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The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture · Alexander Gill

The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture, Article 2 · Chapter 13

CHAP. XIII. That the World is not Eternall.

Section. 1. THe puritie, or uttermoſt ſimplicitie of the Divine being, is the fountaine from whence all the perfections which are therein, doe flowe: for neither can any thing be living, powerfull, wiſe, continuall, glorious, &c. except it bee: neither can any thing be ſuch infinitely, if it have not an infinite being: but an infinitie of being cannot be but with the uttermoſt ſimplicitie of being. For whatſoever is put to being, takes away the ſimplicitie thereof, and muſt needs be a limitation thereto, and ſo take away the infinitie alſo. The manifold perfections therefore in the Divine being, are not additions of other beings to make compoſition therein, or to take away the ſimplicitie thereof, ſeeing they all ſignifie one and the ſame being; but becauſe the moſt ſimple being muſt needs bee the firſt of beings, as being altogether in act or perfection, and no way in poſſibilitie of being: for then wereit not a moſt ſimple being, if it were both in act of being that which it is, and in poſſibilitie of being that which it is not: therefore muſt all other beings depend hereon; nay bee herein: becauſe all things are virtually contained in their principles. And this is that eternitie of the creature which it had in the infinite wiſdome and power of God before it was, Gen. 2.5. For ſeeing that in God is infinite perfection and that nothing can bee wanting to that which is perfect; neither yet can any thing be perfect but in him: therefore the firſt and higheſt being of all things muſt bee in his perfection. But becauſe abſolute perfection muſt needs bee with the uttermoſt ſimplicitie, without otherneſſe or change: therefore muſt all things in God bee one, and he though one alone, yet virtually all things. But becauſe all things were in him eternally one; that they might in time bee different in themſelves, (for otherwiſe they could never at all, either have beene, or have beene different) It is neceſſarie to grant, that in that one abſolute being which the creature had in God, there muſt be firſt a poſſibilitie for it to be in it ſelfe: for as things utterlie impoſſible can never be; ſo can there bee no poſſibilitie of being but by him. Secondly, a poſſibilitie for the things being to be different among themſelves, and that not onelyonly in their ſeverall kindes, but alſo in their particular exiſtences; and this for the manifeſtation of that manifold wiſdome of the Maker. And from hence thirdly ſucceeds that actuall being, which things that are being have, by that Holy pleaſure or will, by which they are, and continue in their ſeverall beings: which Will muſt needs bee partaker both of the infinite power, and infinite wiſdome; that it might effect that which was poſſible, and foreſeene. And thus is there in the Unitie of the creature, a Trinitie alſo in poſſibilitie, in difference, and actuall being; that wee ſhould never forget to adore the eternall Trinitie in the Unitie.

But the queſtion of the worlds eternitie, is onelyonly about this laſt manner of actuall being: for it is not denyed that it is eternall in reſpect of that being which it had in God, as the cauſe; or in it ſelfe, as poſſible to bee: becauſe that while it was not being, it had not any power to reſiſt that Almightineſſe, which called it out of not being into being; though to ſpeake more properlie, that eternity which it had in pure poſſibilitie, was not in it ſelfe, becauſe it was not: and ſeeing that which any thing hath of it ſelfe is firſt therein, and more proper thereto than that which it hath of another: therefore the world of it ſelfe having not being, it could not poſſible bee eternall, but onelyonly in his eternall purpoſe which had appointed it unto this being. The World therefore in God, the principle, is not begun, but eternall, and one: but whatſoever is ſevered from this Principle, can neither bee one, nor yet eternall, but comes into the reckoning of otherneſſe and change, and ſo of neceſſitie muſt bee ſubject to time, wherein alone all change is wrought.

§ 2. 1. But here it will be asked, whether God who before the creation of the world reſted eternallie in his owne glorie and happineſſe, ſuffered not ſome alteration in this, that he wrought without himſelfe that which hee had not wrought before, and how hee can be ſaid both to worke and to reſt, Gen. 2.2 and yet to bee without all ſhadow of change Iam. 1.17.

2. Then how He infinite in goodneſſe and truth, and ever one in himſelfe, ſubjected the creature to wretchedneſſe, continuall corruption and change.

3. Thirdly, ſeeing that to an infinite and eternall power all things are alwayes poſſible; why the world was not brought forth many ages heretofore; that ſeeing it muſt be ſubject to vanity, it might before this have beene freed from corruption, and brought to that libertie whereto it doth yearne, Rom. 8.22.

1. To the firſt I anſwer; that, although the creature doth of neceſſitie ſuppoſea Creator, without which it could not be; yet on Gods part there was no neceſſitie to enforce him to create; but he created onelyonly according to the pleaſure of his owne will, as it is confeſſed Revel. 4.11. For nothing was able to impoſe neceſſitie, but onelie that which was ſuperiour in dignitie and power, which the ſuperexcellencie of the Divine being ſuffers not; neither can the freedome of an infinite will, ſuch as the will of God is, bee guided either by chance, by deſtinie, or by neceſſitie. But becauſe hee is infinite in goodneſſe, he envied not to any thing the being thereof, but out of not being brought it into being, by his Word our Lord Ieſus Chriſt. Athanaſius de Incarnat. Verbi. But in this creation he ſuffered no alteration, who had eternally wil'd the creature to be in the time appointed, and in the time appointed brought it out, only by the motion of his will: for his will, his wiſdome, & his power being infinite and one being, no other motion, labour or alteration needed, but onelyonly to will that the creature ſhould then bee created, when hee had from all eternitie willed that it ſhould bee created. So then it was in him both to create, that it might appeare that hee had no neceſſitie of the creature, who was abſolutely perfect without it, and yet at his pleaſure to create; leſt that which was not, might ſeeme to be exempted from his power: and againe, that the creature might be bleſſed in his goodneſſe, and yet he himſelfe without all ſhadow of change. As the minde of a man, which hath plotted a convenient houſe, and given or deſcribed the model to the builder; ſuffers no alteration by the houſe being builded. Therefore after the commandement of water, the firſt matier of all things to bee: the labour of the Creator mentioned in the ſixe dayes, was onelyonly the appointment of ſecondarie cauſes, to worke in their times, to thoſe ends which hee had determined, for the bringing forth of their ſeverall effects: for as the firſt agent moves all ſecondarie agents; ſo it is neceſſarie that all their ends bee ordered to the ends of their firſt mover. So then the ſixe Evenings of the being of things, firſt potentially in their immediate or next cauſes; and in their fieri, or way to perfection, and the Mornings of their actuall and perfect being, are the times*See Eſay 66.8. ages or dayes wherein they were brought forth by their naturall cauſes, all moving in the power of the firſt cauſe, unto their perfection appointed by his eternall decree. And this ordering of cauſes, and giving ſtrength thereto, was his firſt worke: as his continuall bleſſing and upholding the creature by his word, is his continuall worke wherein hee takes delight. Heb. 1.3. & Pſal. 104.31. But his reſt in the ſeventh day, was his ceaſing to bring forth new creatures; which day is therefore ſaid not to have any evening, becauſe his reſt, delight, or glorie is eternall: and is therefore commanded to bee ſanctified by us with a Memento, becauſe it is a pledge unto us, that after the ſixe ages of this worlds travell and wearineſſe in vaine, we ſhall at laſt be made partakers of his reſt. Compare herewith Gen. 1. & 2. to ver. 4. Eſay 46.10. and 2. Pet. 3.8. But this is beſide my purpoſe, and therefore I leave it.

2. To the ſecond queſtion of that ill which is in the creature, though I have anſwered ſufficiently note (a) on Chap. 6. yet I ſay further, that contraries are beſt knowne one by another: …ight by darkneſſe; health by ſickneſſe. And therefore, that we may not onelie deſire, but alſo better know and enjoy our future happineſſe; it is fit that wee ſhould taſte the momentary wretchedneſſe and miſeries of this life; yea drinke at laſt the gar-ans of death it ſelfe, that wee may truly enjoy the happineſſe of everlaſting life. O death! how bitter is the remembrance of thee to a man that hath reſt with his poſſeſsions? But how acceptable is thy doome to him that is vexed in all things? Eccles. 41.1. And queſtionleſſe, if the elect Angels never had any experience of ſorrow; neither did at any time ſinne (for he found no ſtedfaſtneſſe in his ſervants, and laid folly vponupon his Angels. Iob. 4.18. And in his beloved Sonne alone is hee well pleaſed. Matth. 3.17.) Then doe they wonderfully by our afflictions enjoy their owne happineſſe, while they dayly behold our manifold miſeries, and yet know us to be heires of equall glorie. Luke 20.36. for therfore are the ſons of David dayly ſcourged with the rods of men, corrected every morning, and die at laſt, that they may be like unto their Lord, & be made conformable unto his death: for if the Prince of our ſalvation was conſecrated in afflictions; how ſhould we hope duplicate page duplicate page for any portion in his glorie; if we ſhould not with joy be partakers of his ſufferings? For therefore by his owne example did he teach us obedience, becauſe in obedience onelyonly we muſt walke the way to everlaſting life. A ſecond reaſon is, that wee may be humbled before him when we conſider whereto we are come of our ſelves, that is, into miſerie, but not out; and conſequently that wee may bee thankefull for that abundant grace, by which wee are delivered, when our ſufferings ſhall bee recompenſed with an exceeding weight of glorie.

3. The third doubt concerning the time of the worlds creation hath heretofore ſo troubled ſome mens braines, that they thought there had beene infinite worlds, yet ſo, that after everie a ten thouſand yeers all things returne againe to the ſame ſtate wherein they had been before: for whether through the weakenes or ſtrength of the imagination, in ſome fore-catchings of the ſhadowes of things to come, (for it may bee argued both wayes) a man oftentimes perſwades himſelfe, that hee hath beene in the ſame place, with the ſame perſons, ſeene or done the ſame things, heard or ſpoken the ſame words before; upon which ground it ſeemes this Pythagorean fancy was builded. But to the doubt I anſwer: That it would have beene as great, if the world had been made ten thouſand times the whole age of the world before and no greater, if it ſhould have been made as much after the preſent age: for as if you ſuppoſe an infinite ſpace; whereſoever you ſhall ſet a pricke or point therein, it muſt needs be in the middes thereof: ſo time, how long ſoever, yet compared to eternity, can be no more then as an indiviſible centre therein. And therefore S. Paul takes up this queſtion Act. 17.26. That God hath aſſigned the ſeaſons which were ordayned before, and hee that puts not all things in his power, to do both what he will, and as he will, and when he will, denies him to be God. Now let us ſee the reaſons for the Chriſtian faith, that b the world is not eternall or everlaſting, but made by Almighty God, as the Article affirmes.

§ 3. By the world you can underſtand no other thing, than this frame of the whole being of things (beſide the Godhead) whether heavenly or earthly, underſtanding, bodily, or mixt; ethereall, or elementall; with all the cauſes, and effects, proprieties, actions, or other actions that belong to everie one of them. But the word Eternall ſignifies diverſlie. For our purpoſe, either it may meane an age or ſtate of long continuance, as the land of Canaan was promiſed to Abraham and his ſeed for an eternall or everlaſting poſſeſſion Gen. 17.8. which eternitie muſt be limited, either to that age of the world before Chriſt, or at the fartheſt to the uttermoſt age and time of this world, after the deſolation determined ſhall bee fulfilled, and they brought to their owne land againe. And this muſt needs bee the uttermoſt eternitie of that promiſe concerning the letter, as of the everlaſting Covenant of Circumciſion. Another taking of eternitie may bee in that being which hath a beginning and no ending, as our hope is of the ſtate of the ſoule, and everlaſting or eternall life after the reſurrection. So the promiſe of the everlaſting poſſeſſion of Canaan, was a type and Promiſe that heaven ſhould bee our eternall inheritance; whereof we have already aſſurance, yea deliverie, and ſeiſure, in that the Canaanit the devill is driven out from thence by Ieſus our unconquered Captaine Apoc. 12.7, 8. &c. A third and chiefe meaning of eternitie, is that which hath neither beginning nor ending. And ſo we ſay that God onelyonly is eternall. In the firſt ſignification the world is eternall in that ſtate wherein it is, and hath continued from the creation, which wee hold, and ſo ſhall continue unto the diſſolution, which wee hope for. In the ſecond ſignification alſo it may bee ſaid to bee eternall, as concerning the moſt excellent and noble parts thereof; as the Angels and men reſtored from corruption, and in them the ſecond Ideas or formes of all the creatures. But the laſt degree of eternitie is utterlie denied to the actuall being of the world, and that for theſe reaſons following.

1. Whatſoever is eternall, muſt alſo bee infinite, both in the being, and the manner of being, becauſe there could bee nothing before it, by which it might receive any kinde of limit or bounds, any defect or leſneſſe of being. But c the world is not infinite in the being thereof: for it is concluded already Chap. 3. that God is infinite, and of infinites there can bee but one. Chap. 8. conſ. 2. And in the manner of being it cannot bee infinite: for in all things brought forth, there is either quantitie, contrarie to infinitie, or time, contrarie to eternitie; there is defect, or failing, by reaſon of corruption and death: there is abatement, or leſning; becauſe that in everie kinde, one particular is not ſo excellent as another in underſtanding, memorie, ſtrength, beauty, continuance, or one vertue or other. Therfore the world is not eternall.

2. If the world bee eternall, then eternity muſt either bee the whole eſſence and convertible with the eſſence of the world; or elſe it muſt agree thereto as the eſſentiall forme, or as a propertie, or as a common accident. Eternitie is not the eſſence of the world, for ſo ſhould it belong to everie part thereof eſſentially: for everie part is partaker of the eſſence of the whole. But this is moſt falſe in all experience; neither is it the eſſentiall forme thereof: for even from thence would it follow, that the world were not eternall, inaſmuch as having matier and forme, it muſt needs preſuppoſe an efficient cauſe, who both created the parts, and diſpoſed the matier: for the forme; it cannot be a propertie thereto: for all properties proceed from the compoſition or joyning together of the matier and forme. But compoſition takes away eternitie for the reaſon aforeſaid, neither is it an accident, nor yet appropriate thereto by accident, as any relation: for all ſuch, by the order of nature, are after that ſubject whereto they belong; whether they be immediate accidents, or relations depending thereupon. Therefore the world in the actuall being is no way eternall.

3. Whatſoever hath parts muſt needs bee compounded, and whatſoever is compounded or put together muſt needs have parts that were once aſunder, and ſo cannot bee eternall à parte ante. And againe everie compound, by that power whereby it was made, may be reſolved into thoſe parts of which it was made, whether the parts bee eſſentiall, as body and ſoule to a man; or entyre, as ſtones, timber, iron, glaſſe, &c. to a houſe. But the World hath parts ethereall, elementall, incorruptible, and corruptible, animall, vegetable, minerall, &c. Ergo, the World is not eternall.

4. All reall truth is verified, firſt in the things of actuall being, that is, in the individuals. Secondly, in the notions or apprehenſions of the things in their intentionall or common being, either ſpeciall, or more generall. But if the world be eternall, that eternity can agree onelyonly to the common being, and not to the particular or individuall beings, as to this man, that horſe, that tree, &c. So the truth of the worlds eternity, ſhall be intentionall onelyonly, not reall: ſo common intentions onelyonly may bee true, where there is no individuall. But this is moſt falſe and impoſſible: therefore it is moſt falſe that the world is eternall.

5. The whole World, conſiſting of all the parts thereof, is either a body, or not a body. If our ſence (from whence all our diſcourſe proceeds) be judge, it is a body. Now every body in regard of the extent thereof, is finite, is of parts which may bee meaſured, either one by another in halfs, quarters, &c. or elſe by common meaſures, of inches, yards, myles, pints, gallons, &c. It hath likewiſe ſhape or figure, and dimenſion, by length, bredth, depth, without which it could not be a body. But if the world be eternall; then muſt it bee both finite in regard of the extenſion, and infinite in the continuance: ſo infinitie ſhall be more powerfull in a forrein ſubject, that is, in continuance to make it infinite, then it can be in it owne proper ſubject, that is, in meaſure to make it unlimited: ſo alſo infinitie ſhall bee powerfull in the contrarietie of good and ill, to make them eternall, and weake in the littleneſſe of extenſion. So alſo the world being eternall, muſt be for this end, that it may bee that which it is as God. Whereby it would follow that the end of the worlds being could not bee one, but contrarie to it ſelfe in generation and corruption, in good and ill; and all other contrarieties, that are now therein. But all theſe things are impoſſible: therefore the contrary is neceſſary, See Log. Cap. 26. n. 1.

6. Eternitie cannot admit before and after, ſo that one eternall ſhould be before another eternall. But if the world be eternall, this muſt follow neceſſarilie: for every generation is with the corruption or taking away of that forme which was in the matier before; and every corruption is of ſomething that was generate before: So each of theſe eternals muſt bee each before another, and ſo neither of them eternall, and yet the eternity of the world brings in theſe contradictions, inaſmuch as generation and corruption have beene ever ſince the world was. Therefore the worlds eternity is impoſſible.

7. If the world be eternall, that eternity ſhall be rather ill, than good; becauſe the longer the continuance of the world is, the greater is the encreaſe of wickedneſſe and ill, more than of that which is good: at leaſt becauſe of the continuance of good and ill, the worlds eternitie ſhall be both good and ill. And yet becauſe every worldly good hath a beginning and an end in time, and that every privation or taking away of any good eternally, muſt needs be an eternall ill: that eternity of the world ſhall bee neerer to ill than to good, both becauſe of the poſitive ills, and the deprivations of the goodneſſes that are therein. Moreover ſeeing nothing which is corrupted returnes to be the ſame in number, which it was before; generation ſhall bee good and availeable to the maintenance of the ſpecies onelyonly, not to the reſtoring of the actuall or individuall Beings: But Corruption ſhall bee powerfull both againſt the individuall, and therein againſt the ſpecies alſo. And ſo the worlds eternity ſhall bee much nearer to ill than to good, and a bringing in of all theſe inconveniences. Therefore it is not eternall.

8. If the world be eternall, then neither was there any firſt man, neither can there be any laſt: without which laſtneſſe there cannot be any generall reſurrection of men, nor place to containe them. So this eternity of the world muſt be the greateſt ill, as being that which brings in an impoſſibility of the greateſt good, that is, the hope of the reſurrection and everlaſting life, the end of all our hopes. But it is impoſſible that this hope of man ſhould bee fruſtrate, as it will appeare further in the 38. chap. Therefore the world is not eternall.

9. And if you looke backe on the things that have beene already ſpoken concerning the dignities of the Godhead, in the nine firſt chapters, you may from thence make a great ſupply of arguments to this purpoſe, thus; God is, chap. 1. And He is being eſſentially, with all the perfection of being infinitely, eternally, actually; not in poſſibility of being any thing that hee is not, and therefore God is the perfection of being: and convertiblely the perfection of being is God. Now termes convertible cannot poſſibly belong to forrein beings: as to guide a ſhippe at Sea, cannot belong to any but to man alone. Therefore being cannot belong to any thing but to God alone, primarily and of it ſelfe, but onelyonly Analogically, as it hath received the Being from Him. Therefore if the world be not God, which the foole cannot ſay in his heart, the world is not eternall.

10. God is eternall, chap. 2. and eternity belongs eſſentially to God alone, chap. 8. If then the world be not God; then can it not be coeternall with Him. For as it is not poſſible that there ſhould bee more Gods, chap. 8. n. 7. ſo it is not poſſible that there ſhould bee more eternals than one. Therefore the world is not eternall. So you may reaſon from the ſimplicity of His being proved chap. 9. n. 6.7. and from the other dignities of God which are proved to belong to Him in the chapter before; & no leſſe from thoſe things which are denyed to belong to Him, as to bee matier, bodily compounded; &c. chap. 9. But in this plenty and plainneſſe of the matier I take onelyonly that one which followeth.

11. If God bee almighty and one: then it is not poſſible, that anything can be but by his power alone. But it hath beene proved that God is almighty, chap. 6. and one, chap. 8. n. 7. Therefore the world is by his power alone. But if it be obiected, that by his eternall power, hee brought out the world eternally; yet muſt it needs bee, that hee created it, either of nothing; or of ſome matier that was not eternall; or elſe that hee made it of a matier that was eternall. To ſay that God from all eternity had created the world, either of nothing; or of a matier not eternall, would imply a manifeſt contradiction. To ſay that hee made it of a matier which was coeternall to himſelfe, would enforce that the world were conſubſtantiall with God; or rather that it were God. For ſeeing his being is moſt ſimple and one entyre being, without parts, and is not communicated, but whole and all, and that eternity (as all his other attributes) was proved to be God eſſentially, it cannot bee but that the world muſt be God, if it be eternall. Or if that impoſſibility could be avoyded; yet to ſay that God had eternally made the world of eternall matier, would neceſſitate him to an action without himſelfe, which would take away the infinite freedome of his will, his glory, and perfection, which hee hath in himſelfe. Or if it bee ſaid, that the world is eternall without or beſide any action of God upon it, but of it ſelfe alone, beſide the endleſſe abſurdities, contradictions, and impoſſibilities that would follow thereby; It would directly enforce, that there is no God. For if the power by which the world is, and workes; if the wiſdome manifeſt in the ordering cauſes therein; if the truth, goodneſſe, continuance, and other attributes of worldly things, had any other originall than God; their muſt it of neceſſity follow, that God is not infinite in theſe dignities of power, wiſdome, truth, eternity, goodneſſe, &c. when ſo great effects of theſe things are altogether without Him. And to deny unto God the infinity or perfection of theſe dignities, were utterly to deny his Being, and to make him unworthy to bee that which Hee is, contrary to all that hath heretofore beene proved.

12. The holy Scriptures every where teach this truth Gen. 1. & 2. chap. Iob. 38. and many places in that booke beſide. Neh. 9.6. confeſſes to God. Thou art Lord alone: thou haſt made heaven, and the heaven of h…avens, with all their hoſte; the earth and all things that a e therein; the Seas, and all that are in them: and thou preſerveſt them all; and the hoſt of heaven worſhippeth Thee. Pſal. 95.5. The Sea is His, and He made it; and his hands prepared the dryland. Pſal. 96.5. All the gods of the people are Idols: But the Lord made the heavens, whoſe armies, in Pſal. 136. are more particularly reckoned up. And therefore doth God by his owne right challenge the heavens for his ſeat, and the earth for his f…otſtoole; becauſe his hand hath made all theſe things. Eſay. 66.1.2. To this purpoſe you may read other Texts cited by S. Origen, foreign lib. 3. cap. 5. The continuall preſervation alſo of the Creature, as it is manifeſt in reaſon by the arguments afore going; So it is taught, Pſal. 36.6.7. Pſal. 147.8.9. Pſal. 145.15. And Pſal. 104. is wholly in this Argument. And that all this frame ſhall come to nought at laſt, you may read, Pſal. 102.25.26. which is alſo cited by S. Paul, Heb. 1. v. 10.11.12. Read moreover to this purp ſe. 2 Pet. 3.10. Reu. 20.11. And that becauſe it was made of nought. Heb. 11.3. Sap. 11.14.

§. 4. Theſe things then being thus manifeſt, we are now by the way. 1. Firſt to conſider what neceſſary concluſions follow here upon. 2. And then to ſee whether the creation of the world doe belong to every Perſon of the Trinity alike, or to any one more particularly than another.

Firſt, it is certaine, that not being cannot be the beginning of Being. And therefore it is neceſſarie that Being bee eternall. And that which is the firſt of beings muſt needs be the cauſe of al the reſt: So that all other beings muſt acknowledge their originall from thence. And becauſe all things that are, were in time created by that firſt of Beings, not according to any neceſſity of naturall working; as the fire according to the neceſſitie thereof, doth burne any matier that is fit to be burnt; but only according to the pleaſure of his owne will: therefore firſt of all it muſt neceſſarily enſue hereof, that the continuance of all things muſt have the ſame cauſe, which was alſo of their Being. So that for his holy wills ſake alone they alſo continue. If he then withdraw his ſupportance either from all, or from any particular creature, it muſt of neceſſity come to nought in an inſtant.

Secondly, becauſe every agent workes for ſome end: and the greateſt and beſt of work-maſters muſt needs work for the greateſt and chiefeſt good; and ſeeing there neither is, nor can be any thing greater or better than God himſelfe; Therefore it is neceſſary, that this world was created for Him. But becauſe Hee, infinitely bleſſed in Himſelfe, needed not the world, nor any thing of the world, as though he could be better thereby Pſal. 16.2. Act. 17.25. it muſt follow; that the creature was for this end; that as by his Being, it was made partaker …f being, ſo by his infinite goodneſſe it might alſo bee partaker o… glory and happineſſe. For becauſe his goodneſſe, and life and happineſſe, and all his glories are anſwerable to his owne being; therefore are they infinitely ſufficient for every thing, that in any ſort can poſſibly be partaker of being. So then the goodneſſe of God was not encreaſed in the creation, but manifeſted onelyonly; that the creature, according to the meaſure thereof, might bee bleſſed in him. Thus then is God the end of all the creature; Becauſe hee is that ſuperſupreme perfection of goodneſſe, and happineſſe whereof the whole creature deſires to be partaker: but that not our of any choice or purpoſe of the creature; but of him alone that hath created it to be partaker of that image of his goodneſſe.

From the firſt concluſion we are taught with what reverence and feare we ought to live before him; to whoſe onelyonly pleaſure we owe our being and continuance. Next with what great reſpect and care we ought to behave our ſelves toward the creature; not onelyonly men which have the ſame pretious hopes of immortality which wee have; but likewiſe toward every other creature, even the leaſt of Beings. For although we know that all the more bodily creature was made for the uſe of that which hath underſtanding; and that not onelyonly for the exerciſe of the minde in his wiſdome and power that created it; but for thankefullneſſe alſo to that goodneſſe which hath ſubjected it to our uſe in food, in clothing, and other ſuch ſervices for our eaſe, or conveniences; that being deſtitute of no good thing, wee might give our ſelves to his ſervice, and praiſe him alone: And laſtly, that the whole creature might bee bleſſed in man, in whom it is to poſſeſſe an eternall being: yet when wee remember, that there is nothing ſo meane, or ſeeming ſo baſe in the Creature, but that it was eternally foreſeene to that infinite wiſdome even as we; that it was created by the ſame power, appointed by the ſame foreknowledge to this or that very uſe; with what reverence and feare ſhould we carry our ſelves leſt we abuſe it, and ſo offer diſhonour unto the Lord and owner both of it, and us alike? eſpecially ſeeing that when we were not, hee had determined ſo to bleſſe us.

From the ſecond concluſion wee may learne with what patience wee ought to endure all the troubles and afflictions of this life; becauſe wee know thoſe pretious promiſes whereto wee are created, if we acknowledge Him faithfull, and hold our hopes unto the end, ſee Tit. 1.2.

The queſtion moved, to which Perſon the Creation belongs, is full of perplexity, and of any other moſt hard and darke, if it bee well thought on. And therefore in the ſolution thereof it is moſt ſafe for us to hearken to the oracles of God alone. It is commonly and truely ſaid, that the workes of the Holy Trinitie which are without are undivided; yet ſo as that they receive a certaine determination or order from that man…er of Being which is in the Perſons. And therefore becauſe the …ther is the fountaine of Being they commonly aſcribe the creation or bringing of things into being unto Him. So becauſe all perfection of Sonſhip is in the ſecond Perſon, and that there can be no moe Sonnes than one: therefore the redemption of mankinde by the in-dwelling of God in Man is given unto the Sonne, and ſo the ſanctifying of the church to the Holy Ghoſt. But if wee looke diligently unto the text of the Holy Scripture, we ſhall finde how neceſſary it was that the Mediator ſhould ſatisfie for the ſinne of the creature, becauſe the whole creature, was made by Him. For ſo wee may reade Ioh. 1.2.3. All things were made by that word which in the beginning was with God. And without it was nothing made which was made. And verſ. 10. He was in the world, and the world was made by him. And verſ. 14. And that word was made fleſh, (that is, tooke on him the whole nature of man, body and ſoule) and dwelt among us, and we ſaw on the holy mount, Mat. 17.2. &c. 2 Pet. 1.18. the glory thereof, that is, of that fleſh or man, as the glory of the only begotten Sonne of the Father. And againe Col. 1.16. By him that is the Sonne were all things created which are in heaven, and which are in earth: things viſible, and inviſible, all things were created by him, and for him, and in him all things conſiſt. 1 Cor. 8.6. There is one God the Father, of whom were all things, and we by him. Eph. 3.9. God hath created all things by Ieſus Chriſt. And Heb. 1. v. 1.2. God hath ſpoken unto us in theſe laſt dayes by his Sonne, whom He hath made heire of all things: by whom alſo he made the worlds. By all which texts it is cleere which S. Paul hath Rom. 11.36. of him, through him, and for Him are all things. That is, that God the deliverer, which ſhould come out of Sion, verſ. 26. And thus have theſe Apoſtles explained that which is written. Gen. 1.1. In the beginning Elohim created heaven and earth, which word in the whole body of the old Teſtament (as wiſemen have obſerved) is almoſt never ſpoken but of the Perſon of the Mediator onelyonly. I ſuppoſe then that it is plaine enough, which is ſpoken by our Lord, Ioh. 5. v. 19. The Sonne can doe nothing of Himſelfe ſave what he ſeeth the Father doe: for whatſoever things He doth, the ſame things doth the Sonne in like manner. That is, whatſoever the eternall Godhead ordeined in his everlaſting Counſell and decree to bee done, that ſame doth the Sonne execute and performe in the creature anſwerably, and brings forth every thing in time according to the poſſibilities and opportunities of the creature. For as the wiſeman ſaith, Ecclus. 18.1. He that liveth for ever made all things together, or at once. So the Pſalmiſt, as alſo the other Scriptures, tels us by whom and in whom, Pſal. 104.24. In wiſdome haſt thou made them all, that is in our Creator and Saviour. So then, it being cleered by the text of the holy Scripture that the creation of the world was of God the Father in Chriſt, by Chriſt and for Chriſt; it will eaſily follow how neceſſary it was that He our creator by His eternall Spirit ſhould offer himſelfe to God for the ſin of his creature, as it will further appeare when I come to that article.

Notes.

(a) EVery tenne thouſand yeares.] You may reade the poſition in Aug. de Haer. cap. 43. and the refutation thereof in his, 20. 21. 22. bookes de civit. Dei. But the Cabaliſts, for the renewing of this lower world, put ſeven thouſand yeares and no more: for the reſtoring of the whole creature both heavenly and earthly, they put fifty thouſand yeares. You may read the opinion, and partly ſee their reaſons in Leo Hebr. de Amore. pag. 500. &c.

(b) The world is not eternall.] The moſt famouſed opinions that have beene concerning the worlds eternity, are theſe. One, that which the Chriſtian faith doth hold, according to the truth of the holy oracles of God, and the voice of Reaſon, as you have heard: and to this truth the Stoicks are ſaid to hauehave conſented. The ſecond opinion is that of Plato, and his followers, who held that the world had a beginning in time, but of an eternall matier, and that the continuance thereof ſhould bee eternall. For ſeeing generation and corruption is onelyonly by the change of formes, the matier ſtill remaining one: therefore they thought, that as that forme which is purely without matier was incorruptible and eternall; So likewiſe muſt matier bee, which of it owne nature is utterly without forme. And becauſe matier is greedy of all formes how differing or contrary ſoever; Therefore it is ever ſubject to change. Neither is the heaven it ſelfe utterly freed from all power of Change, becauſe of that matier whereof it is, in which the power of Change is ever hidde. Therefore the world is not eternall in reſpect of any power in it ſelfe, either to the production of formes or the continuance of it ſelfe under the ſame formes: but firſt in reſpect of the vnformed matier, and moſt of all in reſpect of that Spirit or life, whereby it is guided and ordered; as by the internall cauſes: and in reſpect of the divine will, and goodneſſe, as the outward principle, and the end: which will as it cannot repent to have done good in giving being unto the world, and the things therein contained; ſo can it not will contrary to it ſelfe, and ceaſe to doe good in the continuance of the creature in that being which it hath. You may reade more to this purpoſe in Plot. Ennead. 2. lib. 1. and his commentator, Marſilius Ficinus.

The third opinion is that of Ariſtotle, that the world was eternall, and from God, as an eternall effect of an eternall cauſe. For becauſe it ſeemed to him impoſſible (and if you looke no higher than nature alone, it is indeed impoſſible) that any thing being can come out of nothing: therefore matier muſt needs be eternall, and therewith generation and corruption, without which nothing is brought forth; And becauſe theſe two could not be thought to be without the moving of the heavens, as the cauſe thereof, therefore both the heavenly bodies and motion, eſpecially circular, muſt be alſo eternall; and herewith time, which is meaſured by the motion of the heavens.

But what this eternall matier ſhould bee, the Philoſophers went into divers opinions. Heraclitus thought it to be fire: Archelans ayre; Empedocles all the elements; and among the reſt, one, one thing; and another, another; as you may reade in Ariſtotle, where hee refutes them: in Tull. Acad. q. lib. 4. and eſpecially in Plutarch de placitis Philoſophorum: and from him in many other. Ariſtotle himſelfe from Heſiod and they that had beene before him, cals it Chaos.

foreign

foreign. — In theogonia.

Firſt was the Chaos, then the earth.

which word if they borrowed not of Moſes his Tohu, which ſignifies empty, of foreign, that ſometimes meanes to bring to nought: nor of that, which ſeem…s to come from thence, Chohus, whereby, as Feſtus ſaith, the old Latines called the world: yet of foreign, they meant by it confuſion, and no way of foreign, which ſignifies a countrie, or an appointed place. Sometime this matier is called foreign, of foreign, mud: For ſo the concluſion of earth and water is beſt underſtood, and fitteſt for generation of earthly things, as Ovid delivers the opinion, and cleeres it by compariſon of the overflowing Nilus. Metam. lib. 1.

All other Creatures tooke their different birth,

And figures, from the voluntary Earth:

When her cold moiſture with the Sunne did ſweat,

And Slimy Mariſhes grew big with heat.

So when ſeven mouthed Nyle forſakes the plaine;

Anantient channel doth his ſtreames containe,

And late left ſlime the heavenly warmth doth feele,

Men ſundry ſhapes beneath the ſod reveile;

Some new begun, and ſome to halfe doe grow,

That halfe alive the reſt but earth below.

But Moſes, Gen. 1. delivers it unto us in the parts active and paſſive, heaven, and earth; which yet before their diviſion were both of water, as it is manifeſt in that place, and 2. Pet. 3.5. According hereunto Homer. Iliad. foreign, and after him Thales affirmes the firſt matier of all things to be water. But the opinions of the leſſe reckoning are thoſe that are found amongſt the heretickes of the Chriſtians. For all the Philoſophers and Poets of the heathen, which held not the eternity of the world, acknowledged God the authour of the world under one name or other: but Simon Magus, and with him Menander, ſaid that the Angels were the makers of the world. Saturnius gives the honour unto ſeven Angels alone, whom he makes the Creators of the world, without the conſent or knowledge of God. Carpocrates, and the Priſcillianiſts affirmed, that the world was made by certaine inferiour Angels, among whom the devill was chiefe workemaſter. Valentinus gave it out, that a devil which was begotten of the thirtieth Ai…n begot other devils, and theſe Sonnes of Avengles made the world; and miſchiefe, and ſinne are in the world, not through the wickedn…ſſe and free will of man, but even by the very creation of the world it ſelfe. The Nicholaitanes tel us, of Angels the makers of the world; and that Barbelo, who was ruler of the eight Sphere, was overſeer of the works, His mothers name was Yaldaboth. But I have not read ſo farre in heraldry, as to tell you who was his Dad, nor of what houſe his mother came, nor yet whether his fellow workemen were good or bad Angels. The Gnoſticks of the two Gods which they make (as you have heard before) make the ill God the creator of the world; which though it appeare not, either by Irenaeus, Clement, Tertullian, Epiphanius, or by S. Auguſtine; yet it is plaine by Plotinus, Aenead. 2. lib. 9 who writes againſt their opinions, and this in particular. Marcion made three creators: one good, another bad, and another betweene them, whom they called Iuſt. So you ſee how all theſe hereticks had madded themſelves and their followers, in their opinions concerning the Creator of all things. Others erred concerning ſome parts of the creature onelyonly; as the Seleucians, and Hermians or Herm…genians, beſide their errour of the worlds matier coeternall with God, denyed that God created the ſoules of men, but would have them created by the Angels of fyer and Spirit; contrary to that which is in Gen. 2.7. & Eſay 57.16. & 1 Pet. 4.9. That God is the faithfull Creator of the ſoule. The Priſcillianiſts ſaid that the ſoules of men were of the ſame ſubſtance and nature with God; and being by him ſent downe from heaven, the devill met with them by the way, and ſowed them as ſeed in the fleſh: whereupon it muſt follow, either that the being of God is diviſible into infinite partes; or that there is but one onelyonly ſoule of all men; and both wayes unavoydably, that God (at leaſt in part of Himſelfe) muſt be ſubject to Sinne; and ſo that either He muſt need a Saviour; or by His owne law, bee ſubject to eternall death. This is the fruite of hereſie. The Patricians denyed God to be the Creator of the body of man, and gave that honour to the devill; contrary to that which is in Gen. 2. v. 7. and v. 21.22. yea, and ſo deteſted the fleſh, as that to be out of the body, ſome of them killed themſelves. The Paternians ſaid that the lower parts of the body, (it ſeemes onelyonly thoſe that are affixed thereto for generations ſake, that fleſh which the law ſo often commands to be waſhed) were made by the devil, and thereupon tooke occaſion to live in filthineſſe, and luſt, contrary to the Commandement of God. The Marcionites, and Manichees ſaid, that wickedneſſe and ill, was partly from God, and partly from the matier of the world. Florinus and his followers ſaid, that things were created ill, according to their ſubſtances; contrary to the Scripture, Gen. 1.31. But contrarily, the Coluthians would not have God the Author of ill; no not that of puniſhment: which nevertheleſſe the Scripture teaches Eſay 45.7. and 54.16. Amos. 3.6. Some alſo of the heretickes followed the opinions of the ancient Philoſophers; as they that were called Aquei, that of Thales; and ſaid that water was the matier of the would, but yet eternall, and not created. The Audian and Manichean hereticks inſtead of Ariſtotles eternals, brought in darkeneſſe, fire, and water; you might bring hither their fooliſh thoughts concerning the tranſplantation of ſoules, and ſuch like queſtions: but there will bee fitter place thereto in the article of everlaſting life. And becauſe theſe upſtart weenings are ſo witleſſe, as they are falſe; I will not vouchſafe to inquire into their reaſons: the onelyonly authority of the holy Scripture is ſufficient to grinde them all to duſt; and to bring that duſt to nought at all. But leaſt any man contrary to the truth of God, be overſwayed with the reaſons of the Philoſophers, it will not be unfit to examine, and anſwer them.

1. And firſt concerning the reaſons of the Platonicks, that the matier of the world ſhould therefore be eternall, becauſe it is ſimple, and uncompounded. I anſwer, That it is but petitio principii; or a taking of that which is not granted: for it is utterlie denied that there was ever ſuch matier as they ſuppoſe, utterly informed. I ſay according to the Sacred Philoſophie, that when water the firſt matier of all things, was created, darkneſſe or confuſion was upon the face of the deepe: but yet with that water, under that confuſion, was concreated all manner of formes, which afterward were all brought forth out of the poſſibilitie of the matier; ſo that matier was impregnate or great with all kinde of formes, which afterward were made to appeare: for otherwiſe could not the effect bee anſwerable to the cauſe, if hee being in himſelfe the Jdeas or formes of all beings, had not brought forth the firſt matier full fraught with all materiall formes, by which afterwards, according to the diſpoſition of their naturall cauſes, the different kindes of things were informed. And therefore here alſo are all things ſaid, by him to have beene made at once. And although in the workes of the fifth day, the whales, with other things which had a life, with the power of moving, are ſaid to bee created; yet is that ſpoken onelyonly in regard of that more manifeſt life than the vegetable had, in the workes of the third day: but that life nevertheleſſe was brought out of the power of the matier by more powerfull cauſes, his bleſſing comming thereto; even as it was afterward upon them to bring forth after their kinde. OnelyOnly in the ſixth day, becauſe it was not in the power of all nature to bring forth a reaſonable and an immortall ſoule, hee breathed into man a Spirit of new life, and man became a living ſoule, the epitome or modell of all the creature, earthly and heavenly, bodily and ſpirituall. This truth is ſo plaine, that Ovid the prince of all the heathen Poets for wit, judgement and manifold learning, read it in the booke of nature Metam. lib. 1.

Before the Sea, the earth, and heaven all hiding,

There was one face on all the world abiding;

Which men name Chaos, an unordered load,

Wherein the ſeeds of things contrarie aboade.

But though it be granted that the firſt matier was meerely and purely ſimple, yet can it not follow that therefore it was eternall, except it may withall appeare, that it had power to bee of it ſelfe, without the power of the Creator. But that would utterlie take away the infinite power of God; if beſide his power, any power could bee ſuppoſed to another thing, which could uphold an eternall being. And ſeeing in all corruption everie thing returnes to thoſe principles of which it was; as in man his body to the earth, and his Spirit unto God that gave it, and that nothing materiall returnes to a ſimple and pure being, but that it is ſtill found under ſome forme or other; it is manifeſt, firſt, that that firſt matier was not created ſimple; but by his decree ever ſubject to compoſition: and therefore ſecondly impoſſible to be eternall. Concerning that eternall Spirit or life of the world, in reſpect of which they thought it ſhould bee eternall, both before and after; you ſhall underſtand more in the 24. Chap. note (g) § 10. yet in the meane time I anſwer, that if that Spirit whereby the world both is, and is ordered, worke according to that paterne which hee ſees in another; it cannot follow, that the world ſhall thereby bee for ever, except it appeare to ſtand with that will, according to which hee workes. Now what that will is we underſtand better, by his owne Revelation in his owne word, than Plato and all his followers could ſee in all the ſubtilty of their underſtanding. By which word alſo wee know, that the laſt end and hope of the creature is more excellent and glorious by the change, than by the continuance of the world for ever in that ſtate wherein it is. And thus the ſpeciall reaſons of that Sect are anſwered. See more to this queſtion (if you will) in Tertullian againſt Hermogenes.

2. But it is further objected, that whatſoever begins to worke which did not worke before, muſt be moved thereto, either by it ſelfe, or by another. But God is not moved, that is, changed from that which he was before, either by himſelfe, nor by any other: for neither can his action bee new, or begun, ſeeing his action is his being; neither can hee be affected otherwiſe, than hee was before. And therefore is hee an eternall cauſe of the world, an eternall effect, as Ariſtotle affirmed. I anſwer, That no new motion or purpoſe can come unto God concerning the creature: for all his workes are knowne to him from eternitie, Acts 15.18. But ſeeing that theſe workes of which we ſpeake; are of his will alone; they muſt be according to the limitation or appointment of that will: ſo that although hee had eternally willed to create the world; yet had he eternally willed, when, by whom, and after what faſhion, the world and all the things therein ſhould be created. And this by one onelyonly will and one onelyonly action of the ſame will eternally. The newneſſe then of the world is in the actuall being of the world, not in the will or power whereby it was wrought. But for the better underſtanding of this thing, you may obſerve a difference of actions, of which ſome are immanent, or in-dwelling in the doer and are accompted among the perfections of the thing; ſuch are the workes of the will or underſtanding: ſome againe are tranſeunt, or paſſing from the doer upon that which is done; as the worke of the Smith upon the ſteele in making a ſword. The workes of God in himſelfe are immanent; neither doe theſe of neceſſitie put the outward object into actuall being; as a man may conceive of a houſe, which is not yet built; or the Smith by his art or skill hath power to make a locke which hee hath not yet made. So God though hee foreſaw and willed eternally that the world ſhould bee, yet the effect followed not, but according to the determination of that will, when, by whom, and how the world ſhould receive an actuall being.

3. But it may againe bee ſaid, that God is an Eternall, and an Almighty agent; and that not in poſſibilitie onelyonly, but in act alſo: for whatſoever is brought from the poſſibilitie of doing unto the act of doing, muſt bee enforced thereto by a former, and more powerfull agent, and that actually, which in God is utterlie impoſſible: and if hee be an eternall and a powerfull agent, and that actually, the effect muſt neceſſarily follow, and that actually: for otherwiſe neither could the effect be anſwerable to the cauſe; nor yet the cauſe bee ſaid to bee ſufficient and Almightie, if the cauſe were in act, and the effect in poſſibilitie onelyonly: therefore it ſeemes the world muſt of neceſſitie be eternall. Anſwer. Although God bee actually and eternally whatſoever hee may bee in himſelfe, yet ſeeing hee workes in outward things, not according to any neceſſitie, but onelyonly according to the pleaſure of his owne will; the outward effect of his power muſt bee limited according to the circumſtances of his will, which I declared before. Therefore this reaſon doth no more enforce the eternitie of the world, than it doth that all the poſſibilities of the creature ſhould be actually at once; and that every thing created ſhould bee eternall, becauſe the cauſe is eternall, actuall, and all ſufficient. But theſe things as they can no way ſtand with the poſſibilitie of the creature; ſo would they utterly take away the working of all naturall cauſes, by which the glory of his manifold wiſdome is declared: neither doth the all-ſufficiencie of the cauſe bring any ſufficiencie to the reaſon to prove the world eternall. For although the creature bee an effect of the infinite power of God; yet becauſe it is not an adequate or proportionable object thereto, that is, wherein that power may bee wholly and onelyonly exerciſed; therefore is it but a forrein effect, wherein that power workes onelyonly according to the will of the worker. Therefore obſerve here ſecondly a difference of agents, of which ſome worke naturally, and theſe worke alwayes neceſſarily according to their uttermoſt power, in the diverſity of things whereon they worke, as the Sunne by his heat melts that which hath thin parts, as butter, or waxe, and hardens that which hath parts more ſtiffe, as clay. Some agents againe are voluntarie, and theſe worke not neceſſarily, but according to the choice and freedome of their owne will; as the Phyſician gives not to his patient all that hee can give, but that which hee knowes to bee with his ſtrength to the procuring of health. Now God is firſt and principall among theſe agents onelyonly, as concerning all things without himſelfe; and no way tyed by any neceſſitie: therefore the world being an effect of the will of God; it muſt be ſubject to all the conditions of that will, that it be ſuch as he will have it, that it be when he will have it, that it bee according to thoſe cauſes by which he will have it, that it bee of that continuance as he will have it, and this unchangeably, becauſe there is no ſuperiour being whereby that will can poſſibly be changed.

4. But what God willed he willed, from eternitie, and becauſe his will (as you truly ſay) cannot be changed; therefore no new motion can come thereto, and becauſe no defect can bee therein, nor yet any hinderance, as being convertible with an infinite power; therefore it is neceſſarie that the world was created eternally, that his will eternally might take effect. Anſwer. It is not denied but that the world in the purpoſe of God was willed to bee eternally, and that no change, defect or hinderance was or ever could bee found in this will: for if any of theſe things were not thus; it had beene impoſſible that ever the world ſhould have beene. But yet to put the eternitie of the world, leſt this will ſhould be without effect, would neceſſitate this will to the actuall being of the creature; in that it might ſeeme deficient and hindred, and ſo, miſerable; if the creature had not beene eternall: but this by no meanes may be yeelded unto; becauſe it would utterlie take away the abſolute libertie of of an infinite will: for although God doth not, or cannot bee ſaid both to will and unwill the ſame things, in reſpect of the effect of his will, or the actuall being of the things themſelves; becauſe hee cannot denie himſelfe, 2. Tim. 2.13. Yet in regard of any ſuperiour cauſe which might enforce his will to the one ſide, or the other, it cannot bee denied but that hee had abſolute libertie, both to will, or not to will the being of any thing without himſelfe: for otherwiſe his will were more limited then the will of a man, who hath freedome of will to doe or not to doe the things that are in his owne power; and therefore his will tooke effect in this, neither could it bee effected otherwiſe than thus, that the creature was then when hee had determined that it ſhould bee. But for the better underſtanding and aſſoyling of this doubt, remember this third difference concerning the neceſſitie of Gods will; which is either abſolute, or conditionall. The abſolute neceſſitie of Gods will is in that which concernes himſelfe alone; as, that hee be, that his being bee ſuch as it is, infinite, eternall, glorious, &c. The conditionall neceſſitie which they call of ſuppoſition is of things without himſelfe; as becauſe hee knowes his infinite being ſufficient for ſupportance of all manner of being; his owne goodneſſe to bee likewiſe infinite, and yet loves the multiplicitie of goodneſſe, as the ſimilitude or repreſentation of his owne; therefore wils hee that the creature bee the image of his being and goodneſſe; and although there bee but one action of the will whereby it is carried to the deſire of good; yet becauſe goodneſſe cannot be infinite, but in himſelfe alone; therefore doth hee will his owne being with an abſolute neceſſitie of his will: but hee wils other things as hee hath limited the times of their being, and degrees of their perfection. So that as by one eternall act of knowledge hee knowes both his owne being, and therein all the poſſibilities of being; ſo by one act of his will, which is moved by the ſhew of good, doth he will himſelfe as an infinite, good, with an abſolute neceſſitie of his will, and other things as the repreſentations of his goodneſſe; which goodneſſe is that condition for which hee wils them neceſſarily, ex ſuppoſito, I meane, that they may bee partakers of his goodneſſe, not that hee hath need of any of them. So having willed that man ſhould bee, it is neceſſarie that hee will alſo all thoſe things which are neceſſarie to his being; as that hee have a ſoule endued with reaſon, and election, &c. which things though hee willed eternally, and neceſſarily; yet not with any abſolute neceſſitie; becauſe hee is abſolutely perfect in himſelfe without them: therefore as it followes not, that all things poſſible ſhould bee at once, becauſe he is Almightie; ſo neither doth it follow, that any thing created ſhould bee eternall, becauſe hee from eternitie willed that it ſhould be; but rather becauſe he willed that it ſhould be in time, therefore it cannot in any caſe be eternall.

5. Whatſoever begins to be that which it was not before, muſt needs have the preſent being by ſome kinde of change whereby it was brought to bee that which it is. But before all change it is neceſſarie that there bee ſomething that may be changed; and this may ſeeme to be eternall. Anſwer. The propoſition is true onelyonly in things that are changed according to naturall cauſes. But creation is a thing above nature; by which nature her ſelfe had her beginning, not onelyonly in regard of the ſubject or matier wherein ſhee workes; but alſo of the cauſes by which ſhe brings forth all naturall effects. But you will ſay, that all things are not materiall: for the ſpirituall beings, of whom it is fit to thinke that they are both moe in number, and in greater differences of eſſentiall formes than the bodily are; yet are not materiall: in which reſpect, not being ſubject to change, they may well be thought eternall. I may anſwer hereto as to the firſt objection from the ſimplicitie of the matier: for firſt, it is not granted, that the ſpirituall beings ſpoken of, are utterlie without matier: then although that were given; yet it followes not but that they were brought into being out of not being, and ſo created as the Article affirmes. And theſe are the chiefe arguments brought by the Platonicks and Ariſtotelians to prove the worlds eternitie. Other objections of leſſe importance you may reade (if you will) with their anſwers in Thomas Aquinas contra Gentes, lib. 2. Cap. 32.33.34. &c. But if you underſtand the anſwers, and the differences which have beene obſerved; I ſuppoſe you ſhall be able thereby to anſwer for the truth.

The opinion of the worlds creation from a precedent matier, was recalled by Hermogenes againſt whom Tertullian diſputes, as you may reade.6. But infinitie is not onelyonly of continuance, which we call eternitie, which we may ſeeme to have refuted ſufficiently; but of greatneſſe or extent, of number alſo, of power, of goodneſſe, or the like: but if it hath beene proved, that the world tooke a beginning as concerning the continuance; it may eaſily follow that no manner of infinitie can belong unto it. Yet Fran. Patricius Pancoſ. lib. 8. upon the ſame arguments of the infinitie of the power, goodneſſe, and will of God, would build up the infinitie of the world, at leſt concerning the extenſion or ſpace thereof. And although the anſwers heretofore made to the arguments above, may ſeeme to anſwer his reaſons ſufficiently; yet I ſuppoſe you may better underſtand whatſoever is to bee ſaid hereto, if you have well peruſed that which is ſaid in the ſecond and eighth Chapter. In the meane time you may doe well to remember who meaſured the water in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with his ſpan, Eſay 40.12. And if all theſe things were made in number, weight and meaſure, Sap. 11.17. It may well follow, that the world cannot be infinite in any of theſe.

7. But the infinitie or uncertaintie of number hath moſt doubt, becauſe it is ſaid, Heb. 1.2. & 11.3. That God hath appointed Chriſt to bee heire of all things; becauſe that by him he made the Worlds. But the word World anſwers to two words in Greeke, foreign and foreign. The firſt ſignifies oftentimes the frame of the whole creature, as in Matth. 25.34. but not alwayes: for ſometimes it ſignifies the world of the wicked onelyonly, as Iohn 14.17. ſometime of the elect onelyonly, as Iohn 3.17. ſometime as age or time of the world, and the people of that age, as S. Peter 2. Epiſt. 2.5. ſaith, that God ſpared not the old world; and againe 2. Pet. 3.6. The world that then was, periſhed by waters, to which meaning the word foreign uſed in that text of Heb. 1.2. doth moſt directly anſwer. So that the ages there ſpoken of may well receive interpretation by the dayes of the creation, by which God foretold what ſhould afterward come to paſſe, as it is ſaid, Eſay 46.10. and elſewhere.*See Brocardi Myſtica in Gen. So then the firſt day of nature when darkeneſſe was upon the deepe, ſignified that time when the wickedneſſe of man was great on the earth, and the thoughts of his heart were onelyonly evill continually. And although they had the light of reaſon in them; yet becauſe they did not walke according to that light; therefore God brought the floud upon the world of the ungodly. The ſecond day wherein was the diviſion of the waters by the firmament of heaven, meant that time when God ſeparated his Church from the people of the world, and parted them by the firmament of his Covenants, firſt of circumciſion given to Abraham, afterward of the ceremoniall Law by Moſes, which worke of the ſecond day is therefore not praiſed as good; becauſe the Law workes wrath, Rom. 4.15. And becauſe theſe ceremonies were not able to give life to the doers of the ſame: for Moſes might not bring Iſrael into the land of promiſe. Deut. 34.4. Eſay 66.3. Gal. 2.16. & 1…. & 30.10. The third day ſignifies the third age or ſtate of the Church, when the earth, that is theſe worldly rites, by the lively interpretation of the Prophets, who unfolded their meaning, and taught the people of their times to have hope in him that was to come, brought forth the herbe and fruit tree yeelding ſeed unto everlaſting life. The fourth age of the Church was that time wherein the Sun of righteouſneſſe did ſhine, and brought in that new light, that true light which lightens every man that come into the world of his Church, that Sun which gave ſhine unto the Moone, the Apoſtolike Church, and to the Stars, thoſe Doctors whoſe knowledge, zeale, and conſtancie, gave light in that darke night of perſecutions and hereſie which did enſue. And theſe and ſuch other are the ages (even untill the great Iubile) of which the Apoſtle ſpeakes in that place Heb. 1.2. which is brought for the proofe of many worlds. So this Democritan fancie may vaniſh.

8. Concerning the infinitie of multitude in the different ſpecies or kindes of things, the Cabaliſts have an opinion that although they riſe to an exceſſive number, yet they muſt needs be definite; and that according to the difference of words, in all the poſſible change and joyning of the letters: for if either the things were not different, according to the ſignification of words; or that the words had not their meaning according to the difference of things: that wiſdome who both made the things, and gave words to expreſſe their differences, ſhould ſeeme diſproportionable, and wanting on one ſide or on the other; neither could that word be verefied Gen. 2 19. which ſaith, And whatſoever Adam called every living creature, ſo was the name thereof. The opinion is delivered in the booke which they call Iezirah, the author of the tradition they make Abraham the Patriarch, the deſcription of Iuda an ancient Rabbine, the collection of the number is of Fr. Georgius in his 244 Probl. tit. 67. and this*You may ſee alſo the comment of Poſtellus on that booke, and Archangels apologie of the Cabala. pag. 548, &c. is the number 1124002590827719680000. that is, one thouſand one hundred twentie foure millions of great millions, two thouſand five hundred and nineteene great millions, eight hundred twenty ſeven thouſand ſeven hundred and nineteene millions, ſixe hundred and foureſcore thouſand. But although the poſſible combination of letters be ſo different as they make it, yet the reaſon holds not for the actions and paſſions as well as the proprieties of things muſt be expreſſible with all the differences of times, paſt, preſent, and to come, and that either alone, or with others. Beſides, wordes expreſſe the defects of things, the vices alſo and imaginations of the minde, which are neither created beings, nor alwayes true. Moreover although Adam had power over all words, yet it appeares not that hee had knowledge alſo of the nature, and differences of the heavenly and ſpirituall creatures; ſo that the words may perhaps fall ſhort of the number of different beings. But becauſe they will not be out bidden, they fix this number to the combination of conſonants (it ſeemes for the different ſpecies) to which if you adde the different vowels above or below (as the manner of that writing is) you ſhall have a number ſo great as may equall all the individuals, of all the ſpecialls that ever have beene or ſhall bee hereafter: which by Patricius muſt needs be infinite: for thus he reaſons, Panarch. lib. 19. from three infinities, eſſentiall, potentiall, and actuall, a fourth infinite muſt needs proceed, at leaſt of number: for otherwiſe the effect ſhould not bee anſwerable to the cauſe. The infinite eſſence hee ſuppoſes the Father; the infinite power, the Sonne; and the infinite worker, the Holy Ghoſt. And by theſe three are three Trinities brought out of ſpirituall creatures, or Angels, as he by Pſellus underſtands the Chaldean in wiſdome; whether well or ill, it skils not much; For we are taught Iob. 1.3. That By the word all things were made, and without him was nothing made that was made. But to his reaſon. Can an infinite Being bring forth an effect without power, and working thereto? or can an infinite power bee, but in an infinite being? or can an infinite worke bee without an infinite power? ſo that theſe three which hee makes divers Creators, and that of ſeverall Trinities, can bee but one Creator, as they are but one Trinity in unity of eſſence, as hath afore beene declared at large. And as concerning the concluſion, it is yeelded that the number of individuals or particular beings is infinite to us, utterly beyond our reckoning: but yet to Him, without whom a Sparrow lights not on the ground, they are all numbred. Nay I ſay further, that through his bleſſing upon the creature to multiply according to kinde, Gen. 1. the individuals are in nature potentially infinite: but no way to Him, by whoſe onelyonly power nature doth worke. For otherwiſe, His wiſdome and power could not bee coequall. And thus have men wearyed themſelves in vaine to finde out his wayes, that are paſt finding out.

The firſt ſupply concerning Man.

CHAP. XIV.

That Man was created one alone, male and female, as the Scripture names them, Adam and Eve.

CHAP. XV.

That Man was created innocent and without ſinne.

CHAP. XVI.

That Man continued not in that innocencie, but that he ſinned, and thereby became ſubject to eternall death.

CHAP. XVII.

That by the ſinne of our firſt parents, the whole maſſe of mankinde was corrupted, and made liable to eternall death both of body and ſoule.

CHAP. XVIII:

That there is a reſtoring of man to a better life, and further hope, than that from which our parents fell.

CHAP. XIX.

That this reſtoring could not be made by any meanes that was in man, nor by any one that was man onelyonly.