The Arts of Logic and Rhetoric, Title page – To the reader
THE ARTES OF LOGIKE AND Rethorike, plainlie ſet foorth in the English tounge, eaſie to be learned and practiſed: togither vvith examples for the practiſe of the ſame for Methode, in the gouernement of the familie, preſcribed in the word of God: And for the whole in the reſolution or opening of certayne partes of Scripture, according to the ſame.
☞ IN THE SWEAT OF THY FACE, SHALT THOV EATE THE BRIAD. Gen. 3. 19.
1584
To the Christian Reader.
ALthough theſe Treatiſes follovvinge, were begunne and ended at the requeſt and for the benefite of ſome fewe which were deſirous of them, for whoſe cauſe they are alſo nowe come vnderunder the printe: though peraduenture not done (as they ſay in printe) yet becauſe it is not vnlikely, but by theſe meanes they will come into the handes of many, who will enquire vponupon what groundes I hauehave aduentured this thing, whiche to ſome will ſeeme ſtraunge and newe, yea vnprofitable and inexpedient, that they are made common to all which are wonte to ſit in the Doctors chayre: to other alſo (which wil neyther greatly miſlike the turning of them into our tounge, nor yet the folowing of the better ſorte in that arte, they will carrie notwithſtanding the ſame taſte, becauſe they will ſeeme newer then the neweſt:) I thought it neceſſarie to write theſe fewe following, if not to ſatisfie them, yet at the leaſt to incline them to a more moderate iudgement concerning my labours, then otherwiſe, the former coniectures will ſuffer them to come vntounto. There is in deede a thirde ſorte, which will looke for a defence of theſe artes in generall, being by them accuſed as vayne & vnprofitable. But becauſe their reaſonings are ſuch as are to be anſwered by keeping them in the darke and from the noyſe of ſounde oppoſitions, which will more hurte them and trouble the worlde, then any defence of good aunſwere, profite others. I will follow the example of many wiſe, nay the precept of Salomon, to confute them with ſilence. To come therefore vntounto the firſte ſorte, there can be nothing more fitte to ſatisfie them, then to ſhewe that that whiche they doo but floriſhe againſt vsus, will deadlie wounde their cauſe. Howe can they call that newe, the which hath teſtimonies of the wiſeſtes and auncienteſt of both ſortes. For to omitte the examples of theſe dayes, whiche hauehave alreadie brought all artes into Frenche, Dutch, and almoſt into Engliſhe, and that by the hande of the moſt cūningeſt workemen: What will they anſwere vntounto the knowledge and learning of the Egiptians, wherein Moſes excelled, before the Greeke or Romane tounges became generall? Were not their writinges, thinke they, in their owne tounge? yea after that, were not Salomons treatiſes & diſcourſes (whether written or vnwritten) both of naturall things, and of al that is done vnderunder the Sunne, and therefore of theſe thinges) were they not done in the moſt ancient and worthie tounge of the Hebrues? Nay euen their chief maiſters nowe, Plato and Aristotle, Tullie, and Quintilian, wrote they not in their owne tounges, and that euen when theſe artes were more ripe in the tongues of others? So that Tullie is fayne (as he him ſelf ſomewhere confeſſeth) to borrowe from the Grecians, and of others, it is manifeſt they did it frō the Egiptians and Hebrues.
Moreouer, the ende why theſe artes hauehave bin kept in theſe tounges, doeth not only propte, but alſo holde vp this our practiſe, ſeeing it was done becauſe theſe tounges being moſt generall by reaſon of the ſpread that the Grecian and Romane Empire had made of them, they were the fitteſt to bee made the ſtorehouſe of the worlde for theſe commodities. A ſtorehouſe I ſaye, not to keepe them for the Romanes and Grecians alone, or for the expert in theſe tounges their free denizons: but at the leaſt that by their traffike, it might with their gay ne of the praiſe and glorie, become common to euerie particular nation, that euerie one who had neede might buie of the ſame. Wherefore ſeeing the end was with their gayne the commoditie of all, let them not ſtill keepe in this corner to make it rare & exceſsiuely deere, leaſt the people curſe them: eſpeciallie nowe that the famine of prouiſion to diſcerne of ſo many ſtrifes and ſubtelties, to vnderſtande and iudge of ſo many Treatiſes as are written both to hurte and benefite the worlde, both in regarde of matters ciuill and diuine, humane and ſpirituall, doeth daylie crie and call for it. Let them take heede alſo of open iniuſtice, for ſeeing the common vſe and practiſe of all men in generall, both in reaſoning to the purpoſe, and in ſpeaking with ſome grace and elegancie, hath ſowen the ſeede of theſe artes, why ſhould not all reape where all hauehave ſowen? at leaſt, why ſhould not ſome of euerie ſorte gleane, though by their cunning they had purchaſed theſe artes, as corne fields proper to them ſelues? Vnleſſe the more excellent and neceſſarie their commodities bee (as couetous men) they will be the more vnmercifull and nigardlie. Neither let them obiect againſt vsus: A ſword in a fooles hand: for beſides that weapōs are not reſtrained & tyed only to maſters of fence, no… ſinging to muſitions only: the ſimple playnes of theſe treatiſes, which drawe men to no curiouſe or doubtful diſcourſes, but onelyonly put them in minde of that which they may eaſilie ſeeke and knowe in moſt familiar examples with great fruit and delight, ſhall ſufficientlie aunſwere for them ſelues in this behalfe: praying all men to vſe them with ſome ſtudie as their callings may ſuffer, to ſtrengthen their iudgement, to diſcerne of the ſayinges and writinges of other men, to keepe better that whiche they learne, and not beyond their gifte and callinge, to aduenture to a further vſe then they can reache vntounto. And thus much for the firſte ſorte.
Concerning the ſeconde I will not deale with eueryevery alteration and difference, for ſome are ſuch as I thinke the verie alteration conſidered with the common rules nowe receyued of the ſounder ſorte, to iudge by, will giuegive ſufficient defence: the other more doubtfull and ſtraunge, I will as brieflie and plainlie as I can mainteyne. Wherein if I go beyonde the capacitie or reach of the vnlearned, they are to be deſired either to ſtaye till they hauehave ſomewhat laboured in theſe artes, or elſe not to trouble thē ſelues at all with this diſcourſe, but leaue it to thoſe for whoſe ſatisfaction chieflie it is written. And here our labour ſhalbe for the Logike: for the other I ſuppoſe neede not this defence, as hauing fewe and light alterations. Cōcerning the definition of Logike I will not ſtriue whether well reaſoning, which is reaſoning accordinge to the arte, be conteyned in the generall of the definition, An arte or no, it is ſufficient for me that in my definition there is a true generall, an arte, and a true full difference, by which it differeth from all other artes: namely that it is of reaſoning. Nowe whether the proper ende be declared by the addition of well or no, I leaue it to thoſe who will diſpute of all the cauſes and not of the definition of Logike. For there is no reaſon why the ende of any thing ſhould come into the definition any more then the efficient cauſe, when as the difference is before full and ſufficient. In inuention that is moſt generall, which concerneth the diſtribution of an argumente, that I make it not Artificiall and inartificiall, but firste and ariſing of the firſte, and after deuide the latter into more artificiall, and leſſe artificiall. At which none neede greatly to maruell, ſeeing that reaſon whiche by arte appeareth the greater force of an other reaſon to the weaker force it hath in it ſelfe, and ſo reaſoneth more forcibly as doeth a teſtimonie, whoſe force the ſayde dependeth vponupon other argumentes, it muſt be both artificiall, and ariſe in part of another: but becauſe it hath neither his force in it ſelfe, nor ariſe perfectlie as a definition or diuiſion, but in parte onelyonly from other argumentes. It may for both cauſes be well iudged to be an Argumente, ariſing imoerfectly of the firſte, and ſo be called a leſſe artificiall ariſing of the firſte. The generall being touched, the difference in the cauſes aske the next place, where the referring of the ende vntounto the efficient cauſe, wilbe odiouſe: but if it be weighed that by this meanes, the trueth is preferred & the doctrine of the ende which is not commonly diſcerned from the effect and adioynte, is more cleared, the gayne wil eaſilie recompence the alteration of the place. For ſeeing it is a cauſe onelyonly as it bringeth ſome force to the verie beinge of the thing, and all the force it bringeth is to moue the efficient or making cauſe to worke, it followeth that in that reſpect onelyonly it is a cauſe. If it be ſayd, the end doeth not moue euerie efficient as the ende of naturall and artificiall thinges, as of the eye to ſee, the plūmet in a clok to force the next cauſes of the orderlie motion: the aunſwere is, they are deceyued, for as it regardeth theſe artificiall things, it is an effect of the doing of it, and an adiointe in regarde of the force wherewith it is done: and to theſe things it giueth or bringeth nothing, but receyueth and taketh all from them: but it is a cauſe onelyonly as it was ſet before the author of nature, or the artificer to moue him to make this thing apte to this effecte, or to hauehave theſe properties: ſo that my ſentence remayneth neceſſarilie true. Neither doo I ſee what other reſpect of a cauſe it can hauehave, for that which ſome ſpeake of the perfection it bringeth to the thing, is altogither vntrue, for all the perfection of the thing commeth from the efficient, and lyeth in the matter and forme as the cauſes of the thing and the adiointes, as the ornamentes of it: In which reſpect this perfection is cauſed, and doeth not cauſe. The next to this is that the diuiſion of conceyuing and begetting cauſe is left out, and iuſtlie. For when as there ought to be no diuiſion, but that which ariſeth of ſome difference of the partes betweene them ſelues, and of agreement with the whole, there being here no difference in the partes, becauſe the begetting cauſe is referred to procreation, as to his nexte effecte, and the conſeruing or preſeruing cauſe, as to his nexte effect to preſeruation: in which reſpects they remaine onelyonly ſimple as all others efficientes or making cauſes: it is to be inferred that they can make no diſtribution of the efficient cauſe.
The like is to be ſaide, of working by it ſelfe and by chaunce, whiche make no difference of working or cauſing: for although in ſuch the principall inſtrument had no ſuch ende or purpoſe, yet the chiefe worker GOD in his prouidence hath, beſides this putteth no differēce in that force which bringeth forth effect, b… only betweene the purpoſe of the chiefe worker of the action, god:Ephe. 1. 11. who worketh all things according to the counſell of his owne will, and the principall inſtrument who did it to another purpoſe. Next to theſe followe the difference in the diſagreeing argumentes, where this is one and the chiefe, that the diuiſions of Contraries are lefte out: Firſt into affirming and denying, whiche are no ſortes of contraries, but of the manner of vttering contraries, whiche as it falleth not into Logike to handle, ſo it is nothing to this purpoſe, becauſe the difference ariſeth not from any diſtinction of the contrarietie it ſelfe, whiche it ſhould doo, if they were diuerſe ſortes of contraries, but from the difference of expreſsing one and the ſame kinde. And this it yet more cleare in the eiuers ſortes of theſe: for relatiues are no contraries, becauſe the contrarietie lyeth in the deniall of the relation, not in the relation: neyther can it in that reſpecte be a newe ſorte of contrarietie, for when all the repugnancie lyeth in theſe two regardes, the one that being ſette as agreeing in the conſideration of reaſon to one, it muſte be diſagreeing & oppoſite in the ſame cōſideration one to another, as if it agree with Iacob to be Iſaaks father, it muſt diſagree with Iſaak to be ſo, this it hath from the generall nature of oppoſites, the other reſpecte being that one is ſet againſt one, that it hath from the generall rule of contrarietie, and further it repugneth not. If ſaye one it hath this proper that relatiues are here contrarie, the aunſwere is that bringeth no newe kinde of contrarietie, and if this be a iuſt cauſe of a diuiſion of contraries, you may diuide contraries agayne: ſome of cauſes, ſome of effectes, ſome of ſubiectes, and ſome of adiointes: ſeeing it maye be ſayde, theſe are cauſes whiche are contrarie, as it ſayde, theſe are relatiues which are contrarie.
The like almoſt may be ſayde of the priuatiues, which are contraries, whereof one is naturallie in the ſubiect as the habite, and the other diueth out or depriueth it of the habite: for what newe ſorte of contrarietie is here? Surely no other but that one is ſette againſt one, for the beeing naturally or not naturallie in the ſubiecte, belongeth not the Logiſion to conſider, but the ſeuerall Maiſter in his arte, as to the Phiſition that health is naturally in the bodye and howe, that ſickenes driueth that awaye, and howe: otherwiſe, why may we not make hurtfull contraries, whereof one is hurtfull to the ſubiecte, or profitable contraries, whereof one is profitable to the ſubiecte, as peace and warre to a common wealthe, Vice and vertue to the minder?
Nowe lette vsus conſider of thoſe others which they call contradictories, when one affirmeth, and the other denieth, as a man, not a man: iuſt, not iuſt. Concerninge theſe, when all the contrarietie (which they ſaye) is proper to them, lyeth eyther in the contradiction, it is, it is not: which is proper to iudgement, not to inuention, to ſette foorth, or that one thing is opponed to all other thinges which it is not: which is no contrarietie, but the oppoſition of diſperates, ſeeing one is not opponed to one kinde, but one to many kindes, and that equallie, as a man opponed to not a man, is equallie opponed to ſpirites, to fowles, fiſhes, beaſtes, vnſenſible creatures, &c. in the ſame not a man: wherefore it followeth, that eyther they muſt allowe my dooing, or elſe in the firſte bring in confuſion whyleſt they ſpeake of that parte in one parte of the arte, which is proper to the other, and in the ſeconde confuſion and follie both: whyleſt they make that a contrarie whiche is none, and without all gayne repeate that whiche they hauehave ſufficientlie handled before. Neyther lette any ſaye they are contrarie, becauſe their is no midle betweene man and not a man, for ſo there is not betweene man and other things, & yet they are not contrarie but diſperates only.
And thus much for the firſte argumentes.
The leauing out of Notation and Coniugation remayneth onelyonly to bee ſpoken of in Inuention, the reaſon whereof is manifeſt, becauſe it is graunted of all that they hauehave no newe force, beſides the firſte, no newe reaſon or argument, ariſing from the firſte: For he is iuſt, he doeth iustlie, theſe are co…ingates, referre them one vntounto an other, and what is their beſides the cauſe and the effecte? What force or reaſon more? For that iust and iustlie are formed one of an other, apperteyneth to Grammer, that they allude fitlie to the figure of Rethorike, called Poliptoton, which chaungeth finely the ende or caſe of wordes.
The like is to be ſayde of Notation, which is the interpretation of a name, which apperteyneth not to Logike but to Dictionaries: as in this, An argument is ſo called, becauſe it argueth, a faithefull man, becauſe he hath faith: what force of reaſon is there in the firſt example? of the cauſe and the effect. What in the other? of the effect and the cauſe. But is there nothing elſe? yes. A fitte and elegant vttering of diuers things by wordes, not much, but ſomewhat differing in ſounde, as argument, arguing, fayth, faythfull: but this is neither reaſon, nor newe force of reaſon; but onelyonly an elegancie of the Trope called Paranomaſia, or chaunge of the name. Wherefore let vsus keepe them no longer, nowe the honour claymeth them, but according to the lawe turne them home agayne. Thus much for inuention: As for the chaunge in a teſtimonie, I am contente to leaue it vntounto the iudgement of the reader, when hee ſhall examine it according to the rules of Logike: as alſo thoſe ſmall differences which are in the ſeconde parte of Logike, for in that ſometimes the firſte ſorte of a Sillogiſme is founde in all his partes, there is nowe no longer any reaſon to traſe him vppe onelyonly in an Enthimeme. And thus much for the ſatisfying of both theſe ſortes. Nowe, if they be not fullie contented, my deſire is of the former to beare with that, for the commoditie of others, whiche them ſelues like not. The other ſorte alſo I praye, to ſatisfie them ſelues in mending and bettering that which can not yet ſufficientlie pleaſe them. And ſo I committe thee to the direction of God his Spirite, whom I praye ſo to increaſe thy knowledge by all good and lawfull meanes, as thou mayeſt diſcerne things that differ, and walke without offence, vntill the day of the Lorde.
AMEN.