The Sacred Philosophy of the Holy Scripture, Article 1 · Chapter 9
CHAP. IX. Sect. 1. That God is neither matier. 2. Forme. 3. Compound. 4. Bodily. 5. Nor ſubject to any accident. 6. And that His being is moſt ſimple and pure.
WEe have hitherto dwelt on the conſideration of the divine being and according to the weakeneſſe of mans underſtanding have aſſayed to ſhew what He is. Now as well for further cleering of the premiſſes, as for the avoyding of ſome left-handed opinions concerning Him, it is likewiſe fit that we conſider what hee is not; And becauſe the author of that booke which by him is ſtiled Soiga, (by which forſooth in his deepe Cabala, you muſt underſtand foreign that is (holy) and by ſude, deus, and ſuch deepe myſteries) doth moſt falſlie affirme pag. 12. that God is the matier of all things that have exiſtence, or a peculiar being; it may appeare unto you for theſe reaſons following.
Section. 1. That God is not Matier.
1. NO matier is eternall. But God is eternall: a therefore God is not matier. The rule or propoſition is thus proved. Whatſoever is moved by any kinde of motion cannot be eternall: becauſe it ſuppoſes another being whereby it is moved, either from the pure poſſibilitie of not being into being, as the firſt matier of all things; or in being, from one ſtate of being into another. But all matier is one of theſe: therefore no matier is, or can be eternall; and therefore not God. And if no matier can be God, then God cannot be matier. See log. Cap. 13. B. rule 1.
2. All matier is in poſſibilitie to become this or that; that is, to change from one forme to another, as the moiſture of the earth by the vertue of the root turnes to graſſe, thence by the vertue of the ſtomacke of the oxe, becomes blood, then fleſh; which in the ſtomacke of the man being digeſted againe, becomes his blood, then fleſh, and ſo returnes to earth againe, and is capable of as many formes or ſhapes as it was before. But God is actually whatſoever he is, and without poſſibilitie of change to become this or that. Therefore God is not matier.
3. No matier is a beginning of naturall action, but of ſufferance onelyonly. But God is the beginning of all naturall actions. Therefore God is not matier, you may bring hither divers of the reaſons following in 2.3.4.
Section. 2. That God is not the forme of other things being.
1. Every naturall compound is a third thing ariſing from the matier and the forme, in which b the parts that were before underſtood ſeparate, had power to be joyned, and to become that which they were not before. But God can neither be a part of another, nor be joyned with another, nor be in poſſibilitie to another, nor yet become that which he was not before. Therefore He is neither matier nor forme.
2. No forme is totally and onelyonly for the being of it ſelfe, c but is deſtinate unto another totall, as a thing more excellent than it ſelfe. But God is wholly his owne being onelyonly, not for another; for all things are for him: neither can any thing be more excellent than He. Therefore d God is not the forme of any other being.
3. No forme of any thing begun can be eternall. But God is eternall: therefore God is not the forme of any thing begun. And ſo you may conclude likewiſe of matier.
4. The matier and forme are the eſſentiall being of all bodilie things, and being is affirmable of that, whoſe being it is. If God then were the being of other things, it were as truely ſaid, This man is God, as this man is a living creature indued with reaſon; but this is moſt falſe, and would juſtifie the Idolatrie of all the heathen, yea even of the Aegyptians. Therfore God is neither matier nor form. And if God be neither matier nor forme, it muſt needs follow.
3. Section. 3. That God is no Compound.
1. FOr in every compound the parts being actually ioyned muſt needs be ſuch as were poſſible to be ioyned together, ſo that there muſt be therein both actor perfection, in reſpect of the totall wherin the parts are actually ioyned, and poſſibilitie or imperfection in regard of the parts that may be both ioyned, and conſequently diſioyned againe: ſo that the totall in poſſibility not to be, as it was not before the parts were ioyned together. But nothing of all this is poſſible to bee in God; neither parts, nor imperfection; nor poſſibilitie to be, and not to be, e Therefore God is no Compound.
2. Every Compound is a ſecond thing in Nature, whoſe being followes upon the uniting of the parts compounded. But God is the prime or firſt being, as was ſhewed. Therefore no compound.
3. Every compound ſuppoſeth neceſſarily a cauſe efficient which brought the parts together; which cauſe efficient muſt needs be before the effect or compound. But nothing of this belongs to God. Therefore He is no compound.
Every compound is liable to diviſion and ſo to deſtruction. But this is againſt the eternity of God; and therefore God is no compound or made of divers things. And if no compound, then neceſſarily it follows.
Section. 4. 4. That God is not a Body.
1. FOr every body whether it be Phyſicall, or Mathematicall hath parts divideable into parts. It is alſo finite, and may be meaſured. But nothing of all this belongs to God, one infinite being. f Therefore God is not a Body.
3. No bodily being can bee the firſt of Beings, and the cauſe of all other: For if it be a body onelyonly, it cannot poſſibly move it ſelfe: And if it bee a bodie enlived and quickned by another, then it cannot bee the firſt of beings, becauſe it is compounded. But God is the firſt, and cauſe of all beings, as hath beene proved. Therefore no Body.
3. No bodily being is abundantly ſufficient for it ſelfe. For if it bee a whole and entire body, it needs the parts, without which it could not be whole; and if it bee a part, it needs the other parts as helpers, and the whole as the ſuſtayner; And yet the outward being or cauſer which brought altogether. But God is abundantly ſufficient for himſelfe; of whom alone all other things have their ſufficiencie. Therefore God is no body. And if God in himſelfe be abundantly ſufficient for himſelfe, it followes neceſſarily, that hee needs not any thing from without, And therefore.
Section. 5. 5. That no Accident can be in God.
1. FOr every Accident, whether it bee of Inherence, or circumſtance, comes to the ſubject beſide the being thereof. The accidents of circumſtance come to the ſubject, for the better being thereof; as to bee clothed, to have a wife, &c. But all theſe come from without; And as they are needleſſe to him that hath all ſufficiency in Himſelfe ſo are they impoſſible to belong unto God. The accidents of inherence proceede either from the matier, forme, or compoſition of the ſubject. In God is neither matier, forme or compoſition, as hath bin proved, g Therefore in God is no accident.
2. Nothing can be in any thing moſt excellently and perfectly but only the being thereof. Whatſoever is in God is in Him moſt excellently and perfectly. Therefore whatſoever is in God is only his being; And then no accident.
3. If no addition can be unto God, to make him any thing other than He is; then can no accident be in him: which ever makes the ſubject ſomewhat that it was not before. But no addition, taking away, or change can come to Him, who is eternally, infinitely, and actually whatſoever Hee may bee. Therefore no accident can bee in God.
4. Every Accid…nt is neere unto not being, as having no being but in that ſubject wherein it is. But the being of God is infinitely diſtant from not being. And therefore God is no way ſubject to Accidents.
5. If any thing can come to God as an Accident, it muſt come to Him, either from Himſelfe, or from another. Not from himſelfe, as having neither matier, forme, compoſition, or bodily being, from which all accidents doe proceed. Neither can it ſuffer any thing from another; for all ſuch accidents as proceed from without, proceed from the poſſibilitie, or weakneſſe of the ſubject unable to reſiſt, as heat is in water. But his being is infinitely perfect and ſuch as cannot ſuffer: For ſo ſhould he ceaſe to be happy, and to be God; and therefore nothing can be in h…m but eſſentially.
6. And moreover ſeeing Hee is the firſt of all beings, and the onelyonly thing being of himſelfe eternally; it is impoſſible that hee ſhould either ſuffer violence, or have any thing added to him by another, or be moved by another; ſeeing he is the firſt cauſe & mover of all things. If then no accident can be in God, neither from himſelfe, nor yet from without; it is manifeſt that in him can be no accident at all. And ſeeing nothing of all theſe things before ſpoken matter, forme, compoſition, body or accident can bee in God, it followes neceſſarily.
Section. 6. 6. That the Being of God is moſt ſimple and pure.
1. WHich is further manifeſt by this. That He is the firſt of beings, and ſo muſt needs be ſimple. And againe, that which is ſimple, muſt needs bee the firſt. For that which is not the firſt of all beings, muſt needs have dependance on another, and ſo two things muſt be therein. Firſt ſomewhat from the cauſe whereby it is; Secondly ſomewhat peculiar to it ſelfe, whereby it differs from the cauſe. But God is the firſt of all Beings, becauſe he is eternall and one, as was proved, cap. 2. & 8. h Therefore his being is moſt ſimple and pure.
2. If nothing can be in God, but only his owne eſſence or being, then purity it ſelfe, or ſimplicity muſt needs bee his being: which being, becauſe it is proved to be infinite, it neceſſarily followes that his purity is alſo infinite, beyond which no purity or ſimplicitie can be greater.
3. Whatſoever is infinite and no way limitted muſt needs bee moſt ſimple or uncompounded and onelyonly one. The being of God is infinite; Therefore moſt ſimple and pure.
4. God is no compound, as was proved, therefore his being is moſt ſimple.
And becauſe all our knowledge which wee have of all things being, is only by the helpe of our ſenſes, taking them either directly or further of by compariſon, by compoſition, or by negation; whereby we judge of the properties or accidents which we finde in the things; and not by the underſtanding of the moſt inward and true being thereof; no not of our owne very ſoules, whereby we live, or that whereby wee are moſt guided, our verie imagination; we muſt confeſſe that this higheſt and firſt being of all, being ſo utterly without all our ſenſes, muſt needs be as farre beyond all our words, and all our underſtanding; and muſt ever aſſure our ſelves that that cannot bee that infinite God, which can come into our moſt finite underſtanding; Neither that wee can aſſigne any name which may equall his being, ſee Cuſan. de Deo abſcondito. And that we may end as we did begin, let us returne by the waies wee came, and we ſhall finde that all theſe names and beings, which wee have given unto God, yea even all together cannot equall him. For if we call him the beginning of all things, wee make him not an abſolute Being, but ſpeake with relation to that which is began. If wee ſay he is infinitie, eternitie, power, wiſdome, and the reſt of thoſe dignities which we have viewed, they are but ſo many particular eſſentiall attributes to one moſt perfect being: yet when wee have ſaid Moſt perfect Being, we have not ſaid right. For He by his Infinity and Almightin…s is utterlie beyond both being & not being, for he hath power over not being to make it to be, & over being to make it not to be: Neither can not being be even verie nothing, but by him that commanded it to be nothing. Such therefore is He, Infinite beyond both being, and not being. If we ſay he is moſt perfect only, we cannot underſtand his perfection to be any thing elſe than the union of his eſſentiall attributes. If by unity though moſt ſimple and abſolute without reſpect to number or magnitude, we ſay he is One; yet wee cannot truly ſay ſo, but by his truth. And although that which is firſt muſt needs bee one, and nothing can be more ſimple than unity: yet ſeeing we cannot thinke but that he which is the firſt of beings, muſt needs bee the beſt of beings, wee are enforced to returne from the Centre of his unitie into that infinite circle of his goodneſſe, his power, his glory, his wiſdome, his truth. Therefore whether in the innermoſt center, and firſt conſideration of that moſt one and abſolute ſimplicity, foreign. as the Philoſopher Plotinus Ennead. 6. l. 8. cap. 11. ſaith we ought in ſilence to adore as the Pſalmiſt ſpeakes foreign ſilence is praiſe to thee, Pſal. 65.2. or whether in the circumference, wee dwell in the conſideration of thoſe tytles which He for our underſtanding hath bin pleaſed to fit unto himſelfe; becauſe we would as the Areopagite ſpeakes lib. de Div. nom. cap. 13. underſtand and ſpeake ſomething of that unſpeakeable excellencie, let us ever endevour a further knowledge of him; becauſe wee know that the leaſt knowledge that wee have of the moſt excellent being is more worth than the knowledge of all things beſide. And although the endevour be high and hard, yet have wee ſo much the more encouragement by the helps or meanes of our knowledge; and ſo much the greater hopes in reſpect of the reward. The meanes common to every man are in ſum either diſcurſive; or experimentall. The diſcurſive are two, and in our power; two are experimentall and above it, but yet not hopeleſſe if wee endeavour. The firſt of theſe diſcurſive wayes whereby wee endevour to come to the knowledge of God, is by denying unto Him all thoſe things which are common; and every where meeting our ſences; ſuch are all things, that have matier, outward ſhape, compoſition, that are bodily; ſubject to motion, place, time, and other accidents. And hitherto you muſt bring all thoſe things which are ſpoken in the holy Scripture by way of Example and for our underſtanding onelyonly, as when God is ſaid to have hands, feet, eyes, jealouſie, anger, and ſuch like, wherein wee muſt forſake that which is outward and ſenſible, and inward in our ſelves, becauſe theſe titles are only to lift up our underſtanding by ſenſible and well known things to thoſe that are truly and eſſentiall in him; as by his hand, is meant his power; by his feet, his continuall preſence in every place; by his eyes, his wiſdome; by his jealouſie and anger, his juſtice againſt Sinners, &c. And thus by the helpe of our ſenſes in things that are, and in things that are not, our underſtanding is furthered in the knowledge of God; and that eſpecially if in both theſe wayes of diſcourſe, that is, denying things that agree not to God, and affirming thoſe honourable dignities that are due unto him, we uſe the rule and guidance of the holy Scripture, and the ſtrength of our beſt underſtanding, to approve thoſe things that are excellent, and to reprove that which ſtands not with his truth, as I have already ſhewed in both kinds, as well as I can.
The firſt of thoſe wayes that are experimentall in the knowledge of God are thoſe inbred thoughts, and apprehenſions of Him, whereby every man, will he, nill he, confeſſes in his heart that there is ſomething greater than himſelfe, whereof hee ſtands in awe and dread; which hee cannot chuſe but acknowledge an avenger of all wickedneſſe and ſinne. And this the witneſſe of God in every man, his conſcience within accuſing or excuſing him, in the judgement of his own heart. This Plotinus often, & Iamblichus De myſt. cap. 1. call the touch of the deity, and affirme truely that it is more powerfull over the minde than that diſcurſive knowledge of which I ſpake before. But becauſe this knowledge is ever with affrighting, and addreſſed onelyonly as the two former, to the laſt: it beſeemes every man that would know God truely, as hee may bee knowne for his owne comfort, to cleanſe his owne heart with all his diligence, in prayer, in meditation, in reading of the holy Scripture, in denying of himſelfe in all his ungodlie and ſinnefull luſts; that he may become a holy and a meet Temple for God to dwell in. And ſo hee may aſſure himſelfe that God will give him experience of himſelfe; as hee hath promiſed. Ioh. 14.23. That hee will come and make his abode with him. This is that wiſe merchant who for this pretious pearle ſels all that hee hath, to buy it. This is hee that eates of the hidden Manna. Ioh. 6.50.51. Rev. 2.17. that receives that white ſtone, and a new name written, which none knowes ſaving hee that receiveth it: This is hee that in the face of Ieſus Chriſt, as in a mirrour, beholds the glory of the Lord, ſo that hee is changed into the ſame Image from Glory to Glory, as by the ſpirit of the Lord.
Notes.
(a) GOd is not matier] Anaximenes ſaid the aire was God; that he was therfore unmeaſureable, but had a beginning, & was always in motion. Diagoras of Apollonia (for he of Melos was the Atheiſt) conſented unto him as concerning the matier. The opinion of Cleanthes I told you before, which one while held God to bee matier in this ſenſible world, in the uppermoſt ayre and in the Starres. Parmenides imagined a mighty wide circle which encompaſt the world like a Crowne or garland (therefore called by him Stephane) to be God. Xenophon, and with him Plato where hee ſpeakes in ieſt, ſaith the world was God, which we call Mammon, and yeelds there were moe ſuch, but where he ſpeakes in earneſt, (as in his Epiſtles) hee ſpeakes of one God the Author of all things, as we doe. Ariſtotle could not tell how to gaine-ſay his maſter with his owne credit, and ſo followed his judgement. Heraclides of Pontus ſomewhiles ſaid the Starres were Gods, then heaven, and earth. So Theophraſtus, and ſometime Zeno was for the Starres. Chriſippus that was accounted moſt ſubtile amongſt the ſchollers of Zeno, was moſt wavering in his opinions; ſometime he thought the world was God: ſometime the uttermoſt or burning aire: then water: now earth; after this ayre below; and by and by the Sunne, and the Moone, and the Starres, at laſt all together was but one God, yet men canonized for their vertues muſt needs bee Gods apart; and then much more the vertues for which they were immortall. And thus they that would ſeeme wiſe, while they cared to know more than the truth of God, became idle in their imaginations, and there fooliſh heart was full of darkeneſſe.
The parts which were before ſeparate. 2.1.] (b) All parts are underſtood apart, as things differing. And therefore although divers formes are brought out of the power of the matier, or propagate with the matier; yet that affords no objection to weaken this argument.
But is deſtinate unto another totall. 2.2.] (c) If you looke on the queſtion, you ſhall finde it onelyonly to be about ſuch formes as theſe. For it is not ſaid that God is utterly no forme. For forme is the moſt ſimple or pure being which wee can conceive; but he is none of thoſe formes, which are allyed to matier. The Angels are accounted formes, but ſeparate. But I runne not with that opinion. The Ideas are conceived to bee formes altogether ſeparate, not deſtinate unto matier, much leſſe is that moſt ſimple forme of formes, the originall of all formes.
God is not the forme of any other Being. 2.2.] (d) The opinion of Democritus is contrary to this concluſion, in that he makes mans ſoule to be God. Straton thought that God was only a certaine divine power in Nature: ſo ſaid Chriſippus otherwhile; and ſo Cleanthes, where hee affirmed that God was the life of the world. His opinion that reaſon was God, was an errour, againſt this concluſion alſo, if by reaſon hee meant that reaſonable ſoule, the forme of mans b…dy. Heraclides ſuppoſed God to change his ſhape at his pleaſure. Zeno ſaid that reaſon in every thing was God, or that he was that living law, that gave life to every thing. Wavering Chriſippus ſometime held the life of the world to be God, ſomewhile he cal'd him deſtinie.
Therefore God is no compound. 3.1.] (c) Among the matiers reckoned up before [note a.] ſome you ſee are compounded, and they belong properly to this place, as earth, water, and our ayre below, of which none are ſimple elements, but mixt one with another for generation ſake, and fitted to the inhabitants that dwell therein; of which none could live in elements that are pure being themſelves compounded.
Therefore God is not a body. 4.1.] (f) The ſchoole of Epicurus taught that God was in ſhape like a man; and that he was alſo bodily For they thought that if hee were without a body (as Plato taught) he could neither have ſence nor wiſdome, and ſo could no way be partaker of any pleaſure, or happines. But concerning the pleaſure which God enjoyes, Plato teaches, Epiſt. ad Dionyſ. that it is not in outward or bodily things; which hinder the happineſſe of the minde. The weaknes of Epicurus argument is ſhewed by Cotta a follower of Plato, Cic. de Nat. D. l. 1. & the opinion it ſelfe confuted by the arguments here brought; eſpecially againſt the Audean hereticks, that were called Anthropomorphites, who upheld the opinion of the Epicurean Philoſophers, becauſe the holy Scripture, teaching men by their ſenſes, ſpeakes of Gods powerfull right hand, and treading down his enemies; that hee was ſorry in heart, and ſpecially where it is ſaid, Gen. 1. Let us make man in our owne likeneſſe: They here underſtood the likeneſſe of the body, not of the minde, in holineſſe and knowledge, which we have loſt, muſt endeavour our ſelves to recover, as we are exhorted, Eph. 4.24. Put on the new man which is created according to God, in righteouſneſſe and holineſſe of the truth, and againe, Put on the new man which is renued (in you) unto knowledge, according to the Image of Him that created him.
Therefore in God is no accident, 5.1.] Zeno (g) ſometime affirmed that the yeare and the ſeaſons thereof, the ſpring, the harveſt, the moneths alſo were God. Chriſippus ſaid, the truth of things was God. And if you account truth an accident, you may referre his opinion hither. You have now heard the difference of opinions among the Philoſophers; But how much wiſer was Simonides that learned Poet, who being demanded by Hiero king of Siracuſe, what God was; He deſired a day to thinke of his anſwer: being the next day asked againe, he deſired two dayes: And thus being often asked, ſtill doubled his time. Being demaunded the reaſon, he anſwered, that the longer he thought thereon, the more hard and darke the thing ſeemed unto him. What thanks therefore can we give unto God who by his holy word hath ſo fully revealed himſelfe unto us, that the holy Angels themſelues with wonder deſire to pry into thoſe myſteries, wh…ch hee hath made manifeſt unto his Church by Chriſt, 1 Pet. 1.12.
1. Therefore his being is moſt ſimple. 6.1.] Againſt this concluſion, a doubt or two may be raiſed. 1. being without addition, is affirmable of every thing. But the being of God is not ſo. For wee ſay the body, or ſoule of a Man, or an Angell is being, yet not God. Therefore the being of God is not a being without Addition. And if addition bee made to the being of God, whereby it may be diſtinguiſhed from other beings, it will ſeeme not to be a ſimple, but a compound being. I anſwer, that the propoſition being without addition, is affirmable of every thing, is true of that common predicate or tranſcendent being onelyonly of which I ſpeake, Introd. logic. ſect. 3 n. 2 & 3. But the being of God is that one proper and pure being which belongs to him alone, and receives no addition, nor is affirmable of any other thing beſide himſelfe. Secondly, I anſwer, that the concluſion of this ſyllogiſme, the being of God is not without additition, being granted, takes not away the former concluſion, that his being is ſimple and pure; Neither is the conſequence rightly gathered thereon: that if Addition be made, it is not then a ſimple being. For theſe additions bring in no ſuch beings, as to make the being of God either compound, or mixt, but only diſtinguiſhable from other beings. For to ſay the being of God is one, is pure, is ſimple, is incommunicable, are here onelyonly negation differences, as one, therefore it cannot belong to any beſide himſelfe; Pure, that is, not mixt. Simple, that is, not compounded. Incommunicable, whereof none can be partaker beſide himſelfe. Nay, thoſe very poſitive additions of Goodneſſe, eternity, infinity, power, wiſdome, &c. are not additions of new beings, but onelyonly eſſential conditions of the ſame moſt ſimple being diſtinguiſhed by us in our underſtanding. For, becauſe our underſtanding receives nothing but by the ſences from the creatures; Therefore when it findes theſe ſeverall perfections in the creature, and acknowledges that no perfection can be in the effect, which is not more eminently and excellently in the cauſe thereof; it is compelled, as it received theſe perfections in the creature with differences, ſo alſo to referre them unto the Creator. So this difference or plurality of attributes in God, growes, firſt in regard of the weakeneſſe of our underſtanding; and ſecondly by that ſuperexcellency of the divine nature, whereby the underſtanding is ſo farre exceeded. Therefore although our underſtanding bee no way able to compare all theſe ſeverall perfections of goodneſſe, power, wiſdome, &c. together; and then to conceive them as one, but onelyonly in one: yet our undertakings how ever wandring, or unable to conceive them as one infinite being, can no way make any difference or otherneſſe in them, or put any thing to the purity and ſimplicity thereof; but muſt acknowledge the more pure the being is, the more powerfull; and therefore by one only action of that ſimplicity, and one manner of working, doth it bring forth moſt different and manifold effects, both of the object, and in the object or matier whereon it workes.
2. Secondly it may be objected, that the ſimplicity is more where there is no diſtinction, than where there is. But in the Godhead there is diſtinction of perſons. Therefore it may ſeeme his being is not moſt ſimple. I anſwer. That the diſtinction is not made in the nature or being of the Godhead, which thing only takes away ſimplicity; but only in the reall relations, in which the being is ſtill one and the ſame in all. And although the relations be truly and really diſtinct: yet that reall diſtinction, or diſtinct realitie is but only relative, and not bringing in any other being than is in the Godhead, underſtood without theſe relations, but only imports the order or manner of being.
3. Thirdly, it may bee objected, that every thing that is, muſt participate of being that it may bee, and of ſome other thing, that it may be ſomething, or a being in it ſelfe, diſtinct from other beings. So God by his being is; and by his greatneſſe, and power, He is infinite, and almighty. Therefore it may ſeeme, his being is not ſimple. I ſay the propoſition is true onelyonly in things that are by participation. But God is abſolutely of himſelfe, not by participation; and that abſolute and ſimple being of His, is of it ſelfe eſſentially infinite, and almighty, and not by participation, as was ſhewed, chap. 8. ante. in the anſwer, to the firſt objection.