A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 2 · Argument 2
Or more particularly for the present businesse:T. G. of Lots, ubi supra. A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, such as a man may lawfully either doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, such may a man lawfully put either to the will of another, or to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of any creature whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in game (or the vsing of it in any businesse, be it serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before) is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent, to wit, who shall ioyne or stand out, who shall lead or follow, who shall ouercome or yeeld to the other side, &c. which are matters meerely indifferent, such as may without sinne be either done or forborne, either done the one way or the other. The vse therefore of a Lot in such cases, and the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot, is not euill simply in it selfe.
The other shape of his Reason, more particularly I. B. Answer.as he saith, for the present businesse is this.
A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, such as a man may lawfully doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, such may a man lawfully put to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature, whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in Game is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent. Therefore the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot is not euill simply in it selfe.
T. G.
Mr. B. cannot (it seemeth) for his life relateT. G. Reply. any Argument of mine as he ought. For
1. Here in the Assumption he leaueth out that that ought not to hauehave beene omitted, to wit, of a Lot qualified and cautioned as before, without which mine Assumption were indeed very false.
2. He mangleth my Conclusion, leauing out the very principall part of it, to wit, Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, &c. that he might finde some matter of exception against it.
But his exceptions to it follow.
I. B.
What a trembling Argument is this?
T. G.
I see, a man must be very peremptorie that dealeth with Mr. B. or else he shall be nothing worth. But I shall desire him to pardon me, if I be not so peremptorie, as hee and some other are.
But wherein, thinke we, doth this trembling and timorousnesse discouer it selfe?
I. B.
In the Proposition he speaketh of a Lot in the former acception. In the Assumption, of a Lot in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creator himselfe.
T. G.
What trembling argued this, if I did so? as indeed I doe not. And Mr. Bs. eye-sight, it seemeth, failed him when he made this exception. For how can I in the Proposition take a Lot either in this or that acception, when there is no word at all of a Lot in it? as euen Mr. B. himselfe relateth it. In the Assumption I speake of a Lot as it is ordinarily taken, and as himselfe out of Lyra in effect defineth it, for aMr. B. Dialog.a variable euent (or a casuall rather) applied vntounto the deciding of some doubt, which that it hath any speciall relation to the Creator, more than any other ordinarie ciuill Actions hauehave, is denied.
I. B.
In the Proposition he affirmeth lawfulnes: but concludeth onelyonly, as not euill simply in themselues.
T. G.
These bforeign. Occidit miseros crambe repetita legentes. Iuven. sat. 7.twise sod Coleworts wee had more than once serued in before: nor deserue they any answer.
I. B.
Indeed the Conclusion is to follow the worse part. But in this Argument the Assumption is particular, and the Conclusion is generall.
T. G.
The Assumption is, But the vsing of a Lot in game, or in any other businesse serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before, is, &c. And the Conclusion, The vse therefore of a Lot in such cases is, &c. And where were Mr. Bs. wits (thinke we) then, when he writ this?
I. B.
What? Is Mr. G. afraid to put (The vsing of a Lot in game) into the Conclusion?
T. G.
Mr. G. is not afraid to put it in; for he doth it in effect. But Mr. B. (who with all faithfulnesse, if you will beleeue him, relateth Mr. Gs. Arguments) cutteth it out himselfe in the relating of it, and then asketh Mr. G. why he putteth it not in. If this be not childish, I know not what is. It is like the Papists dealing with vsus, that clip the tongue of antiquitie, and then aske vsus why we doe not or dare not alledge it.
I. B.
Is not the Minor to be the Subiect, and the Maior to be the Pradicate of the Conclusion? I will not question the figure of this pretended Argument, if Sub, prae, prima, will serue the turne. And though I finde it in no mood, yet will I answer the two fore-peeces thereof.
T. G.
That part of the Minor and Maior is to be so, I grant; and that I suppose Mr. B. meant. And that it is so in mine Argument would hauehave easily appeared, if Mr. B. had related the Conclusion aright.
The Argument thus standeth.
To put a matter of meere indifferencie to be done or not done to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of any creature whether it shall be done or left vndone, is lawfull.
But the vsing of a Lot in any businesse, be it serious or lusorious, so qualified and cautioned as before, is no other than the putting of a matter of such meere indifferencie to the hazard of the creatures vncertaine motion.
Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, be the businesse serious or lusorious, is not euill of it selfe, or, if Mr. B. will admit no other termes, is lawfull.
Thus is the Argument it selfe cleared against Mr. Bs. exceptions; let vsus heare his further Answer to the two fore-peeces of it.
I. B.
The former is not true, except Mr. G. vnderstand a matter of meere indifferencie controuerted. For though such a matter may be the Subiect matter of a Controuersie, yet a matter controuerted is the onelyonly subiect matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as Mr. G. truly writeth euen in this case, p. 167. If Mr. G. so vnderstand, then there it some necessitie of ending the Controuersie put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then meerely in the will of a man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it.
T. G.
That I say there is no Lot, where no Controuersie is, is vntrue. I say onelyonly, Where no question or Controuersie is. For a question may be where a Controuersie is not. Since that a Controuersie is properly cControversia, quando de re quapiam controvertitur, vel lis aliqua instituitur.a Question betweene two parties contending; and a Question therefore more large than it. But vnlesse some such controuersie be about the matter of indifferencie to be done or not done, my former fore-peece, saith Mr. B. it not true. If it be then, belike it is. What Mr. B. would say, I know not. What he doth say is this: To put a matter of indifferencie so to the hazard of an vncertaine euent, in a matter of controuersie is lawfull. But, To put it to hazard so out of matter of controuersie, it is not lawfull. The reason hee giueth why it is lawfull in the former, is because there is some necessitie then of ending the controuersie put to the determination of a Lot, and consequently it is not then meerely in the will of man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it. Where 1. Mr. B. is too busie with a Lot, when it is not at all in the Proposition. 2. He presumeth that wheresoeuer any Controuersie is, there cannot be but by Lot a determining of it. Which is so vntrue, as that the contrary rather is most true, that nothing may be decided by Lot, but that that may by other meanes also be decided. 3. Hee misinterpreteth my words when I say of a thing that may be done, as if they were meant of putting or not putting the matter in question to the hazardous euent, whereas my words are plaine of the doing or not doing the thing it selfe, which for the doing or not doing is referred to that hazard. But if in any case it be lawfull, that no way hurteth me.
The reason he rendreth why it is vnlawfull in the latter is, because such a matter vnlesse it be controuerted, cannot be the subiect matter of a Lot; which we hauehave nothing yet to doe withall. And the words therefore, as they are vntrue, nor doe I any where so say, so they are altogether impertinent to the present Proposition. Here is Mr. Bs. Argument: There can be no Lot where no Controuersie is. Therefore to put the question concerning a matter of indifferencie to the hazard of some casuall euent whether it shall be done or not done, vnlesse some controuersie be about it, is vnlawfull. Both the Antecedent is vntrue; and the Consequence vnsound. He might better hauehave said, Where no Controuersie is, no Lot can be: therefore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a casuall euent, as there is no Controuersie of. For it is friuolous for one to say, it is not lawfull for a man to doe that, which by his owne grounds and grants is impossible.
I. B.
In the other peece I obserue, that Mr. G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be vncertaine. Which is begging the question, for the reason giuen to his former shaped Argument.
T. G.
I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casuall, or as dDialog, ex Lyrano.Mr. B. himselfe speaketh, a various euent, vsed for the deciding of some doubt. The vsing, say I, of a Lot in game or otherwise where the thing questioned is such as may be done or left vndone, is the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent. Nor can any man that denieth not that definition, deny the truth of this proposition following necessarily from it.
I. B.
Neither is it true that if in game, a controuersie (truly so termed) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of meere indifferencie is put to hazard.
T. G.
Whether a controuersie in game be by Lot euer decided, though there be oft, is not by me here questioned, nor doth the strength of mine Argument depend thereupon. But that a matter of indifferencie is put to the hazard of a Lot in eueryevery Lot so qualified, as I had before required, must needs be, when eOf Lots, chap. 5. sect. 4.one of the Cautions there required is that the matter put to the hazard and decision of a Lot be a thing indifferent. Yet it is against common sense to say that the matters put to the hazard of a Lot in Game vsually, (as who shall be on this side and who on that, who shall hauehave the precedencie at Tables or Chesse, who shall hauehave these and who those cards to make his Game with, and the like) are not things meerely indifferent. If they be such, and there be controuersie there-about, then by Mr. Bs. owne grants, they may be put to the hazard of a various euent, that is in short, to a Lot, as himselfe defineth it. That they are such no man of reasonable vnderstanding will denie; nor that controuersie may be about them in Game. It is lawfull therefore by Mr. Bs. grounds to vse a Lot in Game about them.
I. B.
But more hereof in my third Reply. In meane while consider, whether this second shape be more particularly for the present businesse, so as to conclude the Question than the former.
T. G.
Indeed as Mr. B. had dismembred my Conclusion it was not: otherwise it is.
I. B.
And note, that in both these Shapes, onelyonly lightnesse and indifferencie of matters put to Lotterie are pressed as causes most iustifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped Arguments Proposition, be positiuely affirmeth, that we shall finde a Lot not fit to be vsed in a weighty affaire. If so, then weightinesse and necessitie of matters controuerted make Lotterie lesse lawfull, if not altogether vnlawfull. But of that also more in that Reply.
T. G.
Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightnesse of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the vse of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirme the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my margine may there shew; nor doe I nakedly affirme it, but adde something to strengthen it: And Mr. B. though he hauehave oft againe and againe carp…d at it, yet neither offreth he to refute it, nor taketh notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirme now further, what Mr. B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightinesse of the businesse, in regard of the euent, maketh Lotterie the lesse lawfull, nor to be condescended vntounto without very great necessitie, and to be vsed with far much more care and caution than were otherwise needfull in it. And I say therefore the lesse lawfull in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so vsing it, or in those that vrge the vse of it, when in such case it is condescended vntounto. The reason is euident. For if the matter to be decided by Lot be weighty in regard of the euent of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the Lot falleth. If it be of great moment which way the Lot falleth, then as it may proue well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconuenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconuenience, the weightier the thing is in regard of the euent. If it must needs then produce such inconuenience if it doe fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter vponupon hazard of such inconuenience. But to put the matter vponupon the hazard of a Lot, is to put it vponupon hazard of falling that way, since that the Lot may fall out either way, for ought they know that make vse of it, or else it is no Lot; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a Lot, is to put it vponupon hazard of much inconuenience. Which to doe (as some say of an Oath in some cases) fAut malum est, aut à malo. Matth. 5. 37. Non ait, qui amplus facit, malus est; vel siquid sit amplius malum est: sed quod amplius est à malo est. sed quaere cujus; & si non à malo jurantis, à malo est non credentis. i. à malo est, quando sine justa causa offertur, illius ultro qui offert: à malo est & quando exigitur, sed illius qui exigit. Aug. de verb. Ap. 28. A malo vel proprio vel alieno. Ianse…. concord. Euang. c. 40. Ex bominum vitijs oritur, quia simplicitatem non colunt. Calvin. harmon. Euang.it either is euill, or it is of euill; it is euill in the party himselfe that voluntarily doth it, it is from euill in others, when a man is vrged thereunto. But for the further confirmation hereof, I refer the Reader to gOf Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 6.that place, where I handle the Caution of Conuenience.
For matter of Indifferencie, I wonder that Mr. B. dare except against it: And I auow here confidently, without trembling and fearefulnesse, (which Mr. B. so oft layeth in my dish) that nothing but what is indifferent may lawfully be put vntounto the decision of a Lot. And I would know of Mr. B. whether he dare defend that any either necessarie dutie, or act euill in it selfe, may lawfully be put to the decision of a Lot, whether it shall be done or no. If he dare not iustifie the putting of either to the decision of a Lot, he must needs grant that indifferencie (which here he sticketh so much at) is a necessarie affection of such things as may lawfully be put thereunto. But of this at large hOf Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 5.in my first Caution; which Mr. B. ought to hauehave taken notice of, and to hauehave answered if he could.
For Necessitie, it is true, nor doe I denie it, but that it may make some Lotteries lawfull to some, that for them otherwise to condescend vntounto were vtterly vnlawfull. As necessitie to preuent a greater mischiefe, may make a man yeeld to giuegive his purse to a theefe, iAct. 27. 18, 19, 38. -Solet decidere jactu Navita cum ventis; imitatus Castora, qui se Eunuchum ipse sacit, cupiens evadere damno. Iuvenal. sat. 12.or to cast his wares into the sea, which otherwise he ought not to doe: So necessitie to preuent a far greater inconuenience may inforce a man to put the losing of that to the hazard of a Lot which he hath very good right to, and but for the auoiding of such grieuous inconuenience he might not lawfully depart with, or put the losse of it to the hazard of a Lot. Nor is the Lot therefore the more vnlawfull vntounto him either in regard of the Necessitie, or of the Inconuenience that thereupon may accrue, being yeelded to to redeeme a greater. And yet well may the Lot it selfe in some sense be said truly, to be in regard thereof the more vnlawfull, than if no such either necessitie inforced, or inconuenience accompanied it, because the vse of it is not wholly free from iniquitie on some side. And this, I hope, will suffice, for the present, to stay the mindes of any impartiall from entertaining a preiudice concerning my Iudgement deliuered in this point; (which Mr. B. is so oft snatching at, as if it were a most senslesse conceit, when indeed nothing is more euident, if it be well weighed) vntill the time come that Mr. B. will vouch safe to deale indeed with it, as kSed, Non semper feriet, quodcunque. minabitur arc…d Hor. art. poet. An, Threatned persons we say, liue long.he telleth vsus still and hath told vsus oft that he will.