Dispute Against the English-Popish Ceremonies, Part 4 · Chapter 1 – Chapter 2
CHAP. 1.
Of our Opposites pleading for the Indifferency of the Ceremonies.
IF it seeme to any, that it is a strange Methode to speake now of Indifferency, in the end of this Dispute, which ought rather to have been handled in the beginning of it: they may consider, that the Methode is not ours, but our Opposites. For they have been fleeing upon Icarus wings, and soaring so high that their wings could not but melt from them: so have they from necessity fallen downe to expediency; from it to lawfulnesse; and from thence to indifferency.
I knew certaine of them, who after reasoning about the Ceremonies, with some of our side, required in the end no more, but that they would onelyonly aknowledge the indifferency of the things in themselves. And so beeing wo'ed & solicitously importuned by our former Arguments against the Ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelopes web, thereby to suspend us, and to gaine time against us: this indifferency I meane, which they shall never make out, and which themselves otherwhiles unweave againe. Alwayes, so long as they thinke to get any place for higher notions about the Ceremonies, they speake not so meanly of them, as of things indifferent. But when all their forces of Arguments, and answers are spent in vaine: then are our eares filled with uncouth outcries and declamations, which tend to make themselves appeare blamelesse for receiving, and us blameworthy for refusing matters of Rite and indifferency.
VponUpon this string they harpe over and over again, in Bookes, in Sermons, in private discourses. M G. Powell, in his booke De Adiaphoris, and Tilen, in the 12 and 17 Chapters of his Paraenefis, condemne those who make ought adoe about the controverted English Ceremonies, for so much as they are things indifferent. Paybody in his Apology for kneeling at the Communion, standeth much upon the indifferency of this gesture, both in every worship of God, and in that Sacrament namely. The Arch Bishop of Sainctandrewes in his Sermon at Perth Assembly, because he could not prove this indifferency, he choosed to suppone it. Of the indifferency of these Articles (saith he) I thinke there is litle or no question amongst us. Whether he spake this of Ignorance or of Policy, I leave it to bee guessed at. Howsoever, if we should thus compose our controversy about the Ceremonies; embrace them and practise them, so beeing that they be onelyonly called things indifferent: this were to cure our Church, as L. Sulla cured his Country, durioribus remediis, quam pericula erant saith, ade benef. lib. 5. cap. 16.Seneca. Wherefore we will debate this question of Indifferency also.
CHAP. II.
Of the nature of things Indifferent.
TO say nothing here of the Homonomy of the word Indifferēt, Sect. I but to take it in that signification, which concerneth our present purpose; It signifieth such a mean betwixt good and evill, in humane actions, as is alike distant from both these extreams, and yet susceptive of either of them. Indifferens saith Calepine, is that quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum. b1. 2a q. 18. art. 9.Aquinas calleth that an indifferent action, which is neither good nor evill. Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque mala in se est, saith cBald. de cas. consc. lib. 2. cap. 9. cas. 9.a later Writer.
But dIren. lib. 1. cap. 13. §. 7.D. Forbesse liketh to speake in another language. He will have that which is indifferent, to be opponed to that which is necessary: and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing, as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandement of God: or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternall life, & commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is punishable with eternall death, and polluteth a man with guiltinesse. Now because he knew, that Divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evill. eIbid. §. 10.He therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodnesse of an individuall action. The one he calleth bonitas generalis, concomitans, & sine qua non. By which goodnesse is meant the doing of an action in Faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as hee expoundeth himselfe. This goodnesse, hee saith, is necessary to every humane action, and hindreth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth bonitas specialis, causans, & propter quam. This goodnesse hee calleth legall, and saith, that it maketh an action necessary; In which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those onelyonly which God in his Law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternall life.
But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to Sect. II us, let us onelyonly consider how falsly he supposeth, that there are some things which we doe, neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither bee rewarded (it is his owne phrase which I use) nor yet punished by God. I thought we had learned from Scripture, that we must all compeare before the judgment seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speake, and of every deed which we doe in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punishment. What? could the D. say that those good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith, that they are done in Faith, and for the right end are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he fubi supra.saith, that the generall goodnesse which accompanieth the action, is remunerable, because it is necessary; but the action it selfe is not necessary, because that generall goodnesse may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it. Whereupon he would have it to follow, that the action it selfe is not remunerable.
Ans. 1. The D. had done well to have remembred, that he is speaking onelyonly of individuall actions, and that actus individuatur à circumstantiis & adjecto modo: so that whiles all that he saith, turneth to this, that one action considered in it selfe, without the circumstances and concomitant goodnesse, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point: for he saith no more in effect, but that actus quo ad speciem, is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.
2. An individuall good action of that kind, which the D. calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable, then an individuall good action of that kinde which he calleth indifferent, for example; when I goe to heare Gods Word upon the Lords-day; let this action of mine be considered quo ad individuum: is it any otherwise remunerable, then in respect of the goodnesse which accompanieth it? whence it is, that the hearing of Hypocrites, not beeing accompanied with such goodnesse, is not remunerable: yet the hearing of the Word is an action necessary, because commanded. Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and the remunerable good of one of those actions which the D. calleth indifferent; for example, a womans action of marrying?
I perceave what the D. would answer. For he gubi supra cap. 13. §. 7.saith; if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media & libera, etiam quo ad individuum. Implying, that if on the other part an individuall action be necessary, (as for example the action of hearing the Word,) then it is in it selfe good, etiam quo ad individuum.
But I reply, what meanes he by these words, in se? meanes he the individuall nature of the action? Nay; then the sence shall bee no other then this, quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum, And besides the D. can not define to us, any other nature in a individuall thing, then the nature of the species or kinde.
*Quaestio, quid est? de quolibet individuo contento sub spe cie, non petit quidditatem ejus singularem, sed communem totius speciei, saith P. Fonseca, com. in Metaph. Arist. lib. 7. cap. 15 quest. unic. sect. 2.Is it not holden individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione speciei? Sure, a perfect definition expressing the nature of the thing defined, can not be given to any individuall thing, other then the definition of the species. Needs therefore must the D. by in se, understand the specificall nature: and indeed when Divines speake of things indifferent in se, per se, or, sua natura; they meane onelyonly things indifferent quo ad speciem. Yet thus also the D. hath said none sence. For so should we take his words, quamvis quo ad speciem sit media & libera, etiam quo ad individuum.
But to let his manner of speaking passe, we will consider what Sect. III he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined, except this: that the individuall action of hearing the Word, (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable, in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in it self…, or quo ad speciem, and likewise respectu adjecti modi: whereas a womans action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is onelyonly good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, respectu modi, for, in se, or, quo ad speciem; it hath no remunerable goodnesse in it.
Ans. What doe we heare of any difference betwixt these actions quo ad speciem? That which we crave, is, that a difference may be shewed betwixt the remunerable goodnesse of the one, and of the other, both beeing considered quo ad individuum.
That whereby the D. either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this; that he taketh every thing which agreeth to a individuall thing, to agree to it quo ad individuum: as if to speake of Peter quatenus est homo; and to speake of him quatenus est individuum signatum, or, res singularis sub specie hominis, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individuall action of hearing the Word, that it is necessary because of the commandement of God, (and in that respect remunerable;) is not to speake of it quo ad individuum; but as the specificall nature of that action of hearing the Word,) which God hath commanded,) is found in it. For if we speake of this individuall action, quo ad individuum, we can not consider it otherwise then respectu adjecti modi: because in morall actions, modus adjectus is principium individuationis, and nothing else, doth individualize a morall action.
Thus shall my Position stand good, namely, that those individuall Sect. IV actions which the D. calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individuall actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad inviduum; the former hath no other remunerable good in them, then the latter; and the whole renumerable good which is in either of them, standeth only in adjecto modo. Which beeing so, it is all one, when we speake of any individuall morall action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For as is well said by h1a. 2a. q. 21. art. 2.Aquinas, necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And againe. Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus. Wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodnesse, causans and concomitans, which the D. hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable, which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now morall goodnesse ide subtil. exerc. 307. dist. 27.saith Scaliger, est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Humane morall actions are called good or evill, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith k1a. 2a. q. 100. art. 1.Aquinas, thereupon inferring, that illi mores dieuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt: mali autem, qui à ratione discordant. D. Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question, whiles he lubi supra cap. 13. §. 7.saith, in hac cum fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium. Nay, those actions we call morally good, which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary, or not. Since then, those actions are laudable and remunerable, which are morally good; and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason: it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the D. calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are therefore not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, & so not indifferent. Yea those actions which he calleth necessary, beeing considered quo ad individuum, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable, then those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner quo ad individuum, as hath been shewed.
And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say, of the D••. Sect. V speculation about the nature of things indifferent.
For, 1. the D. maketh that which is indifferent, to be opponed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both those to be morally good. Now albeit in naturall things, one good is opponed to another good, as that which is hot, to that which is colde, yet, mAquin. 1. 2a q. 31. art. 8.bonum bono non contrariatur in moralibus. The reason of the difference is, because Bonitas Physica or relativa est congruentia naturae quaedam saith nubi supra.Scaliger: and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one, may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other, bu… bonum virtutis saith oubi supra.Aquinas, non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem: so that it is impossible for one morall good to be opponed to another.
2. Since Divines take a thing indifferent, to be medium inter bonum & malum morale: and since (as the very notation of the word sheweth,) it is such a meane, as commeth not nearer to the one extreme, then to the other, but is alike distant from both: how comes it, that the D. so farre departeth both from the tenet of Divines, and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent, as have a morall remunerable goodnesse, and yet not evill in them? or where learned he such a Dialect, as giveth to some good things, the name of the things indifferent?
3. Why doth he also waver from himself? for pubi supra lib. 2. c. 5. num. 1.he citeth out of the Helvetike Confession Hierome his definition of a thing indifferent, and approveth it. Indifferens (saith he,) illud est, quod nec bonum nec malum est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habeas nec injustitiam. Behold the goonesse which is excluded from the nature of a thing indifferent, is not only necessity, but righteousnesse also; yet hath the D. excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent, making the other good of righteousnesse to stand with them. For things which are done in faith and done for the right end (such as he acknowledgeth these things to be, which he calleth indifferent,) have righteousnesse in them, as all men know.