The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture, Article 1 – Article 2

The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture · Article 1 – Article 2

p. 53The Father Almightie.

CHAP. XI. That there is a Trinitie of Perſons in the Vnitie of the Deitie.

Section. 1. THat the wiſdome of God manifeſted in this lower creature, and all the poſſibilities that are therein, ſhall at laſt bee made knowne to man, for whoſe ſake and uſe they were created, I have elſewhere ſufficiently proved. But as yet how farre wee are from thence, every man doth ſufficiently know. For is there any Dyer ſo overweening in his craft of dying, as that he dare take upon him to know all the poſſibilities that are in the mixing and ſetting of colours? nay in the ſervice of that great god of our pampered gurmandizers, I meane the belly, is there any Cooke, that will take upon him to bee able to make all thoſe very things which are daylie ſought out to pleaſe the taſte? if then in thoſe things wherein our ſences are moſt delighted, wherein we ſtudie with greedines how to pleaſe our ſelves, we muſt confeſſe our dulneſſe; how much more heavie muſt we needs be in that whereof neither our ſences, nor our reaſon, nor the higheſt and beſt part of our underſtanding, all Nature helping us herein, can give us any knowledge? Who knowes the thoughts of a man but the ſpirit of a man that is within him? how much more then is it impoſſible to know the myſteries of God, but by that relation which hee hath made unto us of himſelfe? Therefore the knowledge of that myſterie of the holy Trinitie in the Unitie of the Godhead, is that ſuper excellencie of knowledge, which we have by the holy Scripture onelyonly; which truth we are ſo much the more carefull to know, and conſtantlie to uphold: firſt becauſe it concernes that moſt excellent and high being, even of God himſelfe; ſecondly, becauſe the revelation thereof is from God alone, manifeſted by his word; thirdly, becauſe it is the foundation of our faith and hope: for if Chriſt our Saviour be not very God, and very man; the being of our Mediatour, and the alſufficiencie of his merit is utterly vaniſhed; fourthlie, it is one of the maine and principall differences between our moſt high Religion taught us by God himſelfe, and the falſe worſhip of Idolaters, of the Iewes, Turkes, Arians, and p. 54other hereticks, which from time to time have turned the truth of God into a lye. Fifthlie, we follow herein the holy Martyrs and the Fathers in the primitive Church, and thoſe Councells which have from time to time maintained this truth againſt all hereſies.

And although it cannot bee denied, but that even among the Heathens, ſome of their wiſeſt, both Poets and Philoſophers knew this myſterie by heare-ſay, as they had received it from the Hebrewes; as you may reade in Thom. Aquin. in lib. 1. diſt. 3. q 2. and more at large in Struchus de peren. Philoſ. lib. 1. & 2. and from them in Philip Mornay of the trueneſſe of Chriſtian Religion Chap. 6. yet among the Hebrewes themſelves (except the Prophets, and ſchooles of the Prophets) this ſecret was not knowne or taught, and that, (as it may ſeem) leſt the miſunderſtanding multitude might fall into the Idolatrie of many Gods: therefore is this thing ſo taught in the holy text of the Old Teſtament, that the wiſe onelyonly might underſtand it: for although the Prophets knew well enough that in the dayes of the king Meſſiah this myſterie ſhould be knowne even to the Gentiles: for of him it is written in the 40. Pſalme verſ. 9.10. I will not refraine my lips O Lord, thou knoweſt, but I have declared thy truth and thy ſalvation, I have not concealed thy mercy and thy truth from the great Congregation: Yet becauſe they knew they miniſtred thoſe things of which they ſpake, not to themſelves, nor to the people of their owne times, but for us, unto whom the treaſuries of the riches of God in Chriſt were more fullie to bee opened; therefore they taught according to the diſpenſation of the Holy Ghoſt, who hath ſo from time to time, opened the fountaines of knowledge unto his Church, and hereafter will; as the holy Church ſhall be able to receive it. This glorious truth then being plainely diſcovered to us in the New Teſtament; let us ſee with what diligence and faithfulneſſe, reaſon that ſervant of God doth wait on the authoritie of his Lord, and how thereby (a) wee are ſummoned to hearken unto this truth: for although reaſon could never have found it out; yet being taught what the truth of God is herein, it joyes to ſee the neceſſitie of that truth which it is bound to beleeve.

But becauſe I have written ſomewhat to this Argument already (which that you miſſe not, I have cauſed to bee printed at the end of this booke) I may be ſomewhat more briefe herein. OnelyOnly the reaſons I take up here together; and adde ſuch other ſupplies as ſeeme to be wanting in that treatiſe.

§. 2. The word Father is taken either perſonally, as it ſignifies the firſt Perſon of the bleſſed Trinitie, with the relation to the Eternall Sonne; or elſe it is ſpoken eſſentially of all the three Perſons in the Godhead, with reſpect of the creature which is created, ſuſteined, and governed thereby. Of this (through his helpe) we ſhall ſpeake hereafter Chap. 13. but firſt of the firſt perſon of the holie Trinitie. The Greeke Churches by the authoritie of p. 55the Apoſtle, Heb. 1.3. for the ſeverall diſtinctions of the Perſons in the Godhead, hold the word foreign hypoſtaſis, which wee from the Latin call a Subſiſtence, or ſeverall ſubſtantiall being by it ſelfe. But the Latin Church turned it Perſona, from an old word (Perſola) becauſe it meanes one onelyonly being intire of it ſelfe: for Solus is of foreign, that is whole in it ſelfe, and entire with all the parts: but yet is Perſona a title of honour given unto men alone: for they define it to be Rationalis naturae individua ſubſtantia, that is an individeable ſubſtance of a reaſonable nature, and from thence it is tranſlated to God and Angels. A Perſon then of the holy Trinitie is an incommunicable ſubſiſtence in the Divine nature. Theſe words have their ground in the holy Scripture, to which in this great Article of our faith wee muſt ever have recourſe, by reaſon of the many and ſtrong hereſies that have beene thereabout. Trinitie, Triunitie, or a threefold being in one, hath ground in that Text which is in Matthew 28.19. Goe teach all Nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Sonne, and of the Holy Ghoſt. But certaine it is that in our Baptiſme, wee bind our faith and allegiance unto G…d alone. So 1. Iohn 5.7. There are three that beare witneſſe in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and theſe three are ^• one thing, or one being. By ſubſiſtence underſtand a ſubſtantiall or eſſentiall being, not comming to, or being in the Deitie by chance. It anſwers to the word foreign, which is different from ſubſtance, nature, being, or the like te…mes that ſignifie any common, or univerſall b ing: for an Hypoſtaſis meanes a peculiar being wherein the common nature is wholl… and entyre, as I ſaid before, and will ſay untill you underſtand mee. For example, the whole nature or being of man is underſtood in that word Man, and ſo the Angelicall nature in that word Angell; but Peter or Gabriel meane that particular perſon, in which the common being is whole and entyre. I meane ſo, as that there is nothing eſſentiall in the being a man, or Angell, whereof Peter and Gabriel are not partakers eſſentially; ſo wee underſtand the difference. The being or eſſence of the Godhead is one individuall, moſt ſimplie, abſolutelie, and ſubſtantiallie one; which infinite and undivideable being of the Godhead is yet nevertheleſſe in everie Perſon entyre and wholly, ſo that nothing of the eſſentiall being of the Godhead is in one, which is not in the other. And therefore Iuſtin the Martyr, and from him Damaſcen Dialect. Cap. 66. and after them our ſound Doctors of all ſides agree, that foreign, or a ſubſiſtence is foreign, that manner of being proprietie, or reall relation, which belongs to every one Perſon in the Holy Trinitie. You may here not unfitly note the difference of theſe words, Being, Subſtance, and Subſiſtence. Being is that which is common to all things that are. The word Subſtance, properlie doth not ſo much import the verie inward being, as that reſpect which it hath to the accidents p. 54duplicate page p. 55duplicate page p. 56that are therein. Subſiſtence, ſignifies that ſpeciall manner of being which belongs to ſubſtances that are actually being. If you will enquire further, you may ſee what Thom. Aquin. hath writ hereto in Sent. lib. 1. Diſt. 23. qu. 4. or if you will, the Introduct. to log. Sect. 4. Incommunicable, that is, peculiar, proper, or belonging to one alone; ſo that one cannot be another. The divine Nature is uſed 2. Pet. 1.4. and here meanes that being or ſubſtance, wherein all the three Perſons are eſſentially one, and the ſame One God. One (I ſay) not compounded or made of the three Perſons, but One moſt ſimple and perfect being, in all the three Perſons of the Godhead.

Now the name of a Father, is moſt poperly given unto God the firſt Perſon of the Trinitie (for of him is foreign all fatherhood of the families both in heaven and earth Epheſ. 3.15.) becauſe that out of the perfection of His owne being hee brings forth a Perſon coeſſentiall, that is, of the ſame being with himſelfe, and coeternall, yet diſtinguiſhed from him by certaine incommunicable properties, which is the Sonne; and that by an eternall, moſt holy, infinite and ſpirituall working in himſelfe, according to that life, holineſſe, wiſdome, power, glory, &c. which are in him eſſentially; and this ſpirituall or eternall working, is the holy Ghoſt. And becauſe that this action of the Godhead, in the bringing forth, or eternall generation of the Sonne, is onelyonly in the eſſentiall being of the Deitie eternally: therefore it is not an action of God proceeding meerely from the freedome of His will, as it is ſaid of the creature, Revel. 4.11. That for his will ſake onelyonly they are and were created. For all ſuch actions are exerciſed onelyonly in things of themſelves meerely not being; in which God hath power to will, or not to will their being: but becauſe that God doth worke according to the perfection of his moſt excellent being, as Prov. chap. 10. So glorious and powerfull an action in himſelfe, cannot be in vaine; therefore it is neceſſarie that the product, effect, or object of that action, which is the Sonne, be every way anſwerable to that action in the infinitie of glory, wiſdome, power, &c. Neither yet is this action of God the Father compel'd or enforced: for then it would not be glorious; but it is with the infinitie of his owne will alſo, becauſe it is eſſentiall to him, and whatſoever workes according to the being thereof (b) workes both neceſſarilie, that is, according to the unchangeable nature, and yet moſt willingly; becauſe it cannot will contrary to the being thereof. But in things wherein there is an abſolute freedome of the will, one way or other, there muſt a choice bee poſſible, which cannot bee but betweene two at leaſt: which not onelie an infinite will doth utterly exclude; but even that naturall will alſo, whereby every thing workes according to the inclination or propriety of the kinde. So then neither can God in the infinitie of his will, but will that being which is the image of himſelfe, the beſt of beings, infinite in p. 57goodneſſe and in glory: Neither can He but worke according to the perfection of his being, for the production of that which Hee doth will. As all our naturall ſences inward and outward worke willingly, yet neceſſarily; that is, according to their naturall being, upon their proper obiect. For the Eye is not ſatisfied with ſeeing, nor the eare with hearing.

Now is it yet further to bee remembred, that although there be an infinite and eternall production of the Perſons in the deity; yet there is no bringing forth, or multiplication of any new being. For the Godhead being eternall, it is not poſſible that any new Godhead ſhould bee brought forth. Neither yet can any addition bee made thereto: becauſe it is infinite. And ſo you may conclude of all thoſe dignities or perfections of the Godhead, as wiſdome, power, glory, goodneſſe, &c. Yet ſeeing goodneſſe doth ever move that which is good to multiply the image of it ſelfe; and power joyned therewith, inableth goodneſſe to worke; and infinity with them cauſeth goodneſſe and power both to be, and to worke infinitely: therfore it is neceſſary that in the Godhead there be an eternall multiplication or production, of thoſe true and reall diſtinct relations, which we call Perſons. So that although goodneſſe, power, infinity, & all the other glorious dignities which are in God, be one infinite being; one onelyonly in the moſt ſimple, pure, and perfect agreement or concord of being; yet theſe relations muſt bee diſtinct, in ſuch cleare difference; that that one cannot poſſibly bee that other from which it is really and truely diſtinguiſhed, though in eſſence or being they be all one infinity. ^c As in the being of goodneſſe there is an infinite producer, or bringeth forth of goodneſſe, which is the Father; an infinite goodneſſe brought forth, which is the Sonne: and an infinite production or bringing forth of goodneſſe: which could not be if either the efficient, or bringer forth of goodneſſe, or the goodneſſe brought forth were not. For where either the agent, or the object is wanting, it is impoſſible that any action at all ſhould be. And therefore as the Sonne proceeds from the Father; So the holy Ghoſt is moſt rightly ſaid to proceed from the Father, and the Sonne. And this is the diſtinction of the perſons, according to their originall or proceſſion. But becauſe all theſe are infinite, and that in the infinitie of being, and working, there muſt needs be eternity; therefore there can bee no beforeneſſe nor afterneſſe, nor ceaſing either to bee, or to worke. And therefore is none of theſe Perſons before, or after another, but all three diſtinct Perſons are one infinite, and eternall deity.

The Reaſons.

§ 3. 1. If God bee infinite in his working, as He is in his being, then hee muſt needs worke to bring forth ſuch as himſelfe is, and that both infinitely and eternally, anſwerable to his being; and this p. 58in the Godhead alone, ſeeing that beſide it, nothing can be infinite and eternall. But it is ſufficiently proved in the 10. chap. That God is infinite in his working, as hee is in his being. Therefore by his infinite working, He brings forth ſuch as Himſelfe is. And by theſe three termes you ſee the holy Trinity expreſſed and proved. 1. God infinite, the Father. 2. That which he worketh, the Sonne; The infinite working it ſelfe, which combineth both together, the Holy Ghoſt.

2. Neither can power be infinite, nor infinity powerfull, if there bee not ſuch an agreement betweene them, that they may together both be and worke infinitely. But if they bee and worke infinitely, it is neceſſary that there bee a production in the Godhead: For otherwiſe that infinite worke ſhould be in vaine, and not powerfull to produce the like. But that is impoſſible; therefore there is a production in the Godhead.

3. If there be not a production of Perſons in the Godhead (as is before ſpoken:) then an infinite goodneſſe is not a bringer forth of goodneſſe, and ſo followes a privation or ceaſing in the working of goodneſſe, which brings on, either a diſability in the power, or a want in the will, or in the wiſdome of the worker: which cannot ſtand with his infinity of power, will, and wiſdome, of whom we ſpeake. Beſides, ſeeing in Him, to be, and to worke are all one, (as was ſhewed) hee that denies the infinity, and eternity of his working, denies alſo the infinity and eternity of his being. Wherefore ſeeing all theſe things are falſe, and impoſſible; it followes of neceſſity, that there is a production of Perſons in the oneneſſe of the Godhead. Or take it thus affirmatively.

4. That goodneſſe is truely a great goodneſſe, which doth bring forth a great good; and by how much more it brings forth a greater good, by ſo much more it comes neerer to infinitie. ^d Therefore God in whom infinity and goodneſſe are one being, doth bring forth eternally an infinite good, that is, the Sonne, betwixt whom and himſelfe reſults an infinite Communion of goodneſſe, viz. the holy Ghoſt.

If there muſt needs bee a diſtinction of termes in the actions of the Godhead, then there muſt needs bee a difference of Perſons; otherwiſe the difference of the termes were idle and vaine, if the being underſtood thereby were not anſwerable. But there muſt needs bee a diſtinction of termes in the working of the Godhead. For an infinite working (already proved) muſt needs be from an infinite worker, about an infinite worke. Therefore there is a difference of Perſons in the unity of the deity.

6. If there were not an infinite and eternall production in the Perſons of the Godhead; then the being of a beginning could not cleerely and evidently bee therein; becauſe though the beginner were; yet the working of the beginner, and the being begun were yet wanting: and ſo theſe two comming after ſhould bee inferiour p. 59or leſſe both in continuance, and infinitie. And ſo the firſt and higheſt cauſe ſhould bee an infinite beginner without any effect or thing begun by him, which muſt bring on, that the firſt and chiefeſt cauſe of all, ſhould be infinitely defective, and ceaſing to worke: and of leſſe force than other cauſes ſubordinate; which all worke inceſſantlie to the bringing forth of their effects, unleſſe they bee hindered by lets more powerfull. Therefore there bee moe Perſons than one in the unitie of the Godhead.

7. Being and the power of Being; working and the power of working are all one in God, as was ſhewed chap. 8. & 9. n. 6. But God by his infinite and eternall power, can bring forth an infinite and eternall being like Himſelfe, by the infinite and eternall working of his power. Therefore He doth bring forth: or if he can, and will not, that power were in vaine; and ſo his power and will were not equall and infinite. So there ſhould bee divers beings in God, finite and infinite. But all theſe things are impoſſible. Therefore God doth bring forth an infinite being, his Sonne, by his infinite working, the holy Ghoſt.

8. If the inward working of the deity bee infinite with all the conditions of Infinitie; then the underſtanding of God (for example) muſt bee infinite, both in the act or perfection of it ſelfe; and in the object which it doth underſtand, and in the worke or action of the underſtanding about that object. So that God underſtanding his owne being, muſt needs behold himſelfe by an infinite action of underſtanding. But the working of God is infinite, with all the conditions of infinitie, as hath beene proved, for otherwiſe there ſhould bee a greaterneſſe in being, and a leſſeneſſe in working; and ſo the being of God ſhould not bee ſimple and one. Therefore in the unity of the infinite deity, there is an infinite underſtanding, which we call the Father, an infinite object, or image of that underſtanding, in the ſight of which that infinite underſtanding is moſt delighted, becauſe nothing can be more excellent than it; and this is God underſtood, that glorious Sonne: and an infinite working of the underſtanding, and that is the Holy Ghoſt: which you ſee cannot be conceived to be; if either the infinite underſtanding, or the object were ſuppoſed not to be; and therefore he is ſaid to proceed from them both. And thus is it in all the other dignities of God; his goodneſſe, his infinitie, his eternity, power, will, truth, glory, &c.

9. Now the texts whereby this doctrine is taught, more darkely in the old Teſtament, leſt the true Church, with the Heathen, might have fallen into the opinion of many Gods, are theſe among many other. Gen. 1. v. 26. Let us make man in our owne image. & Gen. 3.22. Behold the man is become as one of us. Gen. 11.7. Let us goe downe; and let us confound their language, Gen. 11.7. which manner of ſpeech is not borrowed for manners ſake, from the cuſtome of Princes and great men; who for modeſtie, ſpeake not in their owne p. 60name alone (Wee) but as having determined with their great men, and counſellors, men like themſelves. But God doth not ſo conſult nor determine by advice of his Creature; Neither yet doth that language admit ſuch forme of ſpeech; but as the Eaſterne languages even to this day ſpeake to one particular perſon in the number of one: as you may reade. 2 Sam. 12.7. Thou art the man. and 2 Sam. 18 3. Thou ſhalt not goe forth. Thou art worth ten thouſand of us. Eſth 7.3. If I have found favour in thy ſight O King. But to returne to the holy Trinity. You have a like proofe in Numb. 6.24.5.6. where the word Iehovah is three times repeated in the bleſſing and every time with a ſeverall accent. So that although his name be one. Zach. 14.9. and his being one. Deut. 6.4. yet in that one being is a Trinitie of Perſons; which you ſhall better underſtand, if you conſider the bleſſings in the new Teſtament, all taken from hence, as that. 2 Cor. 13.14. & Rev. 1.4.5. &c. So likewiſe in Iob. 35.10. Where is God my makers? and Pſal. 149. Let Iſrael rejoyce in his makers. Eccleſ. 12.1. Remember thy Creators. and againe Pſal. 11.7. His faces or their faces will view the righteous. In which places though for ſome reaſon tranſlated ſingularly, Maker, Creator, Face, yet according to the preciſeneſſe of the Hebrew it is as I have told you. And yet a more evident proofe is that in Gen. 20.13. where the word Elohim, God, is ioyned with a verbe of the plurall number: And in Ioſhuah. 24.19. The Trinity of Perſons in unity of the being is moſt cleare. For with the word foreign Elohim is ioyned an adiective of the plurall number foreign Kadoſhim, and a perſonall of the ſingular foreign hu, as if you would ſay, God He the holy ones, or as Eſay explaneth it. Ch. 6.3. Holy, Holy, Holy art thou O Lord. And againe in the ſame Chapter, ver. 8. whom ſhall I ſend? there is the unity of the Godhead; and who ſhall goe for us? there is the Trinity of the Perſons. And againe in Eſay, chap. 48.16. Chriſt ſpeaketh thus. There am. 1. I. and now the. 2. Lord God. and 3. His Spirit hath ſent me. So you read in Pſal. 33.6. By the 1. Word of 2. Iehovah, were the heavens made; and all the hoſt of them by the 3. Spirit of his mouth. And in Hag. 2.5.6. From the beginning I was; and now I am with you, ſaith the 1. Lord of hoſtes, the 2. word which covenanted with you when you came out of Aegypt, my 3. Spirit ſhall dwell among you. And if you deſire moe proofes out of the old Teſtament, you may reade Ficinus de Chriſt. Relig. Cap. 31. The word foreign Iehovah, that great and fearefull name of God, Deut. 28.58. one name of his owne being, containes the myſterie of the Trinity. For in the forming of the word foreign hawah, or hayah, whence the name is derived. Ie is the ſigne of that which is to come as foreign yeheweh, He ſhall be, or He will be: Ho, of that which is; as foreign being, or He that is: and wah of that which hath bin, as foreign Hee hath beene and thus is the word opened. Rev. 1.8. He which was in eternitie the fountaine and eternall Father of Him which ſhall be in eternity, by the common band of all continuance, that which is in eternity. And this is Hee that was, and is, and is to come. And in p. 61the new Teſtament, beſides the places cited before in the beginning of the chapter, in Math. 3.16.17. and Luc. 3.21.22. you may heare the witneſſe of the Father concerning the Sonne, and ſee the Holy Ghoſt comming downe on Him in the likeneſſe of a dove. And againe, Ioh. 14. verſ. 16.17.1. I will pray the 2. Father, and he will ſend you another Comforter. even the 3. Spirit of truth, And 2 Cor. 13.13. The grace of our Lord Ieſus Chriſt, and the Love of God the Father, and the fellowſhip of the Holie Ghoſt bee with you all. with many other texts not needfull here to bee cited; becauſe that when we come to ſpeake of the other Perſons of the Trinitie, in the Articles following; ſome of them muſt bee remembred. And if the adverſaries teſtimonie be ought worth, you may take hereto the Aegyptian oracle of Serapis,

foreign.

foreign. —

Firſt God and then the Word, and Holy Ghoſt with them:

Of eſſence one, in one accord.

And from hence it ſeemes had Merc. Triſm: that which hee teaches in Pormand of that Light which is God the Father, the word which is the Sonne, and that life which is the union of them both. See the other arguments inductive in the Notes. ^a and ^b.

Notes.

(a) BY reaſon we are ſummon'd to hearken to this truth. [Pref.] Tho. Aqu. in his queſtions on the maſter of the ſentences. lib. 1. Diſt. 2. q. 3. brings a couple of reaſons to prove a plurality of Perſons in the unity of the Godhead, which in effect are theſe. 1. with the greateſt happineſſe there muſt bee the greateſt pleaſure and content. But in the Poſſeſſion of that which is good, there cannot be pleaſure and content without company, ſeeing the perfection of every good thing ſtands in the community of the uſe thereof. But company is not without plurality The ſecond reaſon is from the perfection of the divine love: and all love ever wiſhes well to another. But theſe reaſons prove no more a Trinity than a ſociety of Ten; and fit better for an ordinary, than the high myſtery in queſtion. And therefore having look't well upon his reaſons, and ſeeing that they were very poore inductions; he reſolves, it is no way neceſſary to put a diſtinction of Perſons in the Deity for the force of reaſons; but onelyonly for the juſtifying of our Faith, and for the authority of the Holy Scriptures. And in the third Diſt. qu. 4. whether it were poſſible for the old Philoſophers, which knew not the Scripture, by the knowledge of the creature onelyonly to come to the knowledge of the Trinity; hee ſaith, that by the view of the creature they might come to the knowledge of the divine power, wiſdome, and goodneſſe, as the cauſe is manifeſt by the effect; and conclude that there is one God, even as Saint Paul proves, Rom. 1. and againe. Rom. 10.18. p. 62out of the 19. Pſalme: But that they could not thereby attaine the knowledge of the Trinity; becauſe the Creature was an inſufficient meanes, to bring them to the knowledge of that high myſterie. So in the 4 booke of his Summe Contr. Gentiles. Cap. 1. hee determines even ſo concerning the incarnation, and the conſequents thereof. So likewiſe concerning the reſurrection, everlaſting life and all our hopes that depend thereon. Againe in his Summe of Theologie, chap. 33. hee concludes that by naturall reaſon it is impoſſible to know God in the diſtinction of Perſons: and that for theſe reaſons. 1. Firſt it takes away from the worthineſſe of our Faith. 2. Faith is of things not appearing, and ſuch as exceed reaſon, as it is ſaid. Heb. 11.1. Thirdly, Infidels laugh at that which is not fully proved: and therefore (ſaith hee) it ſhall bee ſufficient to defend, that our faith holds nothing that is impoſſible. But (Doctor) reaſon muſt yeeld that to bee impoſſible which it cannot make to appeare that it is poſſible. And therefore that our faith bee not ſet at nought by misbeleevers, as being of things impoſſible, you tye us for defence thereof to further proofe: which if it be full and ſufficient, your third reaſon is nothing worth. The firſt reaſon is leſſe worth in it ſelfe: For that is the glory of a Chriſtian faith, and the triumph of it over all falſe worſhips, that is ſo ſurely founded in the truth of God, that the Gates of hell cannot prevaile againſt it. Therefore to ſpeake cleerely to this queſtion, I ſay, the word naturall reaſon, may either meane that reaſon whereof a man is capable by that light of underſtanding which is naturally through the gift of Chriſt in every man, Ioh. 1.4.9. the holy Scripture hath opened this light moſt clearely, and therefore is it called the light of Grace; or elſe it may meane ſuch reaſons, as are gathered from the cauſes, effects and rules which are manifeſt onelyonly in naturall things. Now although the articles of our creede by way of Induction onelyonly may be manifeſt by naturall reaſon thus underſtood, as S. Auguſtine de Civit. Dei. lib. 11. cap. 26. in this very queſtion hath made it appeare; yet by that firſt light of underſtanding, which wee call naturall reaſon, becauſe it is in every man according to the poſſibility of nature, they may bee underſtood and approved by other rules, than ſuch as have their grounds in naturall things. For God is not the God of nature onelyonly; but much more the God of grace; and mercy; and to the knowledge of theſe principles and the concluſions gathered thereon, wee are led by better guides than Ariſtotle ever knew; that is, the holy Scripture, and the Spirit of Grace, who leades us to the right meaning thereof. Yet how farre even Naturall light hath gone in the diſcovery of the great Myſteries of Divinity, even of the Trinity it ſelfe, you may judge by this of Proclus taken out of Plato, as you may reade in Stenchus de perenni phi. lib. 2. c. 16. Theſe two (ſaith hee) unity and Being, conſiſting in the Trinity; the firſt begetting, the ſecond begotten; the one perfecting, the other perfected: it muſt needs be, that there is a certaine power, by the which, and with the which that unity gives ſubſiſtence and perfection unto that being. For both the proceſſion from that unity to being, and the returne from that being unto unity, muſt be by a middle power betweene them both. For how can unity bee Being, or Being bee one, but by that power which is in both? And this Trinity is the excellency of all underſtanding, unity, power, Being, the one bringing forth, the other brought forth, and power proceeding from unity ioyned with being. And this is the firſt Trinitie that can bee underſtood, or conceived to bee; unity, being, and the power of them both, by which, divinity is the Father of being, & being is of unity. The Father is the father of wiſdome; and wiſdome the Son of the Father; and between theſe a moſt high power hidden, in the one of producing, in the other of being produced, as Plato hath ſhewed it wonderfully. Thus Proclus. The argument of Pythagoras is not of leſſe weight. That which is unchangeable muſt needs be eternal, and alwayes one. And as al change in every body is by reaſon of inequality of the p. 63parts: ſo that which is abſolutely and ever one, muſt be ever in equality, ſo verity and equalitie muſt be eternall: and multiplicity and inequality muſt neceſſarily bee after unity and equalitie. And as unity is the cauſe of connexion, or being one, ſo inequality is of diviſion. And the effect of the firſt cauſe muſt have priority before the effects of the ſecond cauſe. Therefore connexion alſo muſt be before diviſion and change: and if before change, then alſo eternall. And becauſe there can bee but one eternall: therefore unity, equality, and connexion, muſt bee one thing. And this is that threefold unity which Pythagoras taught was to bee adored. Pet. Blondus de Trenario. pag. 106. 107. And Cuſa de Docta ignorantia. lib. 1. cap. 7. Neither is that reaſon which Cuſa Exerercit. lib. 7. pag. 134 brings from Ariſtotle to bee ſlighted; eſpecially by Thomas, that great Ariſtotelian. Ariſtotle ſaith, that the firſt cauſe of all muſt needs be both efficient, formall, and the end. And three firſts there cannot be; becauſe before all plurality there muſt needs be unity. Therefore it being one firſt, it muſt bee a threefold cauſe; efficient, formall, and finall. The efficient cauſe is neither Formall, nor Finall; and the formall is neither finall, nor efficient. Therefore they are three diſtinct cauſes conſidered in their ſeverall ſubſiſtences: but conſidered in their firſtneſſe, they are in being one alone: many ſuch reaſons and authorities to this purpoſe you may reade in Struchus De perenni Phi. lib. 1. & 2. But how much yet more fitly, and more fully, hath the illuminated Raimund, ſhewed both this point and all thoſe other, which Tho. Aqu. hath given over as paſt all proofe? For Raimund taking all thoſe conditions of the divine being, which the holy Scripture gives to God; and without which that being could not be perfect: and ſuppoſing and proving them to be infinite with all the conditions of infinity, both in being and working; hath taught the way to ſhew the Trinity of Perſons in unity of being, by every one of thoſe conditions, ſee Art. mag. Part. 9. And though his words ſeeme borrel and rude; as bonificant, bonificabile, & Bonificare, in una bonitatis eſſentia; Poſſificans, poſſificabile, and poſſificare in the being of power: yet they are full of excellent meaning. The learned, and witty Cuſa de viſione Dei cap. 17. gives inſtance in the unity: which is either unity uniting, unity united, or the union, or knot of them both: yet all theſe in the moſt ſimple being of unity. And againe in love, which is either in the Perſon loving, or in the Perſon loved, or in the knot of the Love betweene them, all according in the nature of Love; and without any of theſe, Love cannot be perfect and compleate, yet may every one of theſe be underſtood apart; inaſmuch as a man may love, and not be loved; loved, and not love againe. But where that which is Lovely, is alſo loving, there the bond of love is firmely tyed, and love in every part entire: yet is this love but in ſhadowes among us, but perfect in the endleſſe and perfect being of love. 1 Ioh. 4.8.16. And thus in other conditions of the divine nature have other learned and devout men endevoured to ſhew their underſtanding and firme conſent unto this high article of the chriſtian Faith: one in the power of God; another in his wiſdome, &c. according to the proofes you read before. And therefore, not to goe about to overthrow the reaſons brought by Thomas; becauſe the authority of ſo great a Doctor may cut deeper than his reaſons, and ſo cut off, if not the ſtrength of the reaſons in the articles following; yet that comfort which the faithfull ſoule might have thereby. I ſay that all the reaſons which are brought to this article, and ſo for the moſt part in all the reſt, are onelyonly of two kindes. Firſt and chiefely from the impoſſibilities which would follow upon the contradiction of the thing in queſtion: which kinde of diſcourſe I have taught (as I can) log. cap. 8. n. 7. and chap. 26. more at large. Secondly, by that kinde of demonſtration, which I call by converſion of termes, as I ſhewed, log. cap. 18. n. 3. in the ſyllogiſticall handling of ſuch arguments, as in effect are all one with them which log. cap. 13. n. 5. I ſhewed p. 64to bee by rule, in the ſecond kinde of equivalence. Now both theſe kindes of argument prove the queſtion onelyonly that it is; that is to ſay, ſhew onelyonly that the propoſition is true, and neither prove nor enquire how, or for what ſuperiour cauſe, which in this and in many of the other queſtions here handled cannot be given. And there is no propoſition, how true, how univerſall, or manifeſt ſoever, but it may be proved by theſe meanes, both in the affirmative; For in things of the ſame nature, and being, whatſoever agrees to one, moſt needs agree to the other; and in the negative, the ground of impoſſibilities and all negative diſcourſe, whatſoever is denied to the predicate, muſt alſo bee denyed to the ſubject. Now I thinke it is no more derogation from the truth to bee thus confirmed, than it is, ſimplie to bee affirmed, as it is in the article of the Creed. As if I ſay, there is an eternall being, the cauſe of all Beings: there is an infinite wiſdome the diſpoſer of all: an infinite power that governes all, and thereupon conclude, that there is a God. What diſhonour is here offered to God or his truth? are not all theſe termes, an eternall Being, the cauſe of all beings? An infinite Wiſdome, &c. convertible one with another? and all of them meaning one being, which wee call God? have they not all authority in the Holy Scripture? And ſhall not that which is truely affirmed of one, bee as truely affirmed of the other? And ſo on the otherſide by impoſſibilities. If there bee not an eternall being, the beginner and cauſe of all other beings: then that which is begun muſt bee a beginning to it ſelfe. But this is impoſſible, for ſo it ſhould bee a cauſe, and yet not bee. Therefore there is a God. And if any other kinde of argument bee brought, either by rule, or induction, or ſyllogiſme, yet ſeeing ſuperiour cauſes are not alwayes here to bee found, whereby to make analyticall demonſtration; therefore the reaſons for the moſt part are contayned within this bound onelyonly to prove the Article that it is true. Nay, I adde yet further, that the Theologian or divine is not tyed to the uſe of naturall reaſons onelyonly for proofe of his concluſions. For ſo you ſhould make divinity nothing elſe but naturall Philoſophie, except that the one ſhould bee intended to the cauſe of all being, the other to the effect in nature onelyonly; But you know that all truth whereinſoever it is, being founded in the truth of God, reaſon the ſearcher thereof muſt farre exceed the limits of nature or naturall cauſes. Therefore although that concluſion of Tho. Aquin. ſtand ſure, that the philoſophers could not come to the knowledge of the Trinity by the view of nature; becauſe nature was an inſufficient meane to bring them thereunto, which yet may receive limitation, either in reſpect of the degree of knowledge, which nature brings of the Creator as himſelfe makes difference, Pro…em. in lib. 4. contr. gent. or in reſpect of the manner of concluding inductive onelyonly, yet will it not follow from thence, that the articles of our Faith are utterly beyond all proofe of reaſon. For as divinitie is of a farre higher ſtraine than naturall Philoſophie; ſo are the proofes and reaſons thereof, from greater lights than all nature can ſhew. Who knowes not that divinity as concerning a great part of the practice holds all morall Philoſophie, whoſe concluſions though from reaſon, yet are not the reaſons natural, but morall? Have not Grammar, Logick, and all other Artes and Sciences, either inſtrumentall or principall, certaine rules, or principles which are true, foreign and foreign, that is univerſally, neceſſarily, and convertibly, or peculiar to that Science, and yet not demonſtrable by naturall Cauſes? And to this very purpoſe Saint Auguſtine ſaith, De Civ. Dei. lib. 11. Cap. 24. Diligentia rationis eſt, non praeſumptionis audacia; ut in operibus Dei ſecreto quodam loquendi modo, quo noſtra exerceatur intentio, intelligatur Trinitas. That is, the Holy Trinity may bee underſtood by us in the workes of God, by their ſecret manner of ſpeech, in which they ſpeake to our underſtanding. And if this high myſtery may bee underſtood by the creature, as the Father ſhewes in that booke, and p. 65other Chriſtian writers elſewhere, I doubt not but by thoſe honourable titles which the holy Scripture doth give unto God it may much better bee made to appeare. And if it were lawfull to prove the firſt and principall Article of our faith by reaſon, and by reaſon (I ſay) without preſumption of perfection in knowledge, to prove that God is, as it hath beene ſhewed by the warrant of the Apoſtle, is it not likewiſe as lawfull in the Articles following? And theſe things may ſeeme the more ſtrange in Thom. Aquin. becauſe in the 11. chap. of his fourth booke contra Gentiles, he doth ſo clearelie deliver this point of our beleefe, both by the authoritie of the holy Scriptures, and the evidence of reaſon, yea and that on the ſame grounds whereon Raymundus doctrine is builded, that he may ſeeme to have lighted his torch at the lampe of Thomas. Take the meaning of his words, as they lye. Seeing that in the Divine nature, He that underſtands, the action of his underſtanding, and his intention, or object underſtood, are all one and the ſame being; it muſt needs bee, that whatſoever belongs to the perfect being of any of theſe, be moſt truly in Him. Now it is eſſentiall to the inward word, or intention underſtood, that it do proceed from him that underſtands, according to the action of his underſtanding. And ſeeing that in God all theſe three are eſſentially one, (for in him nothing can be but eſſentiallie) it is neceſſarie that every one of theſe be God, and that the difference which is betweene them, bee not of being, but of relation onlie, or the manner of being, as the intention is referred to him that conceives it, as to him from whom it is: therefore the Evangeliſt having ſaid, Iohn 1. The word was God, leſt all diſtinction might ſeeme to bee taken away betweene the Father and the Sonne, addes immediately, That Word was in the beginning with God. Thus ſaith Thomas. Oh but (ſay you) it is a dangerous caſe to commit matters of faith to reaſon. I, but there is no danger to commit reaſon to matiers of faith, that is, to make reaſon a ſervant of faith, neither is our reaſon too good to give attendance on faith, nor faith ſo proud as to ſcorne the ſervice of reaſon: therefore let this jangling and frowardneſſe ceaſe. If I ſay any thing to your content, accept it; if not, you are not bound to reade it: but God hath not given us the knowledge of himſelfe in his word, that as parrats in a cage, which with much adoe are taught a few words, and then can ſay no more; ſo we ſhould hold our ſelves content when wee can ſay the Creed: but that by continuall meditation in his word, our knowledge, and ſo our faith, our love and feare of him, might be increaſed dayly. And this is it which S. Paul ſaith, 1. Cor. 2.6. Wee ſpeake wiſdome among them that are perfect, and againe, 1. Cor. 1.22. The Grecians ſeeke wiſdome, and wee preach Chriſt the wiſdome of God: for in him are all the treaſures of wiſdome and knowledge hid. Now it is apparent that he meanes not the wiſdome of this world, but that which is in things concerning God, whereby we may be able to give a reaſon of the hope that is in us. 1. Pet. 3.15. And this is that perfection whereto we ought to ſtrive, whereof the Catechiſme, doctrine of repentance, of faith, &c. is but onelyonly the foundation, as it is manifeſt. Heb. 6.1.2. For although the leaſt degree of faith, even as a graine of muſtard ſeed, bee ſufficient to remove the high mountaines of rebellious and wicked thoughts that riſe up againſt the obedience of the truth, and conſequently to ſave the ſoule, through his mediation and merciemercy that doth not breake the bruiſed reed, nor quench the ſmoking flaxe: yet ſeeing every man, as he hath received, ought as a faithfull Steward of the manifold graces of God to profit thereby; our hearts by faith being purged from dead workes, wee ought to adde vertue to our faith, and to this vertue knowledge, and by theſe meanes to make our calling and election ſure, 2. Pet. 1.5.10. And for this cauſe S. Paul prayes for the Coloſſians, that having through faith embraced the truth, they might bee filled with knowledge of the will of God, in all wiſdome and ſpirituall underſtanding. And this is our progreſſe from faith p. 66to faith, Rom. 1.17. that is from that pure faith, whereby wee firſt receive the kingdome of God as little children, to that faith, which is ſtrengthened through knowledge: for knowledge doth neither take away faith, nor yet abate any thing of the worthineſſe thereof; but rather encreaſeth it more and more, while it is thereby rooted and grounded more firmely in him, in whom at firſt we did beleeve, as the learned Father, Auguſt. de Trinit. Cap. 14. ſaid, Fides in nobis per ſcientiam gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, & roboratur.

(b) Workes both neceſſarily, yet willingly. Pref.] This Will they call concomitant, becauſe it ever followes the verie being of that wherein the will is. The will of God whereby hee gives being to the creature, is c…uſall; for by it alone the creature is, without any other working of God, but onelyonly the pleaſure or motion of his owne will, power, and goodneſſe, &c.

(c) Jn the being of goodneſſe there is an infinite producer. Pref.] While I was preparing materials for this building, I read the title of a Mart book, Abſtruſa abſtruſorum abſtruſiſſima, primaria Symboli Apoſtolici abſtruſa. Though I had beene more than once gul'd with ſuch titles, Arcana arcanorum arcaniſſima arcana, and the like, wherein theſe writers ſweat more, than for any thing in the booke beſide: yet being interpreted, a pious and very profound meditation of the deepe myſteries of the Apoſtles Creed, I ſuppoſed that ſuch bumbaſt would never bee quilted into a treatiſe upon the grounds of our Religion; ſo that I verely hoped that all my labour was at an end. At laſt having got the booke, I found that it was nothing in good earneſt, but a declamation onelyonly of a certaine ſpringal for exerciſe ſake, into which, as into a common place booke hee had gathered the ſentences of learned men, wherein they juſtlie bewaile the miſerie of mankinde, in his inabilitie to finde out the truth of things, whereupon hee would utterlie ſhut out the uſe of reaſon in matiers of faith. The conſequence is not good, as I have ſhewed Praef. n. 6. His ſpeciall ſpleene is againſt Keckerman and his gregales, that is, them of his ging, I thinke hee meanes the Calviniſts, of whom hee names onelyonly Zanchius, and them of whom he received this learning, Melancthon, and his owne verie Syren and Phoenix Scaliger; out of whoſe ſhreds hee hath botch't up his declamation, ſuch as it is, yet in this caſe he could not ſpare him, that would manifeſt his underſtanding of the Trinitie according to Raymunds principles. The wicked concluſion that will follow thereon, Murſhel the declamer goes about to ſhew out of Andreas Oſiander; as you ſhall heare anon, Chap. 12. note (a). But what have Scaliger or Raymund done herein, which the ancient Fathers had not done before, ſave that they made the doctrine cleere by forreine compariſons? one, of the Sunne, the beame, and the brightneſſe or ſhine thereof; another by the body, the brightneſſe and heat of the fire; another of the minde, wherein is the word or underſtanding thereof, and the will: another ſaith, the minde thinking, the word repreſenting that thought, and the liking or approving thereof: yet another will repreſent the Trinitie by memorie, underſtanding and will: another by the root, the ſtem, and the branch. Auguſtine ſhewes it by a mans owne experience of himſelfe; who both is, and knowes himſelfe to bee, and loves both his being and knowledge thereof. de Civit. Dei. lib. 11. cap. 26. But his reaſon in the 24. Chap. from Gen. 1. is of more force, which is this; He that ſaid, Fiat, muſt needs be the Father of that Word: but you muſt underſtand that word in Himſelfe, or that eternall word or decree, of which our Lord ſpeakes, Iohn 5.19. And becauſe the creature was made thereby, it muſt follow, that it was made by his word. And where it is further ſaid, that all that was made was exceeding good; if by goodneſſe you underſtand the Holy Ghoſt, the whole Trinitie is manifeſted unto us in his workes: another explaines it by the fountaine and the ſtreame; to which Cuſa addes the ſea, and if theſe (ſaith he) be ſuppoſed infinite, then muſt all of neceſſity be one water. And the ſame Cuſa p. 67lib. de Filiatione Dei. expreſſes it by the knowledge in the minde of the maſter; the word ſignifying that knowledge, and the ſpirit, life or meaning of the word proceeding from the knowledge, and the word, whereby the ſcholars are inſtructed. And have not many of theſe compariſons ground in the holy Scripture, Ioh. 1.1. Heb. 1.3. Eſay 11.1. and elſewhere? But Raymund, not by forreine compariſons, but by the eſſentiall properties of the infinite being, in the reall relations of every terme in unitie of that one being, hath with more cleereneſſe expreſſed to mans weake underſtanding, the unſpeakeable myſterie of the Trinitie in the unitie of one undivideable nature; as I have ſhewed in the Preface, in the being of goodneſſe, and Reaſon 3. of infinitie or greatneſſe, and Reaſon 8. of underſtanding. And although I would not erre from company; yet ſeeing I have ſuch company both of the ancient and later writers, which by the adverſary himſelfe are confeſſed to be of incomparable learning, and Divine honeſtie; I need not be aſhamed of my company. But notwithſtanding all this invective againſt reaſon in things of faith; ſee the young man by and by in the Sorbon. The power of God, ſaith he, in the creation of the world, wrought upon that which was not to cauſe it to be. Therefore God is Almightie: for this muſt be the concluſion, howſoever he would turne it to ſhut out the uſe of reaſon: but that will not follow upon the premiſes. So in the caſe of mans redemption, of the incarnation of God, of the reſurrection, hee is over the head and eares in Ariſtotle, and hiſtorie; but all to prove theſe things in reaſon impoſſible. And it is yeelded, that all theſe things are utterly beyond the courſe of nature, but yet upon better and higher principles than Ariſtotle knew, they will all appeare poſſible, and neceſſarie, and then his reaſons ſhall bee anſwered. To this order the declamer would bring their conſubſtantiation, and that which doth neceſſarilie follow thereon, the bodilie preſence of Chriſt in everie place: And here he doth farre ſurpaſſe himſelfe, and by two bodies in one place, will prove it poſſible that one body may bee in all places; becauſe God hath abſolute power of all the nature of being. But if this reaſon be good and ſufficient, then is hee injurious and unconſtant to himſelfe, ſo to debarre the uſe of reaſon in the queſtions of faith: and if that bodily preſence of Chriſt in every place for which he labours ſo, had any ground in the Scripture, if it brought any hope or comfort to the conſcience; if the Primitive Church, or the Councels, or the ancient Fathers had ever taught it; I thinke that by this time reaſon would have found how to make it more probable than it is: but becauſe it is no Article of our Creed, it is not fit to trouble you any further hereabout.

(d) Therefore God doth bring forth eternally his Sonne. Re. 4.] The truth of this concluſion hath beene diverſly gainſaid. For ſome have utterly denyed the Trinitie of Perſons in the Unitie of the Godhead; others with this truth have blended their owne devices. The hereticks which held that as there was but one being in the Deitie, ſo there was but one Perſon called by divers names, of the Father, the Sonne, and the Holy Ghoſt; were of divers families, according to the names of the ſpeciall maintainers of this opinion; but beſt knowne by the name of Sabellius, one of the moſt ſubtile defenders thereof, about the yeere 260. which hereſie after a long ſleepe was againe awaked about the yeere 1110 by one Porretanus, who affirmed that the Perſons in the Godhead differ not, ſave onelyonly in the apprehenſions of our minde, not by any reall or true diſtinction. The Iewes likewiſe among other reaſons doe therefore diſclaime the Chriſtian Religion; becauſe they ſuppoſe that by the Trinitie of Perſons, is taught a pluralitie of Gods, contrarie to that which is Deut. 6.4. The Lord our God is one Lord. The Turkes alſo denie the Trinitie of Perſons, and hold it therefore impoſſible for God to have a Sonne, becauſe he never had a wife. Now of thoſe that held a Trinitie, Simon that witch, of whom you reade, Actes 8. when the gall of his bitterneſſe had levened him thorowout, gave out p. 68of himſelfe, that he in the perſon of the Father gave the Law to Moſes in the dayes of Tiberius, ſuffered (in ſhew) under the Perſon of the Sonne, and afterward came downe on the Apoſtles in fierie tongues. Auguſt. de Haereſ. cap. 1. Hierarcha alſo, from the words of the Ni…en Creed, that Chriſt was light of light, affirmed, that the three Perſons were as three lights, of which one tooke light of another, and ſo he made the beings of the perſons ſeparate and apart, whereas the Fathers in that C…uncell meant not any diviſion, or being apart, but that the Sonne is of the ſubſtance of the Father, without any leſſening or abatement of the Fathers being, as one light takes light of another without any lo…e of light in the former. The Metangiſmonites, ſo called from their opinion taken from veſſels, that they might avoid the opinion of the ſeparate being of the Perſons, held that they were as veſſels contained one within another, falſelie ſuppoſing with the Anthropomorphites, or Man-ſhapers, that God was bodily, and ſo conteined within a certaine ſpace, and againe miſunderſtanding that text of Scripture Iohn 14.11. where our Lord ſaith, I am in the Father; ſo that in the Divine nature they ſuppoſed ſome thing greater, which was the Father, and ſomething leſſe, which was the Sonne, and a third thing within them both, which was the Holy Ghoſt. But againſt that bodily being which they conceived, you have reaſons ſufficient in the 9. Chapter. The text of S. Iohn makes the matter more plaine: for as it is impoſſible that two bodies ſhould bee each one within another (except by way of commixation) ſo it quite overthrowes that fooliſh opinion, becauſe it is thrice there added, that the Father is in the Sonne; ſo that of neceſſitie there can bee but one being of them both. For if the being of God be not moſt ſimple and pure, as was ſhewed before Chap. 9. And if every being anſwers to the Originall, then the eſſence of the Sonne muſt be moſt pure as the Father is; ſo that if each of the Perſons be in the other, there can be no difference but onelyonly in the manner of being onelyonly, See Auguſt. de Civit. Dei lib. 11. Cap 10. Then concerning that third falſhood, which they ſuppoſed of a greater and leſſer being, it cannot poſſiblie ſtand with the nature of infinitie, whether it be underſtood of extenſion, or of vertue onelyonly. The Triformians likewiſe to croſſe the errour of Sabellius, affirmed three Perſons, and that the whole and entyre being of the Godhead was in all the three taken together; yet not in every perſon wholly, but ſo, as one part of it was in the Father, another part in the Sonne, and a third part in the Holy Ghoſt. By which falſhood it would follow, that the Godhead were in it ſelfe a divide…ble being and ſo a compound, contrary to that which is concluded Chap. 9. The Tritheites are yet more mad then the former, that it may appeare how boundleſſe errour is. They make the being of God not one and the ſam…, as the Triformians did; but affirme that there is a threefold nature, and diſtinguiſh the Perſons in their eſſence, or abſolute being, in place alſo, and other differences of particular ſubſtances, as Peter, James, and Iohn, and ſo make three Gods, different and apart each from other. The Tetratheites would ſeeme more ſubtile then all that had beene before them: for they beſide the three Perſons of the Godhead, ſuppoſed a fourth being, which did communicate it ſelfe to all the three, by which communication of divine nature, everie one of thoſe three became God. By which ſottiſh opinion it muſt follow that none of thoſe three Perſons could be either infinite, or eternall, if they receive their being from another; if they be God by grace onelyonly and communication of another being than their owne; neither can their being be ſimple and one, having one being of themſelves, and another imparted unto them. But if that being which they call that fourth common being, be that one moſt ſimple, pure, and eternall being, which wee confeſſe to be God; then it muſt follow neceſſarilie, that in that being there bee three Perſ ns, (as hath been declared in the Chapter before) in every one of which, the whole Godhead is all in all, and all in everie one, not by communication p. 69from another; nor by participation onelyonly; but by the whole and proper poſſeſſion of every Perſon eſſentially; ſo that the Godhead is no other being than that which is in the three perſons; nor the three Perſons any other thing than that manner of being which is in the Godhead eternally: but they prove it thus; Where are one, and three trulie and really different, there muſt needs bee foure: But in the Deitie there is one being, and three Perſons really diſtinguiſhed, therefore foure ſeverall beings. I anſwer. Where is one, and three abſolute beings, there muſt needs be foure: but in the Godhead there is one abſolute being, and three manners of being, which are the Perſons; but the manner of being doth not make a number, different from the being: as Iſaac is one abſolute being in himſelfe; yet Jſaac the ſonne of Abraham is not a ſecond, nor Iſaac the father of Iacob a third. So the follie of this opinion, and the weakneſſe of their reaſons appearing; it remaines for the better underſtanding of this moſt high myſterie, firſt that anſwer bee given to thoſe arguments which Sabellius brought for his opinion; ſecondly, that the reaſons which are brought of the Tritheits be diſcuſſed.

But that no errour or miſtaking may grow concerning the faith in the truth of the thing, it will be neceſſarie to declare what manner of diſtinction or difference that is, which is to bee put betweene the Perſons of the Godhead: for if they be trulie and really diſtinguiſhed, it may ſeeme that their eſſence or being cannot bee one, and this was the errour of the Tritheites. But if they bee not really diſtinguiſhed, then there muſt bee but one Perſon in the Godhead, called by divers names, as Sabellius ſaid, or diſtinguiſhed by our conceits alone, according to the opinion of Porretanus. The difference of things is either in their abſolute and eſſentiall being, and that either generall, ſpeciall, or individuall; as in things living, or lifeleſſe; men and beaſts, Peter and Iohn: or elſe it is according to their proprieties, difference of reſpects, or manner of being; as in Iſaac, his manly ſubſiſtence of his owne ſoule and body is his abſolute individuall eſſence; yet in reſpect of the proprieties of his being, his ſonneſhip toward Abraham, his fatherhood toward Iacob, his lordſhip toward Rebecca, his maſterſhip towards Eleazar, &c. are ſeverall things, and really diſtinguiſhed by that reality or being which is relative, or with peculiar reſpects to another. The third manner of difference is by circumſtantiall accidents onelyonly; as one part of the white wall may ſeeme more ſhining and white than another, becauſe more light doth fall upon it. The fourth ſort of differences are onelyonly ſuch, as wee in our underſtanding are compelled to make. The Perſons of the Godhead are not diſtinguiſhed one from another in their eſſence, or abſolute being, as the Tritheits affirm'd: for this is onelyonly one in all ſubſtantially: but yet in the manner of this being they are diſtinct truly and really; contrarie to that of Sabellius and Porretanus. For whether you reſpect that relation, which is among the Perſons one to another, the being of the Father, as a Father is with thoſe properties or reſpects which make a reall being of a Father, diſtinct from the Sonne, and ſo from that eternall action of his generation, whereby the Sonne is produced or brought forth; or whether you reſpect the Godhead abſolutely: yet ſeeing in that pure and ſimple being nothing can bee but eſſentiallie; it cannot bee more eſſentiall thereunto to bee one in the unitie of being, than it is to bee a Trinitie in the difference of proprieties; that is, that God bee what hee is in his eſſence or abſolute being, and as hee is in his manner of being. And as in the abſolute being of the Godhead, wee ſay according to the neceſſitie of the truth, that there is wiſdome, truth, goodneſſe, &c. not as different eſſences, but as ſo many perfections, conditions, or dignities of that one infinite being: ſo likewiſe in the manner of his being, wee are compelled both by the ſacred authoritie of the holy text, and the enforcement of reaſon, (as hath beene ſhewed) to confeſſe a Trinitie of Perſons, p. 70of which everie one is trulie and reallie diſtinguiſh't from another; ſo that there cannot poſſiblie bee a communitie or enterchange of their perſonall being. And this is that reall diſtinction that I meane, to wit, that cleere differences of the properties in the ſeverall Perſons, whereby they are not different eſſences; nor different Gods; yet different beings, or different things, that is, divers termes of relation with the ſubſiſtences meant thereby, and in ſome ſort oppoſed. See log. Cap. 9. n. 14. For as in the uttermoſt ſimplicitie of their Divine being which is onelyonly one; one not accidentally, or numerally, not of quantitie, but ſubſtantially one; it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe any difference of being, either reall, or intellectuall: ſo in the manner, and relative properties of that being, thoſe differences muſt needs be found, whereby thoſe termes of relation which wee call Perſons, are ſo truly and reallie diſtinguiſhed, as that they cannot poſſiblie bee taken to bee one, either in their ſubſiſtences, or in our underſtanding. So then the Perſons of the deitie differ from the eſſence of the Deitie, not really, as one being differs from another being; which the Tetratheites affirmed: but as the order or manner of being differs from that manner of being wherein it hath the foundation. But the Perſons differ one from another, as the relative properties of a being may differ among themſelves, that is, not in their eſſence the foundation of the properties, for ſo they are but one God; but yet truly and really, according to thoſe differences whereby the properties or relations are diſtinguiſhed: yet ſhall not theſe differences bring in any new or different eſſence into the ſimplicitie of the Divine being, becauſe they are onelyonly relative, and ſuch as follow the manner of being. But becauſe it is eſſentiall unto the Divine being, to have in it ſelfe all the perfection of being, therefore hath God not onelie a moſt pure, ſimple and abſolute being, whereby he is that which he is; but alſo the properties of an abſolute and ſimple being, whereby he workes that which he workes infinitely and eternally. Therefore that feare of the Iewes, that the Chriſtian Religion by the Trinitie of Perſons brings in a pluralitie of Gods, is onelyonly from their owne errour, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God, nor his eternall working.

But you aske what this manner of being or properties are, which adde nothing to the ſimplicitie of the Divine being, and yet are therein eſſentially? Have I tolde you all this while, and underſtand you not? The properties of the Divine being are of two ſorts, the firſt abſolute, the other relative. Whatſoever you adde to the ſimplicitie of being, muſt needs be a condition or propertie thereof; As if you ſay of the being of God, that it is moſt ſimple or pure, that is, One, Infinite, Eternall, Almightie, Glorious, Ever-working, &c. here puritie, unitie, infinitie, &c. are the properties or conditions of that being, which wee call God, which although they ſeeme unto us differing in their ſeverall reſpects; yet they adde no other being beſide that one moſt abſolute being of God; but onelie expreſſe to us the properties, conditions, or dignities thereof, without which that being could not bee perfect. The relative properties are ſuch as proceed from the eternitie of his activitie, life, or working: for the uttermoſt perfection of every thing is manifeſted by the actions thereof. And becauſe in him being and working are eſſentially one: therefore whatſoever doth neceſſarily follow, either his being, or his working, muſt alſo be in him eſſentially; and therfore are theſe relations which we call perſons, in the Godhead eſſentially, whoſe differences notwithſtanding depend immediately upon the working of the Divine Being. S. Auguſtine takes up this difference of properties gravely and wittily, thus. The being of God is ſaid to be ſimple, and ſo is, becauſe he is that which he hath, except that relation which every Perſon hath to another: For the Father hath the Son, yet is not the Son; and the Son hath his Father, yet is not that Father; but yet every p. 71Perſon in reſpect of himſelfe is that which he hath, as life, glorie, goodneſſe, &c. This therefore is the ſimplicitie that he hath, and that which he hath is not different, that the qualitie is not one thing and the ſubſtance another; de civit. Dei lib. 11. Cap. 10. wee ſhall underſtand it better by inſtance in ſome of the Divine dignities. All the dignities of God are infinite in all the poſſibilities of infinitie, both of being and working; for otherwiſe the dignitie were not infinite, and he were not worthy to be God, if any thing might be more excellent than he. The glory therefore of God being infinite in working; He by that infinite working of his glorie, doth glorifie himſelfe infinitely. So God infinitely glorifying is God the Father, God infinitely glorified is God the Sonne, and that infinite action of glorification is God the Holy Ghoſt. As when the underſtanding of a man or Angell doth view or underſtand it ſelfe; then is it in it ſelfe, not onelyonly by the eſſence of it ſelfe eſſentially; but alſo apprehended and underſtood by it ſelfe, according to the action of the underſtanding: ſo the mind underſtanding, is one terme really diſtinct from the minde underſtood, which is the image, word or expreſſion of the minde underſtanding; which minde doth alſo differ from the action of it ſelfe, whereby it doth underſtand it ſelfe. So God the Father underſtanding himſelfe, is in himſelfe God underſtood, the image, word, or expreſſion of God underſtanding. This is that eternall Sonne infinitely and eternally brought forth: thus was the Word eternally with God, and that Word was God, and God was that Word. John 1. For as the actions of God doe not ceaſe; for then God ſhould ceaſe to bee God, if he were not everie way infinite: So doe they not proceed de potentia in actum, that is to take a beginning from whence to raiſe themſelves into perfection; for then they were not infinite a parte ante, and ſo not eternall. But becauſe God is wiſdome or underſtanding eſſentially: therefore is it eſſentiall unto him to underſtand himſelfe eternally. And this is that moſt glorious Sonne, God eternized, God underſtood, God glorified, willed, good, infinite, powerfull, &c. by the infinite action of eternitie, wiſdome, glorie, will, goodneſſe, infinitie and power: which infinite action is God the Holy Ghoſt. Now if this infinite working and being of God bee one eſſentially, as hath beene proved, Chap. 8. it muſt of neceſſitie follow, firſt that all the Perſons of the Godhead are coeternall, Secondlie, that as concerning their abſolute eſſence, there is no difference or inequalitie among them, inaſmuch as everie Perſon is by his owne being God eternally, as it is ſaid of the Sonne, Philip. 2.6. That being in the forme or eſſence of the Godhead, he thought it no robberie to bee equall with God. For ſeeing the eſſence of the Godhead is one, and that which is one cannot poſſiblie beget it ſelfe; therefore neither the Sonne is from the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt from the Father and the Sonne, concerning their Godhead: but the Sonne is of the Father, as concerning his perſonall ſubſiſtence, and ſo the Holy Ghoſt is from the Father and the Sonne, inaſmuch as the Sonne is not underſtood eternized or glorified; but by the action of that being which is actuallie underſtanding; eternall, and glorious: neither can there be any action of underſtanding, eternizing, and glorifying, where there is not both the perſon underſtanding, eternizing, and glorifying; and the perſon underſtood, eternized, and glorified. Then this generation of the Sonne being onelyonly by the eternall action of the Deitie, it may appeare how beaſtlie and ſenſuall that Religion of Mahomet is, which cannot thinke of any other generation than that which is betweene a male and his female. Oh ſcorne and contempt even of honeſt thoughts! yet thus theſe ſwine plot to themſelves their happineſſe in the life to come, in feaſting and ſporting, and fleſhly pleaſure with beautifull women. See Wene (a) Bud. pag. 157. Woe unto that covering of Gog, but his end is at hand, and his deſtruction lingereth not: But the anſwer to this argument, See Chap. 34. § 5. n. 8.

p. 72Concerning the perſon of the Sonne more particularlie you may reade hereafter in the 24. Chapter, and of the Holy Ghoſt in the 33. It remaines here onelyonly to anſwer to thoſe objections which may bee brought againſt this faith of the Holy Trinitie.

1. And firſt it may be ſaid by the adverſaries of this truth, that the defenders thereof doe not agree among themſelves: for Thom. Aquinas in Semen. lib. 1. diſt. 2. q. 2. brings this as an objection. That the perſons are diſtinguiſhed by their properties, or manner of being onelyonly, therefore not really. In anſwer to which hee ſaith, That everie terme of relation inaſmuch as it is ſuch, muſt needs bee diſtinguiſhed from that whereto it is referred, ſeeing they are oppoſed by a relative oppoſition; and therefore are really differing: For things are either abſolute, as the eſſences or ſimple beings of things in themſelves; or relative, as the Father and the Sonne, which differ alſo really; ſo that although they are not different eſſences, yet are they moe or different things. Reſ. underſtand, according to the uttermoſt differences which may bee in that manner of being, which is founded immediately in the Divine eſſence, or which is all one, in the working thereof. Againe Keckerman, Syſtem. Theolog. Cap. 4. to that objection of the Antitrinitarians; that if there be unitie of eſſence, and difference of perſons, a ſubject and a relation, a ſubſtance and an accident; then in the Godhead there ſhould bee compoſition; which becauſe it is not poſſible to be; therefore there are no ſuch different relations; anſwers, and brings in the conſent of Zanchius, that relation is not any thing of reall being; that it is not any accident becauſe it is not being, but imports onelyonly the manner, order or reſpect of being. If this be true, where is then that reall difference, as Thomas ſpeakes? But theſe things are nothing different, if well examined. The purpoſe of one, and of the other, and of all right meaning Doctours is utterly to deny againſt the Tritheits all pluralitie or diverſitie of eſſences or abſolute beings. And as Keckerman for avoyding of any accidentall being in the diſtinction of the perſons, ſaith; that relation is not a thing of being, but onelyonly imports the order, manner, or reſpect of beings one toward another; ſo Thomas to meet fully with that hereſie of Sabellius and Porretanus, that the diſtinction of the Perſons was onelyonly in names, or our underſtanding, holds the Perſons to differ really, and to be different things eternally without and utterly beyond our underſtanding, yet conceive him ſo, as that theſe reall differences are onelyonly perſonall, and in the order or manner of their being, as I have ſhewed before. But it may bee that you are not yet ſatisfied for the ſeeming difference between theſe Doctors: for if this relation which they make betweene the Perſons of the Deitie, be neither ſubſtance nor accident, nor at all any thing of very being (as Keckerman ſuppoſes) but onelyonly a manner of being, which (for ought that I can conceive) being nothing of being, muſt bee but a meere conceit of ours, the opinion of Sabellius muſt ſtand for truth; and ſo on the other ſide, if theſe relations be the very beings or things ſubſiſting; nay, if the Divine being be the very relation of the Fatherhood and Sonneſhip, as Thomas affirmes both, contra Gent. lib. 4. c. 14. then if the Fatherhood differ from the Sonneſhip, and that reallie (as being in Divine eſſence, the difference muſt be moſt reall) and ſo the Sonneſhip from the Fatherhood; and both of them from the proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt; it ſeemes that the Divine being muſt differ really from it ſelfe, and ſo there can bee but one being of all the Perſons, as Arrius affirmed. By relation you may underſtand either that logicall notion which is between the termes relative & correlative, and ſo the ſayings of Kecker. are juſtifiable, or elſe you may meane thereby the things ſpoken of, with that mutuall reſpect which they have each to other, and ſo you muſt underſtand the doctrine of S. Thomas. For your further ſatisfaction remember what I told you Introduct. in log. Sect. 4. n. 11. That thoſe relations which I call neceſſary, commonly called ſecundum eſſe, are p. 73ſuch words as ſignifie, firſt, that mutuall reſpect which they have to their correlatives; and then thoſe beings whereon they depend fundamentally. As the name Father, firſt hath reference to a childe; next, it imports the ſubſiſtence, or perſon, as of Abraham or Ieſſe; ſo double, firſt underſtands ſingle; leſſe, greater; next quantities. Therefore though I thinke it not fitly ſaid, that the fatherhood is the divine eſſence, or that the eſſence is in the Fatherhood, as Thomas ſpeakes; for eſſence imports the ſimple and abſolute being, and fatherhood that reference which is to another: yet theſe relations ſhall not bee ſo meerely the manner of being, but that they may make a reall difference from their correlatives, not onelyonly in regard of that ſubſtratum, or thing meant in their ſecond ſignification, which is really differing from the thing oppoſed; as a Father, from a Sonne, Ieſſe from David; but alſo in reſpect of that being whereon theſe relations are founded immediately: as in Abraham that lively or naturall ſtrength whereby he is enabled to beget his like, in Iſaack that lively humanity which was begotten. As unity the tranſcendent is convertible with being, both which in quantities are the ground of evenneſſe, or equality; in qualities, of likeneſſe. And therefore Keckerman to ſhun a pluralitie of being, doth unneceſſarily avoyd that reall difference, which it is neceſſary to put in the Perſons of the Trinity, wherein there are more or divers ſubſiſtent beings, if you reſpect the Perſons, or relations: but one thing alone, if you regard the eſſence. For the realty in the difference of the relations, can no way enforce a plurality in their abſolute beings, but onelyonly an incommunicable propriety in the things that are different. For although in natures created, ſome attributes be eſſentiall, which are in the thing moſt perfectly: Some accidentall, as learning, Iuſtice, and ſuch other which are not perfect in us: ſome againe are but onelyonly relative, which of all other moſt imperfectly belong unto us, as not neceſſary to our being, but ſometime depend on things without; as a maſterſhip on his ſervants, a fatherhood on his children; and even thoſe relations which are neareſt, doe preſuppoſe not only the being of the ſubject, but alſo ſuch accidents in the ſubject, from whence the Relation doth ariſe; as the right hand, and left hand from the poſition of the members, yet in the ſuper excellencie of the divine being, whereto no perfection can bee wanting, which is poſſible to be either in the being, or manner of being; in the working, or manner of working; it is neceſſary that all things be ſupereminently, according to the moſt perfect manner of being, that is eſſentially. And therefore theſe relations, which are in the Godhead, are not ſo called properly, as being utterly in the ſimplicity of that being which is utterly independent: yet becauſe hee hath reveiled himſelfe unto us by the name of the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, one being: in the conſideration of which wee come neareſt to that relation which is properly ſo called in the creature: we are compeld for helpe of our owne underſtanding, which wee finde ſo dazeled at that infinite light, to hide our Eyes, and by little and little, as by degrees, to take a glympſe thereof, and ſo to ſpeake according to that light which we diſcerne. And as in the degrees of light, firſt we ſee the dawning, then the ſhine or cleare light; after the Beames, and laſtly the body of the Sunne: So contrariwiſe in the knowledge of God from that fountaine of Light. His being which is reflected in all the creatures, wee view the beames, or immediate perfections thereof. His goodneſſe, eternity, wiſdome, and glory: and theſe ſhew themſelves firſt in their inward working; and afterward at an infinite diſtance in the creature, outwardly. In their inward working, becauſe they are infinite, we muſt acknowledge an infinite agent, an infinite object, an infinite action; or the termes or limits of all action, from whence, wherto, & the middle terme between theſe two, which we call Perſons. And ſo though our guide his word, bee that Light which ſhines in the darkeneſſe; yet we muſt confeſſe that he dwels in the Light, whereto none can approach, which to us is all one with that darkeneſſe p. 74which he hath made his pavillion. And as in the Being which wee conceive abſolute, wee put different perfections of wiſdome, of power, of goodneſſe, &c. which nevertheleſſe wee muſt confeſſe to bee one perfection; though they bee truly diſtinguiſhed betweene themſelves: So in the different relations, which wee call Perſons, though wee know and confeſſe them to bee really different; yet muſt wee acknowledge the ſubſiſtences one in their abſolute being. And although the underſtanding in the conſideration of created beings, wonders how all theſe things can bee in that uttermoſt ſimplicity and unity of Being, and that after one moſt ſimple manner of Being, eſſentially; yet when it remembers that that being is therefore moſt perfect, becauſe it is moſt ſimple, and that no degree of perfection can bee wanting to that which is moſt perfect, it diſpoiles it ſelfe of all thoſe rules which it doth verifie in created things; and becauſe it is not able by one ſimple apprehenſion in it ſelfe, either to conceive, much leſſe to expreſſe that perfection which is in the ſimplicity of the divine being; it is content with thoſe expreſſions which it is able to make thereof; ſo that the truth and majeſtie of the thing bee not hurt thereby. Therefore whether S. Thomas deliver it thus, or Zanchius thus; So long as we know they meane no other thing than that which the holy Scripture hath taught us, wee ought not to receive with the left hand, that which they deliver with the right.

2. Now for the opinion of Sabellius, it is ſaid, That if every one of the Perſons, be the divine Being, then ſhall they all bee but one Perſon. But every Perſon in the Deity is the whole divine Being: or if the Sonne, and the Holy Ghoſt be not the whole divine being, then can they not be God, as Arrius affirmed. Anſwer, Although nothing of the Divine being bee without or beſide the Perſons, but that every Perſon is perfectly God, yet the manner of being cannot be the abſolute Being of a thing, ſo the aſſumption is falſe. And although every Perſon, in reſpect of his abſolute Being, be very God, yet is it not ſaid, that any Perſon according to his perſonall properties is the whole divine being, no more than the Son-ſhip of Iſaack is his humanity, ſo the conſequence for Arrius will not hold.

3. What two things ſoever agree in a third, muſt needes agree betweene themſelves. The Father and the Sonne agree in the unity of eſſence: therefore they are one betweene themſelves. Anſwer. The argument is fallacious from ſpecialty, as I ſhewed log. chap. 22. n. 2. For the rule holds onelyonly in equality of quantities, except you reſtreine it to that wherein the agreement is: ſo the Father and the Son agree in the unity of their eſſence, but differ in their perſonall properties.

4. The eſſence of God is moſt ſimply and ſubſtantially one, and therefore firſt not differing from it ſelfe. Secondly, incommunicable to three. Anſwer. Firſt the difference is not betweene it ſelfe, and it ſelfe: but in the properties which are eſſentially in it ſelfe, as the individuall being of Iſaack differs not from it ſelfe, but his Fatherhood toward Iacob, and his Sonſhip toward Abraham, are as really different, that is as diverſe properties, as Fatherhood, and Sonſhip can bee. Secondly, The three Perſons are not ſeverall eſſences, but all one eſſence incommunicable to any other, but they are diverſe relations in that one abſolute being.

5. A Perſon in the deity is either finite, or infinite: if finite, he cannot bee God: if infinite, then if there be three Perſons, there muſt alſo bee three infinites; or if theſe three infinites bee but one infinite, then is there but one infinite Perſon, called by diverſe names. Anſwer. Infinity in the Deity is the condition of the abſolute being, not of the propriety, or manner of being; as to be reaſonable is in Iſaack, the property or condition, not of his Fatherhood, nor of his Sonſhip, but of his humanity only.

6. If there bee moe Perſons than one, in the one onelyonly abſolute being of the p. 75Godhead; then it is neceſſary that there bee ſomething in them whereby they muſt be diſtinguiſhed, and ſo every Perſon muſt bee compounded; or if to avoid compoſition, you ſay that this diſtinction is onelyonly in relation, which brings not any new being, but onelyonly reſpect to another; yet relation cannot bee without ſome abſolute being whereon it is grounded. As in a ſervant there is a being beſides that reference which he hath to his maſter. Nay if this abſolute being bee the individuall and moſt ſimple eſſence of the Deitie; yet that cannot be the foundation of diverſe relations, becauſe of the uttermoſt unity and ſimplicity thereof. And if theſe relations have any other foundation, it is not poſſible to avoid compoſition: therefore there is not any plurality or difference of Perſons. Anſwer. You were told before; That whatſoever is in God, is in Him eſſentially, that it is not more eſſentiall to Him to bee one God, then to be three in the differences of Perſons, becauſe perfection both of being, and manner of being are in him according to his moſt ſimple being. For the diverſe perfections of the creature came thereto by the manifold formes therein over and above the eſſentiall formes, and muſt of force bee Accidents. But the ſuperexcellency of the ſimplicity of the divine being, being the cauſe of all perfection therein, ſuffers neither compoſition nor accident, as hath beene ſhewed, chap. 9. therefore as in the divine being, neither goodneſſe, wiſdome, nor power, adde any thing of new being, ſo in the working, the diverſe termes of agent, action, object, or any other words whereby we expreſſe the difference of relations, or Perſons, doe not adde any thing to the ſimplicity either of being, or working, though they bee therein eſſentially. No nor yet are they properly ſaid to be founded therein as any other things different therefrom; though we in our weake underſtanding can neither conceive, nor expreſſe them but as different termes of relation properly ſo called. Neither yet ſhall it follow from hence that the perſons are not really and truly diſtinguiſhed, for the very being of the Father as he is a Father, is in this, Hee doth eternally bring forth his Sonne. And likewiſe the Being of the Sonne, that he is brought forth of the Father, by the infinite and eternall action of the Father, in himſelfe; but rather, becauſe this production is infinite and eternall (as was ſhewed) therefore the Perſons alſo as concerning their perſonall proprieties, muſt be different eternally, though in their abſolute and individuall being they bee one eſſentially; ſo that as in relations properly ſo called, there is the ſubſtance, the attribute, and the relation which followes thereon: ſo likewiſe here is firſt the abſolute Being of the Deity; then the working thereof; and laſtly the termes of that action, or the relations enſuing, which we call Perſons; yet with this difference, that in the relations of the creature, the attribute and the relation ſucceeding, are both accounted accidents: But here in the deity all things are eſſentially, ſo that although the ſimple or abſolute Being of the deitie bee not the foundation of divers relations, yet the action thereof muſt needs admit theſe different termes which we call relations or perſons, and that without compoſition, either to make diſtinction of the perſons, or to avoide confuſion in them.

7. That relation whereby the Perſons are diſtinguiſhed, either is ſomething of very being, or elſe it is in the underſtanding onelyonly. If it be in our underſtanding onelyonly, then can it not make any perſonall diſtinction: if it bee any thing of very being, yet can it not be that abſolute Being common to all; and if it be anything different therefrom, then muſt ſomething be in the Perſons beſide their abſolute eſſence; which becauſe it is impoſſible, it followes, that there is no diſtinction of Perſons. Anſwer. This argument is in effect all one with the former; And you ought to have remembred, that it hath often beene ſaid, that the diſtinction of the perſons is reall; and therefore not in our underſtanding onelyonly. The Perſons taken together in their abſolute eſſence admit no diſtinction, but are all eſſentially one God. And ſo every perſon by himſelfe in his eſſence is likewiſe p. 76God. But the perſons underſtood apart according to the propriety of their perſonall beings, are really diſtinguiſhed, and that reall diſtinction is their Perſonality, and that perſonality is their reall diſtinction; and that relation whereby they are diſtinguiſhed, is nothing different from any of theſe; nor yet the propriety of their perſonall being is any other thing than that relation. Therefore though the perſons are not diſtinguiſhed by or in that abſolute being wherein they are all one; yet is it moſt falſely brought in thereby, that any thing ſhall bee in them beſide their eſſence, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed. For the diſtinction, or difference of the perſons ariſes from the action onelyonly, or working of the Abſolute Being, which yet is eſſentially in the abſolute Being, and differs not therefrom, no more than heat in the fyer doth differ eſſentially from the fyer; or reaſon, feeling, and growth in a man, doth differ eſſentially from the ſoule of man.

8. Every relative depends neceſſarily upon the correlative. But nothing which is depending upon another, can be truely God. Therefore either the Perſons differ not by relations only; or none of the perſons can be God; or elſe there is no relation, and ſo no diſtinction of the perſons at all. Anſwer. It is a fallacious and froward kinde of arguing, to preſſe the propriety of ſpeech or uſe of words to darken the truth of things, ſee log. cap. 21. n. 5. It hath beene ſaid, 1. that the being of God is ſupereminently above all being, above all created underſtanding to conceive. 2. That relation in created things doth not onelyonly preſuppoſe a ſubject, but alſo ſome quantity, quality, action, or other affection in the ſubject whereon that relation doth depend. 3. That thoſe relations in the perſons of the deity are nothing elſe but the very perſonall proprieties, and that the word Relation (as many other beſide) is taken into uſe in this argument onelyonly, to helpe the expreſſing of our underſtanding, though indeed properly it bee not in the divine being, yet can we not conceive but that there is an order in the proceſſion of the perſons (as I have ſaid elſewhere) yet not ſuch as ſhall bring in any dependence, no not in the perſonall proprieties, becauſe the action or eternall working whence the perſonall differences doe proceed, is eſſentially in the Godhead; or if dependence muſt needes bee yeelded unto, yet ſeeing it can bee nothing but onelyonly the order of proceſſion in the perſons of the Godhead, it brings in no ſuch inconvenience, as that thereupon it ſhould follow, that either the Sonne, or the Holy Ghoſt were not God. So the foundation of the doubt being but a hil of ſand, the whole building proves but a trifle.

And theſe are the principall reaſons brought for the Sabellian hereſie. The authorities of the Holy Scripture which they falſely alleage hereto, are ſuch as prove the abſolute unitie of the divine Being, as you have heard before in the end of the eighth Chapter: which Texts as they doe moſt ſtrongly confirme the eternall truth of the abſolute being of one God: ſo doe they nothing gainſay the Trinitie of the Perſons, which other Texts of the Scripture teach, as you have partly heard, and ſhall heare further hereafter, when wee come to ſpeake in particular of the Perſons of the Sonne, and of the Holy Ghoſt. So it remaines now, only to anſwer that which is brought for the opinion of the Tritheites, which poore fancie though it may vaniſh at the fight of the Reaſons which have beene brought for the ſimple and one Being of God in the eight Chapter: yet becauſe it would juſtifie it ſelfe by this doctrine of the Trinitie; you ſhall ſee what the ſtrength of their Reaſon is.

9 That which is begotten and that which is not begotten, muſt needs be very different. The perſons of the Trinity are begotten, as the Sonne; and not begotten, as the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt. Therefore if every perſon be God, they are different Gods. Anſwer. The things, which in no reſpect are different, muſt be the ſame; and there can bee no difference put betweene things, which brings p. 77not in a deniall on the one ſide, and an affirmation on the other. And this oppoſition is betweene all things howſoever differing. So betweene the Perſons of the Deity there muſt be a relative oppoſition. As the Father, ergo, not the Sonne: the Sonne, ergo, not the Father, &c. becauſe there is a relative diſtinction; but this doth nothing at all enforce a plurality of Gods, or a difference of abſolute Beings, but of the Perſons onelyonly.

And if you deſire to ſee other arguments like theſe, reade Thomas Aquinas. cont. Gent. lib. 4. Cap. 10. and their Anſwers. cap. 14. ſee alſo the note (a) on the 24. chap. following, ſect. 9. and note (a) on the 33. chap. But the anſwers to all objections will bee eaſie, if you remember what hath beene ſaid, and ſuffer not your ſelfe to be carryed away with ſhew of reaſons taken from naturall things; which though they bee moſt true in the creature, which had a beginning; yet can they no way bound or binde the infinite and eternall truth of Him that is Lord and Creator of nature, as I have remembred you elſewhere. Remember alſo to conſider in Chriſt, his eſſence, which in all the Perſons is coeternall and one: and His Perſon begotten eternally of the Father. And in this Perſon diſtinguiſh His natures divine, and humane, from his offices: wherein remember. 1. that His ſending and obedience abate nothing from His equalitie with the Father, concerning the unity of their eſſence. 2. that theſe names which import His office, are ſpoken of Him in reſpect of both His natures.

CHAP. XII. That in the Glorious Deity there be Three Perſons, and no moe.

YOu miſſe here a great deale of learning and wit, which other men have ſhewed in the myſtery of unity, and the number of the Three. But becauſe the reaſons that might bee made from thence, would bee but onelyonly inductive; and I deſire to ſtand with you on the lower and plaine ground; let us leave thoſe high Speculations to them that pleaſe to read them among the Cabaliſts, in Brixianus his comment. Symbol. and elſewhere, and ſee what other reaſons can be brought for the queſtion in hand.

1. Nothing can poſſibly be in the Deity but according to the uttermoſt perfection of Being: that is eſſentially, and neceſſarily. Therefore if it bee not neceſſary to put moe Perſons than Three in the Godhead, then is it not poſſible. But it is not neceſſary to put moe perſons in the divine Being: either Father, Son or holy Ghoſt. For ſo the Fatherhood, Sonſhip, and proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt ſhould not bee perfect in theſe. And if in theſe p. 78Perſons there ſhould not bee perfect Production; then it might follow, that there were a diſability in the producer; and ſo the firſt principle of all ſhould bee imperfect, unable and weake. So nothing beſides it, nothing after it could bee perfect. But all theſe things are impoſſible. Or if the other Perſon, or Perſons to be put in the Godhead, ſhould be neither Fathers, becauſe they did not produce; nor Sons, becauſe they were not produced; nor yet Holy Ghoſts, as not proceeding: then ſhould they bee moſt idle, and defective in the firſt principle of all Being; and therefore not neceſſary, and therefore not poſſible.

2. The ſame number muſt be to the Perſons of the deitie, which is to the termes or perfections of the divine dignities, for otherwiſe the perfections of the dignities, and the Perſons of the Deity could not bee conſubſtantiall and the ſame, as hath beene ſhewed. But the perfections of the dignities are three eſſentially. For in that which is eſſentially wiſdome or underſtanding (as we have proved that God is, c. 8.) the action of underſtanding is an eſſentiall meane betweene that which doth underſtand, and that which is underſtood, and theſe three termes are one underſtanding, and one underſtanding hath theſe three eſſentially. Therefore in God there is unity of eſſence, and that ſubſtantiall: and likewiſe a Trinity of Perſons, and yet ſubſtantiall, that the termes may differ infinitely from accident, confuſion, & contrariety. But if the Trinity be in the Deity ſubſtantially; it is impoſſible there ſhould bee moe, or fewer Perſons therein than three.

3. If in the Godhead there bee but one infinite Agent, whoſe Action is likewiſe one infinite Action like himſelfe, then it muſt needs bee, that the object of this action be alſo infinite and one. But it hath beene proved, that, God this agent of whom I ſpeake, is onelyonly one, chap. 8. and that his action is infinite and one, chap. 10. For if it were not infinite, it could not bee one, nor in Him One, if not infinite: Neither yet can the action be infinite if the object be finite; nor one, if the objects be many. And beyond theſe it is impoſſible to aſſigne any limit or terme neceſſary to action; nor yet can action bee without any of theſe, as you may underſtand by this inſuing induction. Therefore in the Deity, the Perſons are three onelyonly and no moe.

4. The power and propriety of all inferiour cauſes depends onelyonly on the higheſt and firſt cauſe of all. And all effects are the true images of their cauſes. And no action can bee perfect but in the number of three. For the perfection of every action is in the Agent, the obiect, and the action thereabout, and theſe are onelyonly three. So the termes of motion, from whence, whereto, and the middle terme betweene them are onelyonly three. ^a Therefore the divine Perſons are three and no moe.

5. The whole Being of a beginning muſt needs be moſt perfectly in that which is the firſt and chiefe beginning of all beginnings: p. 79ſo as that it cannot receive a Beginning from another, nor yet bee a beginning to it ſelfe; ſo can it not bee worthy the name of a beginning, if it be not a beginning to another Being coeſſentiall, and like it ſelfe. But in the perfect being of a beginning taken actively and paſſively, there muſt bee three termes and no moe; that is a Beginner, a Being begun, and an action of Beginning. Therefore there be three Perſons in the Deity and no moe. And this is that which is ſaid, Eph. 4.6. There is one God and Father of all, and Ioh. 1.18. The onelyonly Begotten Sonne which is in the boſome of the Father hath declared Him unto us. And againe, Eph 4.4. There is one Body, one Spirit one Lord, &c. And yet more cleerely, 1 Ioh. 5.7. There are three which beare Record in Heaven, the Father, the word, and the Holy Ghoſt, and theſe three are one.

Notes.

(a) THerefore the Divine Perſons are three and no moe. Reaſon. 4.] Againſt this concluſion i… is urged, out of Andr. Oſiander by Murschell the declamer of whom I ſpake before cap. 1. note. c. That if the Father by the view and underſtanding of Himſelfe doth bring forth a Perſon like Himſelfe; then the Sonne alſo, and H…ly Ghoſt by view of Themſelves, ſhall bring forth ſeverall Perſons like themſelves: a…d ſo there ſhall be a multiplication of Perſons infi…itly: or if theſe two Perſons doe not bring forth Perſons like themſelves; it muſt needes follow, either that they are deſtitute of the power of underſtanding; or that the underſtanding of the Father is more noble and powerfull than theirs. But this is impoſſible. For ſo the conſubſtantiality of the Perſons ſhould bee taken away. And this objection in their opinion is like thoſe great Stones wherewith Ioſhua ſhut up the five Kings in the Cave. But I ſay, rather like that ſeale of the Iewes on the tombe of Chriſt, whereby they thought to have ſhut up the Lord of life among the dead. But thus is Hee wounded in the houſe of his friends. For you may not thinke that hereby they prepare to Iuſtifie the Tritheites or any other Hereticks, but onelyonly to ſet reaſon againſt reaſon, and to ſhew how inconvenient the uſe of reaſon is in matiers of Faith. But before I goe any further, I would aske a queſtion or two of theſe oppoſers. Is not the Sonne begotten of the Father? you dare not denie it; It is the word of the Scripture, 1 Ioh. 5.1. Is Hee not conſubſtantiall with the Father? you dare not deny it. For the Father, and Hee are one, Ioh. 10.30 If then Goodneſſe, Infinity, eternity, almightineſſe, wiſdome, &c. be the very being of God, as hath beene proved; is it not neceſſary that theſe excellencies bee active in that divine generatio…? for how otherwiſe can He be the Image of his Father? Heb. 1. And if ſo, wherein have Raimund, Melancthon, Scaliger, Keckerman, or other learned men offended, that they ſhould bee ſo ſet at nought by a Phraſe-gatherer? But I ſmell the Fox; they can ſophiſticate authority of Scripture, of Fathers, of Councels, for their Conſubſtantiation, the maine point of their private opinion: B…t by no meanes can they tell how to make it ſtand with reaſon, & therfore that their conſubſtantiation might be a matter of Faith, would they ſo fain make a divorce between faith & reaſon. If this were not the very cauſe, ſo great p. 80a Clearke as Oſiander, ſeeing his reaſon was contrary to his faith, if he could not have anſwered it, ſhould have ſtudied thereunto, leſt it might turne the unſtable from the Faith. But what if wilfully he would not know? had he read nothing of Tho. Aquinas? This Thomas propoſes this ſame doubt, and anſwers it in his firſt booke on the Maſter of Sent. Diſt. 7. q. 3. &. 4. where he makes the objection thus. All the power which is in the Father, is alſo in the Sonne: therefore alſo the power of begetting. To which hee anſwers, that the word Power, doth ſignifie either the ſimple eſſence of power, and ſo it is in all the Perſons one and the ſame: or the order thereof to ſome determinate Act; and ſo the ſame power is in the Father, and the Son; but in the Father to beget, and not to be begotten: in the Sonne to be begotten, and not to beget, and this is the reall diſtinction of their Perſons. So that the objection is onelyonly from that fallacy of the Accident, ſee log. chap. 21.….3. To this hee brings the reaſons of Anſelme. The leaſt inconvenience is not poſſible to be in the Godhead, but if the Son could beget another Son, and He againe another Sonne, &c. the proceſſe might be infinite. But this is impoſſible. Therefore the Sonne cannot beget, no more than He can ceaſe to bee a Sonne, and to be begotten. Againe, He that cannot bee the Father, cannot beget. But the Sonne cannot bee the Father; for ſo all difference and propriety of the Perſons ſhould bee taken away. Therefore the Sonne begets not: nor yet the Father begets any other Sonne. Iohn. 1.14.18. For as nothing of the Fatherhood can bee out of the Father, ſo nothing of the Sonſhip can be out of the Son, for ſo the production of the Sonne ſhould not be perfect: neither is the dignity of their eſſence any thing abated hereby: for that in every Perſon is onelyonly one: but in the Father, it is called Fatherhood; in the Sonne it is called Sonſhip; and in the Holy Ghoſt it is called Proceſſion. And againe, in his Sum. Theol. part. 1. cap. 42. he proves there can be but one Father, one Sonne, and one H…ly Ghoſt, for ſuch reaſons as you may reade there and iudge of their force. Moreover in the 4. booke cont. Gent. cap. 13. he propoſes this very obj…ction almoſt in ſo many words, and anſwers it thus. The Sonne of God is alſo God, yet not another God; differing onelyonly in this, that Hee proceeds from the Father. And if he be not any other God; then alſo muſt there be one Power, one underſtanding of them both. So that the Sonne differs from the Father, onelyonly in this, that hee proceeds from Him; and this is the propriety of the Father, that the Word proceeds from Him; and of the Sonne, that hee proceeds from the Father. Neither is this any weakeneſſe in the Sonne, that he begets not another Sonne, becauſe both the Father, and the Sonne, are as the ſame Deity; ſo the ſame power: one of begetting, the other of being begotten, which difference is onelyonly in the relations. And againe in the 26. chap. of the ſame booke he anſwers. That hee that makes this objection ought to have conſidered; that the Sonne of God is God; not as begetting; but onelyonly as being begotten. For the eſſence being one, the difference betweene them muſt bee onelyonly by that relation which is in their originall, or proceſſion. Relation (I ſay) not that which is founded in quality; for ſo there would bee unlikeneſſe: nor that which is in quantity; for ſo there would bee inequality in their being; but that which is in action onelyonly, action (I meane) not tranſient, wherein the Agent hath a prerogative of power, on an outward ſubject, to cauſe paſſion therein; but immanent onelyonly; wherein that which is produced, is coeſſentiall and coequall with the producer: So that the difference is onelyonly in the order of proceſſion onelyonly. But I ſuppoſe ſuch a learned Maſter as Oſiander, whoſe petits dare ſo boldly cenſure, and ſet at nought whom they pleaſe, could not bee ignorant what ſo great a Doctor as Thomas, had ſo often anſwered. It may be he held the anſwers i…ſufficient; yet he ſhould have ſhewed the weakeneſſe thereof. He held it not worth his paynes: a careleſſe anſwer. But let us once more be bold to looke on this mighty Goliah a little nearer, and try what cunning he hath, at his weapon. p. 81If the Father by the underſtanding of himſelfe doth bring forth a Perſon like himſelfe, then the Sonne alſo, and Holy Ghoſt by underſtanding themſelves ſhall bring forth perſons like themſelves: for otherwiſe they cannot be foreign or conſubſtantiall. I denie the conſequence, and why? becauſe the reaſon thereof bindes mee to denie it: for if the Perſons bee conſubſtantiall, that is, of one and the ſame moſt ſimple being; it is neceſſary, firſt that the whole being be in everie Perſon: for if the being bee divideable (as Hierarcha and the Triformians thought) then can it not be moſt ſimplie one. Secondly, that that one moſt ſimple being, be likewiſe no other thing than the three Perſons: for if that infinite being, might by the manifold actions of the underſtanding bee imparted by every one of thoſe Perſons, to multiplie moe Perſons, then ſhould they not bee foreign but foreign, as Arius granted, that is, not of one and the ſame, but onelie of like being, as Peter, Iames and Iohn, of which everie one hath the common abilitie of kinde to propagate his like. But thus the being in the three Perſons could not be individuall and one, but the Father communicates his whole being to the Sonne, ſo that there remaines no difference of being, but of principall, originall, or begetting onelyonly. Moreover the conſequence cannot follow but upon this moſt falſe ſuppoſition, that there be divers intellections or ſeverall workings of the Divine underſtanding in every Perſon: whereas the underſtanding of God, being his moſt ſimple being, and that moſt individually one, the action likewiſe of his underſtanding muſt bee but one moſt ſimple act of underſtanding, infinitely and eternally: for as hee cannot ceaſe to bee; ſo can hee not ceaſe to underſtand at one action infinitely and eternally whatſoever is underſtandable in himſelfe or his creature: ſo that the Perſons cannot have ſeverall acts of underſtanding, as accidents or proprieties, nor yet can they bee any other thing than the ſeverall termes properties or ſubſiſtences in that one infinite underſtanding, as our Lord teacheth us John 5.19. The Sonne can doe nothing of himſelfe, ſave what he ſeeth the Father doe: for whatſoever things he doth, the ſame things alſo doth the Sonne likewiſe.

Thirdly, this conſequence doth not onelyonly utterlie take away the diſtinction of perſons (as was ſhewed) but would alſo thruſt into the Divine underſtanding that which is utterly falſe and utterly impoſſible, & that contrary to the evidence of the Holie text: for our Lord ſaith, Iohn 10 15. As the Father knoweth me, ſo know J the Father. But it is certaine that the Father knoweth not any thing but as it is: therefore not the Sonne, but as the Sonne; neither doth the Sonne know the Father, but as the Father; nor yet himſelfe, but as the Sonne: therefore it being impoſſible for the Perſons to underſtand themſelves otherwiſe than they are; it is not poſſible for the Sonne or the Holy Ghoſt by underſtanding themſelves, to become the Father, and ſo to bring out other Perſons, as this lewd conſequence would enforce.

But the ground of this miſtaking (which I tell you of for avoyding of the like cavils) is this, that they conſider not the ſuperexcellency of the Divine being; but meaſure it by the ſhort and ſcanty rules whereby they meaſure the creature. It is true, in things here below, that according to thoſe naturall cauſes wherby everie thing is brought forth; ſo may it likewiſe bring forth the like: becauſe that ſtrength or power is given thereto, for the propagation and preſervation of kinde in the like, which it cannot uphold in it ſelfe; by reaſon of corruption, neither is the generation of naturall things but with imperfection; and their multiplication by deciſion of the ſeed into divers parts. Neither doth any father communicate his whole being to that which is begotten by him, neither can the ſpecies or common nature (ſo farre forth as it is multiplicable even by one alone) be ſav…d whole and entire in any one individuall. But nothing of all this is in the moſt glorious ſpirituall and divine generation: for that power of generation is not received, but eſſentiall; ſo that which is begotten, is eternall p. 82and incorruptible. The generation alſo is in the uttermoſt perfection, becauſe the whole infinite being is communicate thereby: but that not for any abaſement in the principle, but becauſe of the infinite perfection thereof. Neither is matier for multiplication, either poſſible, or needfull here; becauſe all the fulneſſe of Fatherhood, Sonneſhip, and proceſſion are herein perfectly, ſubſtantially, infinitely, and eternally; becauſe the proceſſion is not ſuch as tends to any thing without: for ſo that which proceedeth ſhould not bee coequall to the principle from whence it doth proceed. But this proceſſion is in the Divine being onelyonly, in every Perſon according to his peculiar ſubſiſtence, anſwerable whereto, no generation can be found in all the creatures.

2. Another objection there is to the like purpoſe out of Heb. 1.3. where it is ſaid of the ſecond Perſon, that hee ſuſteineth all things by the Word of his power. So that if hee being the Word of his Father, have alſo a Word whereby he ſuſteineth all things, which therefore is another Word, and not the things that are ſuſteined thereby: it may ſeeme that there is a multiplication of Perſons, and that the former objection is not fully anſwered. I have ſaid, Log. Chap. 29. n. 5. That the appointment of all naturall cauſes to the bringing forth of their effects, is the rule or law of Nature. Now this law is that neceſſitie, fate, or deſtinie which is ordained by his eternall decree that made Nature, and all things therein, and bleſſed all the living creature with power to bring forth according to kinde, as it appeares Gen. 1. And this is that Word of which S. Paul ſpeakes, No other divine Perſon, but that Word whereby he melteth the yee, and Snow, Pſal. 147.18. that ordinance which the creature cannot paſſe, Pſal. 148.6. Of which you may reade every where in the Holy text, and eſpecially in that admirable booke of naturall and Divine Philoſophie, the booke of Iob, in compariſon of which all Ariſtotles naturalls are not worth the while. For ſeeing all naturall cauſes have their ſtrength from him, hath not hee bound nature within thoſe limits, beyond which hee gave it no further power to worke? And within which hee is trulie ſaid to worke by his word, or by his power, in the ſtrength of which alone, Nature her ſelfe doth worke.

Maker of Heaven and Earth.