Dispute Against the English-Popish Ceremonies, Part 3 · Chapter 8 · Digression 3
DIGRESSION III.
Of the judging of Controversies and Questions of Faith.
THere is a twofold judgement which discerneth and judgeth of Faith. The one absolute, whereby the most high God, whose supreme Auctority alone, bindeth us to beleeve whatsoever he propoundeth to be believed by us, hath in his written Word pronounced, declared, and established; what he would have us to believe concerning himself, or his worship. The other limited and subordinate: which is either publike or private. That which is publike, is either ordinary or extraordinary. The Ministeriall or subordinate publike judgement, which I call ordinary, is the judgement of every Pastor or Doctor; who by reason of his publike vocation and office, ought by his publike Ministery to direct and instruct the judgments of other men, in matters of Faith. Which judgement of Pastors and Doctors, is limited and restricted to the plaine warrants and testimonies of Holy Scripture, xIun. cont, 1. lib. 3. cap 4. nota 17.they themselves beeing onelyonly the Ambassadours of the judge, to preach and publish the sentence which he hath established, so that a Pastor is not properly judex but Index. The subordinate publike judgement, which is extraordinary, is the judgement of a Councell, assembled for the more publike and effectuall establishment and declaration of one or moe points of Faith, and heads of Christian Doctrine, & that in Opposition to all contrary heresie, or error, which is broached and set a foot in the Church. yM. Ant. de Dom. de rep. Eccl. lib. 7. c. 3. n. 32.From which Councell, no Christian man who is learned in the Scriptures, may be excluded, but ought to be admitted to utter his judgement in the same. For in the indagation or searching out of a matter of Faith, they are not the persons of men, which give auctority to their sayings, but the reasons and documents which every one bringeth for his judgement. The subordinate judgement, which I call private, is the judgement of Discretion, zDavenāt de jud. controv. cap. 25. Iun. ubi supra.whereby every Christian, for the certaine information of his owne minde, and the satisfaction of his owne conscience, may and ought to trie and examine, as well the Decrees of Councels', as the Doctrines of particular Pastors, and in so farre to receive and believe the same, as he understandeth them to agree with the Scriptures.
Beside these, there is no other kind of judgement, which God hath allowed to men, in matters of Faith. Which beeing first observed, we say next concerning the part of Princes, that when questions and controversies of Faith, are tossed in the Church, that which pertaineth to them, is, to convocate a Councell for the Decision of the matter, civilly to moderate the same, by causing such an orderly and peaceable proceeding, as is alike necessary in every grave Assembly, whether of the Church or of the Common-wealth; and finally, by their coactive temporall power, to urge and procure, that the decrees of the Councell be received, and the Faith therein contained, professed by their subjects.
But neither may they, by their owne Auctority, and without a Councell, decide any controverted matter of Faith, nor yet having convocate a Councell, may they take upon them to command, rule, order, and dispose the disputes and deliberations according to their arbitrement; nor lastly, may they, by vertue of their Regall Dignity, claime any power to examine the Decrees concluded in the Councell, otherwise, then by the judgement of private discretion, which is common to every Christian.
First, I say, they may not by themselves presume, publikely and judicially, to decide and define any matter of Faith, which is questioned in the Church: but this definition they ought to remit unto a lawfull and free Councell. Ambrose would not come to the Court to be judged by the Emperour Valentinian, in a matter of Faith, and asked, when ever he heard that Emperours judged Bishops in matters of Faith, seeing, if that were granted, it would follow that Laymen should dispute and deba…e matters, and Bishops heare, yea that Bishops should learne of Laymen.
The true ground of which refusall (cleare enough in it selfe) is darkened by aof the Church lib. 5. cap. 53.D. Field, who alledgeth, 1. That the thing which Valentinian tooke on him, was, to judge of a thing already resolved in a generall Councell called by Constantine, as if it had been free, and not yet judged of at all. 2. That Valentinian was knowen to be partiall; that he was but a Novice; and the other Iudges which he meant to associate to himselfe suspected. But howsoever these circumstances might serve the more to justify Ambrose his not compearing, to be judged in a matter of Faith by Valentinian, yet the D. toucheth not that which is most considerable, namely, the reason which he alledged for his not compearing, because it hath been at no time heard of, that Emperours judged Bishops in matters of Faith, and if that were granted, it would follow, that Bishops should learne of Laymen. Which reason holdeth ever good, even though the thing hath not beene formerly judged by a Councell.
And furthermore, if these (which the D. mentioneth) were the true reasons of his refusing to be judged by Valentinian, then why did he pretend another reason, (whereof we have heard) and not rather defend himselfe with the reall and true reasons? Wherefore we gather, that the reason which made Ambrose refuse to be judged by him, was no other then this, because he considered, that Princes neither by themselves, nor by any whom they please to choose, may, without a lawfully assembled and free Councell, usurpe a publike judgement and decisive sentence in controversies of Faith: which if they arrogate to themselves, they farre exceed the bounds of their vocation For it is not said of Princes, but of Priests, bMal. 2. 7.that their lippes should preserve knowledge, and that they should seeke the Law from their mouthes. And c2 Chron. 19. 8. 10.the Priests did Iehosaphat set in Ierusalem, for the judgement of the Lord, and for controversies, and for judging betwixt Law & Commandement, statutes and judgements.
In the meane while, we denie not, but that in extraordinary cases, when lawfull Councels can not be had, and when the Cleargie is universally corrupted, through grosse ignorance, perverse affections, and incorrigible negligence, in such a case, the Prince notwithstanding the defect of the ordinary and regular Iudges, may yet by the Power of he civill sword, represse and punish so many as publish and spread such Doctrines, as both he and other Christians by the judgement of discretion, plainely understand from Scripture, to be hereticall.
Next I say, that the Prince having assembled a Councell, may not take so much upon him, as imperiously to command what he thinketh good, in the disputes and deliberations, & to have every thing ordered, disposed, and handled according to his minde. To debate and define Theologicall controversies, and to teach what is Orthodoxall, what Hereticall, is the office of Divines; yet by a coactive auctority to judge this Orthodoxe Faith to be received by all, and Hereticall pravity to be rejected is the office of Kings, or the supreme Magistrates in every Commonwealth, saith dde Iud. controv. cap. 16. pag. 92:the Bishop of Sarisburie. And eibid. cap. 14. p. 75,againe, in Searching, Directing, Teaching; Divines, ordinarily and by reason of their calling, ought to goe be fore Kings themselves: but in commanding, establishing, compelling; Kings doe farre excell. Where he sheweth, how in defining of the Controversies of Religion, in one respect Ecclesiasticall persons, and in another respect Kings have the first place.
In the debating of a question of Faith, Kings have not, by vertue of their Princely vocation, any precedencie or chiefe place, the action beeing meerely Ecclesiasticall. For, howbeit Kings may convocate a Councell, preside also and governe the same as concerning the humane and politicall order, yet saith fanimad. in Bell. cont. 4. lib. 1. cap. 12. nota 15Iunius, Actiones, deliberationes, & definitiones, ad substantiam rei Ecclesiasticae pertinentes, à Sacerdotio sunt, à caetu servorum Dei, quibus rei suae administrationem mandavit Deus. And with him the Archb. of Spalato saith in like manner, that howbeit Christian Princes have convocated Councels, and civilly governed the same, yet they had no power nor auctority (g) de rep. Eccl. lib 6. cap. 5. num. 8. 30.in the very discussing, handling, and deciding of matters of Faith.
What then? In the handling of controversies of Faith, have Princes no place nor power at all, beside that of Politicall governement onelyonly? Surely by vertue of their Princely auctority, they have no other place in the hādling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning and understanding in the Scriptures? Then let them propound their owne suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in the Councell doe. But neither as Princes, nor as men singularly learned, may they require that others in the Councell shall dispute and debate matters, and that they themselves shall sit as Iudges having judiciall power of a negative voice. For in a Councell, no mans voice hath any greater strength, then his reasons and probations have. Non enim admitto, &c. For I admit not in a Councell (saith hde Rep. num, 33.the same Prelate) some as Iudges, others as Disputators, for I have shewed that a conciliarie judgement, consisteth in the approbation of that sentence, which above others hath been shewed to have most waight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no man in the Councell ought to have a judiciarie voice, unlesse he bee withall a Disputator, and assigne a reason wherefore hee adheres to that judgement, and repels another, and that reason, such a one, as is drawen from the Scriptures onelyonly, and from Antiquity.
Lastly, I hold, that after the definition and decision of a Councell, Princes may not take upon them, by any judiciall power or publike vocation, to examine the same, as if they had auctority to pronounce yet another decisive sentence, either ratifying or reversing what the Councell hath decreed. Most certaine it is, that before Princes give their Royall assent, unto the Decrees of any Councell whatsoever, and compell men to receive & aknowledge the same, they ought first of all carefully to trie and examine them, whether they agree with the Scriptures or not, and if they find them not to agree with the Scriptures, then to denie their assent and auctority thereto. But all this Princes doe not by any judiciall power, or publike auctority, but onelyonly by that judgement of private discretion, which they have as Christians, and which togither with them is common also to their subjects: for neither may a Master of a Family commend, to his children and servants, the profession of that Faith, which is published by the Decrees of a Councell, except in like manner he examine the same by the Scriptures.