A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 3 · Argument 2
The second Argument.
WE are not to tempt the Almighty by a vaine desireI. B. Dialog. Arg. 2. of manifestation of his power and speciall prouidence.
But by vsing Lots in sport we doe so: therefore we may not vse Lots in sport.
T. G.
The Assumption they seeme to proue on thisT. G. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 6. wise.
oDan. de lud. al. c. 9. rat. 1.To call God to sit in iudgement where there is no necessitie so to doe, or for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mocke God:
But by the vse of Lots in sport, God is called to sit pTanquam rei gerend… extraordinarius modeŕator & arbiter. Dan. ibid.in iudgement where there is no necessitie, for the determining of trifles.
By the vse of Lots in sport therefore we tempt and dishonour God.
The Proposition is confirmed à simili, qEastie historie of Gosp. Reas. 5.by the King and Councell, by whose gouernment though we all liue, yet were it a dishonour to them to be called vponupon by children to determine their sports.
I. B.
The Assumption is proued à pari, by comparing I. B. Dialog. Ground 3.together a Lot and an Oath: A Lot in the nature thereof doth as necessarily suppose the prouidence and determining presence of God, as an Oath in the nature thereof doth suppose the testifying presence of God. yBalmf. ibid. & Zanch…ia miscell. ar. de sort. E…iamsi actu non invoces, tamen re…psa Deum invocas so…titus.Yea so, that as in an Oath, so in a Lot, z1 Sam. 14. 41.Praier is expressed or to be vnderstood. In which regard also as an Oath, so a aPerkins Cas. of Consc. lib. 3. cap. 4. §. 4. q. 2.Lot is an bRes sacra. Dan. lud. al. c. 9. rat. 1. Religi…sa. Iun. in Ion. c. 1.act of religion, in which we refer vntounto God the determining of such weighty things as can no other waies be determined: and therefore cPerkins ibid.in the vse of it is euer infolded, and sometime also expressed, both a confession that God is a soueraigne Iudge to determine such things, and dAct. 1. 24, 25, 26.a supplication to him that by the Lot, when it is cast, he will be pleased so to doe. A Lot, therefore, as an Oath, is not to be vsed but eVise sup. cap. 5. § 3.in case of necessitie and extremitie: and fPerkins ibid.being a solemne act of religion may not be applied to sporting: gEastie hist. of Gosp. Reas. 6.We may as well iest with the Word, and Sacraments, and Oaths, as with Lots.
There might be diuers seuerall Arguments framedT. G. Answer. out of these allegations; but because they build all on one ground, and stand vponupon one bottome, I hauehave thought best to put them in this manner together, that the same common answer might serue them all.
First therefore the vsing of Lots either in mattersibid. sect. 7. sage and serious, or of sport and delight is hIn Iudo taxillatorio iudicium divinum non requiritur, sed fortunae res cōmittitur. Thom. de sortib. c. 5. & Lyra in Prov. c. 16.not of it selfe any desire of the manifestation of Gods speciall power and prouidence by an immediate disposition, vnlesse men offend against the caution before giuen in doing it to this end, to try thereby whether God will vouchsafe to worke immediately and extraordinarily or no; which being not of the nature of the thing it selfe, is not necessarily implied in the ordinary vse of it. Neither is there any such calling in of God to decide doubts in game, but iIudice fortuna cadat alea. Petron. satyr. Fortuna sit optionis iudex, & sorte d…rimatur. Iustin. inst…t. l. 2. til. 20.the matter in question is put to the casuall disposition of the Creature; no more than there was any solemne calling of God in, or calling vponupon him to determine the Tithe, in the example before alledged out of kLevit. 27. 37.the Law. And therefore consequently lNon est … ne Deum tentare vide… mur. Martyr in 1 Sam. c. 10.no such tempting of God, as is here charged, in the vse of a Lot, be it vsed either in case of necessitie or otherwise.
Yea rather if a Lot be such, as here they say, it is not to be vsed in my businesse at all vponupon any occasion whatsoeuer. For, It is mDeut. 6. 16. Matth 47.not lawfull to tempt God nPraecepta negativa lig…nt semper & ad semper. Gerson. reg. mo…al.in any case whatsoeuer: But to vse Lots in any case whatsoeuer is to tempt God: It is not lawfull therefore to vse Lots in any case whatsoeuer.
The Assumption is thus proued euidently oEx con…essis.by the former grounds and grants: pExod. 17. 2. 7. Psal. 7…. 18, 19, 20.To require a worke of Gods immediate power and prouidence in this or that kinde, is to stint, and so to tempt God: But to vse a Lot in any case, is to require a worke of Gods immediate power and prouidence: (for eueryevery Lot, say they, is such:) Therefore to vse a Lot in any case whatsoeuer is vnlawfull.
But this Conclusion is vntrue: for qProv. 18. 18.a Lot in some cases may lawfully be vsed: the former ground therefore is false.
It is indeed *Nō permittit nos Deus voluntate suam per media extraordinaria investigare. … disq. mag. tom. 2. l 4. c. 4. q. 5. §. 2.vnlawfull and a tempting of God to vse a Lot so as they would hauehave it vsed only, to wit, requiring and expecting an extraordinary worke of God in it, in any case or vponupon any occasion whatsoeuer, without Gods expresse appointment of it, though all meanes should faile otherwise. For to hauehave recourse to extraordinary meanes when ordinary faile, is to tempt God by refusing to depend and wait vponupon God, as our Sauiour implieth, when rMath. 4. 3, 4, 2.at the Deuils motion he refused to sforeign, &c. sicut foreign 1 Reg. 2. 17. malè vulgò exponunt, Iube, impera, &c.speake to his Father to hauehave stones turned into bread, lest by so doing he should tempt God, though it were in case of extremitie: that which was *Exod. 17. 2, 3. Psal. 78. 41.the sinne of the Israelites sometime in the Wildernesse. No such Lot therefore at all as they allow of is allowable. And to speake as the truth is, by the course and force of this their discourse, the only lawfull vse of a Lot is disallowed and condemned, and an vnlawfull and vnwarrantable vse of it is allowed in the roome of it.Ibid. sect. 8.
Secondly, an Oath and a Lot are not alike: the comparison therefore laid betweene them will not hold. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot put to the speciall prouidence or immediate and extraordinary worke of God; as t2 Cor. 11. 31. Galat. 1. 20. Phil. 1. 8.the truth of the thing testified is in an oath put to his testimonie: neither is there in eueryevery Lot any such solemne inuocation of God, as there is in an Oath euer either u2 Cor. 1. 23.expressed or implied, by which God is called to witnesse with vsus the truth of that we auow, or the truth of our purpose to performe what we promise: as may hereby appeare.
The definition of each thing containeth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without this: but so cannot an Oath. Yea so *Balm. Dialog.some of the aduerse party define Lottery out of xLyra in Pr. c. 16.Lyra, To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull or vncertaine matter. Which definition of Lottery containeth no such matter as is here supposed to be of the very nature and essence of a Lot, as it is of the essence of an Oath; which cannot be defined therefore without it.
Neither doe the *1 Sam. 14. 41. Act. 1. 24, 25, 26.places produced proue it. They proue only that Prayer was sometime vsed (but mPrecatur, sed prorsus absque omni fide. Martyr in Sam. c. 14.a faithlesse prayer n1 Sam. 14. 41.the one of them without word or warrant) before an extraordinary Lot for an extraordinary power and prouidence to direct the euent of it; oAct. 1. 24.the thing intended being such as the Lot by no naturall power, either of the Creature vsing it, or vsed in it, was able to effect: which kinde of prayer hath no place, nor is lawfull in ordinarie or meere diuisory Lots. For example: pLevit. 27. 32.In assigning and setting out Tithe, it was not lawfull, much lesse necessarie, to pray God so to giuegive a right Lot, that eueryevery Lambe or Kid that were indeed in course of time the tenth, might certainely or constantly so come to hand. But they proue not that prayer is part of a Lot, or is in the Lot, as it is part of an Oath, and is included in the Oath, as by the vsuall qHoc est iurare, Deum testari. Aug. in Psal. 109 Deum testem adhibere Cic. Offic. l. 3. Quid est iurare, nisi nes veritatis Deo reddere. Aug. de verb. Ap. serm. 28. Iurare est testem adhibere Deum. Lomb sent. l. 3. d. 29. F. Deum in testem vocare. Thom. sum. par. 2…. 2ae. q. 89. a. 1. 4. & q. 98. a. 2. implorare testimonium Dei exhibendum. Ibid. q. 89 a. 1. Iuramentum est Dei attestatio ad veritatem sermonis nostri consirmandam. Calv. instit. l. 2. c. 8. §. 23. Invocatio Dei qua petimꝰ ut Deus sit testis de animo nostro quod fallere nolimus, & vt vindex fit si sefellerimus. Melan…h. loc. com. in definit. Iuratio itaque ad invocatione pertinet. Ibid. de 20 praecept.definitions of an Oath may appeare. In election of offices sacred or ciuill, prayer is vsed or at least ought to be vsed: yet it followeth not therefore that praier is a part of the choise, or that therefore the election in the nature of it doth necessarily suppose a speciall prouidence and determining presence of God. Yea prayer may be vsed both before game and in game, as both before and at meat, and yet is not therefore of the nature of game, nor supposeth therefore a speciall prouidence of God and a determining presence in it.
Lastly, a Lot is no religious act, nor holy thing of it selfe, as rChap. 6. §. 6.before hath beene shewen: there is much difference therefore betweene Lots, and the word of God, Sacraments, and Oaths. For these things are holy of themselues and in their owne nature, as the very definitions of them will soone shew: and therefore cannot but be holy. Whereas a Lot is not in the nature and the definition of it holy, and therefore is not alwaies and necessarily sacred. Yea those things are now holy, as euer, in our ordinary vse; whereas no Lot is holy that we can vse now adaies; nor indeed was euer any so, saue extraordinarily. But Gods taking of any thing sometime extraordinarily, or from ordinarie vse, to apply it to some holy and extraordinarie vse, doth not exempt the kinde in generall, but the thing only it selfe so vsed in speciall from ciuill or light and ordinarie vsage; and that also so long only as it is so set apart: As the vse of water in Baptisme hindreth not but that a man may play with water, yea and with that very water that may afterward be a Sacrament in Baptisme, or that hath so beene, but is not now. In like manner, when a Lot shall be extraordinarily vsed for a speciall signe of Gods immediate election and choise, whosoeuer shall then contemne or set light by that Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing and Gods name in so doing; but not whosoeuer shall vse otherwise any Lot to disport, yea though it were that Lot that had beene vsed in such a businesse before; there remaining no more holinesse in it after that vse is ouer, than in sExod. 3. 2, 5.the bush that burnt but wasted not, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, after that manifestation was once ended.
To this long Answer I might make a short Reply.I. B. Reply. For whereas Mr. Gs. maine ground i… this: There is no immediate prouidence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinary Lot, and thereupon he buildeth these Answers. Therefore there is no tempting of God by vsing Lots in sport. Therefore Praier expressed, or to be vnderstood, is (not) required in ordinary Lots: and Therefore an ordinarie Lot is not an holy thing in it selfe. I might (referring my selfe to the defence of my former Argument) briefly reply and say: There is an immediate prouidence of God in an ordinarie Lot: Therefore God is tempted by vsing Lots in sport: Therefore Praier expressed, or to be vnderstood, is required of them who vse an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinarie Lot is an holy thing.
Here that appeareth that I told you before, thatT. G. Reioinder. vnlesse you grant Mr. B. what he could not in the former Argument make good, all is gone. For here is nothing that will stand, vnlesse that be made good. So that by his owne acknowledgment nothing needed to be anew answered to this Argument, if sufficient Answer hauehave beene giuen to the former.
But Mr. G. hee saith vponupon such ground denieth all this.
1. Mr. G. need lay no ground at all for his deniall: It is enough for him barely to denie some Proposition, which vponupon his deniall Mr. B. is to proue.
2. Mr. G. doth not denie all this vponupon such ground as Mr. B. here pretendeth, because there is no immediat prouidence in any ordinary Lot; which he saith not; no more than that it is in eueryevery extraordinary one: for who can hinder God from working immediately when he will, either in that or in ought else? or who can enforce him to worke in such manner saue when he himselfe will? But because it cannot be proued that there is so ordinarily in ordinarie Lots, nor doth the nature of a Lot require that it should be. Yea because that ordinarily it is not, as hath already beene shewed.
3. I might demand of Mr. B. how the vse of a lusorious Lot can be a tempting of God, by desiring the manifestation of his speciall prouidence in his immediate disposing, if such an immediate prouidence of God be generally in all Lots. For what is it to tempt God, but to stint him to that, or to try him whether he will doe that, or no, which it is vncertaine whether he be willing vntounto or no? But if in all Lots such an immediate prouidence of God be, then it is certaine before hand that God will so worke in it. And if it be said, that God is not willing to hauehave lusorious Lots …ast; yet he is not vnwilling, if this ground be good, when they are cast so to worke in them: for who can enforce him to it, vnlesse he will? A man might reason therefore rather backward from Mr. Bs. grounds, and say, An immediate prouidence of God is in eueryevery Lot necessarily: And, Therefore it is no tempting of God to expect that of it, that cannot but be in it, to wit, a speciall prouidence in disposing the Lot without meanes.
I. B.
But something more in replying, will hauehave more sauour in reading.
T. G.
aVt enim aliae benae res, ita bonus liber melior est quisque, quo major. Et M. Tull…j oratio optima fertur esse quae maxima. Plin. epist. …0.True: if it be not so vnsauourie as some things before hauehave beene. bforeign. Callama. h. apud Ath…n. … s. l. 3. E…, foreign. Diogenian. in Pa…m.Otherwise the more and the longer, I suppose, the lesse sauour.
I. B.
Therefore I first maruell that Mr. G. forgetteth himselfe in concluding: That all Lots be vnlawfull, if there be an immediate prouidence in all Lots. What? Were extraordinary Lots vnlawfull too? Nay; he vnderstandeth an exception of them, because they were commanded by God. So I say, ordinary Lots were aduised by God to end controuersies. Therefore vsing them in that case is no tempting of God.
I. B.
Mr. B. might, if he pleased, easily hauehave seene what my Conclusion intendeth, not to determine ought concerning any such Lots as by Gods speciall appointment were sometime vsed with expectation of such a speciall and extraordinary prouidence in them, but of such only as may in these daies be lawfully vsed, which alone we now deale with. Betweene which two sorts there is much difference in the case now questioned. It being no tempting of God to expect such an extraordinary worke of his in the one, because without it that could not be certainly effected, for which he had inioyned them to be vsed. Whereas in the other it is; because neither the businesse whereunto they are vsed, requireth it, nor hath God himselfe any where promised it. So that it is not the want of either command or warrant for the vse of them, but the expecting or requiring that which there is no ground or promise of God for in the vse of them, that maketh them guilty in that kinde.
That which followeth therefore I auow still, and can easily make good; both that all extraordinarie Lots now vsed are vnlawfull, and no better than meere Soreeries; as the attempting by Lot to discouer a malefactor would be, which yet was lawfull when *Iosh. 7. 14, 15.God enioyned it.
And againe that to vse any Lots in that manner as Mr. B. prescribeth, to wit, with inuocation for and expectation of a speciall and immediate worke of Gods prouidence therein, or to put things to Lot vponupon presumption of such prouidence, is to tempt God, he hauing no where promised any such thing.
I. B.
I maruell also, why Mr. G. should so confidently affirme, that by this course, that is, by maintaining an immediate prouidence in all Lots, an vnlawfull vse of a Lot is allowed in the roome of the onelyonly lawfull vse.
T. G.
The reason is apparent, because such an vse is allowed, as is superstitious, and without warrant. Yea such as Mr. B. himselfe, I doubt not, but will condemne, if that position be vnsound, to wit, that such an immediate prouidence, as Mr. B. pretendeth, is ordinarily in Lots; which Mr. B. knowing that Mr. G. denieth: why should hee maruell that hee holdeth that, that doth necessarily follow vponupon the deniall of it?
I. B.
But I referre the discussing hereof to the defence of my third Argument.
T. G.
There then we shall deale further with it.
I. B.
Againe it is to be obserued, that he sets downe a Comparison betweene an Oath and a Lot, which I set not downe, whereby the minde of the Reader may be troubled. For I say not: As the truth of a thing is by an Oath put to Gods Testimony; so in an Ordinary Lot the right of a thing is put to Gods immediate prouidence. This is it that I say: As an Oath in the Nature thereof supposeth the testifying presence of God: so a Lot, in the Nature thereof, supposeth the determining presence of God. My reason is, Ending a Controuersie; I say not, Deciding a right: For before diuiding the land of promise by Lot, no Tribe, or family could challenge more right to one portion than to another. Ending (I say) a controuersie is by a Lot referred to Gods determining, the same by his whole or immediate disposing the vncertaine Lot to a certaine euent.
T. G.
I set downe no more as Mr. Bs. but what is his, and he himselfe in precise termes hath set downe before me. OnelyOnly I shew diuers differences, and those materiall betweene an Oath and a Lot, in regard whereof there is no sound reasoning from the one to the other. And among other things withall shew, that there is no necessitie of Gods determining presence in such manner as is here presumed in a Lot, because there is nothing in an ordinary Lot put vponupon Lottery, that requireth any such diuine determining presence.
But whereas Mr. B. here auerreth that no right of ought is in an ordinary Lot put to Question, because the vse of it is onelyonly to end Controuersie; the reason is most friuolous: For are not Controuersies most frequent about matter of Right? and many of them more impossible to be ended by any other course, than other Controuersies ordinarily are? And sure if there be such an immediate prouidence and a determining presence of God in them, as by Mr. B. is presumed, why should not questions of right, where they cannot well be determined otherwise, be referred to a Lot, as well, if not rather, than any other? Since also that that place in the Prouerbs speaketh of Controuersies in generall, without distinction or exclusion of any. For to reason, as Mr. B. heere from a particular to a generall, There was no question of right (though that also may be questioned by those that ranke that among extraordinary Lots) in the diuision of the land of Canaan; Therefore there is none in any: I say no more but that it is like Mr. Bs. reasoning oft else-where.
I. B.
It is also to be obserued that in the 2. Comparison betweene an Oath and a Lot, touching Praier, he saith, Neither is there in eueryevery Lot any such solemne inuocation. Therefore in some Lot, there is, that is, in an extraordinary Lot, because of an immediate prouidence to direct the euent of it. For the same cause (say I) praier to be expressed, or vnderstood in the vse of an ordinary Lot to.
T. G.
You see, if a man grant Mr. B. what he will, hee can proue what he list. Wee had this before in the briefe Answer at first: Why doth hee trouble his Reader now with it againe? But you see, he cannot goe on an inch vnlesse that be still granted; which will neuer be made good.
I. B.
But, saith Mr. G. Praier is of the essence of an Oath, and not of a Lot. I hauehave said nothing to the contrary. So that he might hauehave spared his definition of a Lot.
T. G.
But if he say nothing now to it, hee answereth not mine Argument; that therefore prayer is not necessarily in eueryevery Lot either expressed or implied. Wherein also because I spake somewhat short then, it being sufficient to giuegive the contradictory to Mr. Bs. assertion, I speake further home now and say, that it is not in any Lot at all; for it is one thing to be vsed about it, another thing to be in it. Prayer, and other discourse is vsed oft about or at our meales, but is not therefore in them.
I. B.
But because he taketh a Definition, (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The definition (so called) is from Lyra, viz. To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull, or vncertaine matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Euen by Gods whole or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination? And is not then Prayer to be expressed, or vnderstood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vsers thereof.
1. If that definition be but a sory one, why didT. G. Mr. B. giuegive no better? Or why doth he not shew wherein it is defectiue?
2. You see still, he must hauehave that granted him, which so oft hee inculcateth, or else nothing will fadge with him.
3. Hath not God an hand, and if an hand, I hope, a principall, because a ruling and ouer-ruling hand in all things. Must solemne prayer therefore be necessarily vsed before eueryevery thing, eueryevery step that a man strideth, or eueryevery chery that he eateth?
4. It is one thing to hauehave prayer vsed about a thing; an other thing to hauehave prayer necessarily vnderstood or implied in it.
5. By this silly reason it may be proued that any serious affaire about which solemne praier is to bee vsed, is of the same nature with an Oath.
I. B.
Now then let vsus consider the places produced to proue it. The former (saith Mr. G.) was faithlesse. I say so too. Because that Lot was without any warrant. This notwithstanding, praier in this and the other place, doth shew that Gods people beleeuing that God doth signifie his iudgement by the whole or immediate disposition of that Lot, did therefore thinke themselues bound to pray.
T. G.
What is all this to proue that in a Lot, as in an Oath, praier is euer vnderstood or implied. A man might as well reason thus; Our Sauiour aMatth. 14. 14. Luke 24. 30.more than once praied, before he brake bread: Therefore in all breaking of Bread praier euer is implied.
I need not adde, that in those being extraordinary, there was necessary cause to craue by prayer some speciall presence and prouidence, because Mr. B. himselfe in his next words obserueth it.
I. B.
But both their Lots were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate prouidence of God. Therefore they might well beleeue that they should pray. True: so all Christians may, yea and must beleeue, they ought to pray in the vsing ordinary Lots, because of Gods immediate prouidence exercised therein.
T. G.
True, if they will beleeue Mr. B. on his word: but not else: for out of Gods word, I am sure, he cannot make this good, which yet so oft he repeateth, and buildeth all vponupon.
I. B.
Nay; It was vnlawfull in setting out Tithe. If so; not because it was an ordinary Lot, (if a Lot) but because the Lord expresly saith, of all that goeth vnderunder the rod the tenth shall be holy.
T. G.
I no where deny that any Praier might hauehave beene vsed at that manner of assignement, but praier onelyonly to such particular purpose. Which yet if it had beene vsed, did not require ought against the tenths being holy, but that each tenth might come forth according to the due order of being yeaned.
I. B.
The instance of election of Offices is besides the purpose. For it is not argued thus: Because Gods people praied when they vsed a Lot; therefore there is an immediate prouidence of God in a Lot. But thus: There is an immediate prouidence of God in a Lot: Therefore Gods people praied when they vsed a Lot.
T. G.
Then belike it was produced to proue nothing at all that was to be proued. For the point to bee proued was not that Gods people praied at the vse of a Lot, but that that a Lot doth suppose the determining presence, or immediate prouidence of God. Which hereby also Mr. B. endeuoured to proue. But now Mr. B. it seemeth, taketh that for a thing granted; which is the point that he is to proue.
The instance is to the purpose; for it doth shew that Praier is not therefore implied in a Lot, as in an Oath, though it be vsed thereabout.
I. B.
If then there be an immediate prouidence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof praier is to be expressed or vnderstood in the lawfull vse of a Lot, then praying and playing (though they rime well together, yet) run not well together in the lawfull vse of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both, That a Lot is not to be vsed but in a case of necessitie more or lesse. And therefore strange (I will not say, absurd) is Mr. Gs. Position p. 111. to wit, The lesse weightie the matter is, wherein a Lot is vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be proued, that the lesse weightie the matter is, the greater is the necessitie of ending the controuersie by a Lot. The said Position is more strange, because he granteth p. 95. That Prayer specially applied to the Lot may (in some case) be conceiued, where the matter is more weightie, as in the choise of a Magistrate. But concerning this also more shall bee said in my next Reply.
T. G.
If a man grant Mr. B. his Ifs still, hee can proue any thing: else nothing. He said but euen now that he doth not here proue it, and yet presently vponupon it, he telleth vsus, If then it be so &c. as if it were heere proued to hand. But vnlesse that bee proued, all that followeth is iust nought. For nought and nought and nought maketh nought; as in Ciphering they vse to say.
Yet that praying & playing doe not at all runne well, I hope Mr. B. will not affirme. For albeit a man may not play with praier, yet hee may pray, I hope, before he play; yea and vponupon iust occasion too at his play.
That absurd Position, as Mr. B. here implieth it to be, hath beene sufficiently canuased already; and hath more truth in it, I beleeue, than Mr. B. is aware of. If ought further come against it, it shall in his due place be answered. That here alledged of Praier vsed with some Lot, no way crosseth it; nor doth Mr. B. shew wherein it any way doth.
I. B.
Lastly, It serueth my turne that Mr. G. acknowledgeth that Gods name, and an Holy thing is abused, whensoeuer an extraordinary Lot is contemned, because an immediate prouidence of God is therein. For the same cause an ordinarie Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and therefore not to be abused in sport. But Mr. G. hath shewen before, that a Lot is not in it selfe an Holy thing. Indeed; he would hauehave shewen in his third Reason, inducing him to allow lusorious Lots, as not euill in themselues, that a Lot is not holy either in it selfe, or by diuine institution. Whereunto I hauehave already answered somewhat. But hauing learned more (occasionally) by his further dispute, I will now for some more satisfaction, answer somewhat more. A Lot (saith Mr. G. p. 132, & 133.) is not holy either in it selfe, because a Casualtie hath no holinesse in it selfe: For then all Casualties should be holy: or by diuine institution in the word sanctifying it to some holy Vse.
I answer briefly. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an holy thing in it selfe, because of Gods immediate prouidence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in respect of the same prouidence? If it be, Then though all casualties be not holy in themselues, yet all lawfull Lots be holy in themselues. So that as the Bush that burnt and wasted not, was holy, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, p. 156. So a Lot is holy, because of Gods speciall presence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, because God was present in it but for a time: Where as a Lot is holy from time to time, so oft as it is lawfully vsed, because of Gods speciall presence therein from time to time. Therefore howsoeuer sport might hauehave beene made with the Bush, the presence of God being remoued; yet ought sport neuer be made with a Lot, because Gods speciall presence is euer therein.
T. G.
This should hauehave come before. Yet better at last, we say, than neuer. But aMirabar, inquit ille, si quid afferres novi. Ter. Phorm. 3. 2.what new matter hath Mr. B. here brought? Doth hee any more than bAt enim taedet iam eadem audire millies: dum eandē semper cantilenam canis. Ibid.abuse his Reader by singing ouer and ouer his wonted song, that in eueryevery lawfull Lot (it must be in eueryevery one lawfull or vnlawfull, if it be of the nature and essence of a Lot) there is an immediate prouidence: and if so, then that such and such things follow; that which no man doubteth of or denieth. I passe by, that he saith, I grant that eueryevery extraordinary Lot is Gods Name, and Gods Name abused in it, when it is contemned; whereas I hold many extraordinary Lots, as all Diuinatorie ones vsed now adaies, to be rather the Deuils Name; and Gods Name most honoured, when they are most, not contemned only, but detested too.
I. B.
Againe, I need not proue that an ordinary Lot to end controuersies is by diuine institution in the word, seeing Mr. G. granteth that God in Prou. 18. 18. aduiseth vsus to vse it to that end.
T. G.
What I grant, is to be seene. But by this Argument a man may as well proue, eueryevery peare-plum, or Lectise-leafe, to be holy, because cGen. 1. 29.by diuine institution in the word, all herbs and fruits are for mans vse. Mr. B. himselfe saw the slightnesse hereof: and addeth therefore to mend the matter:
I. B.
But it is not sanctified to an holy vse. I hauehave shewed otherwise.
T. G.
Where? Can you tell?
I. B.
But what then? Is not a Lot therefore alwaies holy in it selfe? as Mr. G. saith in this passage.
T. G.
I no where say, that a Lot is not alwaies holy in it selfe, (nor is any at all so) but onelyonly, that Lots are not alwaies sacred.
I. B.
Were all extraordinary Lots sanctified to holy vses?
T. G.
Yea: all that were vsed by Gods speciall direction, if Mr. B. speake of such, were sanctified to an holy vse, to wit, to be diuine Oracles. And what then?
I. B.
Yet Mr. G. deemeth them all holy in themselues, because of immediate prouidence in them.
T. G.
Rather: therefore he deemeth them sacred, and in that regard holy, though not holy otherwise of themselues.
I. B.
Why may not I for the same cause, thinke the same of all ordinary Lots?
T. G.
Proue the same, and then thinke the same of them. But this is nothing but dVersat Sisyphus ingens Saxum sudans nitendo; neque proficit hilum. Cic. Tuscul. l. 1.the rowling of Sisyphus his stone forward and backward: and taking still for granted *foreign.the maine Question it selfe.
I. B.
And the rather because Mr. G. saith, p. 227. Mariage being Gods ordinance is holy in it selfe. But (as he acknowledgeth, p. 1.) a Lot is Gods ordinance. Therefore from his grant a Lot is holy in it selfe. If then a Lot is holy in it selfe, I conclude with Mr. G. p. 133. It may in no case be made matter of sport.
T. G.
This belike is the new matter that M. B. had of late better learned, and which hee thought good therefore to close vp this his wilde and diffused discourse with; eforeign. Liban in Demosth. Quae excellunt ad perorandum serventur. Cic. de …rat. l. ….reseruing that that he thought would strike all dead to the last. But so sory and silly a thing it is, that I wonder a man of his grauitie, vnlesse he did it a little to recreate himselfe, would produce it. For what man of the meanest vnderstanding seeth not▪ that there is a meere equiuocation in the word holy: taken in the Proposition in a generall sense, as all Gods ordinances, recreation and meat (which in f1 Tim. 4. 4. Si… Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Coitus viri & mulieris res pura est, honesta, & sancta; quia Dei institutie.one of the places of Scripture there by me cited, is conioyned with it) as well as mariage, are said to be holy: but concluded in the strict sense here disputed of, as those things only are termed holy, that hauehave speciall relation vntounto God: which of Mariage, I suppose, vnlesse it be, as the Popish sort say, a Sacrament, Mr. B. will not auouch. What such poore shifts as these are argue, I had rather others should say than my selfe.
Let me adde but a word, to solue a seeming contradiction; (howsoeuer I say not in that place, that Mariage is holy in it selfe, which yet I well might;) that it is one thing to say, a thing is holy of it selfe, not requiring therefore any further speciall institution to make it such; and another thing to say, that it is holy in it selfe, in way of opposition to mans corrupt and euill vsage of it, that gTit. 1. 15. Hegg. 2. 13.may pollute and vnhallow that that is holy in it selfe.