The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture, Article 1 · Chapter 5

The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture · Article 1 · Chapter 5

p. 12CHAP. V. That the wiſdome of God is infinite.

EVery thing naturally ſeekes the preſervation of it ſelfe in the being which it hath, as the perfection and happineſſe of it ſelfe, and therefore firſt avoids thoſe things that are contrary thereto, as you may ſee in a greene ſticke put into the fire, how the water ſhunnes the heate, as the greateſt enemy it hath. Secondly encreaſeth it ſelfe by thoſe things which it can make like, and turne into it ſelfe, as I have elſewhere ſhewed, how every ſeed encreaſeth by the earth and moiſture thereof, which cannot be but with a wehling out, or choice of things that are homogeneous, or of parts like thereto; and a refuſing of thoſe things that are heterogeneous, that is of unlike parts, or of another kinde. And over and above this, every thing doth ſpread it ſelfe in that goodneſſe which it hath, upon thoſe things that are capable thereof, as it appeares in the effect of every medicine. And nothing of all theſe things can be done, but by a certaine degree of naturall knowledge inbred in every thing; according to which it doth chuſe or avoid thoſe things which are within the compaſſe of that knowledge. And this is ſeene in every thing ſimple, or compound, in things elementall, minerall and vegetable. But in things wherein life is more manifeſt, by moving, which we call Animall, the fruits of knowledge and underſtanding appeare in farre greater differences of degrees, as you may finde betweene the oyſter, or the ſnaile, and the fox, the horſe, or the elephant; of which they write, he may bee taught to know letters. Plin. hiſt. nat. lib. 8 cap. 3. & Aquin. contra Gent. lib. 3. Cap. 57. what knowledge theſe things have of the Creator, it is not eaſie to define. See Plin. hiſt. lib. 8. Cap. 1. But certaine it is, that the whole creature hath a moſt earneſt deſire and hope to bee delivered from that corruption and change whereto it is ſubject, Rom. 8.19. But that man, though knowing nothing at all, but by the helpe of things ſenſible, was created to know and honour the creator by, and for his knowledge, is moſt manifeſt: for otherwiſe the Creator ſhould loſe his honour, which he might, and conſequently ought to have, by the outward ſences, from things ſenſible. And this was the condemnation of the world, that thus knowing by the creature, they did not honour him accordingly, Rom. 1.17. Of how much ſorer puniſhment then ſhall the Iew, and yet much more the falſe Chriſtian be worthy of? who having not onelyonly the dawning light in the creature, whereby to ſee the power, the p. 13wiſdome and goodneſſe of God; but alſo the cleere Sun-ſhine and uſe thereof in the Scriptures of the old Teſtament, and yet much more evidence and proofe of the ſame in Ieſus Chriſt; for neglect of that grace ſo freely offered? The Angels yet in more excellent manner, though with their differences and degrees of underſtanding, without either ſence or imagination, by the onelie ſight or beholding of things, know the truth of their being, properties, and poſſibilities: or elſe yet in a ſuperexcellent manner, beholding the Creator, know by him his admirable workemanſhip. But how much more wonderfull is his wiſdome, Who is made more excellent than the Angels? Hebr. 1.4. Whom God hath exalted and given him a name (and being alſo) above every name? Philip. 2.9. Who is the image of the inviſible God, the firſt begotten of every creature? Coloſ. 1.15. And laſtlie, how ſuperabundantly infinite is that wiſdome, whoſe brightneſſe ſhines, firſt upon that image, and thence reflected upon the creatures, becomes that light which enlightens the Angels, and every man that comes into the world? Iohn 1.9. And that this wiſdome of God is infinite, it is apparent, not onelie by theſe degrees afore declared, but alſo by the reaſons following.

1 Whatſoever is imperfect and yet ordained unto a degree of further perfection, muſt needs be from that which is perfect, and able to bring it to that perfection, whereto it is ordeyned. But ſuch is the wiſdome and knowledge of man; both by his owne experience of the preſent imperfection, and ſacred authority of our future hopes: For now we know in part: now wee ſee thorow a glaſſe darkely. But hereafter wee ſhall know as wee are knowne, perfectly. 1 Cor. 13.9. to 12. Therefore the wiſdome of God is perfect and beſeeming himſelfe; that is infinite.

2. The apprehenſion of the truth of things, is the object and delight of the underſtanding; and infinite truth of an infinite underſtanding. Seing then, that the truth of things being is ſo manifold; and the poſſibilities of truths, in the poſſibilities of all beings much more indefinite: and the Fountaine of all theſe truths infinite: ^a if the wiſdome of God were not infinite, that it might bee anſwerable to all truths: then ſhould they bee in vaine, and the knowledge thereof wanting in Him, in whom, and from whom, all truth both created and increated is. But this is impoſſible. For although the underſtanding of the Creature bee admitted to ſee the truths of things created; yea, and all the poſſibilities thereof, that God may have his glory from the Creature which is due unto him; yet cannot all the wiſdome of all the Creature ſound the depth of that Sea, whence all theſe truths proceed, but that muſt bee underſtood onelyonly by that wiſdome, and glorified onelyonly within that glory which is in himſelfe. Therefore it is neceſſary, that the wiſdome of God be infinite.

3. If the truth of Gods being bee infinite, then it is neceſſary p. 14that his wiſdome alſo be infinite; For otherwiſe he could not know the truth of his owne being, and ſo not deſire, nor will it; nor yet be happy and glorious in his owne being. But all this is impoſſible. But the truth of Gods being is infinite. For as all falſhood is in not being, and neceſſary falſhood in the impoſſibility of being; So all truth is grounded in being, ^b neceſſary truth in actuall being, and poſſible truth in the poſſibility of being. And it is manifeſt before, cap. 3. that the being of God is infinite. Therefore his Truth, and ſo neceſſarily his wiſdome is infinite.

4 No perfection which is in any kinde of being, can be wanting unto God, which is the cauſe of all being, as it is manifeſt in this, that he is eternall and made all things. But if infinite wiſdome be wanting unto him, a principall perfection is wanting. Therefore God is infinitely wiſe.

5. And this Argument the Prophet uſes. Pſal. 94.8. O yee fooles when will ye be wiſe? ſhall not hee that planted the care heare? or be that formed the eye, ſee? Hee that teacheth man knowledge, ſhall not Hee know? That is, Hee that hath given to every thing a degree of knowledge anſwerable to the perfection of that being, ſhall not Hee according to the infinity of his owne being, have the infinity and perfection of knowledge? as Iob ſpeakes, 37.16. So againe, Pſal. 147.5. Great is our Lord, and great is his power, his wiſdome is infinite. Read Pſal. 139. alſo Rom 11.33. O the depth, both of the wiſdome, and knowledge of God! how unſearchable are his judgements, and his waies paſt finding out!

Notes.

(a) IF the wiſdome of God were not infinite, that it might be anſwerable to all theſe § 1. truths. Rea. 2.] Becauſe the wiſdome of God is infinite, and ſuch as no addition can be made thereto; it muſt of force bee held for an undoubted truth; That God doth know not only the infinity of his owne Being, but alſo Hee hath the moſt certaine, moſt particular, and uttermoſt knowledge of all things that are, or are any way poſſible to bee, or not to bee; paſt, preſent, or to come; how infinite ſoever in number; how meane, how ill, how uncertaine ſoever they ſeeme to us: yet to Him they are good, certaine, and determined: yea, our very deſires, and thoughts, He underſtands long before us: As by many reaſons, and theſe Texts of Scripture, and many more it may appeare, Pſal. 33.14.15. & 94.11. & 139 all. 113.9. Heb. 4.13. And yet becauſe it is as certaine, that whatſoever is in God, is eſſentially Himſelfe; As it will be manifeſt, Chap. 8. & 9. And that the being of the Creature is no way neceſſary to His being, infinitely and abſolutely perfect without it: it will be neceſſary to enquire, how the multitude of things created can be in the wiſdome and knowledge of God. And becauſe it is neceſſary to put this: that the underſtanding of God, is by the moſt excellent and perfect way of knowing: therefore it cannot be either by infuſion from another: nor gotten by experience and practice; nor by diſcourſe; as all the knowledge of man is by ſome of theſe; nor yet by the view of the things in themſelves, or of the things in another; as is the knowledge of the Angels; but onelyonly by the pure p. 15and ſimple fight of His owne being; which although it be moſt ſimple, and one▪ yet it is the patterne and ſample of all things, that can either bee, or bee knowne. Becauſe that on his being and power alone, the being and poſſibilities of al things depend. Neither can any thing be, live, or underſtand; but that i… one or moe of theſe it expreſſes his Image. So that he in that one ſimple working of his owne underſtanding and ſight of himſelfe, ſees at once, both himſelfe, and in himſelfe; the being and poſſibilities of all things beſide. For ſeeing his underſtanding i… his being, chap. 8. if Hee did underſtand by any other meanes than by the ſight of his owne Being; then Hee ſhould have in himſelfe a Being and a Being: then there ſhould be a cauſe of underſtanding to him without himſelfe. So his underſtanding ſhould be in poſſibilitie only, actuated, or brought to worke by an outward underſtandable object: So his underſtanding ſhould be accidentall to Him, as ours to us; and ſo it ſhould not be infinite. For nothing can be infinite which is in poſſibility of being: becauſe it hath not all thoſe perfections of being which it may poſſibly have. So then, God by the ſight of his owne being, knowes all things being**S… …. n…. or not being. And to know all things in their cauſe, and by their cauſe, is the excellencie or perfection of knowledge. For al…hough the effect be not neceſſary to the being of the cauſe; yet is the firſt cauſe more eſſentiall to the effect, than all other ſucceeding cauſes whatſoever they are. And therefore it is ſaid. Act. 17.28. In him we live, m…ve, and have our b…ing. Seeing then that all effects are in the power of the cauſe; and that every thing which is in another, muſt be therein according to the manner of that being wherein it is. If God be underſtanding and wiſdome it ſelfe: they muſt be in Him underſtandably, and therefore be perfectly knowne by Him.

But (you ſay) If the creature bee knowne and ſeene by the infinite wiſdome; and if nothing can be in God, beſide His very being, chap. 9. then that knowledge of the Creature muſt bee in the very being of God, becauſe it is in Him. Then it is neceſſary that in the divine being there bee a manifold or divers being, becauſe a different knowledge; one, that whereby Hee knowes himſelfe which will eaſily be yeelded to be eſſentiall, and his very being, ſee chap. 8. and another of the creature: which if it be eſſentiall, His eſſence muſt be d vers. Becauſe the eſſence and being of the Creator, and of the creature are moſt different. If not eſſentiall, it muſt be accidentall to Him; and ſo His being ſhould not bee infinite, and in abſolute perfection of being, if capable of accidents.

I ſay, that if the divine wiſdome ſhould view the being of the creature in any other being beſide himſelfe, then the divine underſtanding, for as much as concernes the creature, ſhould be dependent on that, which muſt be inferiour and after Him. Therefore all this quarrell is, becauſe that which was firſt deluded, was either not underſtood, or not remembred. It was ſaid, that the knowledge of all things is in God moſt certainely, moſt particularly, and that not according to the being of things as they are; but according to all poſſibilities whereto they are ſubject. But as the being of the creature comes not unto it, but by Him: ſo this knowledge of the creature in God, comes not to Him, as raiſed or gathered from the things in their owne being (for ſo it ſhould be chancefull, as they had hapned to be) But by that being which they have in Him, as in their cauſe. For God knowing his power anſwerable to all poſſibilities of being, and Himſelfe able thereby to worke according to the pleaſure of his owne will, according to that pleaſure, appointed of all cauſes to the bringing forth of things in their being. Therefore as the power of all cauſes is from Him, the firſt of cauſes; ſo that knowledge of His, is a creating knowledge and eſſentiall to Him. For becauſe He is the firſt of beings, it is neceſſary, and eſſentiall to him, not onelyonly to be the beſt, moſt wiſe, powerfull, infinite, &c. and yet the moſt ſimple, and pure of all beings, but alſo the cauſe of all beings that can come after Him. Therefore as the being, ſo the knowledge of the creature alſo is in God; that is, in the object of his p. 16underſtanding, which is his word, ſeene by one infinite action of underſtanding: For by his owne abſolute perfection, doth Hee meaſure all the diſtances of imperfection, as by one ſimple unity all the proportions in numbers are both made and meaſured. Neither doth it any way follow, that becauſe the beings of God and the creature are divers, therefore his knowledge of Himſelfe and the creature ſhould bee alſo different ſo farre, as to make a different eſſence or being in Him. For the underſtanding of man though one in it ſelfe, yet ſees and knowes the things that are moſt different and contrary. As a looking glaſſe may repreſent all bodily ſhewes without any change in the being of it, either eſſentiall, or accidentall: Beſide, that being of the creature, which He beholdes, is no other than that being which it hath in Him increated, eternally, intellectually, and cauſally. And if our imagination, or thought, which takes hold of nothing but by the outward ſence, doth yet turne it ſelfe from the ſence, to view the ſame likeneſſe though abſent, though long agoe beheld; and the underſtanding much more taking that likeneſſe from the imagination, and utterly withdrawing it from matter, doth frame to it ſelfe a patterne or likeneſſe of the common or univerſall being, under which all things of the ſame kinde are contayned, expreſſed in the definition: how much more ſhall the divine wiſdome know the being, and poſſibilities of all things? not by that being which is in them, derived and dependant, whereby the Angels know; but moſt perfectly by that being which all things have in Him, which is independent. Of which being of the Creature, you ſhall have further occaſion to conſider in the 13. chap. when wee ſhall ſpeake of the eternity of the world, and the originall being of the creature.

2. This may ſeeme an anſwer (you ſay) for things that are being, if good, if worthy His knowledge. But ſeeing that every thing that is knowne is after ſome ſort in Him that doth know: it may ſeeme that the excellency of his being and underſtanding cannot ſuffer, that the knowledge of things that are vile, and baſe, or eſpecially, that are ill, ſhould be in Him. For ſeeing thoſe things that are baſe and ill, ſeeme altogether to bee in want and defect of perfection, if the knowledge of them be in God, and conſequently his eſſence, then his being ſhould be of things which are in defect, which cannot agree to Him that is the moſt perfect of all being. Moreover, if the things that are knowne by Him be in Him, as in their cauſe; then muſt it follow neceſſarily, that if He know things that are ill, He ſhould alſo be the cauſe of ill; which can no way ſtand with the infinity of his goodneſſe.

I anſwer. Baſe or vile, and excellent are onelyonly words of Compariſon; And if all things created were excellent alike, then could nothing at all bee excellent. But becauſe it is neceſſary for the beauty of the whole frame of the creature, that there bee difference of degrees in greater or leſſe excellencie; therefore are theſe things which have fewer degrees of perfection in them, called meane, or vile, though not truly and indeed ſuch. For there is nothing ſo meane or baſe, but as it is being, it is a proofe and image of His being who created it, and ſo though not of it ſelfe, yet in it ſelfe is exceeding good Gen. 1.31. And if the order of Nature be well marked, as we know that the whole Creature was brought out of not being, into the meaneſt and firſt degree of being, which was water, Gen. 1.2. 2 Pet. 3.5. ſo all the excellency that is in the creature, is but by addition of one degree of perfection unto another, which perfections taken together, with their cauſe and originall, are in their many differences; firſt being, then life, after ſence; fourthly Reaſon, as in a man; Fifthly underſtanding by the onelyonly ſight of the being, as in the Angels: the ſixth is of the received power of the Mediatour, Ioh. 17.2. Eph. 1.20.21.22. Heb. 1.2. that runnes into infinity; the ſeventh is Infinity it ſelfe, in the ſimplicity of ſelfe being, beyond which is nothing. But whether theſe perfections of the creature, come into it by addition, as I have ſpoken, or that it be ſo raiſed from p. 17nothing immediately into thoſe perfections which it hath: it is neceſſary that theſe differences of degrees be therein, that that foreign, Eph. 3.10. that manifold wiſdome of God may be manifeſt in the Creature. In which creature how perfect ſoever in it ſelfe, no degree can bee found ſo excellent, but that it muſt differ infinitely on the one ſide from the perfection of the Creator: not none ſo meane, but that on the other ſide it muſt differ infinitely from not being: I meane that not being which it had of it ſelfe and in it ſelfe, for in him it had an eternall being, being eternally foreſeene and appointed in him.

§. 3. But in things that are ill, you thinke this anſwer will not ſerve; For though you can bee content to thinke, that the glory of the divine wiſdome is nothing abated in the beholding of things, no not in their preſent being, how differing ſoever in their degrees of perfection, as it is ſaid Pſal. 113.5. Who is like unto Iehova our God, that lifteth up Himſelfe high to ſit; that abaſeth Himſelfe low to ſee in the heavens and in the earth? no more then the luſtre and ſhine of the Sunne is more or leſſe cleere, whether it light upon the beautifull hill of Libanus or Carmell; or the dirty land of Cabul: yet if he know alſo things that are ill; and that his knowledge be a cauſing or creating knowledge, it cannot bee avoyded, but that he muſt alſo be the cauſe of ill.

I anſwer. Ill is of three kindes; one naturall, whereby every thing is ſubjected to ſome other thing contrary thereto, whereby it may be corrupted, for the deſtruction of that particular being, that ſome other thing may be raiſed thereout, according to the poſſibilitie of the matter, and the manner of the corrupting. Hitherto we may bring poyſons and all thoſe things that we call hurtfull and ill, becauſe if they be not rightly uſed, they are harmefull to our kind, which are not ſimply ill, but onelyonly accidentally; ſeeing that if they be rightly uſed, they may be helpefull to our nature: as it appeares in the trocisks of the vipers fleſh, and other medicines, as Phyſicke teaches. So theſe things of themſelves naturally good, may be ill; that is, good cauſes of ill effects: as riches, and authority, things civilly indifferent, may bee ill, if abuſed to pride, idleneſſe, and the oppreſſion of others.

The ſecond kinde of ill is that of puniſhment, which cannot juſtly be termed ill, if you conſider the uſe and benefit thereof, as S. Paul hath taught Heb. 12. from ver. 5. to ver. 12. For neither can wiſdome be in things civill, or morall; but with the judgement of good and bad: neither is that judgement in the diſcerning of good and ill ought worth, if the good be not praiſed and rewarded, and the ill puniſhed. So that without juſtice and merciemercy, in reward and puniſhment; neither wiſdome, nor goodneſſe can be either perfect or praiſed. Therefore this kinde of ill, becauſe it is juſt that the ill-doer ſhould beare the burden of his owne deſert, is no way ill, but onelyonly in the ſmart of the guilty ſufferer deſerving it. So theſe two kindes of ill (onelyonly ſo called for ſome reſpects) though in themſelves neceſſary, and therefore good; will eaſily bee acknowledged to be from God.

The maine queſtion therefore is onelyonly about that ill of ills which is ſinne: for ſinne, both in regard of the effect, which is puniſhment, and in it ſelfe the deſerving cauſe thereof; and much more taking occaſion by the Law holy and good to worke death in the ſinner; muſt needs be exceedingly ſinfull, as it is concluded, Rom. 7.11.13. And becauſe it is as certainely and neceſſarily true, that ſinne is ſinne, and ill is ill; as it is, that good is good: and that the knowledge of the truth in every thing, is in the perfection of the underſtanding; it cannot bee, but that all ill and ſinne is perfectly knowne unto the infinite wiſedome. Moreover, whether ill be onelyonly a privation, or taking away of that good which ought to bee in the creature; or whether it bee any thing of very being therein: it is neceſſarie that the infinite wiſdome know all manner of beings, both according to their perfections, and all their poſſibilities and p. 18defects. But concerning the manner of this knowledge, the Doct…rs ſay, That becauſe the very being of ill (you remember what ill I ſpeake of) is nothing elſe but the privation of that goodneſſe which ought to be in the creature; it is knowne of God onelyonly by the contrary goodneſſe, as by the d…finition, that is to ſay, to be a defect or privation of goodneſſe. Neither is it any defect in the divine knowledge, to know that which is onelyonly a def ct by the contrarie perfection; ſeeing nothing can be knowne further then according to that being which it hath. And therefore they ſay further, See Th…m. Aquin. and his Comment. lib. 1. Cap 71. and lib 3. Cap. 4, 5, 6, &c. contra Gentes. That ill, inaſmuch as it is ſuch, is in the number of things not being: and that of things not being, there can be no cauſe efficient, but deficient and privative onelyonly. For every agent workes as f…rre forth as it is in actuall being, to bring forth ſomething into acte or perfection, and that to a good end; ſo that ill comes into effect by accident, beſide the purpoſe and intent of the doer. Ah bleſſed Origen! hath thy too much charity been blamed ſo long? who art ſaid (though unjuſtly, ſee the defence of Pamphilus for O…igen, and Ioh. Picus Mirandula de Salute Origenis) to have taught, that all ſinners, yea, even the devill himſelfe ſhall be ſaved at the laſt; now thou art juſtified. Sinne is not being, it hath no cauſe of being, but comes in by chance, beſide the good intent of the worker: he anſweres more directly elſewhere, as you ſhall heare by and by. It is ſtrange that this Doctor, who ſticks every where ſo cloſe to Ariſtotle, ſhould here depart ſo farre from him, as to make privation in the number of things not being, whereas Ariſtotle rancks it in the order of beginnings with matier and forme. In the meane while underſtand, things not being are either utterly not being, or not being ſuch. In the firſt kinde you may account the ſecond terme of contradiction, S…e Log. Chap. 9. nu. 15, 16. as not a ſtone, not wiſe. By the affirming of which no being at all is put to the ſubject, as to ſay, Thomas is not a ſtone. The not being ſuch, which they call Non ens tale, may hold all thoſe termes which we call privative. But privation may meane, at large, either the abſence onelyonly of any forme not due to the ſubject; and thus it is in the number of things ſimply not being: for ſeeing the preſence of one forme ſhuts out all other formes unfit for that ſubject: (although all matier in the root of nature be ſubject indifferently to all formes ſucceſſively) the privation of other formes follow thereon neceſſ…rily. As the forme of iron in the matier of iron is a privation of the matter of gold, ſo a horſe naturally covered with haire is thereby deprived of a covering of feathers like a bird. But this privation is not in the number of things that are ill, ſeeing it is the law of nature that every thing be upright in that proper kinde in which it is. Secondly privation may ſignifie the taking away of that forme which was in the ſubject, as blindneſſe in the eye, which as it may be ſaid to be not being in reſpect of the taking away of the ſight; yet in reſpect of the cauſes whence it may proceed, it is in the number of things being, yet ill in both reſpects; that is, of the want of that which ought to be in nature; and the cauſe, being ſuch as ought not to be, and ſo of all other ſickneſſes. Thirdly privation may be in a ſubject in reſpect of the forme to which it hath not yet attained, as Tartar or dreggs in the wine, by the ſpirit of ſalt may be hardned into a hard ſtone; and ſo the diſpoſitions to other diſeaſes before they ſhew themſelves. And this privation or want of forme, is in the number of cauſes: as drought is in a thirſtie man to make him drinke. Now ſinne muſt be one or both of theſe two laſt orders of privation, and not in any order of things not being abſolutely: for ſo, firſt it ſhould not be ill: for that which is not at all, is neither good nor ill. Secondly it would bring upon God the greateſt injuſtice that might be, to puniſh the creature for ſinne, if ſinne were utterly not being. And thirdly, if ſinne were not being, then our Lord ſhould have died without cauſe: but it is plaine p. 19that ſinne was the cauſe of his death, that thereby he might deſtroy death, and the power of the devill over vsus, to which we were ſubject becauſe of ſinne: but that which is utterly not being, cannot be a cauſe. Fourthly, if ſinne bee not being, where is then the way which God doth weigh out to his anger, Pſal 78.50. when he doth balance the puniſhment with the ſinne? Are all the puniſhments of ſinne, all the ſorrowes of this life, and death at laſt, both bodily and eternall, nothing? for if they be any thing, they cannot be an anſwerable puniſhment to that which is nothing. So many commandements of God, ſo many threatnings by his Prophets, and Apoſtles, ſo many woes denounced by our Lord, ſo many ſacrifices and clenſings from all the temporary puniſhments, and at laſt the death of the Sonne of God himſelfe for the eternall remiſſion of ſinnes, and is ſinne not being? How much more true is it to ſay, that our righteouſneſſe (as farre forth as it is of our ſelves) is nothing; and to confeſſe with the Prophet, that it is like a ſoiled ragge? as S. Paul knew, that in himſelfe as a naturall man, dwelt nothing that was good, that hee had not power, no not to thinke a good thought, as our Saviour hath taught us, that without him we can doe nothing. And he that hath had experience of the combat, that hath ſo often been foyled in the bickering, muſt needs confeſſe the ſtrength of ſin, and cry out, O wretched man that I am, who ſhall deliver me from this body of death? I ſay not, as ſome hereticks heretofore, that ſinne is a ſubſtance either materiall or formall: or as the author of that booke which is intituled Ratio Rationum, that it came into mankinde by that poyſonous ſlaver which the Serpent put upon that apple which hee reached unto Eve; but yet I ſay that ſinne is ſomething, but the worſt of beings: It is that peſtilentiall contagion, wherewith the devill hath infected the maſſe of all mankind: it is that ſickneſſe of the whole man, of which he languiſheth unto death; but principally the ſickneſſe of the ſoule, whereto nevertheleſſe the body is alſo ſubject, in fulfilling the unorderly luſts both of it ſelfe, and of the minde: for one of theſe works upon another, both for good and bad. Therefore to anſwer, how God doth will that which is ill; it is not nor can be denyed, but that Gods puniſhments of all ſorts, being weighed with the ſinne are juſt, ſo one ſinne as it is the puniſhment of another, may ſtand with juſtice, and both ſinnes together in juſtice may bee puniſhed. When David was in plenty and eaſe at Ieruſalem, and had forgotten him that had delivered him out of all his troubles; O treaſon of proſperity! his eies wandered in the beauty of Bathſheba, and led his heart to luſt: ſo ſin conceived, brought forth adultery, that murder: thus one ſi…e was the puniſhment of another; which were altogether at laſt puniſhed to every degree, in the treaſon and death of his ſonne Abſalom: So if you compare the ſinnes and degrees thereof in the Aegyptians, you ſhall finde one ſinne the puniſhment of another, and all together at laſt balanced in their plagues; ſo that it is moſt truely obſerved by the Wiſe, Sap. 11.13. that wherein a man ſinneth, thereby he ſhall be puniſhed. Now it is a cleere caſe, that all the ſinne of mankinde proceeds from the corruption of his owne nature, after which wee are moſt juſtly ſuffered to wander; becauſe that knowing both the rotteneſſe of our owne hearts, and the puniſhment due to ſinne, yet we doe not ſtrive and and fight againſt our ſelves, to ſubdue thoſe wicked thoughts, from whence is the ſtreame of all our ſinne. Heere you will queſtion what ſtrength wee have to fight, and univerſall grace, and free will: but they are beſide this preſent purpoſe; whereby it is cleere, that all our ſins being but iſſues of our owne corruption, againſt which we ſtrive not; it is juſt with God, both to puniſh our careleſneſſe, and neglect of his commandement, and our owne ſafety, with ſinne, and to leave us in that corruption, to be guided by him whom we chuſe to ſerve, having forſaken our true Lord and owner. But becauſe this corruption is from our birth, and that we made not our ſelves ſuch; but that by p. 20the fault of Adam, ſinne and death reigne over all; the ſumme of the queſtion is knit up in that one ſinne of our firſt father, concerning whoſe fall wee are brought to this point. If God ſo foreſaw the fall of Adam, that he will'd it; it was impoſſible but that he ſhould fall; if he will'd it not, it was impoſſible that he ſhould. To which doubt Thomas Aquinas in lib 1. Sen. Diſt. 46. q. 4. anſweres wittily and modeſtly: that although the propoſition be true and neceſſary, yet it is not neceſſary that the will ſhould be carried to either ſide of the contradiction. His reaſon (as I thinke) is, becauſe truth is not the object of the will, but of the underſtanding onelyonly; and therefore he ſaith, that God doth permit ill onelyonly, not becauſe it is ill: but becauſe of the annexes or dependances thereon; either precedent, as becauſe it is good that the creature ſhould have the power, whereby it may be enabled to doe ill, or not to doe ill: or conſequent, which is that good that is occaſioned by the ill. I reverence the judgement: but yet (Doctor) the queſtion is here concerning good and ill, the proper object of the will: and as the underſtanding cannot avoid it, but muſt conſent to a truth which it knowes; ſo neither can the will in that which it takes to be good or ill, but that it muſt chuſe one, and refuſe the other. For as the outward ſences cannot refuſe to be moved by their proper objects; as the eare to heare a ſound within a meet diſtance; no more can the inward faculties of the minde. Beſides, the queſtion is here of the will of God, an infinite will, and convertible with an infinite underſtanding: for in God there is not one being of his will, and another being of his underſtanding; as will appeare more large hereafter in the 8. and 9. Chap. Neither is the will of God as mans will, which may ſit ſtill while his underſtanding workes; but what he underſtands, he wills it alſo to be, or not to be; as his promiſes are not yea and nay, but in him, all is yea, and Amen. Therefore to let paſſe thoſe queſtions which are moved hereabout, concerning the freedome of Adams will; why God ſhould forbid that to Adam, wherein he ſaw that Adam would tranſgreſſe, and ſo make his eating to be ſinne: for where no law is, there is no ſinne; and ſuch unneceſſary queſtions; I anſwer directly, that it is utterly impoſſible, but that God did foreſee the fall of Adam, the taint of all mankinde thereby, all the ſins and all the puniſhments wherunto any one particular perſon is lyable, all the wandrings, backſlidings, and wants which can be in the creature. Neither will I bluſh to affirme with the Apoſtle, Rom. 11.32. That God hath ſhut up all under ſinne, that hee might have mercy upon all. But it followeth not hereupon that hee decreed our miſery in Adam; becauſe he foreſaw it: yet ſuch was his mercy, that out of this great evill, he wrought a greater good; ſo that it may ſeeme by conſequence we are rather gainers by Adams fall: for though we loſt by the ſinne of Adam an inheritance of holineſſe, &c. Yet that holineſſe was like the morning dew, that vaniſhed at the heat of the firſt tentation; it was a created holineſſe, it was in a low degree; fit to his being in whom it was. Is not the preſent inheritance of our holineſſe more ſure, more excellent, who are made partakers of his holineſſe, who is holineſſe it ſelfe? his knowledge was but of worldly things, ours of eternall: and though our naturall knowledge bee by Adams ſinne corrupted, or loſt; yet ſhall it at laſt be reſtored againe with endleſſe advantage: for the gift is not as the ſinne. Rom. 5.15. His life but a naturall life; ſo that if Adam had not ſinned, he might have lived a naturall life till now, and afterward; free from ſickneſſe, and want, abounding in all the knowledge of nature, and naturall bleſſings; but that ſhould have beene the end of his hope (as farre as I can ſee) though ſome there be that give us hopes of the ſame degrees of happineſſe and glory, which now we have, although Adam had not ſinned. Yet becauſe they ſee that that could not be brought to paſſe, except God ſhould take our nature, that thereby we might be lifted up to that eſtate of glory; they thinke that Chriſt our Lord ſhould have come in p. 21the place of Henoch, the ſeventh from Adam, and that therfore Henoch was taken away in ſtead of Chriſt. See Paſtellus de Nativitate Mediatoris pag. 116. But wee are bound both by reaſon and authoritie of holy Writ to know and confeſſe; that the firſt Adam was of the earth earthly, and ſuch ſhould our happineſſe have beene, if we had continued in our created innocencie; the ſecond Adam is the Lord from heaven, heavenly; into whoſe image being renewed, we are made partakers of his ſuperexcellent and heavenly glorie. The meanes whereby we come to this ſtate of glory is alſo our aſſurance that it ſhall be fully accompliſhed. God dwells in our fleſh, O unſpeakeable myſterie! he hath taken upon himſelfe our ſinnes, O unſpeakeable love! he calls them his owne ſinnes. Pſal. 40.12. 2. Cor. 5.21. He hath healed us with his ſtripes, and is made unto us wiſdome, righteouſneſſe, holineſſe, redemption, life, with an over-abounding waight of glory. Is not the exchange well made with this advantage? who would not loſe himſelfe that he might winne Chriſt, with all his demerits? who would not forfeit the life and happineſſe of Adam in his innocencie, that he might gaine the life and glorie of Chriſt in his eternitie? And thus much briefly for the advantage.

Is it nothing to ſee the infinitie of the wiſdome and goodneſſe of God, which out of the greateſt ill, could bring the greateſt good? The greateſt ill on Adams part was his ſinne which from him ſpread it ſelfe over all mankind, to make it liable to eternall death: on the devils part his malice and murder; yea ſuch a murder as could not be in the world beſide, in one man to murder the whole world of men. Is it nothing (I ſay) that out of this great ill, God could bring the greateſt good; that is, our aſſured and everlaſting righteouſneſſe and glorie? is it nothing that he hath caught the wylie in his owne craftineſſe? for whereas the devill envying that happy eſtate wherin man was created, ſought his overthrow by making him ſubject to ſinne, and ſo to death; He our Creator, to ſhew to the principalities and powers, the riches of his wiſdome, and goodneſſe in man; did not onelyonly redeeme him from that thraldome of ſinne and death; but alſo exalted him unto an eſtate of glorie and happineſſe, farre above that in which he was created. Thus out of the eater comes me…t, and out of the ſtrong comes ſweetnes. Iud. 14.14. Thus the head of Leviathan is broken in pieces, and given to be meat to us in the wilderneſſe of this world Pſal. 74.15. Therefore ſeeing it was the good will and pleaſure of Almighty God to mankinde, to make him partaker of theſe unſpeakable mercies, which his goodneſſe hath wrought unto us out of the ill of our ſin; and becauſe he that wills the end, wills alſo thoſe meanes that leade unto the end, we may with reverence to his wiſdome and truth affirme, that although God by his revealed will forbad the tree of knowledge unto Adam, and ſo made his eating ſin, yet in his ſecret counſell he did foreſee that ſin in Adam, not as an enforcing or a working cauſe, but leaving him to himſelfe. But here a doubt muſt be anſwered; firſt, if we be indeed redeemed from the thraldome of ſin, why doth God ſuffer ſin ſtill to remaine in us, yea ſo far forth, as that we cannot ceaſe to ſin, yea ſo farre forth as that it makes our beſt actions, even our prayers abhominable, while our tongue utters one thing, and our heart wanders after another? Anſwer. It was poſſible and eaſie to God ſo to have renewed the heart of m… ſo as that he ſhould not ſin: but yet God would let ſin to dwell in us for divers advantages to us; but eſpecially for two; firſt that at the ſight of our ſin, we might caſt down our ſelves before him, and utterly renouncing our owne worthineſſe, we might ſeek that righteouſnes which is of him, and in him alone; the ſecond, that by the perpetuall remembrance of our ſin, & the puniſhment due unto us for the ſame, we might be thankfull unto our moſt mercifull Redeemer, by faith the anker of our ſouls, holding out our hope, that although we fal, we ſhal not be caſt away: and hereupon depends our repentance, our patience, and our endeavour to the maſterdome of our owne wickednes. Thus as the wiſe Phyſician for long p. 22continuing and deepe rooted maladies, gives ſtrong purging medicines of Seamony, or Colocynthis, and after applies his cordialls; ſo our moſt gracious Healer, to let us know what we are of ourſelves, leſt through pride the ſinne of the rebellious Angels, we ſhould be loſt for ever, doth not only ſuffer us to taſte the bitter fruits of our owne corruption: but ſuffers ſinne alſo, as the fleſh of the venomous tyre to be ſtill in us, that by it, the vertues of the precious ſpices of his graces may be conveyed to our hearts, to preſerve us from eternall death, that balefull infection of the devill, unto everlaſting life.

(b) Neceſſary truth in actuall being, R. 3] Neceſſary truth is not here meant that truth which depends upon the neceſſary being of the thing, in reſpect of the cauſe thereof: but that neceſſity which bindes the underſtanding or words to be agreeable to the preſent being. And thus this propoſition Peter ſits, is as neceſſarily true while he doth fit, as to ſay, Peter is a man.