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A Just Defense of Certain Passages · Thomas Gataker

A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 3 · Argument 3

The third Argument.

WHatsoeuer God hath sanctified to a proper end, isI. B. Dialog. Arg. 3. not to be peruerted to a worse endzMath. 21. 12, 13..

But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end; viz. to end controuersies*Num. 26. 55. Prov. 18. 18..

Therefore man is not to peruert them to a worse; viz. to play, and by playing to get away another mans money, which without controuersie is his owne.

This Argument thus conceiued is faulty twoT. G. Answer. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 13. waies. For first it goeth from the question, which is not whether any Creature or ordinance of God may be peruerted, or peruersly vsed; but whether the vse of Lots questioned; be a peruerting of them or no; whereas in the conclusion it is taken for granted that it is. Neither againe is the question whether men may vse Lots playing for money; (a thing incident to other games as well as these; which whether it belawfull or no, I shall not need now to diseusse) much lesse, whether they may be vsed in game to that end, to get another mans money from him, or no; (which is no generall vse of them, nor hath any place at all there, where either there is no wagering at all, or where the Lot is vsed onelyonly at the beginning of the game, to decide who shall ioyne, who lead, or the like:) but whether Lots may in any wise be vsed in sport.

Secondly, there is more inferred in the conclusion than was in the premisses, and that which followeth not from ought in them. For the vse of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie, though a light one it is like, yet a question or controuersie truly so termed; otherwise it were no Lot.

For the mending of these faults, the Argument may better be conceiued on this manner:

That which God hath sanctified to some proper vse, is not to be applied to any other, especially a worse vse. But aTheir proper vse is to decide great controuersies. Perkins gold. chaine, chap. 20. on precep. 3.God hath sanctified Lots to this proper vse, to wit, the deciding of controuersies in matters of weight. A Lot therefore may not be applied to any other vse, much lesse to a worse.

The Proposition is proued by bMatth. 21. 12, 13. ex Esai. 56. 7. & Ier. 7. 11.an instance of the Temple, set apart for praier, which the Iewes therefore are reproued for applying to market and merchandise.

The Assumption is confirmed principally by that saying of Salomon, cProv. 18. 18.The Lot stinteth strife, and maketh partition among the mighty. For dNum. 26. 55.the other place is but an instance that a Lot once was by Gods owne appointment so vsed. It is amplified à simili, eThe proper end of a Lot, as of an Oath, is to end a controuersie. Balmford dial. ground 2.by the like vse of an Oath: concerning which there is a further speech of the Apostle brought fFennor of recreat. spec. rule 4. reas. 1.to proue that Salomons purpose in those words before alledged, is to shew the only lawfull vse of a Lot, (viz▪ to end controuersies, which otherwise conueniently cannot, when each Contender without the Lot is too mighty to yeeld) thus: gFennor ibid.As when the Apostle saith, hHebr. 6. 16.An Oath for confirmation among men is an end of all strife, his purpose is not so much to teach vsus, that men vse an Oath to end controuersies; (which eueryevery man knoweth) but that God hath dedicated and made an Oath holy and sure onelyonly for that vse of necessarie deciding of doubts-of importance among men: so the like words vsed of a Lot must be vnderstood in the same sense▪ not so much to teach vsus that a Lot ended such controuersies among men, which all know, but that God hath ordained it onelyonly for that vse.

For the fuller answer to this Argument and theibid. sect. 14. proofes of it, diuers distinctions, of some good vse, would be obserued.

First therefore the word, sanctifie, is diuersly taken. For to omit all other acceptions; it is taken sometime in a larger sense; and so to sanctifie signifieth to assigne a creature to any speciall or singular vse whatsoeuer, either sacred or ciuill: thus are iEsai. 13. 3.the Medians said by God to be sanctified for the subduing and sacking of Babel: and so are k1 Tim. 4. 4.meats said to be sanctified by Gods word for mans food; and l1 Cor. 7. 14.the vnbeleeuing Mate sanctified to the maried beleeuer▪

Sometime againe it is taken in a stricter sense; and so to sanctifie signifieth to set apart a Creature beside his ordinary vse to some sacred and spirituall imployment: as where it is said▪ that mGen. 2. 3.God sanctified the seuenth day of the world; and where nExod. 20. ….men are commanded to sanctifie the same: he by precept inioyning that imployment of it; they by practise imploying it according to his precept.

Now in both these kindes may the Lord well be said sometime to sanctifie, but not to appropriate; when by his ordinance he either inioyneth or granteth the vse of a Creature so in some kinde, as yet he restraineth not, nor inhibiteth the vse of it in any other kinde. Thus are the fruits of the earth so oGen. 1. 29.sanctified for mans food, as they are pEsai. 38. 21.not yet restrained from physicke: yea thus was the water that qNum. 20 10, 11.miraculously gushed out of the rocke so r1 Cor. 10. 4.sanctified to a spirituall imployment, as yet it was not denied vntounto ciuill and prophane vses, euen sNum. …0. …, 11.to the watering of brute beasts: sometime to sanctifie and to appropriate, when God sequestreth and seuereth the Creature so sanctified vntounto some one speciall or proper vse from all other vses else whatsoeuer.

And thus he sanctifieth and appropriateth either the whole kinde of the Creature; as tExod. 30. 31, 32, 33.that curious composition of pretious and holy ointment expresly inhibited to all other vses; or some particular onelyonly of that kinde; as uExod. 30. 23.the spices and odours ingredients of that holy ointment; as *Exod. 30. 26, 27, 28, 29. & 29. 44.the Tabernanacle, x1 King. 8. 10, 63, 64. & 9. 3.the Temple, and the appurtenances of either: and as those Elements of yMatth. 3. 11. Ephes. 5. 25. 1 Cor. 6. 11.water, z1 Cor. 10. 16.bread and †Matth. 26. 27, 28, 29.wine that in the Sacraments are sanctified to be signes and pledges of spirituall grace: and that againe, either so to continue during the date of that law, as in the vnguent before spoken of; or during the time onelyonly of the speciall vse to those ends, as in the Elements last mentioned.

To apply these distinctions then to the present Argument: If they take the word sanctifie in the stricter sense, the Proposition is true, but the Assumption is vnsound: for Lots are not set apart, or said so to be in either of the aProv. 18. 18. Num. 26. 55.places produced, to any holy or spirituall, but to a ciuill vse onelyonly.

If in the larger and more generall sense, then either they speake of things sanctified onelyonly but not appropriated, or of things both sanctified and appropriated too, and that either the whole kinde in generall, or some of the kinde only.

If of things sanctified onelyonly, but not appropriated, the Proposition is not true; For b1 Cor. 11. 23, to 28.bread and wine are sanctified to be seales of Gods couenant, and yet doth not that hinder cPsal. 104. 15.the lawfull vse of them otherwise: so was oyle sometime dLeuit. 21. 8, 10, 12. Psal. 89. 20. & 133. 2.sanctified to annoint *1 Sam. 10. 1. & 24. 7. & 26. 11. & 16. 13. 2 Sam. 2. 4. & 5. 3. 1 Kin. 1. 39. 2 King. 11, 12. & 23. 30.Kings and eLeuit. 8. 2, 10.Priests, and yet did not that then restraine fPsal. 104. 15. Eccles. 9. 8. Matth. 6. 17. Luke 10. 34.the ciuill vse of it for food, physicke, necessity or lawfull delight. Or to vse a more familiar instance and neerer the present purpose, gGen. 1. 29.the fruits of trees are sanctified to bee mans food; yet doth not that let but that children, as of old time they did, may lawfully play and make themselues pastime as well with hDa nuces pueris. Catul. epithal. Sparge, marite, nuces. Virg. Eclog. …. Iam tristis …cibus puer relictis. Martial. l. 5. ep. vlt. Et, Alex …rua nuces & non … videtur, Saepe tamen pueris abstulit illa nates. Idem l. 14. epig. 18. Quatuor in nucibꝰ non amplius al…ae tota est, Cum sibi suppositis additur vna tribus. Ouid. …. …. Aug. c. 83.nuts or iforeign ▪ Pollux l. 9. c. 7. In comment. Rabbin. iubetur pater familias die festo poma, nuces amygdalas, pueris▪ praebere. Casaub. ad Suet. Aug.almonds, as with cheri-stones, or with checkstones, and the like.

If of things sanctified and appropriated; as it was in that kExod 30. 31, 32, 33.holy ointment inhibited to all other vses; and as it is in the lRom. 4. …. Exod. …. 11.Sacraments sequestred and set apart to certaine spirituall purposes onelyonly, the Assumption is vnsound.

If of the sanctification and appropriation not of the whole kind, but of some particulars of the kind, the premisses might bee granted, and yet nothing concluded against the vse of Lots in generall.

If of the whole kinde, the Proposition is true, though the proofe be not so pertinent; but the Assumption is not sound.

For the proofe of it out of mProu. 18. 18.Salomon: that place sheweth onelyonly nSumma est singularem esse sortis vsum in componendis litibus. Cartwr. in Prou. c. 18.how a Lot may well and wisely be vsed; but neither inioyneth that vse of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. It approueth onelyonly the vse as good and commendable in that kinde: But it is one thing for a Lot to bee vsed well and wisely to that end; and another thing to hauehave that the proper or onelyonly end of it.

But oHebr. 6. 16.the Apostles speech of an Oath sheweth that Salomon meant so, when he vsed the like speech of a Lot.

It doth nothing lesse. For neither is it true that the Apostles scope was to shew that this is the only end of an oath, to stint strife and controuersie, neither is it so indeed.

His purpose is not to shew it: for pHebr. 6. 13, 16, 17, 18.it is only to shew how sacred, firme and inuiolable an Oath is among men from man to man; (which he proueth by that which all men know and acknowledge) and how much more then from God to man, when qIurat vobis per quem iuratis. Cassiod. Var. l. 8. ep. 3.he sweareth to vsus by whom we sweare: like the Argument vsed by the Apostle else-where, rGalat▪ 3. 15.A mans couenant or testament once ratified no man annulleth; much lesse can any annull or abrogate Gods.

Neither is that the only lawfull end of an Oath. For there be other ends of it; as, to giuegive assurance of the performance of couenants and promises. For what controuersie was there betweene Ionathan and Dauid to be ended by Oath, when s1 Sam. 20. 16, 17, 42.they sweare either to other? or what controuersie was there betweene God and Abraham, or Dauid and God; when tGen. 22. 16, 17. Heb. 6. 13, 14, 17, 18.God sware to Abraham, and uPsal. 119. 106. & 132. 2, 3.Dauid to God? or what controuersie is there to bee ended by those Oathes, that men vsually take at entrance into office both in Church and Common▪ weale?

The like may be said of that *Prou. 18. 18.other place of Salomon. The scope of the place is not to stint or restraine the vse of a Lot to the ending of strife, much lesse to the ending of great quarrels onelyonly; or among men of might alone, though Salomon expresly name such: For he speaketh of contentions in generall: And why may not a meane inheritance be diuided by Lot among meane men as well as a rich one among mighty men? Or doe not contentions arise among mighty men many times about meane matters? But the scope of it is rather xVise Lauat. &. Bain… in Prou. 18.to perswade all sorts of men to compose their controuersies, be they great or small, rather by such a course so easie and so equall, than to plunge themselues by eager pursuit of Law-suits into further inconueniences; and yCartwr. ibid.to induce men of meane condition the rather so to doe, when euen men of might are content oft to submit themselues thereunto.

Not to adde, that Lots hauehave beene vsed zIosh. 7. 14. Ion. 1. 7. 1 Sam. 14. 42. Leuit. 16. 8; 9.oft to other ends (for it is but one vse among many that is there mentioned) as both hath beene in part, and shall further hereafter be shewed, and as *Vsus particular is sortis litium diremptio. Valet porrò ad veritatem investigandam; ad concordiam ubi prius culta est alendam, &c. Cartwr. in Prou c. 18.some of them that in this point oppose vsus, confesse.

I would thanke Mr. G. for mending mine Argument,I. B. Reply. though there be not any great need, if he had not put into his Assumption these words [In matters of weight] for his owne purpose, as shall appeare.

What need there was both of mending it, and ofT. G. inserting those words, that it might conclude, and the conclusion might not be wholly impertinent, by mine Answer may appeare.

I. B.

But to the matter. In mine vnderstanding and meaning, the proposition doth sufficiently expresse all that which moueth Mr. G. to grant it.

T. G.

Yea and somewhat more too; for it beggeth the question in controuersie, and presumeth that that is to be proued; which the Conclusion following it must needs also hauehave done; as in mine Answer I shew.

I. B.

Well; then let vsus consider his Opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. G. imply a Lot not to be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not inioyned? What? Is Recreation (in generall) inioyned by precept, if not directly, yet (at least) by iust consequence? as Mr. G. in his allowance of lusorious Lots saith is granted by all, p. 138. And is not so vsefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end controuersies, inioyned by precept, either directly or by iust consequence? Doth God more carefully prouide for recreations, than for peace among his people? But Mr. G. is not so peremptory in another place, p. 135. where he saith: The vse of Lots is not simply commanded. For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept; and not so much a commandement, as an aduice and counsell. I will come to an issue. If it will please Mr. G. to set downe his iust consequence to proue Recreation inioyned by precept, I will vndertake to set downe as iust a consequence to proue, that a Lot to end a Controuersie is likewise inioyned by precept. In meane while, I cannot be perswaded, that our God of peace, who commandeth vsus to seeke peacePsal. 34. 14. and follow after it, and hath ordeined a Lot, wherein he is specially present by his immediate prouidence, to end controuersies, which otherwise cannot bee ended conueniently, doth leaue vsus at liberty in that case, to vse or not to vse a Lot.

T. G.

1. Mr. B. is somewhat like those Lawyers of whom Aristotle saith, that *foreign. Aristot. rhet. l. 1. c. 1.they would hauehave little to say, if they were held to the matter that they are to deale in. He taketh occasion here to run out into a by-matter, which though all were granted him is aforeign. Nihil ad rem ipsam.not a pin to the purpose. For the question is, whether Lots be not onelyonly sanctified, but appropriated so to the ending of Controuersies, that to no other purpose they may be vsed, and whether Salomons testimonie, Prou. 18. 18. proue as much. Now grant all that Mr. B. here pleadeth for, and that I deny not; That the vse of Lots is inioyned in some cases, such as hee last mentioneth, or, that it is inioyned by iust consequence out of the word, is this sufficient to proue that it is therefore to that vse onelyonly appropriated, or that this place of Salomon proueth the same? This I deny to follow; and (besides that reason it selfe euidently discouereth as much) Mr. B. himselfe bDialogue.elsewhere cutteth the very sinewes of his owne Argument, where hauing obiected that Bread and Wine are in the Sacrament to holy vses sanctified, and yet we may recreate our selues therewith; as also that singing of Psalmes is sanctified to the praise of Gods Name, and yet with singing also we may recreate our selues, he answereth that those ends be not proper, though they be holy. So that all this granted, yet is his Assumption, by his owne grant, as far from being proued as euer it was.

2. He chargeth me most vntruly to deny that the vse of a Lot for ending of any Controuersie is no where inioyned in the word, either expresly, or by iust consequence. I say onelyonly, that Salomon in that particular place questioned, neither inioyneth that vse of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. Which latter branch it is especially, that Mr. B. must oppose & disproue, if he will from thence hauehave any proofe. But this is like cVide Bellarm. praefat. ad Controvers. 2. & Apolog. Erasmi adv. articulos à monachia Hispanis sibi objectos. Sed & Aegid. Hunnium in Calv. Iudais. & Paraum in Calv. Orthod. praefat.the Argument that Bellarmine and some others vse to proue Caluin and Erasmus, Arrians, because they denie some places to be vnderstood of Christs Deity, out of which the same is supposed to be confirmed by others. Doth a man necessarily say, Such a thing cannot at all be proued out of Scripture; if he say, that Out of this or that place it cannot be proued? dScripturae docent non aequalem s…re gloriae modum in coelis. Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 25. §. 10.Caluin holdeth degrees of glory in heauen; and yet denieth that eDa…. 12. 3. 1 Cor. 15. 41. Vide Calv. cōment. in haec loca.some places affirme it, which are yet alledged commonly for the proofe of it. But whether either this or any other place of Scripture doe proue that the vse of Lots is inioyned for the ending of Controuersies, is nothing to the purpose, vnlesse it be proued also that they restraine it wholly thereunto.

3. A man if it were to the purpose, might well make question, whether the vse of Lots to end controuersies, be so necessary as recreation is. Since many an one hauehave liued quietly enough, and done well enough without vse of the one, which no man liuing can doe without the vse of the other.

4. Why doth Mr. B. offer to ioine issue hereupon here, where it is nothing to the purpose, and not rather accept of it before offred him, in the last of my Arguments, concerning other recreations, as Boules, Chesse, &c. generally iustified, and some other ciuill actions; but slily slincke by it there, as if no such matter had at all beene once mentioned? And I would gladly yet heare what proofe he would bring out of Gods word for recreation by Boules or Chesse, or for wearing band and cuffs, ruffs or falls, and the like. Here it needeth not: for I grant all he requireth; and doubt not but that in some speciall cases, though very few, a Lot is inioyned necessarily, & that by the word the same may be shewed. But Mr. B. is very forward indeed to proue that that is not denied: but that that is most denied, he still obtrudeth vponupon vsus without proofe, to wit, that God is in a Lot present by his immediate prouidence. For that commeth in also here againe. It is as the Crosse with the Papists; fCrucis signum in omnibus rebus adhibendum. Ex Pseud…-Dionysio & Martiale Steph. Durant. de rit. Eccles. l. 2. c. 36. In omni…ꝰ sacramentis Crucis signum adhibetur. Bellarm. de Imag. c. 29. Quod Lucian. de Rhetor. foreign.nothing can be done without it.

I. B.

But suppose the vse of a Lot be not (thus) inioyned; yet doth not Gods counsell (which me thinks is a commandement, though it be said of a mans counsell, that it is no commandement) sanctifie it to be vsed to end controuersies? This (I thinke) will not be denied.

T. G.

1. If it will not, as indeed it is not: why doth Mr. B. keepe such a coile about it; as if it were denied, when it is not. But thus Mr. B. as he saith of some, gforeign. Agatho apud Clem. strom. l. 5. & Athen. dipnos. l. 5. Observanda trajectio, ne lepos intercidat.loueth to be briefe in the maine point, and long (euen to tediousnesse) in by-matters.

2. Whether difference be or no betweene Gods counsels and commands, (the Apostle seeming h1 Cor. 7. 5, 6, 7, 25, 27, 28, 39, 40. De virginibus, inquit, praeceptum Domini non habe…. Cur? Quia & ipse ut esset virgo, non suit imperij sed propriae voluntatis. Hieron. ad Eust…ch. de custod. virgin. Coelibatum ut laudet, nihil audet praescribere; nemini necessitatem vult imponere; sed suam cuique libertatem relinquere. Coelibatum commendat, liberum tamen conjugium facit; ut quod nemini negari debeat. Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Coelibatus res est indifferens à Domino in lege nemini vel praecepta vel prohibita, sed tantum omnibus permissa. In istis verò rebus indifferentibus imperium quidem peremptorium jubens vel ve…ans, nullum; at consilium earū commoditatē vel incommoditatem ostendens, magnum & usum & locum habet. Morton. ibid.to allow some things, which yet he would not aduise, and not absolutely to inioyne some things, which yet he wisheth and aduiseth to) I stand not now to dispute. Sure I am, that he that aduiseth a man rather to diuide by Lot, than to waste himselfe at Law, doth not inioyne him thereby to diuide by Lot, but onelyonly to vse that course, or some other of like nature, (for it tieth him not to that particular) whereby a quiet end may be had.

3. But to what end should words be multiplied more about this, when as it is acknowledged, whether it be a counsell or a command, a permission or iniunction, it is sufficient to sanctifie Lots to that vse? So that Mr. B. need not hauehave strained himselfe to vtter herein an vntruth, and then dilate vponupon it with so many Rhetoricall amplifications, if he had not beene disposed iforeign. Homer. Iliad. v.to picke a quarrell without cause.

I. B.

But it is denied, That the vse of a Lot is restrained to end controuersies, much lesse great quarrels onelyonly; and duplicate page duplicate page sundry instances are giuen of vsing Lots to other ends than to end Controuersies. But all those Lots were extraordinary. Therefore whereas in the beginning of this Answer, where he would finde fault with mine Argument, he saith, That the vse of Lots in play is euer to determine some question or controuersie, though a light one (it is like) yet a question or controuersie truly so termed, otherwise it were no Lot. If he meane a Lot in generall, then (with his fauour) he forgetteth himselfe, in saying, Lots by him quoted were not to end controuersies. If he speake of a Lot in play, as being an ordinarie Lot, then he faileth in iudgement, In denying that the vse of ordinary Lots (whereof is the question) is restrained to end controuersies: and the instances which he giueth being extraordinary Lots, are not to the point.

T. G.

1. Let it be obserued, that Mr. B. hath neuer a word here to proue that that is denied. It is denied, as Mr. B. himselfe here confesseth, that that place, Prou. 18. 18. doth restraine the vse of Lots wholly to the ending of Controuersies, so that they may not in any other case be vsed with good allowance. For this in effect I cite some of those that seeme to concurre in opinion with Mr. B. at least in part, Mr. Cartwright by name: Nor is there ought either in the Text or about it, as I there plead, to inforce any such thing out of it. *Hoc est quod dici solet, foreign. Hyperides apud Suidam.All which Mr. B. sliding by, and not offering by any Argument to make good any such thing out of the Text; pitcheth at length vponupon some instances in the very taile of my discourse, giuen of Lots wherein no controuersie was to be ended.

His exceptions against them are two:

1. That they were all extraordinary Lots; which yet is more than of all he can make good. For how will he proue it to hauehave beene an extraordinary Lot, that was kLet it. 16. 8, 9.cast vponupon the scape goat? But suppose there could be no instance giuen of any Lot in Scripture vsed where no controuersie were. Would that proue that the place of Salomon restraineth it onelyonly to such? Nothing lesse: Nor doe I offer to hazard my cause thereupon. My maine Answer, which I relie vponupon is this, that out of the Text no such restraint can be proued or produced: Not to adde, say I afterward, that Lots hauehave beene vsed oft to other ends, &c. as some also that in this point oppose vsus, confesse. Besides that, it would be obserued, that Mr. B. who hath so oft offred to argue from extraordinary to ordinary Lots, yet can by no meanes here endure to heare of any such arguing. He shall doe well to remember that Rule giuen in both Lawes, lNon licet actori, quod reo licitum nō existit. Bonisac. in 60. de Regul. Iur. c. 32. Non debet actor… licere, quod reo non permittitur. Pandect. Reg. Iur. l 42. ex Vlpian. ad Sabin. lib. 26.What is not lawfull to the one party, neither is lawfull to the other. Though indeed neither doe I, as may appeare, frame any Argument at all out of it.

2. That by mine owne confession, if they be not to end controuersies they are no Lots at all. But he taketh my words, as I hauehave shewed formerly, a little too short. For I say not simply, controuersie, but, question or controuersie, as he himselfe here citeth me; the former whereof is a terme more generall than the latter, and easily salueth the seeming repugnancy.

I. B.

Besides the subiect matter of an extraordinary Lot, being by Gods speciall direction, if it be lawfull; there may haply be no present controuersie. Where as the subiect matter of an ordinary Lot being something questioned betweene man and man, there may be a great controuersie. I say, May be. For if it be well obserued, in an ordinary Lot there is not alwaies a present controuersie to be determined: But alwaies some question to be decided to preuent a controuersie. As may appeare by Mr. Gs. owne words, partly here, where he saith, [That there must be some question or controuersie, or else it is no Lot] but more euidently where he saith; that the Lot vsed by the Souldiers about Christ his garments, which he truly calleth a serious diuisorie Lot, was to preuent all contention and strife, p. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot also which was vsed about the Land of Promise, about which was no present controuersie. For God who would hauehave no controuersies, would hauehave such things remoued, which may cause or iustly occasion controuersies. Therefore m Christ expounding the Commandement, Thou shalt not kill, forbiddeth words of prouocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common controuersies, and the occasions thereof be, giueth direction in Prou. 18. 18.

Oh nQuod Passunus olim cuidam, teste Plin. ep. 6. l 7. Benè, benè: sed quo istud tam benè? Benè scripsisti, sed nihil ad causam pertin…ns. Hieron. ad Ioan. Hier.how plentifull Mr. B. can be where no proofe needeth! But oforeign. Greg. Naz. in Christi natal. & in Pasch. ex Homer. Iliad. foreign. Idem ad Eunom.keepe the horse, as they say, home to the hedge. That Lots may be vsed also for the preuenting of controuersies; (and that is more than the bare ending of them: for *Non potest videri habere des…sse, qui nunquam habuit. Reg. Iur. Civ. 208.a thing cannot be ended ere it be begun) Mr. B. hath at large shewed vsus. Though I know not by what Logick he can gather out of my words, that it must needs euer be either for the one or the other; because I say, it was for the one of them in the Lot cast vponupon Christs coat. But pforeign; Quid haec ad Bacchum?what is all this to the purpose? How doth all this proue a restraint of Lottery to the deciding onelyonly of some controuersie? which it may be Mr. B. hoped that this long discourse would hauehave put cleane out of his Readers head. That, he told you, was denied; and that, not onelyonly is not proued, but no assay of proofe made of it. For Mr. B. in the whole ensuing discourse giueth it cleane ouer, and spending many words about other by-matters leaueth his Argument to shift as well as it can for it selfe. qforeign. Aristot. rhet. l. 3. c. 14.It is the manner of those, saith the Heathen man, that maintaine a bad cause, that they desire to dwell rather on any thing than that that they should deale in.

I. B.

That which is said of an ordinary Lot, may iustly be also said of an Oath, that the vse of it is sanctified to end controuersies by present determination, or preuention. For, as it is true that Hebr. 6. 16. implieth, that Gods oath to man is more inuiolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof onelyonly Mr. G. taketh knowledge: so it is true, that Hebr. 6. 16. intimateth, That as an Oath, for confirmation, is among men an end of all strife: so Gods Oath for confirmation of his promise to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, question, or controuersie. Else these words [An end of strife] were to no purpose. But that they were to the purpose by me vnderstood, appeareth in the two next verses, where it is written, That God bound himselfe by oath, as to shew the stablenesse of his counsell, so that the heires of promise might hauehave strong consolation. So that Gods oath to Abraham tooke away doubting, questioning, and all strife that might be, not onelyonly in Abrahams minde, but also in the mindes of the heires of promise. Therefore an Oath doth not onelyonly and present contronersies, according to Mr. Gs. vnderstanding, but confirming a promise or couenant, doth also end a strife, though there be none present, when the Oath is giuen, to wit, by preuention.

T. G.

I wil notstand (lest I either seeme too contentious, or proue ouer-tedious) to frame such exceptions, as well I might, against diuers particulars of this discourse, built mainely vponupon a meere equiuocation: Nor to presse anew the Oaths taken vsually at entrance into office: OnelyOnly I demand, how all this proueth, that the Apostles purpose there is to limit the vse of an Oath, and to restraine it wholly to such an end. Which though it were also granted, as it neuer can be proued, yet it leaueth that place of the Prouerbs still as free as before. But Mr. B. hath forgotten, it seemeth, what he was to proue out of it.

I. B.

Now let vsus somewhat consider Mr. Gs. purpose in putting into the Assumption these words, [In matters of weight] Forsooth, by denying the same, to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. Because (as he saith, p. 130.) they best agree with the nature of Lots, that is, with vncertaine hazard.

T. G.

rforeign. Homer. Odyss. foreign.A Witty man, they say, can soone finde a fault, where none is. Why I put or required those words to be put into Mr. Bs. Assumption, I render a reason in his due place; to wit, because without them the Conclusion could not hauehave gone currant against a lusorie Lot. Now Mr. B. if any man can be so filly and senslesse as to beleeue him, telleth vsus, that I did it to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end, viz. to end controuersies; saith Mr. B. in generall. I wish him to put in, lest his Conclusion else against lusorious Lots come short, in weighty matters. Whether this be to make way for the bringing of them in, or the shutting of them out, let sforeign. Philostr. vit… Apollon.any iudge that hath but common sense onelyonly. He might as well hauehave said, that Mr. Perkins put in the word great for the same purpose, when in the place cited there in my margine, he saith, tPerkins gold. Chaine, chap. 20. on precept. 3.The proper vse of Lots is to decide great controuersies. But belike Mr. B. had no other way to hooke that in here, that he is now falling foule on.

I. B.

Surely if Mr. G. had acknowledged Gods speciall presence by his immediate prouidence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God to end controuersies, he would not hauehave so written, but deemed weighty matters best agreeing with the nature of a Lot.

T. G.

I beleeue Mr. B. that if I beleeued as he doth, (for I hope he thinketh as he writeth) I should beleeue otherwise than I doe. But these coleworts come so oft in still, that I feare there is the lesse sauour for them in this his tedious discourse, which yet he promised vsus should hauehave the more sauour in it for the length of it.

He must proue, he must proue this his immediate prouidence and imaginarie speciall presence, before he controll others either for not admitting of it, or not obseruing what would necessarily ensue vponupon it.

But why was he offended with me for putting that into his Assumption, that he himselfe, as appeareth here, would hauehave therein maintained?

I. B.

It is true, that a matter of lesse weight in it selfe, may be the subiect matter of a controuersie, as a controuer sie may be among men, as well meane, as mighty in their estate, as Mr. G. here saith, p. 137. For by mighty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. so) in Prou. 18. 18. are meant men strong in affections, so as the controuersie cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the subiect matter of the Controuersie be of more or lesse weight in it selfe, so as there is a necess…ie that one or both parties be satisfied. For otherwise there may be a great quarrell about a matter of lesse weight. Neither doe I say, that onelyonly great quarrels are to be ended, or preuented by a Lot, as Mr. G. denieth not, but some may. For (as he saith truly, p. 173.) God speaketh in Prou. 18. 18. of contentions in generall.

T. G.

1. Not to question the exposition of the word mighty here and Gen. 6. 4. (albeit the word be uforeign Gen. 6. 4. foreign Prov. 18. 18.not the same also in either) which yet I beleeue Mr. B. is not able to make good. All granted that is here said, how doth it hence appeare, that the vse of Lots is in that place of the Prouerbs restrained to such quarrels or controuersies, as Mr. B. here speaketh of? Or how appeareth it hence, that for some sinister end I put in those words?

2. If any Controuersies but weighty, may by a Lot be decided; how holdeth the comparison betweene a Lot and an Oath, both by himselfe, and by those that herein concurre with him, so oft vsed and vrged, for the excluding off from light matters the vse equally of either?

I. B.

Here then we may enter into further consideration of that which Mr. G. writeth, p. 135. to wit, That by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the onelyonly lawfull vse is condemned, and an vnlawfull vse is allowed in the roome thereof. What is that onelyonly vse of a Lot? I can finde none other than the putting of that to a Lot which he calleth, (p. 130.) A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, Such as is not materiall, whether a man doe or omit. Howsoeuer there may be a lawfull vse of a Lot about such a matter questioned, to determine, or preuent a Controuersie, yet I wonder that Mr. G. deemeth that onelyonly lawfull.

T. G.

Mr. B. is like children, that are willing rather to goe any whither than to come home. But it is our taske now to follow him; and to tread in his steps. What I there say therefore, I stand still vntounto. And I maruell as much at Mr. B. that he should once imagine that a man may safely put any other matter then is here specified, to the hazard of a Lot. For may a man put it to the hazard of … Lot, Non iussa quidem licitè vel admittantur vel omittantur: jussa verè non sine culpa negligantur, non sine …rinune contemnantur. Ber. de praecept. & dispens.whether he shall either omit some necessary duty, inioyned him of God, or commit ought that is naught and euill. If he may neither, of those there is nothing left for a Lot to deale but such things as are indifferent, and may consequently be either done or omitted.

I. B.

Doth he not grant p. 91. that Praier may be conceiued in weighty matters, as in the choise of a Magistrate, which is not a matter of meere indifferency, that is such as is not materiall whether it be done or omitted.

T. G.

And in the choise of a Magistrate, if there appeere a materiall difference betweene party and party, in regard whereof it may bee of consequence whether the one hauehave the office or the other, it is not lawfull to put it to the hazard of a Lot, vnlesse some far greater inconuenience enforce it. Which when it shall so doe; it may be lawfull to entreat God so to direct the Lot, that the mischiefe may not ensue; but yet there is no assurance (it is but as prayer for other temporall things) that the Lot shall be so directed. For whither the choise of a Magistrate be a matter of meere indifferency or no, is no whit to the purpose. It is not Magistracy it selfe that is put to the Lot, in such cases, whether men shall liue without it or no, but that presumed that Magistracy must be maintained, and Magistrates consequently designed, whether this man or that man shall hauehave the place, which i… they be both alike fit for, it is a thing indifferent, and not materiall at all, whether o… them hauehave it.

I. B.

Did God specially appoint Lots to be vsed about only matters of weight? and must man so farre swerue from Gods example as to striue onelyonly about matters of such indifferencie, and then to put onelyonly such controuerted to the determination of a Lot?

T. G.

Mr. Bs. Rhetoricke will not so carry it. What men may striue or not striue about is not now to bee discussed (and yet who dare condemne lusorie controuersies: or what strifes in themselues are more harmelesse than they are?) nor what one mans iniquitie may enforce another to put to the hazard of a Lot. But in all controuersies bee the matter in question of more or lesse weight, the more equality things are reduced vntounto on either side, the lesse materiall it is which way the Lot goeth; and the lesse materiall it is which way the Lot goeth, the lesse danger of wrong or inconuenience; and consequently the lawfuller the Lot. Let Mr. B. lay aside his Rhetoricall amplifications, and answer this Argument.

I. B.

So that I doubt not, but that with sound iudgement, and a cleare conscience not accusing me of not duly respecting the speciall prouidence of God by his immediate disposing of a Lot, I may affirme, That the more weightie the subiect matter of a controuersie is, the more iustifiable is the Controuersie: and be that matter of more or lesse weight, the greater the necessitie of ending a Controuersie is, the more iustifiable is the vse of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abusing of Gods ordinance?

T. G.

It is the manner of bad pleaders yProbationibus deficientibus fidem suam interponunt.when proofes faile them to fall to protesting. And it is reported to be the guise of your preaching Friers, when they know not how to confute our doctrine, to assure their hearers vponupon their saluation that it is herefie… Mr. B. methinkes should doe otherwise. I say nothing in this point without reason; which Mr. B. must refute, if he will hauehave me alter my iudgement. But if it may be had with protestations, Mr. B. will not misse of it. Which when he hath thus solemnly made, grounded still vponupon a false supposall, (which vnlesse you grant him, all is gone,) he then demandeth, Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abuse? Why so? what is the reason. Because Mr. B. is perswaded so as he saith. All This *Pali aura paleas non triticum ex area dispergit. Aug. de verb. Dom. 18.wind will shake but little corne, saue with such, if there be any, that hauehave pinned their faith vponupon Mr. Bs. sleeue, and must depend vponupon his perswasions. It is the property of zVeritas docend… suadet, non suadendo docet. Tertull. adv. Valent.truth, saith one, not to instruct by perswading, but by instructing to perswade.

I. B.

But, (saith Mr. G. glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot) The vse of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie truly so termed. If so, then he might hauehave called it a serious Lot according to his doctrine, the lightnesse of the subiect matter controuerted not withstanding.

T. G.

Mr. G. is not so glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot, as Mr. B. is aforeign. Greg. Naz. de pace ….glad to lay hold on any thing to be girding at Mr. G. what a silly toy hath he found here to cast in his dish, that if any question or controuersie be by a lusoricus Lot decided, it may be by Mr. Gs. doctrine termed a serious Lot. If you aske how; you may goe seeke. But suppose it were so, (as he cannot, I know, make good,) what then?

I. B.

But where about is that controuersie? Mr. G. in his written Answer to my Dialogue before mentioned saith; The controuersie tendeth to victorie, which till it be decided, there is a Controuersie, though a light one, yet a Controuersie truly so termed. But is that truly or worthily to be called a victory, which falleth out by haphazzard (according to Mr. Gs. esteeming a Lot) without any desert? But (say I) Is it not a tempting of God to put him by his immediate prouidence in disposing the Lot, to humour (I say not, honour) some of the vaine-glorious fooles with supposed victory, who make a pretended controuersie thereabout, whereas (before they entended so to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a controuersie truly so tearmed? I need say no more.

T. G.

No: you hauehave said, though not enough, because bforeign.nothing at all to the point, not one tittle to make your Argument good, or to proue the maine matter denied in it; yet a great deale cQuomodo ille, Fortuna multis dat nimis, nulli satis. Martial.too much; because so much cleane beside the matter. And here nothing but vnsauoury stuffe, vnworthy to be answered.

You tell here of Mr. Gs. writing, which you neuer returned any answer to. Why picke you this alone out of it, letting passe many other things in it of more moment still vnanswered?

But what is the fault here I maruell, that hath moued Mr. Bs. choler thus much? I say, forsooth there is in play a controuersie, and that it tendeth to victory. And is it not so in all games and sports ordinarily? Or doth not dforeign. Eustath. ad Il. foreign. ex Pausan. Lex. Attic. foreign. Pollux. l. 9. c. 7. foreign. Ibid. Vicissem velquinquaginta millia Aug. apud Sueton. c. 71. Aliquandò ut vineat, ludit assiduè aleam. Ibid. c. 70. Verū in rebus apertis argumentari tam sit stultū, quam in clarissimū Solē mortale lumen inferre. Quint inst. l. 5. c. 12common vse of speech confirme as much? matter of desert, I thinke, is not vsually much respected in play. Yet in those Games that Mr. B. condemneth there is eforeign. Sophocl. Palā. foreign. Hesych.vse of wit and Art to in managing what the Chance affordeth. I might adde that there is in Game question, and controuersie also, if with Mr. Bs. leaue I may so speake, whether of the two shall leade, and who shall ioyne either with other, either of which in some cases may well be termed a controuersie, though it tend not directly vntounto victory, and which by Lot also is and may be lawfully decided, for ought Mr. B. hath hitherto to the contrary discouered.

But what kinde of controuersie or victory soeuer it be, that is in Game and disport, must they needs all be stiled vaineglorious fooles, that in game striue, as we say, who shall beat either other. This fauoureth too much of supercilious (for I will not say superstitious) either Stoicisme or Pharisaisme.

But his reason hereof is worth all: for that is it that is all in all with Mr. B. which if you once debarre him of, fforeign. Lucian. Gallo.he is as mute as a Fish, and standeth stone still, as gAd incitas redact'. Plaut. Trin. 2. 4.one at his wits end. It is a tempting of God, by putting him to dispose the Lot by his immediate prouidence, and thereby to humour such vaine-glorious fooles. This is the hforeign. Prora & puppis. Cic. epist. sam. l. 16. ep. 24.head and foot of all, the perpetuall burden of Mr. Bs. song, which if you grant him, he is able to proue all that euer he would: but if it goe, iforeign. Philostr. in Hero. c.all is gone with it.