A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 2 · Argument 2

A Just Defense of Certain Passages · Part 2 · Argument 2

p. 67The second Argument.

SEcondly, if we consider aright the natureT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 5. Argum. 2. of a Lot, and the great vncertaintie of it, we shall finde it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, and ccSors est incertissima qua res gra…es quaelibe… no possunt …. Baro …on. c. 1. Non li…et uti in causis jud…ialibus au… …, vel in obeu…is nego… ▪ js … ▪ …el bellicis. Ibid. Ne… imme itò notatꝰ a … Senato… Rom. quod … pridiè … d…ctā post…diè repud…asset. Suel. Tiber. c. 35.not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. In regard whereof, as those that make vse of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be materiall which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left vntounto it: so where it may be materiall and of some consequence whether it goe the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquitie of others may inforce a man vntounto; a lesse inconuenience is allowable for the auoiding of a greater;) there p. 68ddforeign. Plato de leg. lib. 6. Vise & quae supra c. 5. § 5, 6. foreign. Secr. apud. Xenoph. foreign.will no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the vncertaine hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vntounto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed.

Now I proceed to the second reason, which is setI. B. Answer. downe in two shapes.

The former is this:

That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vntounto. But the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot. Therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed.

The proposition he proueth thus. Great is the vncertaintie of a Lot. Therefore not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire.

The former Argument was propounded vnfaithfully; T. G. Reply.this both vnfaithfully and negligently. Vnfaithfully, because diuers enforcements of some branches are omitted, as by comparing mine and his may appeare: Negligently, because the proofe of the Assumption is here said to be the proofe of the Proposition. Otherwise I acknowledge it indeed to containe for the maine substance the matter of my principall Argument.

M^r. B^s. answer followeth.

I. B.

p. 69A Lot is taken sometimes for the instrument of purpose disposed vntounto Casualtie, as [The Lot is castProu. 16. 33. 1 Sam. 14. 41.Prov 16:331 Sam 14:41 into the Lap.] and sometime for the euent, as [GiueGive a perfect Lot.] Which howsoeuer it be casuall in relation to the former, yet falleth out certainly this or that, by Gods whole disposing the former. Prov. 16. 33.

I therefore denie both the Proposition and Assumption, perswaded that M^r. G. would neuer hauehave set downe this supposed reason, if a Lot in the former acception had not drawne his religious eye from God as the only disposer thereof to be a Lot in the latter acception.

T. G.

M^r. B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratiuely not for the casuall euent applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein vsed. But what is this at all to mine Argument, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense.

For his deniall he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembred well what he denied. He denieth both Proposition and Assumption.

The Proposition is this, as himselfe also propoundeth it, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vntounto▪ Will any man that hath common sense, beside M^r. B. denie this Proposition, or require a proofe of it? If any doe, I will for my part p. 70deale no more further with such an one, than aaContra principia negantem non est ulterius disputandum.with one that denieth principles.

The Assumption is this, The lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot.

This M^r. B. denieth too, and by denying it therefore, it seemeth his deniall is grounded vponupon his former distinction; which yet he seemeth to apply not to the Proposition it selfe denied, but to the antecedent of the proofe, to wit, that a Lot is a matter of great vncertaintie. To which he answereth, that a Lot in relation to the Creature vsed in it is casuall; in relation to Gods whole disposing the creature, Prou. 16. 33. (which place will come to be examined hereafter in his due place) is certaine. If his meaning be this, that it is vncertaine in regard of the Creature either vsing it or vsed in it, but certaine in regard of God in his prouidence disposing it, who either doubteth of the one, or denieth the other? or what is said more of a Lot herein than is true bbSee my Booke of Lots, Chap. 2. Sect. 7.of any contingent Act, whether casuall or other? But if his meaning be that God doth certainly euer dispose eueryevery Lot according to the nature of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the better part in a diuision vnequally made, shall goe with him that hath the better right the office in an election, with him that is fittest for it: or againe, so that in the same case it shall euer fall out the same still certainly, as if in diuiding of commodities bought in common, when for the parting of them the Lot hath beene cast once, and the one party shall remaine vnsatisfied, p. 71suspecting or pretending that some fraud was vsed in it, that vponupon the second or the third casting too, it shall still certainly goe the same way; If this I say, be his meaning, (as the one of these two it must needs be, or else it is nothing to the purpose) experience it selfe will soone confute him; and as to him therefore that denieth the fire to be hot, I will wish him onelyonly to thrust his finger into the flame, so to him that shall denie a Lot to be of vncertaine euent, I will wish him only to make triall of it.

I. B.

So that I maruell much, that he findeth a Lot to be not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. For why? Diuiding the Land of promise, Num. 26. 55. by Lot: discouering Achan, Iosh. 14. Chusing a King, 1 Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle, Act. 1. 26. were they not weighty affaires? Nay rather the premises considered, a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires.

T. G.

Leauing and passing wholly by the inforcements before spoken of brought for the strengthning of mine Antecedent, which hee should rather hauehave dealt withall; nor denying the Consequence, which ccforeign. Plato. Qui tacet, consentire videtur. Bonif. 8. in 6. de Reg. Iur. c. 43.he giueth therefore as granted; M^r. B. here contrary to all rules of dispute denieth the Consequent, or in plainer termes, the Conclusion of mine Enthymem or imperfect Syllogisme: And by another Enthymem grounded on foure instances, endeuoureth p. 70duplicate page p. 71duplicate page p. 72to proue the direct contrary to it. His Argument is this:

The diuision of the land of promise, the discouerie of Achan, the chusing of a King, and an Apostle, all done by Lot, were weighty affaires.

Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires, than about affaires of lesse weight.

For the Antecedent, I might well question one branch of it concerning the diuision of the Land of Promise by Lot, of which also I hauehave spoken ddOf Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 10. pag. 67, 68.else-where at large, and to auoid prolixitie referre thither my Reader. OnelyOnly thus much for the present. Whether that Lot were ordinarie and now imitable or no, may be questioned. If it were done with respect to a former prophecie, and with expectation that the seats of the seuerall Tribes should by vertue of the Lot fall out answerably thereunto, it was extraordinarie, and not imitable now of any without the like speciall ground. If it were done onelyonly to determine which share each Tribe should hauehave of the Land as equally as could be diuided; though the businesse it selfe, to wit, the diuiding of the Land was weighty, yet that which the Lot was to doe in this businesse was it selfe of no great weight; for it was not much materiall which part this or that Tribe had, when little difference was betweene part and part; yea the lesse difference there was, the lesse inequalitie there could be; the lesse inequalitie there could be, the lesse weighty it was p. 73how the Lot went; againe, the lesse danger of inequalitie, the lawfuller the Lot, and consequently the lesse weighty the euent, the lawfuller still the Lot. So that this instance either is of the same stampe with the other three, and must receiue then the same answer with them; or if it be of another kinde, yet it confirmeth not the consequent, because neither was that of much weight that the Lot was to doe therein, nor will it follow, A Lot was vsed once (yea say more than once) in a weighty affaire; therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires, than it may about those that are of lesse weight.

This premised for that branch of the Antecedent; I denie now M^r. B^s. not Consequent, but Consequence. And that for two causes: 1. Because though it were granted that the instances were to purpose, yet the Consequent will not necessarily flow from thence; In such three cases and vponupon such occasions a Lot was vsed in weightie affaires: therefore a Lot may more lawfully, &c. as before. All that will follow; all granted that M^r. B. himselfe requireth; is but this, Therefore in weighty affaires sometimes a Lot is not vnlawfull; or (for I had almost forgotten my selfe) the vse of a Lot is lawfull.

2. Because the instances are nothing to purpose, being of such Lots as were extraordinarie, and are not now imitable, as may appeare by M^r. B^s. owne grants in the very next words to these. The Question is about the lawfull vse p. 74of a Lot, that is, how and wherein we may lawfully vse Lots, & whether in such Lots as we may now lawfully vse, the lesse weighty the matter be, the lawfuller the Lot is. Now to disproue mine Affirmatiue herein, or to proue the contrary thereunto, M^r. B. produceth three Instances of Lots vsed in such cases, as none lawfully now may vse them in; in some whereof indeed, had not the Lot by an extraordinarie prouidence bin certainly directed, the euent was in hazard to hauehave beene of foule and fearefull consequence, either some innocent condemned, or some vnfit person designed to a place of the highest moment. That these examples are such, I hauehave shewed euidently **Of Lots, chap. 10. sect. 3. & 5.else-where, which M^r. B. ought to hauehave taken notice of. Nor will any wise man, I trow, be so absurd or senslesse, as to imagine, that to finde out a theefe or a murtherer, or the like, a Lot may now be vsed, or that in choise of a King, where the place is electiue, a Lot may be cast vponupon the bodie of the State without exception of any, as in Sauls case it was, for the setling of the succession, lest it should fall out as it did bbIoseph. capt. l. 4. c. 12.with the Iewes, when they cast Lots for an High-Priest, the Lot lighting vponupon ccforeign.a most silly ignorant Asse. So that to reason on this wise is all one, the very self-same, with this, Our Sauiour **Iohn 9. 6, 11.John 9:6John 9:11Christ opened ones eyes with clay, matter fitter to put out than to open a mans eyes. Therefore such matter as will rather put out than open a mans eye is fitter to be vsed in the like case than any other. Or, A Lot was sometime vsed by Gods p. 75speciall appointment in some weighty affaires wherein we may not now lawfully vse it: Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed of vsus in weighty affaires, than it may be in those that be of lesse weight.

But will you heare M^r. B. controlling himselfe, and ouerthrowing what he here buildeth? Read me but his next words.

I. B.

But indeed, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, a Lot may be vsed about it, prouided it be with Gods allowance. For want whereof both Diuinatorie and Lusorious Lots be equally vnlawfull.

T. G.

1. Had M^r. B. before put in as much as here he doth, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, he had neither wronged mine Argument, and hee might easily hauehave discouered much difference in this very point betweene the vse of a Lot, and the vse of an Oath.

2. Are all Diuinatorie Lots vnlawfull? then are all those three examples before alledged of Lots vntounto vsus at least wholly vnlawfull. For they were all Diuinatorie, ayming at the discouerie of that which no wit or skill of man was able by any meanes to reach to: and by M^r. B^s. owne ground and grant therefore not now allowable. As for lusorie Lots, sub iudice lis est; it is the Question, which M^r. B. too oft beggeth.