controverſy is the onelyonly lawfull vſe of an Oath. For there be other vſes of it, As, to give aſſurance of the performance of Covenants, and promiſes. For, what controverſy was there betweene Ionathan, and David to be ended by1. Sam. 20. 16. 17. 42.1 Sam 20:161 Sam 20:171 Sam 20:42 Oath when they ſware either to other?

Reply ….I would thanke Mr. Gataker for mending mine argument, though there be not any great neede, if he had not put into his Aſſumption theis wordes [In matters of weight] for his owne purpoſe, as shall appeare, But to the matter. In mine vnderſtanding, and meaning, the Propoſition doth ſufficiently expreſſe all that which mooveth Mr. Gataker to graunt it. Well, Then let vsus conſider his oppoſition made to the Aſſumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. Gataker p. 120imply a Lot not be ſanctified, becauſe (as he ſaith now peremptorily) it is not inioyned? What! Is Recreation (in generall) inioyned by precpt, if not directly, yet (at leaſt) by iuſt conſequence, as Mr. Gataker in his allowance of luſorious Lotts, ſaith is graunteth by all, pag. 138? and is not ſo vſefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end Controverſies, inioyned by precept either directly, or by iuſt conſequence? Doth God more carefully provide for recreation, than for peace amongſt his people? But Mr. Gataker is not ſo peremptory in an other place, pag. 135. where he ſaith. The vſe of Lotts is not ſimply commaunded, For. Prov. 18. 18. is Rather a permiſſion than a precept, & Not ſo much a commaundement as an adviſe, & counſaile. I will come to an iſſue. If it will pleaſe M. G. to ſet downe his iuſt conſequence p. 121to proove Recreation inioyned by precept, I will vndertake to ſett downe as iuſt a conſequence to proove, that a Lot to end a Controverſy is likewiſe inioyned by precept. In meane while I cannot be perſwaded that our God of peace,Pſal. 34▪ 14.Ps 34:14 who commaundeth vsus to ſeeke peace, and follow after it, and hath ordeined a Lot, wherein he is ſpecially preſent by his immediate providence, to end controverſies, which otherwiſe cannot be ended conveniently, doth leave vsus at liberty in that caſe, to vſe, or not to vſe a Lot. But ſuppoſe the vſe of a Lot be not (thus) inioyned, yet doth not Gods counſel (which me thinkes is a cōmandemēt though it be ſaid of mans conſell that it is no commaundement) ſanctify it to be vſed to end controverſies. This (I thinke) will not be denied: But it is denied That the vſe of a Lot is reſtrained to end p. 122controverſies, much leſſe great quarrelles onelyonly, and ſundry inſtances are given of vſing Lotts to other endes than to end controverſies. But all thoſe Lotts were extraordinary. Therefore, whereas in the beginning of this anſwere where he would finde fault with mine argvment, he ſaith, That the vſe of Lotts in play is ever to decide ſome queſtion, or controverſy, though a light one (it is like) yet a queſtion, or controverſy truely ſo tearmed, otherwiſe it were no Lot. If he meane a Lot in generall, then (with his favour) he forgetteth himſelfe in ſaying Lotts, by him quoted were not to end controverſies: If he ſpeake of a Lot in play, as being an ordinary Lot, then he faileth in iudgment, In denying that the vſe of ordinary Lotts (whereof is the queſtion) is reſtrained to end controverſies, and The p. 123inſtances which he giveth being extraordinary Lotts, are not to the point. Beſides: The ſubiect-matter of an extraordinary Lot being by God's ſpeciall direction, if it be lawfull, there may (happily) be no preſent controverſy. Whereas, the ſubiect-matter of an ordinary Lot, being ſomething queſtioned betweene man, & man, there may be a great controverſy. I ſay, May be, For if it be well obſerved, in an ordinary Lot there is not alwayes a preſent controverſy to be determined: But alwayes ſome queſtion to be decided to prevent a controverſy. As may appeare by Mr. Gatakers owne wordes, partly here, where he ſaith [That there muſt be ſome queſtion, or controverſy, or elſe it is no Lot,] but more evidently, where he ſaith: That the Lot vſed by the ſouldiers about Chriſt his garments, which he truly calleth p. 124a ſerious diviſory Lot, was to prevent all contention, and ſtrife, pag. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot alſo which was vſed about dividing, the Land of Promiſe, about which was no preſent controverſy. For God, who would have no controverſies, whould have alſo ſuch things remooved which may cauſe, or iuſtly occaſion controverſies. Therefore Chriſt expounding the commaundement.Math. 5. 21. 22.Matt 5:21Matt 5:22 Thou shallt not kill, forbiddeth wordes of provocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common, controverſies, and the occaſions thereof be, giveth direction in Prov. 18. 18. That which is ſaid of an ordinary Lot may iuſtly be alſo ſaid of an Oath, that the vſe of it is ſanctified to end controverſies by preſent determination, or prevention. For, as it is true, that Heb. 6. 16. implieth, that Gods Oath p. 125to man is more inviolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof onelyonly, M. G. taketh knowledge, ſo itpa, 17…. is true, that Heb. 6. 16. intimateth, That, as an Oath, for confirmation, is amongſt men an end of all ſtrife▪ ſo Gods Oath for confirmation of his promiſe to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, queſtion▪ or controverſy▪ Elſe, theis wordes ▪An end of all ſtrife] were to no purpoſe. But that they were to the purpoſe by me vnderſtood, appeareth in the 2▪ uext verſ. where it is written. That God bound himſelfe by Oath as to shew the stableneſſe of his Counſell, ſo that the heires of promiſe might have ſtrong couſolation. So that Gods Oath to Abraham tooke away doubting, queſtioning, & all ſtrife that might be, not onelyonly in Abrahās minde, but alſo in the mindes of the heires of promiſe. Therefore an Oath doth not onelyonly end preſēt cōtroverſies, according to p. 126M. G. vnderſtanding, but confirming a promiſe▪ or covenant doth alſo ende a ſtrife, though there be none preſent, when the Oath is given, to wit, by Prevention. Now let vsus ſomewhat conſider Mr. Gatakers purpoſe in putting into the Aſſumption, theis wordes▪ [In matters of weight.▪ Forſooth, By denying the the ſame, to make way for light matters, and conſequently for playing with Lottes. Becauſe (as he ſaith, pag. 130.) they beſt agree with the nature of Lotts, that is, with vncertaine hazard. Surely, If Mr. Gataker had acknowledged God's ſpeciall preſence by his immediate Providence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God, to end controverſies, he would not have ſo written, but deemed weighty matters beſt agreeing with the nature of a Lot. It is true that a matter of leſſe weight in it p. 127ſelfe may be the ſubiect-matter of a controverſy, as a controverſy may be among men, as well meane, as might, yin their ſtate, as Mr. Gataker here ſaith pa. 137. For by mighty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. ſo) in Prov. 18. 18. are meant Men ſtrong in their affections, ſo as the controverfy cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the ſubiect-matter of the Controverſy be of more, or leſſe weight in it ſelfe; ſo as there is a neceſſity that one or both parties be ſatisfied. For otherwiſe there may be a great quarrell about a matter of leſſe weight. Neither doe I ſay, that onelyonly great quarrells are to be ended, or prevented by a Lot, as Mr. Gataker denieth not, but ſome may. For (as he ſaith truly, pag. 173.) God ſpeaketh in Prov. 18. 18. of contentions in generall. Here then we may enter into further conſideration p. 128of that which Mr. Gataker writeth, pag. 135. to wit. That, by the force of our diſcourſe againſt playing with a Lot, the onelyonly lawfull vſe is condemned…, and an vnlawfull vſe is allowed in the roome thereof. What is that OnelyOnly lawfull vſe of a Lot? I can finde none other than The putting of that to a Lot which he calleth (pag. 130.) A matter of mere indifferency, that is, Such as is not materiall, whether a man doe, or omitt: Howſoever there may be a lawfull vſe of a Lot about ſuch a matter queſtioned to determine, or prevent a Controverſy, yet I wonder that Mr. Gataker deemeth it that onelyonly lawfull. Doth not he graunt, pag. 91. That Prayer ſpecially applyed to a Lot may be conceived in weighty matters, as in the choiſe of a Magiſtrate, which is not a matter of mere indifferency, that is, ſuch p. 129as is not materiall whether it be done or omitted. Did God ſpecially appoint Lotts to be vſed about onelyonly matters of weight? and muſt man ſo farre ſwerve from Gods example as to ſtrive onelyonly about matters of ſuch indifferency, and then to putt onelyonly ſuch, controverted, to the determination of a Lot? So that I doubt not but that with found iudgment, and a cleare conſcience not accuſing me of not duely reſpecting the ſpeciall Providence, of God by his immediate diſpoſing of a Lot, I may affirme. That the more weighty the ſubiect-matter of a controverſy is, the more iuſtifiable is the Controverſy: and Be that matter of more or leſſe weight, the greater the neceſſity of ending a Controverſy is, the more iuſtifiable is the vſe of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abuſing p. 130of Gods Ordinance? But (faith Mr. Gataker glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot.) The vſe of a Lot in play is ever to decide ſome queſtion, or controverſy truely ſo tearmed. If ſo, Then he might have called it a ſerious Lot, according to his doctrine, the lightneſſe of the ſubiect-matter controverted, notwithſtanding. But whereabout is that ſuppoſed Controverſy? Mr. Gataker in his written anſwere to my Dialogue, before mentioned, ſayth. The Controverſy tendeth to Victory, which till it be decided, there is a Controverſy though a light one, yet a Controverſy, truely ſo tearmed. But is that truely or worthily to be called A Victory, which falleth out by hap-hazard (according to M. Gatakers eſteeming a Lot) without any deſert? But (ſay I) Is it not a tempting of God to put p. 131him, by his immediate Providence in diſpoſing the Lot, to humour (I ſay not, honour) ſome of the vaine glorious fooles with ſuppoſed Victory, who make a pretended controverſy there-about, whereas (before they intended to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a Controverſy truly ſo tearmed? I need ſay no more, and therefore proceed to the laſt argumēt (whereof, but part is mine) It is this, pag. 173.

That, which there is neither precept for, nor practiſe of, in GodsDial. 4▪ word, generall, or ſpeciall, expreſſed or implied, that there is no warrant for in the word: But ſuch is the vſe of Lotts in game. For we reade in Scripture that Lotts were vſed, but in ſerious matters onelyonly, both by Iewes, and Gentiles; Neither is there any warrant in the Word for the ludicrous vſe of p. 132them, by precept, or practiſe, generall, or ſpeciall, expreſſed, or implied, There is no warrant therefore for luſorious Lotts in Gods word.

Aunſw.The Propoſition is vnſound. For an argument holdeth (indeed) from the Negative in matters of Faith, but not in matters of Fact. Mnch leſſe may a man reaſon from a matter of Fact, to a matter of Right negatively. For many things are of ordinary vſe, whereof there is no mention at all in Gods Word, which yet all generally allow, as2. ſugar for ſweetning, &c. Secondly; An action may have warrant ſufficiently by permiſſion, without precept, or practiſe. For where God hath not limited the vſe of any creature, or Ordinance, there he hath left the vſe of it free: Where he hath not determined the Circumſtances of any action, there, p. 133what he hath not prohibited, that he hath permitted. For this cauſe,Ier. 7. 31 & 19. 5. Col. 2. 22 23. Deu. 12 30. 31. 32Jer 7:31Jer 19:5Col 2:22Deut 12:30Deut 12:31Deut 12:32 in the point of Gods worship, the argument holdeth from the Negative, for the ſubſtance of it. Becauſe God hath determined it: But in civil affaires, it will not holde from the Negative to diſallow ought, becauſe God hath not determined them.

Reply 4.Mr. Gataker in his booke sheweth many inſtances of Lotts vſed both by Iewes, and Gentiles, and all in ſerious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they, by the light not onelyonly of the Word, but of nature too, diſcerned, that Lotts are to be vſed onelyonly in ſerious matters. O let vsus take heed how we put out ſo great light. But let vsus conſider his anſwere, which is onelyonly to the Propoſition, though I have already confuted many principall parts thereof. In my Dialogue to shew p. 134that the Spirit ſometime reaſoneth from a matter of Fact to a matter of right, negatively, I quote theis Scriptures, Iohn 8. 39. 40. 1. Cor. 11. 16. The wordes of the former be theis, Yee goe about to kill me, a man that hath tolde you the truth; This did not Abraham. The argument is this Abraham did not kill any that tolde him the truth, Therefore yee ought not goe about to kill me, if yee would be ſonnes of Abraham. This is Christ his Logicke, wherewith I dare finde no fault: Neither doth Mr. Gataker. For he ſaith nothing to it, becauſe the Printer putteth for verſ. 40. the 48. verſ. wherewith Mr. Gataker maketh paſtime, but I will let paſſe time now to take further knowledge of it. Of the other quotation the wordes be theis. We have no ſuch cuſtome, nor the Churches of God. The conſequent implied is. Therefore nomen ought p. 135not to pray vncovered. Herevnto Mr. Gataker anſwereth indeed, but ſo, that he doth not deny that Paul argueth negatively from a matter of Fact to a matter of Right. Which is all that I intended by the quotation, and not, to imagine this argument. The Churches of God, and faithfull men doe not vſe Lotts in gaming▪ Therefore ſuch gaming is vnlawfull. So that I neede not herein reply vponupon Mr. Gataker, I onelyonly wonder that he ſaith. The vſe of Lotts in games hath beene common in the Churches of God. What! In the publicke Aſſemblies? as was the fault of women their heads vncovered in the Church at Corinth? But Mr. Gataker in this anſwer ſpeaketh of things merely naturall, or civill, as ſweetning with ſugar, &c. I will not now indeavour to proove that in the Word there is matter of iuſt conſequence p. 136either generall, or implied (which is a part of the propoſition) to allow as well ſweetning with ſugar, &c. as Recreation in generall, and therefore they may be lawfull though they be not mentioned in the Word. But ſuppoſe M. Gatakers axiome holdeth in them, what is that to Lotts, wherein is the Name of God by his immediate providence, and the vſe whereof is limited to ende ſerious controverſies? In regard whereof doubt I not but an argument concerning the vſe of them, may holde from the Negative in matter of Fact, as well as in matter of Faith, or of the point of Gods worship for the ſubſtance of it. For I preſume that as Abraham would not, if he had had occaſion, as he did not, kill a man that tolde him the truth: ſo that all who feared God, and knew the nature, and vſe of a Lot, would not, p. 137as they did not, vſe a Lot in game. Secondly. Why may not there be for2. a thing permitted, ſome precept in the Word, generall, or implied? The permiſſion of any thing muſt be in the Word, either expreſſe or by iuſt conſequence, and then the thing ſo permitted is indifferent. But Mr. Gataker reconſileth theis two axiomes [Every action is indifferent,] & [No action is indifferent,] thus, Every naked and bare action ſimply conceived, is indifferent: But, No action cladde with his particular circumſtances, is indifferent, pag. 94. So that, he concludeth it to be moſt true, That no particular morall action, or No action of the reaſonable creature, proceeding from reaſon, can poſſibly be ſo indifferent, but it muſt of neceſſity, be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or diſconformable therevnto, pag. 95. p. 138Theis things, eſpecially theis wordes (Rules of Gods Word, conſidered,) I may ſay, that howſoever a naked indifferent thing be by permiſſion, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawfull, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. Gataker ſaith, Recreation in generall, is both by permiſſion, and by precept, if not expreſly, yet by iuſt conſequence pag. 138. Doth then Mr. Gataker make permiſſion a iuſt exception againſt the Propoſition? Touching his proofe that Permiſſion is a ſufficient1. warrant: I first would know what ordinance of God that is, which hath not ſome limited, or appointed vſe thereof. I am ſure, and have shewed, that Gods ordinance…. touching a Lot, hath. Secondly, I greive to obſerve what a gappe Mr. Gataker hath, by this doctrine, opened to Licentiouſneſſe. What! may man diſpoſed to finne, imploy p. 139any creature, whoſe vfe God hath not limited, to what vſe he will? No; For here is to be vnderſtood that exception which is expreſſed in the next part of the reaſon touching circumſtances, viz [Any vſe, but that which is prohibited] Howſoever I could demurre the revpon, eſpecially if an expreſſe prohibition be vnderſtood, yet herein I will be ſilent having enough graunted me. For the vſe of Lotts in game is prohibited by iuſt conſequences, as I have demonſtrated. For the better vnderſtanding of the 2. part of the reaſon, (haſting to an end) I onelyonly deſire an anſwere to this queſtion. Is any vſe of a Lot lawfull where the circumſtances of Time, Place, and Perſons be not determined? If Mr. Gataker except an extraordinary vſe, I may as well except the luſorious vſe of Lotts, In anſwere to the exemplification p. 140of this reaſon, graunting that an argument holdeth from the Negative for the ſubſtance of Gods Worshippe, I yet make this Quaere. Whether, onelyonly becauſe God hath determined it? For in thoſe places of Ieremy, God doth blame his people onelyonly for vſing a worship [which he commaunded not], without any intimation that he preſcribed his owne worship. To the ſame purpoſe writeth Paul to the Coloſsians againſt traditions of men, and will-worship, not for Mr. Gatakers cauſe, but becauſe in ſo worshipping they held not the Head, ver. 19. which is Christ, King of his Church teaching, and governing the ſame in all things. But in Deut. Mr. Gatakers cauſe is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other nations ſerved their Gods, and ſendeth them to his word to obſerve p. 141the ſame, without putting anything to, or taking out from the ſame. Surely, I should not gather from hence Mr. Gatakers cauſe, as being the onelyonly cauſe; Becauſe I feare it would incourage Papists in their ſuperſtitious rites, and ceremonies called Circumstances, though, indeed, parts of the ſubſtance of Gods outward worship. For they are to ready to take holde thereof and ſay God hath determined nothing touching theis ſuppoſed Circumſtances, & they are not againſt the word of God, therefore they are permitted, and ſo warranted. But I should gather from that, and the other places (I thinke directly, and not auckwardly) this concluſion. Becauſe all things in, & vntounto the ſervice of God ought to be preciſely according to Gods Will revealed in his word, therefore whatſoever is not commaunded p. 142ought not to be. And the rather (God being jealous) becauſe of th… meaning of the fringes vponupon theExo. 20. 5. Num. 15 39.Exod 20:5Num 15:39 Iſraëlites their garments, to witt, Tha… yee may remember all the Commaunde▪ments of the Lord, and doe them, and that yee ſeeke not after your owne heart, nor, after your owne eyes, after which yee goe … whoring. To the laſt I anſwere. That a Lot is no more a Civill affaire, than is an Oath, though it, (as is an Oath,) be vſed in Civill affaires. And lastly, I affirme againe, that God hath determined the vſe of a Lot to determine controverſies, ſo as, without Gods ſpeciall appointment, (which is not now to be expected,) it cannot be lawfully vſed to any other purpoſe; Therefore an argument from the Negative will holde by Mr. Gatakers rule, to diſallow the vſe of any other Lot, as well luſorious, as divinatory. Thus having anſwered Mr. Gatakers p. 143reaſons inducing him to allow Luſorious Lotts as not evill in themſelves, and remooved Mr. Gatakers anſweres to mine arguments, I may more confidently holde mine opinion, which Mr. Dudley Fennor (of reverend memory) his godly treatiſe of Recreations hath taught me▪ to witt, That Tables, and Cardes, as well as Dice, and all other games conſisting in cha…nce, (wherein there is vſe of a Lot) are vtterly vnl…wfull.

ERRATA.

Pardon the reſt, both literall and punctuall▪

End of the text · James Balmford, Reply to Answers of Mr Gataker (1623)